Politics
Aristotle
tr. Joe Sachs

[these notes are a work in progress]

"For that which has the power to foresee by thinking [τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν] is naturally ruling [ἄρχον] and naturally mastering [δεσπόζον], but what has the power to carry out those things with the body is ruled and is naturally slavish; hence the same thing is advantageous to a master and to a slave. And by nature, the female and the slave are distinct. (For nature does nothing stintingly, the way the bronze-workers make the Delphic knife, but one thing for one job, since in that way, by serving not for many jobs but for one, each of the instruments accomplishes its work in the most beautiful manner.)" (1252a31-1252b5)

"The complete association [κοινωνία τελείος] made of more than one village is a city, since at that point, so to speak, it gets to the threshold of full self-sufficiency [αὐταρκεία], coming into being for the sake of living, but being for the sake of living well. Hence every city is by nature, if in fact the first forms of association are as well. For it is their end [τέλος], and nature is an end; for what each thing is when it has reached the completion [τελεσθείσης] of its coming into being is that which we say is the nature of each, as with a human being, a horse, a house. And that for the sake of which, the end, is also what is best, and self-sufficiency is both an end and what is best." (1252b27-1253a1)

"A city is more primary by nature than a household, and more primary than each one of us, for the whole is necessarily more primary than its parts. For if the whole is done away with, there will not be a foot or a hand, except in an ambiguous sense, as if one were to speak of a hand made of stone (for once it has been disabled it will be like that); but all things are defined by their work and their potency, so when they are no longer of the sort defined they cannot be called the same things except ambiguously. So it is clear both that the city is by nature and that it is more primary than each person, for if each person is not self-sufficient when separate, he will be in a condition similar to that of other parts in relation to the whole, and one who is no part of a city, either from lacking the power to be in an association or from needing nothing [μηδὲν δεόμενος] on account of self-sufficiency, is for that reason either a beast or a god." (1253a18-29)

"For just as a human being in a state of completeness [τελεωθείς] is the best of all animals, so too, one who is separated from law and a judicial process is the worst of them all. For injustice is the most severe when it has weapons, and a human being is born having weapons for good judgment and virtue which are capable of being used to their utmost for their opposites." (1253a31-35) [PSA: the opposites of φρόνησις and ἀρετή are πανουργία and μοχθηρία]

"For in cases in which anything is organized out of a number of things, whether continuous or separated, and becomes some one thing in common, something that rules and something that is ruled become apparent in them all, and this carries over from nature as a whole into beings with souls." (1254a28-32) [PSA: this hints at an analogy between the organization of the city and the organization of the human soul]

With regard to household management, Aristotle says: "for all those who have the opportunity [ἐξουσία = liberty] to avoid being bothered with it themselves, a manager takes on that office, while they devote themselves to political or philosophic activity." (1255b35-37)

"So one form of natural skill at acquisition [κτητική] is a part of household management, because it either needs to have available or provide a means to make available a supply of possessions necessary for life [ζωή] and useful for association [κοινωνία] in a city or household. And it seems that true wealth, at any rate, it made up of those things. For self-sufficiency in this sort of property for a good life [πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν] is not unlimited the way Solon claims in the verse 'no upper limit of wealth is laid down in the sight of men.'" (1256b26-34)

In I.9 Aristotle identifies a limitless kind of acquisition [κτητικῆς] we could call amassing [χρηματιστική] (Sachs renders the term as "provisioning"); Aristotle observes: "What is responsible for this attitude is being zealous [σπουδάζειν = serious] about living but not about living well [τὸ εὖ ζῆν]. So since that desire [ἐπιθυμία = craving] is of unlimited extent, they also desire what produces an unlimited supply of things." (1257b40-1258a2) Furthermore, such people turn every craft - such as medicine or warmaking - into an opportunity for amassing wealth, "as though this were their end [τέλος]." (1258a13)

"The most craftlike [τεχνικώταται] kinds of work are those where chance is present the least, the most mechanical [βαναυσόταται] those in which people's bodies get the most wear and tear, the most slavish [δουλικώταται] those where there is the greatest use of the body, and the most debased [ἀγεννέσταται] those where there is least need of virtue in addition." (1258b35-39)

The story of Thales and the olive presses shows that "it is an easy thing for philosophers to get rich if they want to, though that is not what they are serious about." (1259a17-18) [PSA: this is connected to the fact that philosophers differ from sophists in their προαίρεσις.]

"This is something that needs to be examined about one who is ruled by nature and who rules: whether virtue is the same or different. For if both ought to participate in complete goodness [καλοκαγαθία], why should the one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? For it is not possible for them to differ by greater and less since being ruled and ruling differ in form and in no respect as greater and less.... And this leads straight to a consideration of the soul, for there is in it by nature something ruling and something ruled, of which we claim there are different virtues, as of the part having reason and the irrational part." (1259b32-1260a7)

"[T]he slave wholly lacks the deliberative capacity [τὸ βουλευτικόν], while the female has it, but without authority [ἄκυρον], and the child has it, but incomplete [ἀτελές]. It must likewise be assumed that this necessarily holds for the virtues of character as well, that everyone needs to participate in them but not in the same way, but each to the extent that concerns his own work [πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον]. Hence the one who rules ought to have complete virtue of character (for work is the responsibility of the master-craftsman in an unqualified way, and reason is a master-craftsman), but each of the others as much falls to his lot." (1260a12-20)

"Since a child is incomplete [ἀτελής], it is clear that virtue does not belong to its present self in relation to itself [πρὸς αὑτόν] but in relation to its end [πρὸς τὸ τέλος] and the one guiding it there." (1260a31-33)

"A household is more self-sufficient than one person, and a city than a household, and what is means to be a city is to be at that point at which the association of a multiplicity of people turns out to be self-sufficient. So if what is more self-sufficient is more worthy of choice, then what is less of a *one* is more worthy of choice." (1261b11-15) [PSA: this statement seems paradoxical, but the point is that a city is not monolithic but is an *organic* unity of multiple households, neighborhoods, economic functions, etc.; if the soul is like a city, then this insight is relevant also to human fulfillment as inclusive of many different aspects of the person.]

"And one ought to look at the amount of property as well, whether it might be better to determine this differently in some clearer manner. For he [Socrates] says it ought to be enough to live moderately [σωφρόνως], as if one were to say enough to live well, since that is more general. Yet it is possible to live moderately but wretchedly [ταλαιπώρως], and a better limit would be "with moderation and generosity [ἐλευθερίως = liberality?]" (for apart from the one, luxuriousness would result, and drudgery apart from the other), since these are the only states of character worthy of choice that have to do with the use of wealth; there is no such thing as using wealth gently or courageously for example, but there is such a thing as using it moderately and generously, so it is necessary for these states of character to apply to it as well." (1265a28-38)

"This is one of the most necessary things to see to from the beginning, how the best people will be enabled to be at leisure [σχολάζειν] and not do anything demeaning [ἀσχημονεῖν], and not only while they are ruling but even in private life." (1273a32-35)

"Practical judgment [φρόνησις] is the only virtue peculiar [ἴδιος] to a ruler [ἄρχοντος]. The rest seem common to those who are ruled and those who rule, but it is not practical judgment that is a virtue in one who is ruled but rather true opinion. The one ruled is like a flute maker while the ruler is like the flute player who uses it." (1277b26-32) [PSA: the same principle would seem to apply within the soul: the part of the soul that is authoritative [κυρίος] engages in φρόνησις, whereas the part that listens merely possesses true opinion; as to the last sentence in the quoted passage, when Aristotle says that the flute player uses "it" does he refer to the flute maker or the flute or both?]

"[A] human being is by nature an animal meant for a city. For this reason, even when they have no need of assistance from one another, people are no less desirous of living together. But their common advantage brings them together too, in proportion as it falls to the lot of each to have a part in living beautifully. This, then, it the highest end for them all, both in common and separately. But they also come together and hold the political association together for the sake of life itself. For there is perhaps some portion of the beautiful present in and resulting from the mere and sole activity of living, as long as the hardships that come along with life are not too great a burden. It is obvious that most human beings will endure great suffering while clinging to life, as if there is in it a certain joyfulness and natural sweetness." (1278b19-30)

"[I]t is the proper business of someone who is treating any pursuit philosophically, and not just looking ahead to the practice of it, not to overlook or leave out any difficulty [ἀπορία], but to bring to light the truth about each one." (1279b12-15)

"If people came together and entered into association for the sake of possessions, they would have a share in the city exactly as much as they had a share in property, and the argument of the oligarchs would consequently seem to be strong.... But they do not do so just for the sake of living but instead for the sake of living well. Otherwise there could even be a city made up of slaves, or of the other animals, but as it is there is none, because they do not share in happiness or in living in accordance with choice [κατὰ προαίρεσιν]." (1280a25-34)

"[A] city is instead an association of households and families in living well, for the sake of a complete [τελείας] and self-sufficient [αὐτάρκους] life. This will not be possible, however, unless they occupy one and the same place and practice intermarriage. This is why marriages came within the purview of cities, along with fraternal organizations, religious rites, and shared forms of recreation. And this sort of thing is the work of friendship, because friendship is a choice to live life in common [συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία]. The end aimed at by a city is living well, and these things are for the sake of that end. And a city is an association of families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life. And we claim that this is living happily and beautifully." (1280b33-1281a2)

"[L]aws rightly laid down ought to be in authority, while the ruler, whether this is one person or more than one, ought to be in authority over those things that laws are utterly incapable of speaking precisely about, since it is not easy to make universal determinations about everything." (1282b2-6) [PSA: this principle also holds within the soul; cf. the role of φρόνησις in ruling and living]

"[I]n any art whatever, it is foolish to govern things by written rules [κατὰ γράμματα].... So for the same reason it is obvious that the best form of government is not one under written rules and laws. But surely that sort of universal account [τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου] ought to be present to those who rule. And that which has no passionate ingredient [παθητικὸν] in it as all is superior to that in which it is innate [συμφυές], and while this is not present in the law, every human soul [ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην] necessarily contains it." (1286a11-20)

"[A]n orderly arrangement [τάξις] is a law. Therefore having the law rule is more choiceworthy than having any one of the citizens do so, and by the same argument, even if it is better for some one of them to rule, they should be set up as protectors and servants of the laws. For it is necessary that there be some rulers, but they claim it is not just for that to be one person so long as all the people are alike. And as for those things the law does not seem capable of determining [διορίζειν], a human being would not be capable of knowing [γνωρίζειν] either. But the law educates people for this very purpose, and sets up rulers to judge and administer [κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν] what it leaves out as justly as their judgment [γνὠμη] permits. Furthermore, the laws allow themelves to be corrected [ἐπανορθοῦσθαι] by whatever seems to those with experience [πειρωμένοις] to be better than what they lay down. So it seems that one who bids law to rule is bidding a god and reason to rule by themselves, while one who bids a human being to rule is adding a beast. For that is the sort of thing desire [ἐπιθυμία] is, and spirited passion [θυμός] warps [διαστρέφει] even the best men when they rule. That is why the law is intellect [νοῦς] without appetite [ὄρεξις]." (1287a18-32) [PSA: there are insights here regarding the operation of φρόνησις in governance]

"So it is clear that in seeking what is just, people are seeking the mean [τὸ μέσον], since law is the mean." (1287b3-4)

"What is the best form of government, and what is the best life for most cities and most human beings? The questioms are posed not to those who measure by a standard of virtue that is beyond ordinary people, or by an education that requires a fortunate nature and resources, or by having in place a government one might wish for, but by a life that is possible for most people to share and a form of government which most cities are capable of taking part in." (1295a25-31) [PSA: these remarks might shed light on the audience for whom the Politics - and by extension the EN and EE - were written.]

"Judgment about all these things is drawn from the same elements. For if it was beautifully said in the Ethics [i.e., EE 1153b9-21] that the happy life is one in accord with unimpeded virtue [κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον], and that virtue is a mean [μεσότητα], then the mean [τὸ μέσον] in life, consisting of a mean condition [μεσότητα] every person is capable of attaining, would necessarily be best, and these same terms would necessarily also apply to the virtue and vice of a city and a government, since a form of government is one sort of life of a city. And in all cities, the city has three parts - those who are exceptionally well off, those who are exceptionally needy, and those in the third group in between these. Now since it is agreed that measure [τὸ μέτριον] and the mean [τὸ μέσον] are best, it is clear that even with the gifts of fortune, a moderate possession [ἡ κτῆσις ἡ μέση] is best of all. For that makes it easiest to be obedient to reason [τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν], whereas an extreme degree of beauty, strength, high birth, or wealth, or the opposite of these, an extreme degree of beggarliness or weakness or exceptional dishonor make it hard to follow reason. For the one sort tend more to become insolent [ὑβρισταὶ] and vicious [μεγαλοπόνηροι] on a grand scale, while the other sort are too apt to become dishonest and succumb to petty vices; and acts of injustice stem from either insolence or dishonesty. Also, those in the middle range are least likely to avoid ruling or be eager to rule, and both these things are harmful to cities. And in addition to these things, those who have an overabundance of the goods of fortune - strength, wealth, friends, and other things of that sort - do not want to be ruled and do not even know how to. And this is already part of them straight from when they are children at home, for the result of luxury is that they do not get into the habit of being ruled even in their schoolrooms. But those who suffer from an extreme state of neediness in these things are too broken in spirit. Consequently, the latter sort of people do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled under a slavish rule, while the former sort do not know how to be ruled in any way at all, but only how to rule the way slavemasters rule. So a city comes to consist of slaves and masters and not of a free people [οὐκ ἐλευθέρων], with one group resentful and the other contemptuous. These things are the farthest removed from friendship and political association, for association has a friendly character." (1295a34-1295b24)

"For lawlessness creeps in unnoticed, in the same way that a small expenditure frequently repeated wastes away one's property. But the expense goes unnoticed because it does not happen all together, for one's thinking [διάνοια] reasons falsely [παραλογίζεται] about the expenditures, as with the sophistical argument, 'if each is small, then all are too.'" (1307b32-37)

"And besides all these things, there is something that must not be disregarded, which is disregarded at present in the deviant forms of government: the mean [τὸ μέσον]. For many of the things that seem inclined toward popular rule are the undoing of democracies, and many that seem oligarchic undo oligarchies. People who suppose that one of these characteristics is the only virtue [μίαν ἀρετὴν] carry it to the extreme, in ignorance of the fact that, just as it is possible for a nose to deviate from the straightness that is most beautiful, toward being hooked or turned up, but still be beautiful and graceful to the eye, thought if one were to stretch it any further to the extreme, he would first of all be throwing out the fitting proportion [μετριότητα] of the part, and finally get to the point at which he would make it not even look like a nose, on account of its excess in one of the opposite directions and deficiency in the other. And it is the same way with the other parts as well, and this happens with forms of government too. For it is possible for oligarchy and democracy to be in good enough shape even though they are departures from the best arrangement [τάξις], but if one were to stretch either of them any further, he would first of all make the government worse, and finally make it not even a government. This is why this is something the lawgiver and student of politics must not be ignorant of." (1309b18-36) [PSA: Aristotle's mention of "the only virtue" suggests that a balance of virtues is required both in governance and within the soul; this further suggests that Aristotle's talk about "complete virtue" is not misplaced]

"The tyrannical objective [σκοπός] is what is pleasant; the kingly objective is what is beautiful [τὸ καλόν]. Hence the objects of tyrannical ambition are things of monetary value, while those of the kingly sort lead to honor [τιμή] instead." (1311a4-7)

"Tyrannies are preserved in two ways that are complete opposites. One of these is the traditional method by which most tyrants maintain control of their rule .... by cutting down those who stand out and getting rid of those with proud thoughts, and not allowing common meals, clubs, education, or anything else of that sort, but guarding against everything from which two things customarily come - pride and trust [φρόνημά τε καὶ πίστις] - and not letting there be any schools or other collegial gatherings for leisured pursuits [σχολαστικούς], and doing everything that will keep all the people as unknown to one another as possible (since familiarity breeds a greater degree of mutual trust). Another measure is to require the townspeople to be always out in the open and spend their time near the palace gates (since in that way what they are doing would be least likely to go unnoticed, and they would get in the habit of thinking small [φρονεῖν ἂν ἐθίζοιντο μικρὸν] and as a result of always living like slaves)." (1313a34-1313b9)

"These things and their like are the characteristic of tyranny and are safeguards of its rule, and there is no sort of vileness they leave out. One may say that they are all encompassed within three forms, for tyranny aims at three things. One is for its subjects to think small, since a small-souled person [μικρόψυχος] would not plot against anyone. A second is for them to distrust one another completely, since a tyranny cannot be overthrown until some people have trust among themselves. And this is the reason tyrants make war on decent people as detrimental to their rule - not just because such people do not think they deserve to be ruled like slaves by a master, but also because they are trusted, among themselves and by others, and do not inform on their own kind or anyone else. And the third aim is a lack of power for action, since no one attempts impossible things, and hence no one overthrows a tyranny if the power to do so is not there. So the ultimate terms into which the intentions of tyrants are reducible are just these three, since one may trace every tyrannical measure back to these three underlying purposes: making the people not trust each other, making them have no power, and making them think small." (1314a12-29)

"For a license [ἐξουσία] to act however one wishes leaves no capacity to guard against the baser element [φαῦλον] in every human being." (1318b39-1319a1)

"[M]ost people find it more pleasant to live an undisciplined life [τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως] than a moderate one [σωφρόνως]." (1318b31-32) [PSA: to live ἀτάκτως is to live without τάξις]

"This is why one must first have agreement about which way of life [βίος] is most worthy of choice [αἱρετώτατος] for practically everyone." (1323a18-19)

"[O]f the three classes of goods - external ones, those of the body, and those of the soul - all of them must belong to those who are blessedly happy [μακαρίοις]." (1323a25-27)

"[L]iving happily, whether this is found by human beings in enjoyment or in virtue or both, belongs to a greater extent to those who have set in order [κεκοσμημένοις] their character [ἦθος] and thinking [διἀνοια] to the utmost and are moderate [μετριάζουσιν] about the acquisition [κτῆσις] of external goods." (1323b1-4)

"[E]ach of the goods pertaining to the soul is more useful [χρήσιμον] to exactly the same extent that it goes on increasing, if indeed one ought to speak of these things too not only as beautiful [καλόν] but also as useful. And in general it is clear that we will maintain that the best conditions of a variety of things in relation to one another follow the ranking of priority which is allotted to those things of which we say they are the conditions. So if the soul is a more valuable [τιμιώτερον = more glorious] thing, both simply and for us, than both possessions and the body, then it is necessary that the best conditions of each have a relation corresponding to these things. Furthermore, it is the soul for the sake of which these things are naturally worthy of choice, and for the sake of which all those who think soundly [εὖ φρονοῦντας] ought to choose them, and not the soul for their sake." (1323b10-21)

"[T]he best city is one that is happy and gets along beautifully. But it is impossible for those who do not perform beautiful actions to get along beautifully, and there is no beautiful deed [καλὸν ἔργον], whether of a man or of a city, apart from virtue and good judgment [χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως]. And courage, justice, good judgment, and moderation in a city have the same power and form [δύναμις καὶ μορφὴ] that every human being who is called courageous, just, sensible, and moderate participates in." (1323b30-36)

"[T]he best way of life [βίος ἄριστος], both separately for each person and in common for cities, is one equipped with virtue to such an extent that one can take part in the actions that proceed from virtue." (1323b40-1324a2)

WIP