Metaphysics
Aristotle
tr. Joe Sachs

"So the other animals live by images and memories, but have a small share of experience [ἐμπειρία], but the human race also lives by art and reasoning [τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς]. And for human beings, experience arises from memory, since many memories of the same thing bring to completion [ἀποτελοῦσιν] a capacity for one experience. Now experience seems to be almost the same thing as knowledge or art [ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη], but for human beings, knowledge and art result from experience, for experience makes art, as Polus says and says rightly, but inexperience makes chance. And art comes into being whenever, out of many conceptions from experience, one universal judgment [ὑπόληψις] arises about those that are similar." (980b25-981a7) [PSA: see also Post. An. 99b33-100b5]

"For the purposes of acting [πράττειν], experience doesn't seem to differ from art [τέχνη] at all, and we even see people with experience being more successful than those who have a rational account [λόγον ἐχόντων] without experience." (981a12-15)

"Nevertheless, we think that knowing [εἰδέναι] and understanding [ἐπαΐειν] are present in art more than is experience and we take possessors of arts to be wiser [σοφωτέρους] than people with experience, as though in every instance wisdom is more something from and following along [ἀκολουθοῦσαν] with knowing; and this is because the ones know the cause while the others do not. For people with experience know the what, but do not know the why, but the others are acquainted with the why and the cause. For this reason we also think the master craftsmen [ἀρχιτέκτονας] in each kind of work are more honorable [τιμιωτέρους = glorious] and know more than the manual laborers, and are also wiser, because they know the causes of the things they do, as though people are wiser not as a result of being skilled at action, but as a result of themselves having the reasoned account [κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν] and knowing the causes [τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν]. And in general, a sign of the one who knows and the one who does not is being able to teach, and for this reason we regard the art, more than the experience, to be knowledge [ἐπιστήμη], since the ones can, but the others cannot, teach." (981a24-981b10)

"But once more arts had been discovered, and some of them were directed toward necessities [πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα] but others toward a way of living [πρὸς διαγωγὴν], it is likely that such people as were discoverers of the latter kind were always considered wiser, because their knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] was not directed toward use [πρὸς χρῆσιν]." (981b17-20) [PSA: this implies that a way of life [διαγωγή] is concerned not with useful necessities but with beautiful superfluities]

"Now it has been said in the writings on ethics what the difference is among art [τέχνη], demonstrative knowledge [ἐπιστήμη], and the other things of a similar kind, but the purpose for which we are now making this argument is that all people assume that what is called wisdom [σοφία] is concerned with first causes and origins [τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς]. Therefore, as was said above, the person with experience seems wiser [σοφώτερος] than those who have any perception whatever, the artisan [τεχνίτης] wiser than those with experience, the master craftsman [ἀρχιτέκτων] wiser than the manual laborer, and the contemplative arts [θεωρητικαὶ] more so than the productive ones [ποιητικῶν]. It is apparent, then, that wisdom is a knowledge concerned with certain sources and causes." (981b25-982a3)

"[S]urely the skill that is suited to teach is the one that has more insight into causes [ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ], for those people teach who give an account of the causes [οἱ τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες] about each things." (982a28-30)

"[T]he most ruling [ἀρχικωτάτη] of the kinds of knowledge, or the one more ruling than what is subordinate to it, is the one that knows for what purpose each thing must be done [τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον]; and this is the good [τἀγαθὸν] of each thing, and in general the best thing in the whole of nature [τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ]. So from all the things that have been said, the name sought falls to the same kind of knowledge, for it must be a contemplation of the first sources and causes [πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν], since also the good, or that for the sake of which [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα], is one of the causes." (982b4-10) [PSA: here τὸ ἄριστον might be τὸ καλόν - see 1078a31ff and MA 700b25-26]

"[B]y way of wondering [θαυμάζειν], people both now and at first began to philosophize, wondering first about the strange things near at hand, then going forward little by little in this way and coming to impasses [διαπορήσαντες] about greater things, such as about the attributes of the moon and things pertaining to the sun and the stars and the coming into being of the whole. But someone who wonders and is at an impasse considers himself to be ignorant [ἀγνοεῖν] (for which reason the lover of myth [φιλόμυθος] is in a certain way philosophic, since a myth is composed of wonders). So if it was by fleeing ignorance that they philosophized, it is clear that by means of knowing [τὸ εἰδέναι] they were in pursuit of knowing [τὸ ἐπίστασθαι], and not for the sake of any kind of use [χρήσεώς]. And the following testifies to the same thing: for it was when just about all the necessities [τῶν ἀναγκαίων] were present, as well as things directed toward the greatest ease and recreation [πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν], that this kind of understanding [φρόνησις] began to be sought. It is clear then that we seek it for no other use at all, but just as that human being is free [ἐλεύθερος], we say, who has his being for his own sake and not for the sake of someone else [ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν], so also do we seek it as being the only one of the kinds of knowledge [τῶν ἐπιστημῶν] that is free, since it alone is for its own sake." (982b12-28) [PSA: here again Aristotle opposes the necessities / τἀναγκαῖα to a free and easy lifestyle / διαγωγή]

"For this reason one might justly regard the possession of it [i.e., philosophical φρόνησις] as not appropriate [νομίζοιτο] to humans. For in many ways human nature is slavish, so that, according to Simonides, "only a god should have this honor," but a man is not worthy of seeking anything but the kind of knowledge that fits him.... but one ought not to regard anything else as more honorable [τιμιωτέραν = glorious] than this knowledge. For the most divine is also the most honorable.... All kinds of knowledge, then, are more necessary than this one, but none is better [ἀμείνων]. It is necessary, however, for the possession of it to settle [καταστῆναι] for us in a certain way into the opposite of the strivings with which it began [τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζητήσεων]." (982b29-983a12)

"[O]ne must take hold of a knowledge of the causes that originate things (since that is when we say we know each thing, when we think we know its first cause), while the causes are meant in four ways, of which one is thinghood, or what it is for something to be (since the why leads back to the ultimate reasoned account [λόγος], and the first why is a cause and source), another is the material or underlying thing [τὸ ὑποκείμενον], a third is that from which the source of motion is, and the fourth is the cause opposite to that one, that for the sake of which or the good [τἀγαθόν] (since it is the completion [τέλος] of every coming-into-being and motion)...." (983a24-32) [PSA: it's not fully clear what Aristotle means when he says that that-for-the-sake-of-which is the opposite of that-from-which, but one possibility is this: that-for-the-sake-of-which is what an entity reaches out for or stretches toward [ὀρέγεται] in its activity.]

"[L]earning is by means of things all or some of which are already known, whether it is by means of demonstration [ἀπόδειξις] or by way of definitions [ὀρισμός] (for it is necessary that one already know and be familiar with those things out of which the definition is made), and likewise with learning by examples [ἐπαγωγή]." (992b30-34)

"[I]t is also right to call philosophy the knowledge of truth [ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας]. For the end [τέλος] of contemplative [θεωρητικῆς] knowledge is truth, but of practical knowledge [πρακτικῆς] it is action [ἔργον - here likely "the deed"]; for even if people devoted to the active life [οἱ πρακτικοί] do examine the way things are, they do not contemplate the cause in its own right, but in relation to [πρός] something now [νῦν = urgent]. But without the cause we do not know the truth, but each thing is what it is most of all, and more so than other things, if as a result of it the same name also belongs to those other things. (For example, fire is the hottest thing, since it is also responsible for the hotness of the other things.) Therefore also, what is responsible for the being-true of derivative things is more true than they are." (993b20-27) [PSA: here Aristotle hints that there is a certain urgency about necessities]

"[N]or can that for the sake of which go on to infinity - walking for the sake of health, this for the sake of happiness, happiness for the sake of something else, and for one thing to be the sake of another forever in this way...." (994a8-11)

"[O]ne thing comes out of another in two ways: either as a man comes into being out of a boy by his changing, or as air comes into being out of water. So the sense in which we say a man comes into being out of a boy is as what has become comes out of what is becoming, or what is complete out of what is being completed [ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτελουμένου τὸ τετελεσμένον]." (994a22-26) [PSA: this comment might shed light on the opposition between that-for-the-sake-of-which and that-from-which]

"And since that for the sake of which something *is* is an end, and this sort of thing is what is not for the sake of anything else, but they for the sake of it, then if there is any such last thing [ἔσχατον], there will not be an infinity, but if there is no such thing, there will be nothing for the sake of which it is. But those who make there be an infinite are unaware that they abolish the nature of the good. (Yet no one would make an effort to do anything if he were not going to come to a limit [πέρας].) And there would not be intelligence [νοῦς] among beings; for what has intelligence always acts for the sake of something, and this is a limit." (994b9-14)

"It is necessary, looking toward the knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] that is being sought after, for us first to go over those things about which one must first be at an impasse [ἀπορία]. And these are all those things about these topics that some people have conceived in different ways, as well as anything apart from these that they might happen to have overlooked. And it is profitable for those who want to get through something well to do a good job of going over the impasses. For the later ease of passage [εὐπορία] is an undoing [λύσις] of the things one was earlier at an impasse about, but it is not possible to untie [λύειν] a knot [δεσμός] one is ignorant of. But the impasse in our thinking reveals this about the thing [πράγμα], for by means of that by which one is at an impasse, one suffers in much the same way as people who are tied up [τοῖς δεδεμένοις], for in both cases it is impossible to go on forward. For this reason it is necessary to have looked at all the difficulties beforehand, both on these accounts and because those who inquire without first coming to an impasse are like people who are ignorant of which way they need to walk, and on top of these things, because one never knows whether one has found the thing sought or not. For the end [τέλος] is not apparent [δῆλον] to this one, but to one who has first been at an impasse it is clear." (995a24-995b1) [PSA: those who have not first come to an impasse and thus don't know what they're seeking could be compared to the idle talkers in EN II.4, because an impasse is experienced and not merely intellectual]

"[T]o many beings, not all the causes belong; for in what way is a source of motion possible in motionless things, or the nature of the good, if everything that is good in itself and through its own nature is an end, and a cause in the sense that for its sake other things come into being and are, and the end and that for the sake of which is an end for some action [πρᾶξις], while all actions include motion. Therefore among motionless things there could not be this kind of source [ἀρχή], not could there be any good-itself [αὐτοαγαθόν]." (996a21-29) [PSA: αὐτοαγαθόν could also be rendered as "self-good", which is not experienced by non-living entities since they don't have an inherent good in their life-activities.]

"[I]f there are a number of kinds of knowledge of the causes and a different one for a different source, which of these ought one to say is the one being sought, or who among those who have them is most of all a knower of the thing that is being sought? For it is possible for all the kinds of causes to belong to the same thing; for example, with a house, that from which the motion comes is the art or the builder, that for the sake of which is its work [ἔργον], the material is earth and stones, and the form is its articulation in speech [τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος ὁ λόγος]. From the distinctions made just now about what kind of knowledge is wisdom [σοφία], there is reason to apply the name to each one. For in the sense that it is the most ruling [ἀρχικωτάτη] and leading [ἡγεμονικωτάτη] and that, like slaves, it is not even fitting for the other kinds of knowledge to talk back to it, the knowledge of the end [τὸ τέλος] or the good [τἀγαθόν] (since the other things are for the sake of this), but in the sense that it was defined as being about the first causes and the most knowable thing, the knowledge of thinghood would be of that sort." (996b1-14)

"Being is meant in more than one way, but pointing toward one meaning and some one nature rather than ambiguously. And just as every healthful thing points toward health, one thing by protecting it, another by producing it, another by being a sign of health, and another because it is receptive of it, and always what is medical points toward the medical art (for one thing is called medical by having the medical art, another by being well suited to it, another by being an action belonging to the medical art, and we shall find other things spoken of in a similar way to these), so too is *being* meant in more than one way, but all of them pointing toward one source. For some things are called beings because they are independent things [οὐσίαι = entities], others because they are attributes of independent things, others because they are ways into thinghood, or destructions [φθοραὶ] or deprivations [στερήσεις] or qualities of thinghood, or are productive or generative of independent things, or of things spoken of in relation to independent things, or negations of any of these or of thinghood, on account of which we even say that nonbeing *is* nonbeing. So just as there is one kind of knowledge of all healthful things, this is similarly the case with the other things as well. For it is not only about things meant in one way that it belongs to one kind of knowledge to contemplate them, but also about things meant in ways that point toward one nature, for these too are in a certain manner meant in one way." (1003a33-1003b15) [PSA: a similar thought process can be applied to the good; specifically, all ways of ascribing goodness might point to a root sense of the good as energeia (cf BEERE p. 329)]

"[T]hose who engage in dialectic and the sophists slip into the same outward appearance as the philosopher. For sophistry is wisdom in appearance only [ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστί], while dialectic discourses about everything, and being is common to all things, so it is clear that they discourse about these topics just because they are proper [οἰκεῖα] to philosophy, for sophistry and dialectic turn themselves to the same class of things as philosophy, but it differs from one of them in the way its power is turned, and from the other in the choice of a way of life it makes [τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει]; dialectic is tentative about those things that philosophy seeks to know, and sophistry is a seeming [φαινομένη] without a being." (1004b17-26)

"[I]f contradictory things are all true of the same thing at the same time, it is obvious that all things will be one. For the same thing would be a battleship and a wall and a human being, if something admits of being affirmed or denied of everything, as it must be for those who repeat the saying of Protagoras. For if the human being seems to someone not to be a battleship, it is clear that he is not a battleship; and so he also is one, if the contradictory is true. And so the claim of Anaxagoras comes true, that all things are mixed together, so that nothing is truly any one thing. They seem, then, to be talking the indeterminate [τὸ ἀόριστον], and though supposing they are talking about what is, they are talking about what is not; for the indeterminate is that which has being potentially [δυνάμει] and not in full activity [ἐντελεχείᾳ]." (1007b18-29) [PSA: this passage is relevant to process of turning the indeterminate into the determinate when deliberating]

"But if everyone alike is both in the wrong and speaks the truth, it will not be possible for such a person to utter or say anything; for at the same time he says both these things and not these things. But if one conceives nothing, but alike believes and does not believe, how would he be in any different condition from plants? And from this most of all it is obvious that no one is in this condition, neither anyone else nor those stating this argument. For why does he walk to Megara and not sit still when he thinks he ought to walk? And why does he not march straight into a well in the morning, or straight over a cliff, if it happens that way, but why does he obviously take care, as though not believing that falling was both good and bad?" (1008b5-17) [PSA: here non-contradiction is not merely theoretical but practical; cf FLANNERY p. 59]

"We recognize everything on account of its form [κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπαντα γιγνώσκομεν]." (1010a25)

"Causes are meant in just as many ways, since all causes are sources. And what is common to all sources is to be the first [PSA: primary] thing from which something is or comes to be or is known; of these, some are present within while others are outside. For this reason nature is a source, as are elements, thinking [διάνοια], choice [προαίρεσις], thinghood, and that for the sake of which; for the good and the beautiful are sources of both the knowledge [γνωμή] and the motion of many things." (1013a16-23)

"And in still another it is meant as the end [τέλος]. This is that for the sake of which, as health is of walking around. Why is he walking around? We say 'in order to be healthy,' and in so saying think we have completely given the cause. Causes also are as many things as come between the mover of something else and the end, as, of health, fasting or purging [κάθαρσις] or drugs or instruments. For all these are for the sake of the end, but they differ from one another in that some are deeds [ἔργα] and others are tools." (1013a32-1013b3) [PSA: looked at the from the other direction, all of these things are πρὸς τὸ τέλος]

"For that-for-the-sake-of-which means to be the best thing [βέλτιστον] and the end of the other things [τέλος τῶν ἄλλων], and let it make no difference to say the good itself or the apparent good [διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν]." (1013b26-28)

"Nature is both the first material ... and the form [εἶδος] or thinghood, which is the completion of a thing's coming into being [τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως]." (1015a7-11)

"Necessary means that without which, as a contributing cause, it is not possible to live, as breathing and food are necessary to an animal, since without them it is impossible for them to be, and it means those things without which the good either could not be or could not come about, or the bad be cast off or avoided, as, say, drinking medicine is necessary in order not to be sick, or sailing to Aegina in order to get money. Also, it refers to what is compelled, or to force, and this is what constrains or prevents, contrary to impulse and choice [παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν], for what is forced is called necessary, and for this reason necessity is also painful, as Evenus says 'For every necessary thing is by nature annoying,' and force is a kind of necessity as Sophocles says 'But force made it necessary for me to do this'; and necessity seems to be something that cannot be changed by persuasion, and seems to rightly, for it is contrary to motion that results from choice [κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν] and from reasoning [κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν]. Further, we that that which is incapable of being otherwise to be as it is necessarily, and it is as a result of this necessity that all other necessities are in some way attributed; for what is forced means what is necessary to do or suffer whenever, on account of being forced, one is incapable of acting from impulse [PSA: or choice], as though this kind of necessity were one through which something could not be otherwise, and it is similar in the case of contributing causes of life or of the good. For whenever without something anything is incapable in one case of the good, or in the other case of life and being, these things ar necessary and this cause is a kind of necessity." (1015a20-1015b6)

"[A]mong lines, the shape of the circle is one [ἔν] most of all [μάλιστα], because it is whole [ὅλη] and complete [τέλειος]." (1016b16-17)

"But in another way, thinghood means that which is responsible for the being of a thing, and is a constituent [ἐνυπάρχον] in whatever things are of such a kind as not to be attributed to an underlying thing; an example is the soul of an animal." (1017b14-16)

"But it also means what it is for something to be, the articulation of which is a definition [οὗ ὁ λόγος ὁρισμός], and this is called the thinghood of each thing." (1017b21-23)

"Contraries mean things not capable of being present in the same thing at the same time, which differ in genus, or things in the same genus that differ most, or things in the same recipient that differ most, or things that come under the same capacity that differ most, or things whose difference is greatest either simply, or in a genus or species. The other things that are called contraries are so called either because of having such things, or because of being receptive of them, or because of being productive of or affected by them, or being losses or gains [ἀποβολαὶ ἢ λήψεις] or states of having or lacking them [ἕξεις ἢ στερήσεις]." (1018a25-34) [PSA: this description is relevant to any consideration of ἀρετή as a ἔξις]

"Again, things are said to be of-this-sort in relation to excellence [ἀρετή] and deficiency [κακία] or to the good [τἀγαθόν] and bad [τὸ κακόν] in general. So of-this-sort [τὸ ποιόν] could be meant in pretty much two ways, and of these one is the most authoritative [κυριώτατον]; for the primary sense of quality [ἡ ποιότης] is the specific difference of the thinghood ... while the other senses are the attributes of moving things as moving, and the specific differences of motions. Excellence and deficiency form one part among the attributes, since they reveal distinctions of motion and of being-at-work, as a consequence of which the things that are in motion act and are acted upon in a good [καλῶς = beautiful] or an indifferent [φαύλως = worthless] way; for being able to move and be at work in such-and-such a way is good [ἀγαθόν], while doing so in such-and-such a contrary way is deficient [μοχθηρόν]. But most of all, good [ἀγαθόν] and bad [κακόν] signify of what sort something is in the case of things with souls, and of these most of all among those that have choice [προαίρεσις]." (1020b12-25)

"Complete [τέλειον] means, in one sense, that of which it is impossible to find even one of its parts in any way outside it (as the complete time of each thing is that outside of which it is not possible to find any time which is part of that one), and also means that which has nothing of its kind exceeding it in excellent or rightness [κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ], as someone is called the complete doctor or the complete flutist when they lack nothing of the excellence appropriate to their kinds [κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς] (and by transferring this meaning to bad things, we speak of a perfect slanderer or a complete thief and therefore even call them good, a good thief or a good slanderer). And excellence is a certain completeness [ἡ ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις], for each thing is complete and every sort of thinghood is complete at the time when the form of its proper excellence [κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς] lacks no part of the fullness it has by nature [κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους]. And further, those things are said to be complete to which a good [σπουδαῖος] end [τέλος] belongs, since it is by having the end that they are complete, and so, since the end is one of the extremes, transferring the meaning, we speak of degenerate things [τὰ φαῦλα] as completely ruined [ἀπολωλέναι] or completely decayed [ἐφθάρθαι], when they lack nothing of ruin [τῆς φθορᾶς] and evil [τοῦ κακοῦ] but are at the extreme point of them. And for this reason even death is by a transference of meaning called an end, because both are extremes, and the end for the sake of which something *is* is an extreme. So things that are called complete in their own right are meant in that many ways, some by lacking nothing with respect to rightness [τὸ εὖ], having no superior, and there being nothing outside them, but others entirely on account of having no superior in their own kinds nor having anything outside them. The rest result directly from these kinds either by making something be that way, or having something of that sort, or being appropriate [ἁρμόττειν] to some such thing, or in some way or other being applied to the things that are called complete in the primary sense." (1021b12-1022a2)

"Limit [πέρας] means the extremity of each thing, the first thing outside of which there is nothing to find and the first thing inside of which everything is, which is also the form of a magnitude [μέγεθος] or of something that has magnitude; and it means the end of each thing (and of this sort is that toward which [ἐφ᾽ ὃ] its motion or action [πρᾶξις] tends, but not that from which it starts, though sometimes it is both and consists of that from which as well as that toward which), and that for the sake of which it is, and the thinghood of each thing, and what it is for each thing to be...." (1022a3-9) [PSA: this further clarifies the opposition between that-from-which and that-for-the-sake-of-which]

"[T]he soul is a part of the human being, and in it living [τὸ ζῆν] primarily resides." (1022a32)

"Disposition [διάθεσις] means an ordering [τάξις] of something that has parts, either in place or in power [κατὰ δύναμιν] or in kind [κατ᾽ εἶδος]; for it has to have some sort of position [θέσις], as the name disposition indicates." (1022b1-3)

"An active state [ἔξις] of something is meant in one sense as a certain being-at-work of the thing that has it and what it has, just as if it were a certain action [πρᾶξις] or motion.... But in another sense an active state means a disposition by which the thing disposed is in a good or bad condition [εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται], either in its own right [καθ᾽ αὑτὸ] or in relation to something else [πρὸς ἄλλο], in the way that health is an active state, since it is that sort of disposition. And it is also called an active state if there is a part of such a disposition, for which reason the excellence [ἀρετή] of the parts is also a certain active state." (1022b4-14) [PSA: the last clause is relevant to the excellence of the soul, since all the parts must have excellence in their own right [καθ᾽ αὑτὸ] in order for the entire soul to be in a good condition]

"The form is an end, and it is what has its end that is complete [τέλος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ μορφή, τέλειον δὲ τὸ ἔχον τέλος]." (1023a34)

"Also it ['part'] means the things into which a whole is divided or of which it is composed, the whole being either a form or the thing that has a form; for example, of a bronze sphere or a bronze cube, both the bronze (that is, the material in which the form is present) and the angle are parts. Also, it means the things that are in the articulation [ἐν τῷ λόγῳ] that reveals each thing, and these are called parts of the whole." (1023b19-24) [PSA: the term 'aspect' might sometimes be more appropriate than 'part']

"Some things, then, are called false in these ways, and a false human being is one who skillfully and deliberately [εὐχερὴς καὶ προαιρετικὸς] makes use of such statements, for no other reason but for its own sake, and who foists such statements onto other people, in the same way that we also said that things are false which produce a false appearance [φαντασία]. For this reason the argument in the Hippias goes wrong in saying that the same person is false and true. For it takes the one who is capable of deceiving as being false (and this is the one who knows and has understanding [ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος]), and further assumes that the one who willingly does low things [τὸν ἑκόντα φαῦλον] is better than one who does so unwillingly. But this takes something false out of a survey of examples, for the one who limps willingly is better off than the one who does so unwillingly if limping means imitating a limp, since if one is in fact willingly lame he is perhaps worse off, just as in the case of moral character, in this one too." (1025a1-13)

"And since the kind of knowledge that pertains to nature also happens to be about a particular class of beings (since it is about the sort of independent thing that has a source of motion and rest [κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως] in itself), it is clear that it is not concerned with action [πρακτική] or production [ποιητική] (for the source of things made is in the maker, either intelligence [νοῦς] or skill [τέχνη] or some power [δύναμις], and the source of actions is in the one who acts, and is choice [προαίρεσις], since an action and a choice are the same thing), and so, if all thinking tends toward action, production, or contemplation, the study of nature would be one of the contemplative kinds, but contemplative of the sort of being that is capable of being moved, and of the kind of thinghood which by its very meaning is for the most part not separate only. But it is necessary that what concerns what it is for something to be and its articulation [λόγος] in speech not be ignored, since inquiring without this is doing nothing at all. But among things that are defined and the kinds of what-it-is of things, some are like the snub and other like the concave. And these differ because the snub is conceived along with its material (since what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is without sensible material. So if all natural things are meant in a way similar to the snub, as for example nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, animal in general, leaf, root, bark, and plant in general (for the meaning of none of them leaves out motion [κίνησις = change], but they all have material), it is clear how one must look for and define what is it for natural things to be, and also why it belongs to the one who studies them to pay attention to some aspect of the soul, namely as much of it as is not without material." (1025b18-1026a6) [PSA: these insights are also relevant to εἶδος as way of being or way of life]

"Therefore there would be three sorts of contemplative philosophy, the mathematical, the natural, and the theological; for it is not hard to see that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in a nature of this kind, and that the most honorable [τιμιωτάτην = glorious] study must be about the most honorable class of things. The contemplative studies, then, are more worthy of choice [αἱρετώταται = preferable] than are the other kinds of knowledge, and this one is more worthy of choice than are the other contemplative studies." (1026a18-23)

"Now if there were no other independent thing besides the composite natural ones, the study of nature would be the primary kind of knowledge, but if there is some motionless [ἀκίνητος = unchanging] independent thing, the knowledge of this precedes it and is first philosophy, and it is universal in just that way, because it is first. And it belongs to this sort of philosophy to study being as being, both what it is and what belongs to it just by virtue of being." (1026a27-32)

"[I]t is clear that there is no knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of what is incidental, since all knowledge is of what is so always or for the most part - for how else will anyone learn or teach? For it is necessary to make something definite [ὡρίσθαι] by means of what it is always or for the most part." (1027a19-23) [PSA: these considerations apply just as well to character and action, and to converting the indeterminate to the determinate via deliberation]

"And this is the task [ἔργον]: just as, where actions [πράξεσι] are concerned, one's job is to make what is completely good [τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ] be good for each person out of the things that are good for each one, so too it is to make what is knowable by nature known to oneself out of the things that are more known to one. But the things that are known and primary to each person are often scarcely knowable, and have little or nothing of being; nevertheless one must try to come to know the things that are completely knowable out of the things that are poorly known but known to oneself, passing over, as was said, by means of these very things." (1029b5-12) [PSA: applying these principles to goodness yields insight into the process of becoming good; note also the protreptic aspects relevant to the dialectic progression of the argument in the ethical works]

"And natural comings-into-being are those of which the origin is from nature, and that out of which they come to be is what we call material, that by the action of which is any of the natural beings, and what they become is either a human being or a plant or anything else of that sort, which in fact we most of all say are independent things [οὐσίαι = entities] - and all things that come into being by either nature or art have material, for each of them is capable of being and not being, and this potentiality is the material in each - and in general, that out of which [ἐξ οὗ] they come is a nature and that toward which [καθ᾽ ὃ] they come to be is a nature (for the thing that comes into being, such as a plant or an animal, has a nature), and that by the action of which they come to be is the nature that is meant in the sense of the form and is the same in form as what comes into being (though it is in another, since a human being begets a human being)." (1032a15-25) [PSA: here again, "that toward which" is opposed to "that out of which"]

"All products result from art [τέχνη], or from an aptitude [δύναμις], or from thinking [διάνοια]. But some of these things come about also just on their own and by chance, in much the same way as happens among things that come into being as a result of nature; for there too, some of the same things that come into being from seeds are also produced without seeds. These must be looked into later, but it is from art that all those things come into being whose forms are in the soul (and by form I mean what it is for them to be, and their primary thinghood). For in a certain way, the same form belongs even to contrary things, since the thinghood of something lacking is the thinghood opposite to it, as health is of disease, for it is by the absence of health that there is disease, while health is a pattern [λόγος] and a knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] in the soul." (1032a27-1032b1) [PSA: similar insights apply to ἀρετή and other ἔξεις]

"[T]hat which produces, and from which the motion of healing takes its origin, if it comes about by art, is the form in the soul." (1032b21-23)

"[S]ince the soul of an animal (for this is the thinghood of an ensouled thing) is its thinghood as disclosed in speech [κατὰ τὸν λόγον], and its form, and what it is for a certain sort of body to be (at any rate, each part of it, if it is defined well [ὁρίζηται καλῶς], will not be defined without its activity [ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου], which will not belong to it without perception), either all or some of the parts of the soul are more primary than the whole animal as a composite [τὸ σύνολον], and similarly with each particular kind, but the body and its parts are derivative from the thinghood in this sense, and it is not the thinghood but the composite whole that divides up into these as into material." (1035b14-22) [PSA: applying this argument to human beings yields the fact that νοῦς is more primary than the other aspects of the soul]

"[A] part belongs either to the form (and by form I mean what it is for something to be [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι = identity]) or to the composite of material and form, or to the material itself. But the parts of a thing's articulation [λόγος] belong only to the form, and the articulation is of the universal." (1035b31-1036a1)

"One might reasonably be confused about what sort of things are parts of the form, and what sort are parts not of that but of the all-inclusive composite. And yet so long as this is not clear, it is not possible to define [ὁρίσασθαι] any particular thing, since the definition [ὁ ὁρισμός] is of the universal and the form; so if it is not clear what sort of parts are present in the manner of material and what sort not, neither will the articulation [λόγος] of the thing be evident. Now it seems clear for all those things that are obviously brought into being in materials different in form, such as a circle in bronze or stone or wood, that the bronze or the wood does not in any way belong to the thinghood of the circle, because of its being separated from them; but nothing prevents those things that are not seen to be separated from being similar to the others, just as if all the circles one had seen were bronze, since nonetheless, the bronze would in no way belong to the form, though it would be difficult to subtract it in one's thinking. For example, the form of a human being always appears in flesh and bones and parts of that sort: are they then also parts of the form and of its articulation? Or are they not, but just material, though because humans are not brought into being in other materials we are unable to separate them?" (1036a26-1036b7)

"But the animal is not like the circle, since it is something perceptible, and it cannot be defined leaving out motion [κίνησις = change], nor for that reason without parts that are disposed in a certain way. For it is not a hand of any sort that is part of a human being, but one capable of accomplishing its work [τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν], and therefore being ensouled; and what is not ensouled is no part of it." (1036b28-32)

"But surely it is necessary also to divide the difference into its differences; for instance, provided-with-feet is a difference that belongs to animal, and next one must recognize differences within animal-provided-with-feet insofar as it is provided with feet, so that one ought not to say that of what is provided with feet, one sort is feathered and the other featherless, if one is to state things properly (for one would do this rather through ineptness), but instead that one sort is cloven footed and the other uncloven, since these are differences that belong to a foot, cloven-footedness being a certain kind of footedness. And one wants to go on continually in this way until one gets to things that have no differences; and then there will be just as many kinds of foot as there are specific differences, and the kinds of animal-provided-with-feet will be equal in number to the differences. So that if that is the way these things are, it is clear that the difference that brings the statement to completion [ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ] will be the thinghood of the thing [ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος] and its definition [ὁρισμός]...." (1038a9-20)

"Just as the underlying thing, and what it is for something to be, and what is made out of these are said to be thinghood, so too is the universal. Now what has been said concerns two of these (for it concerns what is it for something to be, and of the underlying thing it has been said that what underlies has two senses, being either a *this*, in the sense that an animal underlies its attributes, or material, in the sense that it underlies its complete being-at-work [ἐντελεχείᾳ]), but it seems to some people that the universal is responsible for a thing most of all, and that the universal is a governing source [ἀρχὴ τὸ καθόλου], and for that reason let us go over this." (1038b3-8)

"Again, thinghood is what is not attributed to any underlying thing, but the universal is always attributed to some underlying thing. But could it be like this: that the universal does not admit of being thinghood in the same way as what it is for something to be, yet is included in this, the way animal is in human being or horse? In that case, it is clear that there would be some articulation of it. And it makes no difference if it is not the articulation of everything in the thinghood of a thing, for this will nonetheless be the thinghood of something, as human being is of the human being in whom it is present, so that the same thing will turn out again to be the case, since the thinghood would belong to that kind, such as animal, in which it would be present as peculiar to it. And what's more, it is impossible and absurd that what is a *this* and an independent thing, if it is composed of anything, should have as a component something that is not an independent thing or a *this* but an of-such-sort; for what is not an independent thing and is an of-this-sort would be more primary than an independent thing as a *this*. But that is exactly what cannot be, for neither in articulation, nor in time, nor in their coming-to-be could attributes be more primary than an independent thing, for they would also be separate. And on top of this, there would be another independent thing present in Socrates, so that an independent thing would belong to two things. And in general it follows that if human being, and whatever things are meant in that way, are thinghood, none of the things present in their articulations are the thinghood of anything, nor are they present separately from them, nor in anything else; I mean, for example, that there is not any 'animal' besides the particular kinds, nor do any of the other components in their articulations have being separately. So for those who pay attention [θεωροῦσι], it is clear from these things that nothing that belongs to anything universally is thinghood, and that none of the things attributed as common properties signifies a *this*, but only an of-this-sort." (1038b15-1039a2)

"If what is one and the same, just as you are with yourself, is in horse and in human being, how will something be one that is in things that have being separately, and for what reason will this animal not be separate even from itself?" (1039a33-1039b2) [PSA: cf 1054a32ff]

"There is something that is the syllable, not only the letters, the vowel and the consonant, but also something else, and the flesh is not only fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, but also something else. Now if that something else must necessarily either be an element or be made of elements, then if it is an element there will be the same argument again (since flesh would be made of this plus fire and earth, and something else again, so that it goes on to infinity), but if it consists of an element, obviously it would consist not of one but of more than one, or else it would itself be that one, so that again in this case we will state the same argument as in the case of the flesh or the syllable. But it would seem that this something else is something, and is not an element, and is in fact responsible for the flesh's being this and the syllable's being that, and similarly too in the other cases. But this is the thinghood of each thing (for that is what is primarily responsible [αἴτιον πρῶτον] for the being of it) - and since some things are not independent things, but those that are independent things are put together by nature and in accordance with nature [κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φύσει], it would seem that it is this nature that is thinghood, which is not an element but a source [ἀρχή] - but an element is that which something is divided into, being present in it as materials, such as the A and the B of the syllable." (1041b15-33)

"It sometimes escapes notice whether a name indicates a composite independent thing or its being-at-work and form, for instance whether 'house' is a sign jointly for a shelter made of bricks and stones placed in such-and-such a way, or for the being-at-work and form, namely a shelter, or whether 'line' indicates twoness in a length or twoness, or whether 'animal' means a soul in a body or a soul, since this is the thinghood and being-at-work of a certain kind of body. But 'animal' might also be applied to both, not as meaning one articulation [λόγος], but as pointing to one thing. But while these things make a difference in some other respects, they make no difference to the inquiry after perceptible thinghood, since what it is for something to be belongs to the form and the being-at-work."

"[E]ach independent thing is a complete being-at-work-staying-itself and a particular nature [ἐντελέχεια καὶ φύσις τις ἑκάστη]." (1044a9)

"[D]eprivation [στέρησις] is meant in more than one way; for it is the not-having what something would naturally have, either at all, or when it would naturally have it, and either in the way that it would naturally have it, such as completely [παντελῶς], or just in any respect whatever. And in some cases, when things that naturally have something do not have it on account of force, we speak of them as lacking it [ἐστερῆσθαι]." (1046a31-35)

"But since some sources of this kind are present in things without souls, and others in things with souls, both in the soul in general and in the part of it that has reason, it is obvious that of potencies too, some will be irrational and some will include reason; and this is why all the arts and the productive kinds of knowledge are potencies, since they are sources of change in another thing, or in the same thing as other. And all potencies that include reason are themselves capable of contrary effects, but with the irrational ones, one potency is for one effect, as something hot has a potency only for heating, while the medical art is capable of causing disease or health. And the reason is that knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] is a reasoned account [λόγος], while the same reasoned account reveals both a thing and its lack [στέρησις], though not in the same way, and in a sense pertains to both, though more so to its proper subject, so that such kinds of knowledge are necessarily about contrary things, though about the one sort in their own right and the other sort not in their own right; for the account [λόγος] is about the one in virtue of itself, but about the other in a certain incidental way, since it reveals the contrary by means of negation and removal, since the thing that something primarily lacks is its contrary, and this is the removal of that other thing. Now since contraries do not come to be present in the same thing [PSA: at the time time and in the same respect?], while knowledge is a potency that has reason, and the soul is a source of motion, then even though something healthful produces only health and something that heats produces only heat and something that cools produces only cold, the person who knows produces both contraries. For a reasoned account pertains to both, though not in similar ways, and is in a soul that has a source of motion, so that it will set both contraries in motion from the same source, connecting them to the same account; which is why things that are potential in virtue of reason act in ways contrary to things that are potential without reason, since contrary things are contained in one source, the reasoned account. And it is clear that, with the potency of doing something well, the potency of merely doing or suffering it follows along, while the former does not always follow along with the latter, since the one doing something well necessarily also does it, but the one merely doing it does not necessarily do it well." (1046a36-1046b28)

"Of all potencies, since some are innate [συγγενῶν], such as the senses, while come about by habit [ἔθει], such as that of flute playing, and others by learning [μαθήσει], such as that of the arts, some, those that are by habit and reasoning [ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ], need to have previous activity [προενεργήσαντας], while the others that are not of that kind, and apply to being acted upon, do not need it. And since what is potential is capable of something, at some time, in some way, and all the other things that need to be added to its delineation, and some things are capable of causing motion in accordance with reason [κατὰ λόγον] and their potencies include reason [μετὰ λόγου], while other things are unreasoning and their potencies are irrational, the former must be in things with souls, but the latter in both kinds of beings; with potencies of the latter sort, it is necessary, whenever a thing that is active and one that is passive in the sense in which they are potential come near each other, that the one act and the other be acted upon, but with the former sort this is not necessary. For with all these unreasoning potencies, one is productive of one effect, but those others are productive of contrary effects, so that each would at the same time do contrary things, but that is impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that there be something else that is governing [τὸ κύριον]; by this I mean desire [ὄρεξις] or choice [προαίρεσις]. For whatever something chiefly desires is what it will do whenever what it is capable of is present and it approaches its passive object; and so everything that has a potency in accordance with reason [κατὰ λόγον] must do this whenever it desires that of which it has the potency and in the way that it has it, and it has it when the passive object is present and is in a certain condition." (1047b31-1048a16) [PSA: the fact that προαίρεσις is τὸ κύριον is relevant to the difference between sophistry and philosophy]

"Now being-at-work is something's being-present not in the way that we speak of as in potency [δυνάμει]; and we speak of as being in potency, for example, Hermes in a block of wood or a half line in the whole, because they can be separated out, or someone who knows [ἐπιστήμονα], even when he is not contemplating [μὴ θεωροῦντα], if he is capable of contemplating [ἂν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρῆσαι]. The other way these things are present is in activity [ἐνεργείᾳ]. And what we mean to say is clear by looking directly at particular examples [ἐπαγωγῇ], nor is it necessary to look for a definition [ὄρος] of everything, but one can also see at one glance, by means of analogy, that which is as the one building is to the one who can build, and the awake to the asleep, and the one seeing to the one whose eyes are shut but who has sight, and what has been formed out of material to the material, and what is perfected to what is incomplete [τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον]." (1048a30-1048b4)

"And since, of the actions [πράχεις] that do have limits [πέρας], none of them is itself an end [τέλος], but it is among things that approach an end [περὶ τὸ τέλος] (such as losing weight, for the thing that is losing weight, when it is doing so, is in motion in that way, although that for the sake of which the motion takes place is not present), this is not an action [πρᾶξις], or at any rate is not a complete one [τελεία]; but that in which the end is present is an action [ἐκείνη ᾗ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος]. For instance, one sees and is at the same time in a state of having seen, understands [φρονεῖ] and is at the same time in a state of having understood, or thinks contemplatively [νοεῖ] and is at the same time in a state of having thought contemplatively, but one does not learn while one is at the same time in a state of having learned, or get well while in a state of having gotten well. One does live well [εὖ ζῇ] at the same time one is in a state of having lived well, and one is happy [εὐδαιμονεῖ] at the same time one is in a state of having been happy. If this were not so, the action would have to stop at some time, just as when one is losing weight, but as things are it does not stop, but one is living and in a state of having lived. And it is appropriate to call the one sort of action motion, and the other being-at-work. For every motion [κινήσεις] is incomplete [ἀτελεῖς]: losing weight, learning, walking, house-building. These are motions, and are certainly incomplete. For one is not walking at the same time in a state of having walked, nor building a house and at the same time in a state of having built a house, nor becoming and in a state of having become, nor moving and in a state of having been moved, but the two are different; but one has seen and at the same time is seeing the same thing, and is contemplating [νοεῖ] and has contemplated the same thing. And I call this sort of action being-at-work, and that sort a motion. So that which is by way of being-at-work, both it is and of what sort, let it be evident to us from these examples and those of this kind." (1048b18-36) [PSA: in the case of ἐνέργεια, "the end is present" but so also is the ἕξις (EN 1174b31-33).]

"And since the various ways in which something is said to take precedence have been distinguished, it is clear that being-at-work takes precedence over potency. And I mean that it takes precedence not only over potency as defined, which means a source of change in another thing or in the same thing as other, but over every source of motion or rest in general. For nature too is in the same general class as potency, since it is a source of motion, though not in something else but in a thing itself as itself." (1049b4-10)

"And it was said in the chapters about thinghood that everything that comes into being becomes something from something, and by the action of something which is the same in form. And this is why it seems impossible to be a house-builder if one has not built any houses, or a harpist if one has not played the harp at all; for the one learning to play the harp learns to play the harp by playing the harp, and similarly with others who learn things." (1049b27-32) [PSA: cf 1047b32]

"[E]verything that comes into being goes up [βαδίζει] to a source [ἀρχή] and an end [τέλος] (since that for the sake of which something *is* is a source, and coming into being is for the sake of the end), but the being-at-work [ἐνέργεια] is an end, and it is for the enjoyment [χάριν] of this that the potency is taken on. For it is not in order that they may have the power of sight that animals see, but they have sight in order to see, and similarly too, people have the house-building power in order that they may build houses, and the contemplative power [τὴν θεωρητικὴν] in order that they may contemplate [θεωρῶσιν]; but they do not contemplate in order that they may have the contemplative power, unless they are practicing [οἱ μελετῶντες], and these people are not contemplating other than in a qualified sense, or else they would have no need to be practicing contemplating." (1050a7-14) [PSA: compare to 1048b20ff and apply to the activities of living well and eudaimonia; also it's interesting that awareness is something that needs to be practiced...]

"What's more, material is in potency because it goes toward a form [ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς τὸ εἶδος]; but whenever it is at work [ἐνεργείᾳ], then it is in that form [ἐν τῷ εἴδει]. And it is similar in other cases, even those of which motion is itself the end, and that is why teachers display a student at work, thinking that they are delivering up the end, and nature acts in a similar way. For if things did not happen in this way, they would be like the Hermes of Pauson, since it would be unclear whether the knowledge were inside or outside, just as with that figure. For the end is work [ἔργον], and the work is a being-at-work, and this is why the phrase being-at-work is meant by reference to work and extends to being-at-work-staying-complete [πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν]." (1050a15-23)

"But since the putting to use [χρῆσις] of some things is ultimate [ἔσχατον] (as seeing is in the case of sight, in which nothing else apart from this comes about from the work of sight), but from some things something comes into being (as a house, as well as the activity of building, comes from the house-building power), yet still the putting to use is no less an end in the former sort [PSA: i.e., ultimate χρῆσις], and in the latter sort [PSA: i.e., χρῆσις with an ultimate product] it is more an end than the potency is; for the activity of building takes place within the thing that is being built, and it comes into being and *is* at the same time as the house. So of those things from which there is something else apart from the putting-to-use that comes into being, the being-at-work is in the thing that is made (as the activity of building is in the thing built and the activity of weaving in the thing woven, and similarly with the rest, and in general motion is in the thing moved); but of those things which have no other work [ἔργον] besides their being-at-work, the being-at-work of them is present in themselves (as seeing is in the one seeing and contemplation in the one contemplating, and life is in the soul [ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ], and hence happiness too, since it is a certain sort of life [ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τίς]). And so it is clear that thinghood and form are being-at-work." (1050a23-1050b3) [PSA: cf Flannery p. 67; this passage sheds further light on the sense in which "the hexis is in the energeia" (EN 1174b31-33) and the sense in which "the end is present" in the energeia (1048b22-23)]

"And that being-at-work is a better [βελτίων] and more honorable [τιμιωτέρα = glorious] thing than a potency for something worth choosing [τῆς σπουδαίας], is clear from these considerations. For whatever is spoken of as being potential in itself is capable of opposite effects; for instance, the same thing that is said to be potentially healthy is also, and at the same time, potentially sick, since the same potency belongs to being healthy and to running down, or to being at rest and to being in motion, or to building up and to knocking down, or to being built and to falling down. So being, potentially, opposite things belongs to something at one time, but the opposite things are incapable of belonging to it at the same time, and the ways of being at work are incapable of being present at the same time (such as being healthy and being run down), and so one of these must be the good one, while the being-potential is equally both or neither; therefore the being-at-work is better. And in the case of bad things, it is necessary that the completion [τέλος] and being-at-work be worse than the potency, since the potential thing is itself capable of both opposites. Therefore it is clear that there is nothing bad apart from particular things, since the bad is by nature secondary to potency. Therefore among things that are from the beginning and are everlasting, there is nothing bad [κακὸν], erring [ἁμάρτημα], or corruptible [διεφθαρμένον] (since corruption [ἡ διαφθορὰ] is also one of the bad things)." (1051a4-21)

"For oneness belongs to what is continuous, either simply or, especially, by nature, and not by contact or by a binding cord (and among these that is more so one and is more primary of which the motion is more indivisible and more simple); and it belongs still more to what is whole [τὸ ὅλον] and has some form and look [μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος], especially if something is of that sort by nature and not by force, as those things are that are so by means of glue or bolts or being tied with a cord, but rather as in itself that which is responsible for its being continuous. And something is of this sort if its motion is one and indivisible in place and time; and so it is clear that, if something has a source of motion that moves it in the primary kind of the primary class of motions (by which I mean the circular type of change of place), this is one magnitude [μέγεθος] in the primary sense. So some things are one in this way, insofar as they are continuous or whole, but others are one because the articulation [λόγος] of them is one, and of this sort are those things of which thinking [νόησις] is one, and this in turn is of this sort if it is indivisible, and an act of thinking is indivisible if it is of something indivisible in form or in number. Accordingly, a particular thing is one by being indivisible in number, but that which is one by means of intelligibility [γνωστῷ] and knowledge [ἐπιστήμῃ] is indivisible in form, so that what is responsible for the oneness of independent things would be one in the primary sense." (1052a19-34)

"Since the *same* is meant in more than one way, in one way we sometimes speak of what is the same in number, but we say it in another sense if things are one in meaning [λόγος] as well as in number, as you are one with yourself in both form [εἶδος] and material, and in another again if the articulation [λόγος] of the primary thinghood of things is one...." (1054a32-1054b1) [PSA: cf 1039a33ff]

"Since things that differ from one another can differ more and less, there is a certain kind of difference that is greatest, and this I call contrareity. That it is the greatest difference is clear from examples. For things that differ in genus do not have a way to one another, but hold apart too much and cannot be compared, but the coming into being of things that differ in species, from their contraries, is as from extremes [ὡς ἐσχάτων], while the interval between the extremes is the greatest, and so also is that between contraries. But surely what is greatest within any kind is complete [τέλειον], since the greatest is that over which there is no excess, and the complete is that outside which there is nothing possible to take. For the complete difference holds an end condition [τέλος γὰρ ἔχει ἡ τελεία διαφορά] (just as also other things are called complete by holding on at an end [τῷ τέλος ἔχειν λέγεται τέλεια]), but nothing is outside the end, since it is an ultimate condition in every thing and encloses it all around, on account of which nothing is outside the end [διὸ οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ τέλους], and the thing at its end is in need of nothing extra [οὐδὲ προσδεῖται οὐδενὸς τὸ τέλειον.]." (1055a3-16) [PSA: this passage has significant implications for the notion of completion in the ethical works, specifically the aspect of lacking in nothing or being in need of nothing]

"The primary sort of contrareity is that of an active state [ἕξις] and a deprivation [στέρησις] - not every deprivation (for deprivation is meant in more than one way), but whichever of them is complete [τελεία]." (1055a33-35) [PSA: examples would be virtue and vice, wisdom and cunning or foolishness, sagacity and deception or ignorance, etc.]

"[I]t is the extremes from which changes are that are contraries. And this is clear also by means of examples: for every contrareity has a deprivation as one of the two contraries, but not all of them in similar ways. For inequality is the deprivation [στέρησις] of equality, and unlikeness of likeness, and vice [κακία] of virtue [ἀρετή], but they differ as was said; for it is one sort of deprivation if only something is deprived, another if it is deprived either at some time or in some respect, as at a certain time of life [ἐν ἡλικίᾳ], or in the decisive respect [τῷ κυρίῳ], or in every respect. That is why there is an in-between [μεταξύ] for the one sort, and it is possible that a human being be neither good nor bad, but for the other sort there is not, but a thing has to be either odd or even." (1055b16-25) [PSA: this passage demonstrates some of the ways that a person can be in between good and bad]

"[A]ll things are divided by opposites, and it has been shown that contraries are in the same genus. For contrareity is complete difference, and every difference in species is a certain kind of thing that is other than something, so that this same thing is also the genus in both things. (This is why all the contraries that are different in species but not in genus are in the same list under the ways of attributing being, and are the most different from one another, since the difference is complete, and do not come into being together with one another.)" (1058a8-16)

"The kinds of thinghood are three, since the material is a *this* by coming forth into appearance (for whatever has being by way of contact, and not by having grown together, is material and underlies something else), while the nature of a thing is a *this* and an active condition [ἕξις] into which it comes; and then the third kind is the particular thing that consists of these, such as Socrates or Callias." (1070a9-13) [PSA: notice that the nature of a thing is a ἕξις; in part this might be why "the hexis is in the energeia"]

"[T]hese perceptible things have the same elements and sources (though different things have different ones of them), but it is not possible to say in this way that all things have the same elements and sources, except by analogy, just as if one were to say that there are three kinds of sources: form, deprivation [στέρησις], and material. But each of these is different as it concerns each class of things .... [B]ut the elements are different in different things, and the first cause that sets them in motion is also different in different things. With health, disease, and a body, the mover is the medical art. With form, a certain particular kind of disorder [ἀταξία], and bricks, the mover is the house-building art. And since among natural things the mover is, say, for a human being a human being, while among things that are produced by thinking [διάνοια] it is the form or its contrary, the causes would again in a certain way be three, though by this means four." (1070b16-32) [PSA: with ἀρετή, a certain kind of ἀταξία, and ψυχή is the mover διάνοια, i.e., φρόνησις?]

"Now since some things are separate while others are not separate, the former are independent things. And it is on account of this that all things have the same causes, because with independent things, attributes and motions are not possible. So then these causes will be, presumably, soul and body, or intellect [νοῦς], desire [ὄρεξις], and body. And in yet another way, the sources of things are the same by analogy, namely being-at-work and potency, though these are both different and present in different ways in different things." (1070b36-1071a6)

"[T]here is a certain ceaseless motion that is always moving, and it is in a circle (and this is evident not only to reason but in fact), so that the first heaven would be everlasting. Accordingly, there is also something that moves it. And since what is in motion and causes motion is something intermediate [μέσον], there is also something that causes motion without being in motion, which is everlasting, an independent thing, and a being-at-work [PSA: according to Fazzo, ἐνεργειᾳ in the dative = "in activity"]. But what is desired [τὸ ὀρεκτὸν] and what is thought [τὸ νοητόν] cause motion in that way: not being in motion, they cause motion. But the primary instance of these are the same things, for what is yearned for [ἐπιθυμητὸν] is what seems beautiful [τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν], while what is wished for [βουλητὸν] primarily is what is beautiful; but we desire something because of the way it seems, rather than it's seeming so because we desire it, for the act of thinking is the beginning [ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις]. But the power of thinking is set in motion by the action of the thing thought [νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται], and what is thought in its own right belongs to an array of affirmative objects [νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ᾽ αὑτήν], of which thinghood is primary, and of this the primary kind is that which is simple and at work [κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν]. (But what is one and what is simple is itself a certain way.) But surely the beautiful and what is chosen in virtue of itself [τὸ δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν] are also in that same array, and what is primary is always best [ἄριστον], or analogous to it. And that-for-the-sake-of-which is possible among motionless things, as the following distinction makes evident; for that-for-the-sake-of-which is either for something or belonging to something [τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τινός], of which the former is and the latter is not present among motionless things. And it causes motion in the manner of something loved [ὡς ἐρώμενον], and by means of what is moved moves other things." (1072a19-1072b4) [PSA: the difference between τινί and τινός seems to be the difference betwen the aim (hou heneka-hou) and the beneficiary (hou heneka-hoi); cf. JOHNSON]

"[T]here is something that causes motion while being itself motionless .... it is something that has being necessarily, and inasmuch as it is by necessity it is beautiful and in that way a source. For the necessary has this many senses: what is by force because it is contrary to a thing's impulse [παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν], what without which something will not be in a good condition [τὸ εὖ], and that which does not admit of being any way other than in a simple condition [τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς]. On such a source, therefore, the cosmos and nature depend. And the course of its life [διαγωγή] is of such a kind as the best we have for a short time. This is because it is always the same way (which for us is impossible), and because its being-at-work is also pleasure (which is what makes being awake [ἐγρήγορσις], perceiving [αἴσθησις], and thinking [νόησις] the most pleasant things, while hopes and memories are pleasant on account of these). And the thinking that is just thinking by itself is a thinking of what is best just as itself, and especially so with what is so most of all. But by partaking in what it thinks, the intellect thinks itself, for it becomes what it thinks by touching and contemplating it, so that the intellect and what it thinks are the same thing. For what is receptive of the intelligible and of thinghood is the intellect, and it is at work when it has them; therefore it is the being-at-work rather than the receptivity the intellect has that seems godlike, and its contemplation is pleasantest and best [ἄριστον]. So if the divine being is always in this condition that we sometimes are, that is to be wondered at; and if it is in it to a greater degree than we are, that is to be wondered at still more. And that is the way it is. But life belongs to it too, for the being-at-work of intellect is life [νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή], and that being *is* being-at-work, and its being-at-work is in itself the best life and is everlasting. And we say that it is a god who lives the best life, so that life and continuous and everlasting duration belong to a god; for this being is god." (1072b7-30) [PSA: note how Aristotle has extrapolated here from the highest human experiences]

"[E]very nature and every independent thing that is unaffected [ἀπαθή] and has, by virtue of itself, attained its best condition [καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου τετυχηκυῖαν], must be regarded as an end..." (1074a19-20)

"One must also consider in which of two ways the nature of the whole contains what is good and what is best [τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον], whether as something separate, itself by itself, or as the order [τάξις] of the whole of things. Or it is present in both ways, just as in an army? For its good condition [τὸ εὖ] resides in its ordering but also in its general, and is more the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it on him. And all things are in some way ordered together [συντέτακταί], though not all similarly, the things that swim and fly and grow in the ground; yet they are not such that nothing that pertains to one kind is related to another, but there is some relation. For they are all organized [συντέτακται] toward one thing, but in the same way as in a household, in which the free members of it are least of all allowed to do any random thing [τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν], but all or most of what they do is prescribed [τέτακται], while for the slaves and livestock little that they do is for the common good [τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν] and much is just at random, since the nature of each of them is that kind of source." (1075a11-23)

"[W]hile, in the order of coming into being, the incomplete magnitude is prior, in thinghood it is derivative, just as what is without soul is derivative from what has soul.... [T]he things around us are one by virtue of a soul, or a part of a soul, or something else, reasonably..." (107718-22)

"[A] body is more complete and whole in the sense that it is what comes to be ensouled..." (1077a28-29)

"And since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former is always involved in action [ἐν πράξει] but the beautiful is also present in motionless things), those who claim that the mathematical kinds of knowledge say nothing about what is beautiful or good are wrong. For they speak of it and reveal it most of all, for if they do not name it but their deeds [ἔργα] and discourses [λόγους] make it evident, it is not the case that they do not speak about it. The greatest forms of the beautiful are order and symmetry and determinateness [τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον], which the mathematical kinds of knowledge most of all display." (1078a31-1078b2) [PSA: on good vs. beautiful, see MA 700b25-26; note also that it is "mathematics as a way of life" that manifests this beauty through its tasks and discourses, similar in this way to philosophy as a way of life...]

"[I]f there were no mathematical things there would still be the soul and perceptible bodies, but it does not seem from the appearances that nature is a string of unconnected episodes as in a bad [μοχθηρὰ] tragedy." (1090b18-20)

"And there is an impasse, and a censure for those who find it an easy passage, as to how the elements and sources are related to the good and the beautiful; the impasse is this, whether one of the sources is the sort of thing we mean by speaking of the good itself and the highest good [τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον], or this is not one of them but something generated as derivative from them. Things that come down from those who wrote about the gods seem to agree with some people of the present time who say that the good and the beautiful are not sources but make their appearance within the nature of things when it has advanced." (1091a29-36)

"The impasse, then, is this: in which of the two ways ought one to speak? But it would be surprising [θαυμαστὸν] if, in what is primary and everlasting and self-sufficient, this very self-sufficiency [τὸ αὔταρκες] and self-maintenance [ἡ σωτηρία] were not present primarily as good [ὡς ἀγαθὸν]. But it is certainly not on account of anything other than that it is in a good condition that it is indestructible or self-sufficient..." (1091b15-19) [PSA: notice that self-preservation as in σωφροσύνη is a good thing] 

END