Aristotle on Eudaimonia
J.L. Ackrill
In Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics
University of California Press, 1980

"That the primary ingredients of eudaimonia are for the sake of eudaimonia is not incompatible with their being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia is constituted by activities that are ends in themselves." (ACKRILL, p. 19)

"[T]he idea of degrees of finality calls for elucidation. The explanation he gives introduces the idea of an objective that is indeed a final end, sought for its own sake, but is nevertheless also sought for the sake of something else. So the *most* final end is that never sought for the sake of anything else because it includes all final ends.... Such, Aristotle immediately continues, is eudaimonia." (ACKRILL, p. 23)

"The word eudaimonia has a force not at all like 'happiness,' 'comfort,' or 'pleasure,' but more like 'the best possible life'.... This is why there can be plenty of disagreement as to what form of life *is* eudaimonia, but no disagreement that eudaimonia is what we all want." (ACKRILL, p. 24)

"Comfort and prosperity may be goals to be secured by action, but eudaimonia is precisely *not* such a goal. It is doing well (eupraxia), not the result of doing well; a life, not the reward of a life." (ACKRILL, p. 24)

"The only proper conclusion of the ergon argument would be: 'if there are more than one virtue, then in accordance with all of them.' This is precisely how the conclusion is drawn in the Eudemian Ethics (1219a35-39): 'Since we saw that eudaimonia is something complete (teleion), and life is either complete or incomplete, and so also virtue - one being whole virtue, another a part - and the activity of what is incomplete is itself incomplete, eudaimonia must be the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue (kat' areten teleian).' The reference to whole and part makes clear that by 'complete virtue' here is meant all virtues." (ACKRILL, p. 27)

"This suggestion is confirmed by two later passages in Book 1, where Aristotle uses the term teleia arete and clearly is not referring to sophia (or any one particular virtue) but rather to comprehensive or complete virtue. The first of these passages (1.9.10) is explicitly taking up the conclusion of the ergon argument - 'there is required, *as we said*, both complete virtue (aretes teleias) and a complete life.' The second (1.13.1) equally obviously relies upon it: 'since eudaimonoia is an activity of soul in accordance with complete virtue (areten teleian), we must investigate virtue.'" (ACKRILL, pp. 28-29)

"[I]s it not paradoxical if practical wisdom, though inferior to sophia, 'is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing'? Aristotle's reply does not amount to the unnecessarily strong claim that *every* decision of practical wisdom, *every* correct judgment what to do, is determined by the single objective of promoting theoria.... To say this, that practical wisdom does not control sophia but makes it possible, is not to say that making it possible is the only thing that practical wisdom has to do." (ACKRILL, p. 30)

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