De Caelo
Aristotle
tr. J.L. Stocks

"Since 'every' and 'all' and 'complete' do not differ from each other in respect of form, but only, if at all, in their matter and in that to which they are applied, body alone among magnitudes can be complete." (268a20-22) [PSA: does a similar observation apply to psyche?]

"It is clear then that there is neither place, nor void, nor time, outside [i.e., beyond] the heaven. Hence whatever is there, is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost motoin; they continue through their entire duration unalterable [analloiota] and unmodified [apathe], living the best [aristen] and most self-sufficient [autarkestaten] of lives. As a matter of fact, this word 'duration' [aion] possessed a divine significance for the ancients; for the fulfillment [telos] which includes the period of life of any creature, outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called its duration. On the same principle the fulfillment of the whole heaven, the fulfillment which includes all time and infinity, is duration - a name based upon the fact that it is always - being immortal and divine. From it derive the being and life which other things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy. So, too, in its discussion concerning the divine, popular philosophy often propounds the view that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and supreme, is necessarily unchangeable [ametableton]. This fact confirms what we have said. For there is nothing else stronger than it to move it - since that would be more divine - and it has no defect [phaulon] and lacks none of its proper excellences [kalon]. Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper [oikeion] place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal." (279a15-279b2) [PSA: note the ideal (human) qualities that are attributed to the divine, such as being steadfast, not easily changed, self-sufficient, fulfilled or completed, lacking in defects, excellent, and active.]

"The ancients gave to the gods the heaven or upper place, as being alone immortal; and our present argument testifies that it is indestructible [aphthartos] and ungenerated [agenetos]. Further, it is unaffected [apathes] by any mortal discomfort [thnetes duschereias], and, in addition, effortless [aponos]; for it needs no constraining necessity to keep it to its path, and prevent it from moving with some other movement more natural to itself. Such a constrained movement would necessarily involve effort - the more so, the more eternal it were - and would be inconsistent with perfection.... Nor, again, is it possible that it should persist eternally by the necessitation of a soul. For a soul could not live in such conditions painlessly [alupon] or happily [makarian], since the movement involves constraint, being imposed on the first body whose natural motion is different, and imposed continuously. It must therefore be uneasy [ascholon] and devoid of all rational satisfaction; for it could not even, like the soul of mortal animals, take recreation in the bodily relaxation of sleep." (284a11-34)

"Everything which has a function exists for its function [hekaston estin, hon estin ergon, heneka tou ergou]." (286a8-9) 

"We regard the zeal of one whose thirst after philosophy leads him to accept even slight indications where it is very difficult to see one's way, as a proof rather of modesty than of over-confidence." (291b25-29)

"We think of the stars as mere bodies, and as units with a serial order indeed but entirely inanimate; but we should rather conceive them as enjoying life and action. On this view the facts cease to appear surprising. For it is plausible that the best-conditioned of al things should have its good without action, that that which is nearest to it should achieve it by little and simple action, and that which is farther removed by a complexity of actions.... For on our earth it is man that has the greatest variety of actions - for there are many goods that man can secure; hence his actions are various and directed to ends beyond them - while the perfectly conditioned has no need of action, since it is itself the end, and action always requires two terms, end and means. The lower animals have less variety of action than man; and plants perhaps have little action and of one kind only. For either they have but one attainable good (as indeed man has), or, if several, each contributes directly to their ultimate good. One thing then has and enjoys the ultimate good, other things attain to it, one immediately by few steps, another by many, while yet another does not even attempt to secure it but is satisfied to reach a point not far removed from that consummation." (292a18-292b12)

"These thinkers seem to push their inquiries some way into the problem, but not so far as they might. It is what we are all inclined to do, to direct our inquiry not to the matter itself, but to the views of our opponents; for even when inquiring on one's own one pushes the inquiry only to the point at which one can no longer offer any opposition. Hence a good inquirer will be one who is ready in bringing forward the objections proper to the genus, and that he will be when he has gained an understanding of all the differences." (294b6-13)

"Things that we call natural are either substances or functions [erga] and attributes [pathe] of substances.... By attributes and functions I mean the movements of these [simple bodies, animals and their parts, etc.] and of all other things in which they have power in themselves to cause movement, and also their alterations and reciprocal transformations." (298a26-298b1)

"The most important differences of bodies are those of property [pathe], function [ergon], and power [dunamis]; for every natural body has, we maintain, its own functions, properties, and powers." (307b20-23)

"There is no reason why there should not be one or more intermediates between the contraries, as in the case of colour; for 'intermediate' [metaxu] and 'mean' [meson] are capable of more than one application." (312b1-2)

END