Parts of Animals
Aristotle
tr. W. Ogle

"Every study [θεωρία] and investigation [μέθοδος], the humblest and the noblest [τιμιωτέρα = glorious] alike, seems to admit of two kinds of proficiency [ἕχεις], one of which may be properly called educated knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of the subject, while the other is a kind of acquaintance [παιδεία] with it. For any educated man should be able to form a fair judgement as to the goodness or badness of an exposition [λόγος]. To be educated is in fact to be able to do this; and the man of general education we take to be such." (639a1-8)

"Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call that for the sake of which. For this is the account [λόγος] of the thing, and the account forms the starting-point [ἀρχή], alike in the works of art and in the works of nature. For the doctor and the builder define health or house, either by the intellect [διάνοια] or by perception [αἴσθησις], and then proceed to give the accounts and the causes of each of the things they do and of why they should do it thus. Now in the works of nature the good [τὸ καλόν = the beautiful] and that for the sake of which is still more dominant than in works of art, nor is necessity a factor with the same significance in them all; though almost all writers try to refer their accounts to this, failing to distinguish the several ways in which necessity is spoken of. For there is absolute necessity, manifested in eternal phenomena; and there is hypothetical necessity, manifested in everything that is generated as in everything that is produced by art, be it a house or what it may. For if a house or other such final object is to be realized, it is necessary that first this and then that shall be produced and set in motion, and so on in continuous succession, until the end is reached, for the sake of which each prior thing is produced and exists. So also is it with the productions of nature. The mode of necessity, however, and the mode of demonstration [ἀπόδειξις] are different in natural science from they are in the theoretical sciences (we have spoken of this elsewhere). For in the latter the starting-point is that which is; in the former that which is to be. For since health, or a man, is of such and such a character, it is necessary for this or that to exist or be produced...." (639b14-640a5) [PSA: this passage sheds light on the way in which deliberation identifies what conduces to the end (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος) and turning the indeterminate target into a determinate action]

"The fittest mode, then, of treatment is to say, a man has such and such parts, because the essence of man is such and such, and because they are necessary conditions of his existence, or, if we cannot quite say this then the next thing to it, namely, that it is either quite impossible for a man to exist without them, or, at any rate, that it is good [καλῶς = beautiful] that they should be there. And this follows: because man is such and such the process of his development is necessarily such as it is; and therefore this part is formed first, that next; and after a like fashion should we explain the generation of all other works of nature." (640a33-640b4)

"What are the forces by which the hand or the body was fashioned into its shape? The woodcarver will perhaps say, by the ax or the auger; the physiologist, by air and by earth. Of these two answers the woodcarver's is the better. For it is not enough for him to say that by the stroke of his tool this part was formed into a concavity, that into a flat surface; but he must state the reasons why [διότι] he struck his blow in such a way as to effect this, and for the sake of what he did so; namely, that the piece of wood should develop eventually into this or that shape." (641a5-14)

"For order [τεταγμένον] and definiteness [ὠρισμένον] are much more plainly manifest in the celestial bodies than in our own frame; while change and chance are rather characteristic of the perishable things of earth." (641b18-20)

"[W]henever there is plainly some final end [τέλος], to which a motion tends should nothing stand in the way, we always say that the one is for the sake of the other; and from this it is evident that there must be something of the kind, corresponding to what we call nature." (641b23-26)

"This third mode is what may be called hypothetical necessity. For if a piece of wood is to be split with an axe, the axe must of necessity be hard; and, if hard, must of necessity be made of bronze or iron. Now exactly in the same way the body, since it is an instrument - for both the body as a whole and its several parts individually are for the sake of something - if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such a character, and made such and such materials." (642a9-13)

"The scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence [τιμιότητα], more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live; just as a half glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than an accurate view of other things, whatever their number and dimensions. On the other hand, in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial things has the advantage. Moreover, their greater nearness and affinity to us balances somewhat the loftier interest of heavenly things that are the objects of the higher philosophy [τὰ θεῖα φιλοσοφίαν]. Having already treated of the celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best of our ability, any member of the kingdom, however ignoble [μήτε ἀτιμότερον μήτε τιμιώτερον]. For if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet nature, which fashioned them, gives amazing pleasure in their study [θεωρία] to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange if mimic representations of them were attractive, because they disclose the mimetic skill of the painter or sculptor, and the original realities themselves were not more interesting, to all at any rate who have eyes to discern the causes. We therefore must not recoil with childish aversion from the examination of the humbler [ἀτιμοτέραν] animals. Every realm of nature is marvellous [θαυμαστόν], and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to go in, is reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture on the study of every kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful [καλά]. Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature's works in the highest degree, and the end for which those works are put together and produced is a form of the beautiful [τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν]." (644b31-645a26)

"[E]ach separate organ is constructed of bones, sinews, flesh, and the like; which contribute either to its substance [οὐσία] or to the proper discharge of its function [ἐργασία].... Even individual homogeneous parts present variations, which are in each case for the sake of the better. For here also such variations as occur must be held either to be related to the substance and the functions of the several animals, or, in other cases, to be matters of better or worse." (647b22-648a16)

"Is then the term 'hot' used in one way or in many? To answer this we must ascertain what special effect is attributed to a hotter substance, and if there be several such, how many these may be. A body then is in one sense said to be hotter than another, if it imparts a greater amount of heat to an object in contact wtih it. In a second sense, it is said to be hotter which causes the keener sensation when touched, and especially if the sensation be attended with pain. This criterion, however, would seem sometimes to be a false one; for occasionally it is the condition [ἔξις] of the individual that causes the sensation to be painful. Again, of two things, that is the hotter which the more readily melts a fusible substance, or sets on fire an inflammabe one. Again, of two masses of one and the same substance, the larger is said to have more heat than the smaller. Again, of two bodies, that is said to be the hotter which takes the longer time in cooling, as also we call that which is rapidly heated hotter in its nature than that which is long about it - as we call something contrary if it is at a distance, similar if it is nearby. The term hotter is used then in all the various senses that have been mentioned, and perhaps in still more." (648b12-24) [PSA: a similar thought process could be applied to the many senses of the term 'good', e.g., that the ἐνέργεια is what turns, say, wealth or power into something good]

"The purpose of its [blood's] presence in animals is no less than the preservation [σωτηρία] of the whole body. For some writers arrest that the soul is fire or some such force. This, however, is but a crude assertion; and it would be perhaps be better to say that the soul is incorporate in some substance of a fiery character. The reason for this being so is that of all substances, there is none so suitable for ministering to the operations of the soul as that which is possessed of heat. For nutrition and the imparting of motion are offices of the soul, and it is by heat that these are more readily effected. To say then that the soul is fire is much the same thing as to confound the auger or the saw with the carpenter or his craft, simply because the work [ἔργον] is done when the two are near one another. So far then this much is plain, that all animals must necessarily have a certain amount of heat. But as all influences require to be counterbalanced, so that they may be reduced to moderation [μετρίος] and brought to the mean [τὸ μέσον] (for in the mean, and not in either extreme, lies their substance [οὐσία] and account [λόγος]), nature has contrived the brain as a counterpoise to the region of the heart with its contained heat, and has given it to the animals to moderate the latter...." (652b7-22) [PSA: this indicates that there can be no true οὐσία or λόγος of life lived at one of the extremes]

"[A]n animal is by our definition something that has sensibility [αἴσθησις] .... it is for the sake of this that all the other parts exist." (653b22-31)

"[W]e shall inquire into the causes which produce them [the heterogeneous parts], and into the goals of their presence severally in the bodies of animals... it is from a consideration of their functions [ἔργα] that alone we can derive any knowledge of them." (655b18-20)

"[I]n all there is a third part, intermediate between these two, in which is situated the principle of life [ἀρχή ἡ τῆς ζωῆς]. Plants, again, inasmuch as they are without locomotion, present no great variety in their heterogeneous parts. For, where the functions [πράξεις] are but few, few also are the organs required to effect them. The configuration of plants is a matter then for separate consideration. Animals, however, that not only live but perceive, present a greater multiformity of parts, and this diversity is greater in some animals than in others, being most varied in those to whose share has fallen not mere life but life of a high degree [τὸ εὖ ζῆν = living well]. Now such an animal is man. For of all living beings with which we are acquainted man alone partakes of the divine, or at any rate partakes of it in a fuller measure than the rest." (655b36-656a8)

"[T]he mean partakes of both extremes [ἀμφοτέρων], shares in the characters of those on either side [μετέχει τῶν ἄκρων]." (661b10-11) [PSA: there is a kind of dialetical process here whereby the Middle Way takes on what is of worth from both extremes]

"[T]he external organs are not precisely alike in all animals, but each creature is provided with such as are suited to its special mode of life [βίος] and motion...." (665b2-4) [PSA: the same could be said of aspects of personhood, traits of character, mental faculties, etc.]

"[I]t behoves the principal part to be as tranquil [ἠμερεῖν] as possible, and this tranquility can be ensured by the blood being pure, and of moderate amount and warmth." (667a4-6)

"[M]an is practically the only animal whose heart presents this phenomenon of jumping, inasmuch he alone is influenced by hope and anticipation of the future." (669a19-21)

"Of the membranes those are the stoutest and strongest which invest the heart and the brain; as is but consistent with reason. For these are the parts which require most protection, seeing that they are the main governing powers [κυρία] of life and that it is to governing powers that guard is due." (673b8-12)

"[I]n all animals there must be some central and commanding part of the body, to lodge the sensory portion of the soul and the source of life." (678b2-4)

"[T]he aim of nature is to give to each animal only one such dominant part; and when she can, she makes it a unity; when she cannot, a plurality." (682a6-8) [PSA: a person without a unified dominant part is literally not one because of internal disorder]

"[O]f all animals man alone stands erect, in accordance with his god-like [θεία] nature and substance [οὐσία]. For it is the function [ἔργον] of the god-like to think [νοεῖν] and to be wise [φρονεῖν]." (686a27-29)

"Now it is the opinion of Anaxagoras that the possession of these hands is the cause of man being of all animals the most intelligent. But it is more rational to suppose that man has hands because of his superior intelligence. For the hands are instruments, and the invariable plan of nature in distributing the organs is to give each to such animal as can make use of it; nature acting in this matter as any prudent man would do. For it is a better plan to take a person who is already a flute-player and give him a flute, than to take one who possesses a flute and teach him the art of flute-playing. For nature adds that which is less to that which is greater and more important, and not that which is more valuable and greater to that which is less. Seeing then that such is the better course, and seeing also that of what is possible nature invariably brings about the best, we must conclude that man does not owe his superior intelligence to his hands, but his hands to his superior intelligence. For the most intelligent of animals is the one who would put the most organs to good use; and the hand is not to be looked on as one organ but as many; for it is, as it were, an instrument for further instruments. This instrument, therefore - the hand - of all instruments the most variously serviceable, has been given by nature to man, the animal of all animals the most capable of acquiring the most varied arts. Much in error, then, are they who say that the construction of man is not only faulty, but inferior to that of all animals; seeing that he is, as they point out, barefooted, naked, and without weapon of which to avail himself. For other animals have each but one mode of defence, and this they can never change; so that they must perform all the offices of life and even, so to speak, sleep with sandals on, never laying aside whatever serves as a protection to their bodies, nor changing such single weapons as they may chance to possess. But to man numerous modes of defence are open, and then, moreover, he may change at will; as also he may adopt such weapon as he pleases, and at such places as suit him. For the hand is talon, hoof, and horn, at will." (687a7-687b4)

"Nature makes the organs for the function, and not the function for the organ." (691a4)

END