Posterior Analytics
Aristotle
tr. Jonathan Barnes

"That the deduction [sullogismos] must depend on necessities is evident from this too: if, when there is a demonstration, a man who has not got an account [me echon logon] of the reason why [apodeixis] does not have an understanding [episteme]." (74b26-28)

"When you have to prove something, you should assume what is predicated primitively of B. Let it be C; and let D be predicated similarly of this. And if you always proceed in this way no proposition and nothing belonging outside A will ever be assumed in the proof, but the middle term will always be thickened [πυκνοῦται], until they become indivisible and single. It is single when it becomes immediate." (84b31-37) [PSA: note the similarity to deliberation, in which you work your way closer and closer to identifying a particular action or commitment; cf. EN 1113a5-7 and BROADIE-1991, pp. 219-220.]

"[W]e seek the reason why up to this point, and it is then we think we know, when it is not the case that this either comes about or is because something else does; for the last term is in this way an end [τἐλος] and a limit [πἐρας]. E.g. with what aim did he come? So as to get the money - and that so as to give back what he owed; and that so as not to be dishonest. And going on in this way, when it is no longer because of something else or with some other aim, we say it is because of this as an end that he came (and that it is and that it came about) And that then we best know why he came." (85b27-34)

In I.33 Aristotle discusses differences between opinion, understanding [episteme], and comprehension [nous] with regard to the necessity of their objects. Although the entire chapter is of interest, his conclusion is most pertinent: "[I]t is is not possible to opine and to understand the same thing at the same time. For one would at the same time hold the belief that the same thing can be otherwise and cannot be otherwise, which is not possible. For in different men it is possible for there to be each of these attitudes with regard to the same thing, as has been said; but in the same man it is not possible even in this way." (89a37-b3)

"[I]n cases in which we know accidentally that a thing is, necessarily we have no hold on what it is; for we do not even know that it is, and to seek what it is without grasping that it is, is to seek nothing. But in the cases in which we grasp something, it is easier. Hence in so far as we grasp that it is, to that extent we also have some hold on what it is." (93a24-29)

"Since we think we understand when we know the explanation (αιτἰα), and there are four types of explanation (one, what it is to be a thing; one, that if certain things hold it is necessary that this does; another, what initiated the change; and fourth, the aim [το τινος ενεκα]); all these are proved through the middle term." (94a20-24) [PSA: this is an interesting description of the formal cause.]

"[W]e have said earlier that is it not possible to understand through demonstration [apodeixis] if we are not aware [μη γιγνὠσκοντι] of the primitive, immediate, principles." (99b20-22) ... "Necessarily, therefore, we have some capacity" [for such awareness] "and this evidently belongs to all animals; for they have a connate discriminatory capacity, which is called perception. And if perception is present in them, in some animals retention of the percept comes about, but in others it does not come about. Now for those in which it does not come about, there is no knowledge outside perceiving (either none at all, or none with regard to that of which ther eis no retention); but for some perceivers, it is possible to grasp it in their minds. And when many such things come about, then a difference comes about, so that some come to have an account [λὀγος] from the retention of such things, and others do not. So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for memories that are many in number form a single experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding - of skill if it deals with  how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case. Thus the states neither belong in us in a determinate form, nor come about from other states that are more cognitive; but they come about from perception - as in a battle when a rout occurs, if one man makes a stand another does and then another, until a position of strength is reached. And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.... Thus it is clear that it is necessary for us to become familiar with the primitives by induction [έπαγωγη]; for perception too instills the universal in this way." (99b33-100b5) [PSA: something similar likely happens during the process of enculturation.]

"All understanding [έπιστἠμη] involves an account [μετὰ λὀγου ἐστἰ]." (101b10) [PSA: cf meta logou in the ethics.]

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