Poetics
Aristotle
tr. Joe Sachs

"[T]hose doing the imitating imitate people acting [prattontas] and it is necessary that the latter be people either of serious moral stature [σπουδαῖος] or of a low sort [phaulos]...." (1448a1-2)

"[U]nderstanding [manthanei = learning] is most pleasant not only for philosophers but in a similar way for everyone else, though they share in it to a short extent. They delight in seeing images for this reason: because understanding and reasoning out [sullogizesthai] what each thing is results when they contemplate them [theorountas]...." (1448b13-16)

"[T]he more dignified poets imitated beautiful actions and people of the sort who perform them...." (1448b25-26)

"[T]he ridiculous [geloion] is a certain sort of missing the mark [hamartema] and a deformity that is painless and not destructive...." (1449a34-35)

"Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action of serious stature [σπουδαῖος] and complete [teleios], having magnitude [μέγεθος]...." (1449b24-25) [PSA: I might render μέγεθος as "grandeur".]

"[A]ction is performed by particular people engaged in action, who must necessarily be of some particular sort in both character [ethos] and thinking [dianoia] (for it is on account of these that we say the actions too are of certain sorts, and as a result of *these* that everyone succeeds or fails....  [B]y 'states of character' I mean that as a result of which we say the people who act are of certain particular sorts, and by 'thinking' all those thins they saw in which they demonstrate something [apodeiknumi] or even declare an opinion...." (1449b36-1450a7)

Of the aspects of a tragedy, "the greatest of these is the organization [sunesis] of the things done. For tragedy is an imitation not of people but of actions [praxeis] and life [bios]. Both happiness [eudaimonina] and wretchedness [kakodaimonia] consist in action, and the end [τέλος] is a certain sort of action, not a quality [poiotes]; while people are of certain sorts as a result of their characters, it is as a result of their actions that they are happy or the opposite. Therefore, it is not that they act in order that they might imitate states of character; rather, they include states of character conjointly on account of the actions. So the actions performed and the story are the end of tragedy, and the end is the greatest of all things." (1450a15-23)

"[T]ragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete [teleois] and whole [holos] and that has some magnitude [μέγεθος]...." (1450b23-25)

"[W]hat is beautiful, both an animal and every organized thing made of any parts, needs not only to have these arranged in an orderly [tetagmena] way but also to start out with a magnitude [μέγεθος] that is not random (beauty consisting in magnitude as well as order [taxis])...." (1450b34-37)

"[T]he parts of the actions performed ought to be organized in such a way that, when any part is displaced or removed, the whole becomes something different and changes. For that which makes no noticeable difference when it is there or not there is no part of the whole." (1451a32-35) [PSA: cf 1106b9-14]

"In connection with states of character, there are four things at which one ought to aim. One such thing, and the primary one, is that they be solidly reliable [chresta]. A state [ἕξις] of character will be present if, as has been said, speech or action makes some choice [prohairesis] apparent, whatever it may be, and a solidly reliable choice indicates a solidly reliable character.... The second thing is that character be fitting [harmottonta]; for it is possible for a woman to be manly in character, but it is not fitting for her to be so manly or terrifying. The third thing is that character be lifelike [homoios], for this is a different thing from making the character reliable and fitting in the way already described. The fourth thing is that character be consistent [homalos], for even if the person showing himself in the imitation is someone who is inconsistent and that sort of character is taken as given, he should still be consistently inconsistent.... And in states of character, just as in the organization of the actions, one should in a similar way always seek either what is necessary or what is likely, namely a persno with the sort of character that is either bound or likely to say or do the sorts of things he says or does, as well as that it be necessary or likely for this to happen after that." (1454a16-36)

"Now while a source of wonder [to thaumaston] needs to be produced in tragedies, there is more room in epic poetry, since we are not looking at the person acting, for something unaccountable, by means of which a source of wonder results most easily.... And wonder is pleasant." (1460a12-17)

END