Physics
Aristotle
tr. Joe Sachs

"[W]hite comes into being from what is not white, and not from every non-white thing but from the black or what is in-between [metaxu], and educated from what is not educated, though not from every such thing but from the uneducated, or from something between the two if there is any. Nor is a thing transformed by destruction [phtheiretai] into the first chance thing, the white, say, into the educated, except when it happens incidentally, but the white is transformed by description into the non-white, and not into a random non-white thing but into something black or in-between, and in the same way the educated is transformed by destruction into the not-educated, and not into a random one but into the unedeucated, or something between the two if there is any." (188a37-188b8) [PSA: similarly with character traits.]

"For the nature that persists is a co-cause with the form of the things that come into being, like a mother, while the other portion of the opposition might often be slandered as not being at all by one who fixes his thinking sternly upon it as upon a criminal. But since there is something divine and good and sovereign [ephetos], we say that there is something opposite to it, and something else which inherently [pephuken] yearns for and stretches out toward it [ephiesthai kai oregesthai] it by its own nature. For them, it follows that the contrary yearns for its own destruction [phthoras]. However, it is not possible either for the form to long for itself, since it is not defective, or for its contrary to long for it (since contraries are destructive of one another), but it is the material that does this...." (192a13-22)

"Of the things that are, some are by nature, others through other causes; by nature are animals and their parts, plants, and the simple bodies, such as earth, fire, air, and water ... and all of them obviously differ from the things not put together by nature. For each of these has in itself a source [arche] of motion and rest, either in place, or by growth and shrinkage, or by alteration; but a bed or a cloak, or any other such kind of thing there is, in the respect in which it has happened upon each designation and to the extent that is is from art [techne], has no innate impulse of change at all." (192b8-19)

"This form or look is nature more than the material is. For each thing is meant when it is fully at work [entelecheiai], more than when it is potentially [dunamei]." (193b6-8)

"Further, that for the sake of which, or the end, as well as whatever is for the sake of these, belong to the same study. But nature is an end and a that-for-the-sake-of-which. (For of those things of which there is an end, if the motion is continuous, the end is both the last stage and that for the sake of which; which induced the poet to say, absurdly, "He has his death, for the sake of which he was born." For not every last thing professes itself to be an end, but only what is best [beltiston].) And the arts make even their material, some simply and others working it up, and we make use of everything there is as though it is for our sake (for we are also in some way an end, and "that for the sake of which" is double in meaning, but this is discussed in the writings on philosophy)." (194a27-36)

"[T]he maker [is a cause] as that from which the source of change or rest is, but other things are causes as the end or the good of the remaining ones. For that-for-the-sake-of-which means to be the best thing and the end of the other things, and let it make no difference to say the good itself or the apparent good." (195a23-26)

"Of things that happen, some happen for the sake of something and some not (and of the former, some in accordance with choice [kata prohairesin], some not in accordance with choice, but both are among things for the sake of something), so that it is clear that even among things apart from what is necessary or for the most part, there are some to which it is possible that being for the sake of something belongs. And for the sake of something are as many things as are brought about from thinking [dianoia] or from nature." (196b17-22)

Chance and fortune "differ because chance is more extensive, for everything from fortune is from chance, but not everything from it is from fortune. For fortune and what comes from fortune are present to beings to whom being fortunate, or generally, action [praxis], might belong. For this reason also, fortune is necessarily concerned with actions. (A sign is that good fortune seems to be either the same thing as happiness [eudaimonia] or nearly so, while happiness is a kind of action, namely doing well [eupraxia].) So whatever cannot act cannot do anything as a result of fortune either. And for this reason no inanimate thing nor any animal or small child can do anything as a result of fortune, because they do not have the power to choose in advance [ouk echei prohairesin]." (197a36-197b8)

"[A]rt in come cases completes [epitelei] what nature is unable to finish off, but in others imitates nature. If then, what comes from art is for the sake of something, it is clear that what comes from nature is too, for the series of things from art and from nature are alike, each to each, in the way that the later things are related to the earlier. This is clear most of all in the other animals, which do nothing by art, inquiry, or deliberation; for which reason some people are completely at a loss whether it is by intelligence or in some other way that spiders, ants, and such things work. But if we move forward little by little in this way, it becomes apparent that even in plants what is brought together comes about in relation to the end, as the leaves for the protection of the fruit. So if both by nature and for the sake of something a swallow makes a nest and the spider a web, and the plants make their leaves for the sake of the fruit, and their roots not upward but downward for the sake of nourishment, it is clear that there is such a cause in things that come into being and are by nature. And since nature is twofold, both material and form, and the latter is an end but the former is for the sake of an end, the form would be the cause for the sake of which. Now missing the mark happens even among things done according to art ... so it is clear that this is possible also among things done by nature. But if there are some things according ot art in which what is done correctly is for the sake of something that is attempted but missed, it is the same among natural things." (199a15-199b4)

"[B]y nature are as many things as, moved continuously by some source in themselves, reach some end; from each beginning does not come the same end for them all, nor just what chances, but each always reaches the same end unless something interferes." (199b15-18)

"It is absurd to think that a thing does not happen for the sake of something if we do not see what sets it in motion deliberating. Surely even art does not deliberate. If shipbuilding were present in wood, it would act in the same way as nature does, so if being for the sake of something is present in art, it is also present in nature. This is most clear when someone practices medicine himself on himself; for nature is like that." (199b26-32) [PSA: "Heal thyself" is like "complete thyself"...]

"There is that which is fully and actively itself [entelecheiai monon], but also that which is what it is, in part, only potentially...." (200b26-27)

"A distinction having been made in each kind of being between the fully active [entelecheiai] and what is only potentially [dunamei], the being-at-work-staying-itself of whatever is potentially, just as such, is motion [kinesis]: of the alterable, as alterable, it is alteration, of what can grow and its opposite, what can shrink (since no name is common to the two), it is growth and shrinkage, of the generable and destructible is it coming-to-be and passing away, and of the movable in place it is change of place. That this is motion is clear from this: when the buildable, just insofar as it is said to be such, is fully at-work, [namely at-work-staying-buildable,] it is being built, and this is the activity of building. A similar formulation applies to the activities of learning, healing, rolling, leaping, ripening, and aging." (201a9-19)

"That of which nothing is outside is complete and whole [teleion kai holon]; that is how we define the whole, as that of which nothing is absent, as a whole human being or box. And just as with each example, so also in the strict sense [kurios], the whole is that outside of which there is nothing; but that of which something absent is outside is not entire, whatever might be absent. But whole and complete are either completely identical or closely akin in nature. And nothing is complete [teleion] which does not have an end [telos], and an end is a limit [peras]." (207a8-15)

"Motion [kinesis] with respect to how-much lacks a common name, but each-by-each it is growth and wasting away, the one into a things's complete [teleion] magnitude [megethos = stature] being growth [auxesis], the one from it wasting away." (226a29-32)

"What is complete is said to be one (mia), whether in genus, in species, or in its own being, just as also with other things, completeness and wholeness belong to what is one. But there are also times when what is incomplete [ateles] is called one, just so long as it is continuous." (228b11-15)

"But since to a motion not only a motion but also rest [eremia] seem to be contrary, this is something that must be distinguished.... it would be absurd if motions were contrary but states of rest were not opposites. And they are the ones in contrary states, as rest in health to that in sickness. (And it is contrary to the motion from health to sickness, for it is unreasonable that rest in health be contrary to motion from sickness to health, since the motion into that in which it stands still is rather the coming to rest, or at least it happens to come into being at the same time as the motion, and the contrary motion must be one of these two)." (229b23-230a6) [PSA: is rest equivalent or analogous to completion?]

"Since everything that is of such a nature as to move [kineitai] or be at rest [eremei] does so when, where, and how it is natural to it, what is stopping must be moving when it is stopping; for if it is not moving it will be at rest, but it is not possible for what is at rest to be coming to rest." (238b23-26) [PSA: cf "coming to rest in nous, specifically in epagoge (An. Post II.19).]

"The limit of growth is that of the complete magnitude in accord with the nature proper to a thing [kata ten oikeian phusin), and of decrease it is the loss of thing." (241a33-241b2)

### begin VII.3 ###

"One might suppose that alteration is present most than in other things among shapes or forms, and among active states [hexeis], both in the taking on and losing of these; but it is present in neither of these. (245b6-9)

"But surely neither are active states [hexeis] alterations, neither those of the body nor those of the soul. For some of the active states are virtues and others vices, but it is not possible that either a virtue or a vice be an alteration; rather, the virtue is a certain perfection [teleiosis] (for each thing is said to be complete [teleion] when it takes on its excellence [arete] - for it is then most in accord with its nature - just as a circle is perfect when it has most of all become a circle and when it is best [beltistos]), and a vice is a spoiling [phthora] or loss [ekstasis] of this. Then just as neither do we call the completion of a house an alteration (for it would be absurd if the top course of stones [thrinkos] or the roof tiles [keramos] were alterations, or if in being built to the top or tiled, the house were altered but not completed), it is the same way also with virtues and vices, and with the things that have them or take them one, for the one kind are perfections and the other losses, and so are not alterations." (246a10-246b3)

"Further, we way that all excellences consist in holding a certain relation [pos echein]. For those of the body, such as health [hugieian] and fitness [euexian], we place in the blending and due measure of the hot and the cold, either of themseves in relation to themselves in the things within, or in relation to their surroundings; and similarly with beauty and strength and the other excellences [aretas] and defects [kakias]. For each consists in holding a certain relation, and disposes the thing having it well or badly toward its proper attributes [okeia pathe], proper being those by which it by nature comes into being or is destroyed. Since, then, relations are not themselves alterations, nor is there alteration of them, nor becoming, nor in general any change at all, it is clear that neither active states nor the losing or taking on of active states are alterations, htough in order that they come into being or be destroyed it is perhaps necessary that some things be altered, exactly as with the form or shape, such as the hot and the cold, or the dry and the moist, or those things in which these happen first to be present. For each defect or excellence is spoke of in relation to those things by which the thing having it is of such a nature as to be altered; for the excellence makes it be either unaffected or subject to be affected in just a certain way, while the defect makes it contrarily subject to be affected or unaffected." (246b3-20)

"And it is the same with the active states of the soul, since these all consist in holding certain relations, and the virtues are perfections [teleioseis], the vices losses [ekstaseis]. And further, the virtue disposes [diatithesi] something well toward its proper attributes, and the vice disposes it badly. Therefore, virtues and vices will not be alterations either, nor will the losses or takings on of them. But in order that they come into being, it is necessary that the perceptive part [aitheton] be altered. And this will have been altered by perceptible things, for all moral virtue [ethike arete] is involved with bodily pleasures and pains, and these are present in acting [prattein], or in remembering [memnesthai] , or in expecting [elpizein]. Some, then, are in the action, following upon the sense perception, so that they are set in motion by some perceptible thing, while others are in the memory or the expectation derived from this, since they are pleasing when one is remembering what sort of things were experienced or anticipating what sort are going to be. So every such pleasure must come into being by way of perceptible things. And since when pleasure and pain come to be present, vice and virtue come to be present as well (for they are involved with these), while the pleasures and pains are alterations of the perceptive part, it is clear that something must be altered both for these to be case off and for them to be taken on. Therefore, the coming into being of them follows an alteration, but they are not alterations." (246b20-247a19)

"But surely neither are the active states [hexeis] of the thinking part [noetikos] alterations, nor is there a coming into being of them. For most of all by far do we say that what has knowledge [episteme] does so by holding a certain relation. And further, it is evident that there is no coming into being of these states, for what is potentially knowing becomes knowing not by being itself moved in any way, but by the becoming-present of something else. For whenever a particular thing has happened, the thinking part of the soul knows the universals in a certain way through the particular. And again, of the use [chresthai] and being-at-work [energein] of knowledge there is no coming into being, unless one thinks there is coming into being of seeing and touching, for the using and being-at-work of it is similar to these. And the taking on of knowledge in the first place is not a coming-into-being or an alteration; for it is by the coming to rest [eremesthai] and standing still [stenai] of the thinking part that we are said to know and understand, and there is no coming-into-being into being at rest, for as a whole, there is none of any change, just as was said before. And further, just as when someone is set free from being drunk or sleeping or from being sick, into their opposites, we do not say that someone has becoming knowing again (even though he was incapable of using his knowledge before), nor in the same way when in the first place one takes on the active state [hexis]; for it is by the soul's calming down [kathistasthai] out of its native disorder [phusikes taraches] that it becomes something understanding [phronimon] and knowing [epistemen]. For this reason too, children are able neither to learn nor to judge [krinein] from sense perceptions in the same way as their elders, for their disorder and motion are great. The soul is calmed and brought to rest [eremizetai] for some by nature itself, for others by other people, but in both kinds by the being altered of something in the body, just as in the case of the use and being-at-work, when one has become sober or has been awakened. It is clear, then, from the things said that being altered and alteration come about in perceptible things and in the perceptive part of the soul, but in no other thing, except incidentally." (247b1-248a9)

### end VII.3 ###

"[S]ometimes when there is no motion [kinesis] at all present in us, though we are still we are nevertheless at one time set in motion, and a beginning [arche] of motion comes to be present in us from out of ourselves, though nothing outside moved it. For we see nothing like this with soulless things, but something else always moves them from outside, but we say that the animal itself moves itself. So if at one time it is completely at rest, then in a motionless thing a motion would come into being out of itself and not from outside." (252b18-24)

"But the third thing would seem to be most an impasse, that motion comes to inhere in that within which it was not present before, the thing that happens with ensouled things; for having been at rest beforehand, afterwards the ensouled thing walks, having been moved by nothing outside it, as it seems. But this is false. For we always see something moved in an animal, of the parts congenital to it; but the cause of the motion of this is not the animal itself, but perhaps its surroundings. We say it moves itself not in the case of every one of its motions, but in the case of those in respect to place. So nothing prevents, but it is perhaps rather a necessity, that many motions come to be present in the body by means of the surroundings, while some of these set in motion thinking [dianoia] or desire [orexis], and that presently sets in motion the whole animal, such as happens with those that are asleep; for even though no motion of perceiving is present, because some motion is nevertheless present, the animals wake up again." (253a7-20)

"What is itself moved by itself is moved by nature, as is each of the animals. For the animal is moved itself by itself, and whatever things have in themselves a source of motion, we say are moved by nature, and so the animal as a whole itself moves itself by nature..." (254b14-17)

With regard to animals, "it is not whether it is moved by something that is unclear, but how one should distinguish within it the mover and the moved..." (254b28-30)

Self-moving is "indicative of life and peculiar to things with souls..." (255a6-7)

"One who is learning is potentially knowing [dunamei epistemon] in a different way from the one who already has knowledge but is not at work with it [echon ede me energon]. But always, whenever what can act and what can be acted upon are together, what is potential comes to be at work, as the one learning, from being something potentially, becomes something potentially in a different way (for the one having knowledge but not contemplating [theoron] is potentially knowing in a certain way, but not in the way he was before having learned), and once he is in this condition, if nothing prevents it, he is at work and contemplates, or else he would be in the contradictory condition, that of ignorance." (255a33-255b5)

"... the knower immediately contemplates [theorei] if nothing prevents it..." (255b22-23)

"It has been set down that it is what is movable that is moved; but this is something that is moved potentially, not actively-and-completely [ouk entelecheiai], and what is the case potentially goes over into being-active-and-complete [entelecheiai], and motion is an incomplete being-active-and-complete [entelecheia ateles] of the moveable thing. But the thing that causes motion is already in activity [energeiai], as what causes heat is what is hot, and in general what brings something into being is what has the form [eidos]." (257b6-10)

"It is clear that the whole itself moves itself not by means of some part's being such as itself to move itself, but as a whole it mvoes itself, being moved and moving by means of some part's causing motion and some part's being moved." (258a22-25)

"... among things in motion there is a source of their being moved which itself moves itself, and among all things a source that is motionless; and as for things which themselves move themselves, we see things that are obviously of this kind, namely the class of ensouled things and of animals." (259ba1-3)

"All motions and changes are from opposites to opposites, as, with coming into being and destruction, the limits are being and not being, with alteratino they are contrary attributes, and with increase and decrease [they are] either greatness and smallness or completeness [teleiotes] and incompleteness [ateleia] of size..." (261a32-26)

"One need not be alarmed that the same thing will be contrary to many things, for example, a motion both to standing still and to a motion to its contrary, but one need only grasp this, that the contrary motion is opposite in a certain way both to the motion and to the state of rest, just as what is equal and the mean is opposite both to what exceeds it and what it exceeds, and that it is not possible for opposites, whether motions or changes, to be present at the same time." (261b15-22)

In contrast to the atomists, there are "those who make the soul responsible for motion; for they say that which itself moves itself is the ruling origin [kurios] of moving things, but an animal and everything with a soul moves itself with a motion in respect of place." (265b32-266a2)

END