De Motu Animalium
Aristotle
tr. M.C. Nussbaum

"For all animals both impart movement and are moved for the sake of something, so that this is the limit [πέρας] to all their movement: the thing for-the-sake-of-which [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα]. Now we see that the movers of the animal are reasoning [διάνοια] and phantasia and choice [προαίρεσις = commitment] and wish [βούλησις = resolution] and appetite [ἐπιθυμία = need]. And all of these can be reduced to thought [νοῦς] and desire [ὄρεξις]. For both phantasia and sense-perception hold the same place as thought, since they are all concerned with making distinctions - though they differ from each other in ways we have discussed elsewhere. Wish [βούλησις] and spiritedness [θυμός = want] and appetite [ἐπιθυμία = need] are all desire [ὄρεξις], and choice [προαίρεσις] shares both in reasoning [διάνοια] and desire [ὄρεξις]. So that the first mover is the object of desire [τὸ ὀρεκτόν] and also of thought [διανοητόν]; not, however, every object of thought, but the end in the sphere of things that can be done [τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος]. So it is a good [ἀγαθόν] of this sort that imparts movement, not everything noble [πᾶν τὸ καλόν]. [PSA: cf. Metaphysics 1078a31ff] For insofar as something else is done for the sake of this, and insofar as it is an end of things that are for the sake of something else, thus far it imparts movement. And we must suppose that the apparent good [τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὀν] ranks as a good, and so does the pleasant (since it is an apparent good). So it is clear that the movement of the eternally moved by the eternal mover is in one respect similar to that of any animal, but in another respect dissimilar; hence the first is moved eternally, but the movement of animals has a limit. But the eternally noble [τὸ ἀΐδιον καλόν] and that which is truly and primarily good, and not good at one time but not at another, is too divine and too honorable [τιμιώτερον = glorious] to be relative to anything else [πρὸς ἔτερον]. The first mover, then, imparts movement without being moved, and desire and the faculty of desire impart movement while being themselves moved. But it is not necessary for the last [τελευταῖον] of the things that are moved to move anything. And from this it is obvious, too, that it is reasonable that movement from place to place is the last [τελευταία] of the movements in things subject to becoming. For the animal moves and progresses in virtue of desire or choice, when some alteration has taken place in accordance with sense-perception or phantasia [κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν φαντασίαν]. (700b15-701a6) [PSA: because τὸ καλόν is what's "truly and primarily good" and philosophy is "the knowledge of truth" (Metaphysics 993b20), it's clear that σοφία is especially concerned with τὸ καλόν whereas φρόνησις is especially concerned with τἀγαθόν.]

"But how does it happen that thinking [νοῦς] is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning [διάνοια] and making inferences [συλλογισμός] about unchanging objects. But in that case the end [τέλος] is a speculative proposition [θεώρημα] (for whenever one thinks the two premises, one thinks and puts together the conclusion), whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is the action [πρᾶξις]." (701a7-13)

"Now, that the action is the conclusion, is clear. And as for the premises of action, they are of two kinds - through the good and through the possible." (701a22-25) [PSA: see also Politics 1342b18, where τὸ πρέπον is listed as another premise of action]

"For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or phantasia or thought [νοῦς] towards the thing for-the-sake-of-which, he does at once what he desires. For the activity of desire [ὄρεξις] takes the place of questioning [ἐρωτήσεως] or thinking [νοήσεως]. "I have to drink," says appetite. "Here's drink," says sense-perception or phantasia or thought. At once he drinks. This, then, is the way that animals are impelled to move and act: the proximate reason for movement is desire, and this comes to be either through sense-perception or through phantasia and thought. With creatures that desire to act, it is sometimes from appetite or spiritedness and sometimes from wish that they make or act." (701a29-701b1)

"Alteration is caused by phantasiai and sense-perceptions and ideas. For sense-perceptions are at once a kind of alteration and phantasia and thinking have the power of the actual things." (701b16-19)

"Now the origin of motion is, as we have said, the object of pursuit or avoidance in the sphere of action. Of necessity thought and phantasia of these are accompanied by heating and chilling. For the painful is avoided and the pleasant pursued, and [the thought and phantasia of] the painful and the pleasant are nearly always accompanied by chilling and heating (although we do not notice this when it happens in a small part). This is clear from the passions. For feelings of confidence, fears, sexual excitement, and other bodily affections, painful and pleasant, are accompanied by heating or chilling, in some cases of a part, in others of the whole body. Memory and anticipation, using things of this kind as likenesses, are now to a lesser degree, now to a greater, responsible for the same things." (701b33-702a7)

"For the affections suitably prepare the organic parts, and desire the affections, and phantasia the desire; and phantasia comes about either through thought or through sense-perception." (702a17-19)

"According to the account that gives the reason [κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν λέγοντα τὴν αἰτίαν] for motion, desire is the middle, which imparts movement being moved." (703a4-6) [PSA: this is true both conceptually (in the form of the practical syllogism) and bodily; cf. 701a35]

"We have said what the part is in virtue of whose motion the soul imparts movement, and what the reason [αἰτία] is. We should consider the organization [συνεστάναι] of an animal to resemble that of a city well-governed by laws. For once order [τάξις] is established in a city, there is no need of a separate monarch to preside over every activity; each man does his own work as assigned [ὠς τέτακται], and one thing follows another because of habit [διὰ τὸ ἔθος]. In animals this same thing happens because of nature: specifically because each part of them, since they are so ordered [συστάντων], is naturally disposed to do its own task [ἔργον]. There is, then, no need of soul in each part: it is in some governing origin [ἀρχή] of the body, and other parts live because they are naturally attached, and do their tasks because of nature." (703b27-703b2)

END