Politics
Aristotle
tr. Joe Sachs

"For that which has the power to foresee by thinking [τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν] is naturally ruling [ἄρχον] and naturally mastering [δεσπόζον], but what has the power to carry out those things with the body is ruled and is naturally slavish; hence the same thing is advantageous to a master and to a slave. And by nature, the female and the slave are distinct. (For nature does nothing stintingly, the way the bronze-workers make the Delphic knife, but one thing for one job, since in that way, by serving not for many jobs but for one, each of the instruments accomplishes its work in the most beautiful manner.)" (1252a31-1252b5)

"The complete association [κοινωνία τελείος] made of more than one village is a city, since at that point, so to speak, it gets to the threshold of full self-sufficiency [αὐταρκεία], coming into being for the sake of living, but being for the sake of living well. Hence every city is by nature, if in fact the first forms of association are as well. For it is their end [τέλος], and nature is an end; for what each thing is when it has reached the completion [τελεσθείσης] of its coming into being is that which we say is the nature of each, as with a human being, a horse, a house. And that for the sake of which, the end, is also what is best, and self-sufficiency is both an end and what is best." (1252b27-1253a1)

"A city is more primary by nature than a household, and more primary than each one of us, for the whole is necessarily more primary than its parts. For if the whole is done away with, there will not be a foot or a hand, except in an ambiguous sense, as if one were to speak of a hand made of stone (for once it has been disabled it will be like that); but all things are defined by their work and their potency, so when they are no longer of the sort defined they cannot be called the same things except ambiguously. So it is clear both that the city is by nature and that it is more primary than each person, for if each person is not self-sufficient when separate, he will be in a condition similar to that of other parts in relation to the whole, and one who is no part of a city, either from lacking the power to be in an association or from needing nothing [μηδὲν δεόμενος] on account of self-sufficiency, is for that reason either a beast or a god." (1253a18-29)

"For just as a human being in a state of completeness [τελεωθείς] is the best of all animals, so too, one who is separated from law and a judicial process is the worst of them all. For injustice is the most severe when it has weapons, and a human being is born having weapons for good judgment and virtue which are capable of being used to their utmost for their opposites." (1253a31-35) [PSA: the opposites of φρόνησις and ἀρετή are πανουργία and μοχθηρία]

"For in cases in which anything is organized out of a number of things, whether continuous or separated, and becomes some one thing in common, something that rules and something that is ruled become apparent in them all, and this carries over from nature as a whole into beings with souls." (1254a28-32) [PSA: this hints at an analogy between the organization of the city and the organization of the human soul]

With regard to household management, Aristotle says: "for all those who have the opportunity [ἐξουσία = liberty] to avoid being bothered with it themselves, a manager takes on that office, while they devote themselves to political or philosophic activity." (1255b35-37)

"So one form of natural skill at acquisition [κτητική] is a part of household management, because it either needs to have available or provide a means to make available a supply of possessions necessary for life [ζωή] and useful for association [κοινωνία] in a city or household. And it seems that true wealth, at any rate, it made up of those things. For self-sufficiency in this sort of property for a good life [πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν] is not unlimited the way Solon claims in the verse 'no upper limit of wealth is laid down in the sight of men.'" (1256b26-34)

In I.9 Aristotle identifies a limitless kind of acquisition [κτητικῆς] we could call amassing [χρηματιστική] (Sachs renders the term as "provisioning"); Aristotle observes: "What is responsible for this attitude is being zealous [σπουδάζειν = serious] about living but not about living well [τὸ εὖ ζῆν]. So since that desire [ἐπιθυμία = craving] is of unlimited extent, they also desire what produces an unlimited supply of things." (1257b40-1258a2) Furthermore, such people turn every craft - such as medicine or warmaking - into an opportunity for amassing wealth, "as though this were their end [τέλος]." (1258a13)

"The most craftlike [τεχνικώταται] kinds of work are those where chance is present the least, the most mechanical [βαναυσόταται] those in which people's bodies get the most wear and tear, the most slavish [δουλικώταται] those where there is the greatest use of the body, and the most debased [ἀγεννέσταται] those where there is least need of virtue in addition." (1258b35-39)

The story of Thales and the olive presses shows that "it is an easy thing for philosophers to get rich if they want to, though that is not what they are serious about." (1259a17-18) [PSA: this is connected to the fact that philosophers differ from sophists in their προαίρεσις.]

"This is something that needs to be examined about one who is ruled by nature and who rules: whether virtue is the same or different. For if both ought to participate in complete goodness [καλοκαγαθία], why should the one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? For it is not possible for them to differ by greater and less since being ruled and ruling differ in form and in no respect as greater and less.... And this leads straight to a consideration of the soul, for there is in it by nature something ruling and something ruled, of which we claim there are different virtues, as of the part having reason and the irrational part." (1259b32-1260a7)

"[T]he slave wholly lacks the deliberative capacity [τὸ βουλευτικόν], while the female has it, but without authority [ἄκυρον], and the child has it, but incomplete [ἀτελές]. It must likewise be assumed that this necessarily holds for the virtues of character as well, that everyone needs to participate in them but not in the same way, but each to the extent that concerns his own work [πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον]. Hence the one who rules ought to have complete virtue of character (for work is the responsibility of the master-craftsman in an unqualified way, and reason is a master-craftsman), but each of the others as much falls to his lot." (1260a12-20)

"Since a child is incomplete [ἀτελής], it is clear that virtue does not belong to its present self in relation to itself [πρὸς αὑτόν] but in relation to its end [πρὸς τὸ τέλος] and the one guiding it there." (1260a31-33)

"A household is more self-sufficient than one person, and a city than a household, and what is means to be a city is to be at that point at which the association of a multiplicity of people turns out to be self-sufficient. So if what is more self-sufficient is more worthy of choice, then what is less of a *one* is more worthy of choice." (1261b11-15) [PSA: this statement seems paradoxical, but the point is that a city is not monolithic but is an *organic* unity of multiple households, neighborhoods, economic functions, etc.; if the soul is like a city, then this insight is relevant also to human fulfillment as inclusive of many different aspects of the person.]

"And one ought to look at the amount of property as well, whether it might be better to determine this differently in some clearer manner. For he [Socrates] says it ought to be enough to live moderately [σωφρόνως], as if one were to say enough to live well, since that is more general. Yet it is possible to live moderately but wretchedly [ταλαιπώρως], and a better limit would be "with moderation and generosity [ἐλευθερίως = liberality?]" (for apart from the one, luxuriousness would result, and drudgery apart from the other), since these are the only states of character worthy of choice that have to do with the use of wealth; there is no such thing as using wealth gently or courageously for example, but there is such a thing as using it moderately and generously, so it is necessary for these states of character to apply to it as well." (1265a28-38)

"This is one of the most necessary things to see to from the beginning, how the best people will be enabled to be at leisure [σχολάζειν] and not do anything demeaning [ἀσχημονεῖν], and not only while they are ruling but even in private life." (1273a32-35)

"Practical judgment [φρόνησις] is the only virtue peculiar [ἴδιος] to a ruler [ἄρχοντος]. The rest seem common to those who are ruled and those who rule, but it is not practical judgment that is a virtue in one who is ruled but rather true opinion. The one ruled is like a flute maker while the ruler is like the flute player who uses it." (1277b26-32) [PSA: the same principle would seem to apply within the soul: the part of the soul that is authoritative [κυρίος] engages in φρόνησις, whereas the part that listens merely possesses true opinion; as to the last sentence in the quoted passage, when Aristotle says that the flute player uses "it" does he refer to the flute maker or the flute or both?]

"[A] human being is by nature an animal meant for a city. For this reason, even when they have no need of assistance from one another, people are no less desirous of living together. But their common advantage brings them together too, in proportion as it falls to the lot of each to have a part in living beautifully. This, then, it the highest end for them all, both in common and separately. But they also come together and hold the political association together for the sake of life itself. For there is perhaps some portion of the beautiful present in and resulting from the mere and sole activity of living, as long as the hardships that come along with life are not too great a burden. It is obvious that most human beings will endure great suffering while clinging to life, as if there is in it a certain joyfulness and natural sweetness." (1278b19-30)

"[I]t is the proper business of someone who is treating any pursuit philosophically, and not just looking ahead to the practice of it, not to overlook or leave out any difficulty [ἀπορία], but to bring to light the truth about each one." (1279b12-15)

"If people came together and entered into association for the sake of possessions, they would have a share in the city exactly as much as they had a share in property, and the argument of the oligarchs would consequently seem to be strong.... But they do not do so just for the sake of living but instead for the sake of living well. Otherwise there could even be a city made up of slaves, or of the other animals, but as it is there is none, because they do not share in happiness or in living in accordance with choice [κατὰ προαίρεσιν]." (1280a25-34)

"[A] city is instead an association of households and families in living well, for the sake of a complete [τελείας] and self-sufficient [αὐτάρκους] life. This will not be possible, however, unless they occupy one and the same place and practice intermarriage. This is why marriages came within the purview of cities, along with fraternal organizations, religious rites, and shared forms of recreation. And this sort of thing is the work of friendship, because friendship is a choice to live life in common [συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία]. The end aimed at by a city is living well, and these things are for the sake of that end. And a city is an association of families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life. And we claim that this is living happily and beautifully." (1280b33-1281a2)

"[L]aws rightly laid down ought to be in authority, while the ruler, whether this is one person or more than one, ought to be in authority over those things that laws are utterly incapable of speaking precisely about, since it is not easy to make universal determinations about everything." (1282b2-6) [PSA: this principle also holds within the soul; cf. the role of φρόνησις in ruling and living]

"[I]n any art whatever, it is foolish [ἠλίθιον = silly] to govern things by written rules [κατὰ γράμματα].... So for the same reason it is obvious that the best form of government is not one under written rules and laws. But surely that sort of universal account [τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου] ought to be present to those who rule. And that which has no passionate ingredient [παθητικὸν] in it as all is superior to that in which it is innate [συμφυές], and while this is not present in the law, every human soul [ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην] necessarily contains it." (1286a11-20)

"[A]n orderly arrangement [τάξις] is a law. Therefore having the law rule is more choiceworthy than having any one of the citizens do so, and by the same argument, even if it is better for some one of them to rule, they should be set up as protectors and servants of the laws. For it is necessary that there be some rulers, but they claim it is not just for that to be one person so long as all the people are alike. And as for those things the law does not seem capable of determining [διορίζειν], a human being would not be capable of knowing [γνωρίζειν] either. But the law educates people for this very purpose, and sets up rulers to judge and administer [κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν] what it leaves out as justly as their judgment [γνὠμη] permits. Furthermore, the laws allow themelves to be corrected [ἐπανορθοῦσθαι] by whatever seems to those with experience [πειρωμένοις] to be better than what they lay down. So it seems that one who bids law to rule is bidding a god and reason to rule by themselves, while one who bids a human being to rule is adding a beast. For that is the sort of thing desire [ἐπιθυμία] is, and spirited passion [θυμός] warps [διαστρέφει] even the best men when they rule. That is why the law is intellect [νοῦς] without appetite [ὄρεξις]." (1287a18-32) [PSA: there are insights here regarding the operation of φρόνησις in governance]

"So it is clear that in seeking what is just, people are seeking the mean [τὸ μέσον], since law is the mean." (1287b3-4)

"There is a third form of tyranny, the one that seems to be tyranny in the highest sense and is the counterpart to full-scale kingship. And this is necessarily the sort of tyranny there is whenever a monarchy is not subject to review and rules over all those who are the ruler's equals and betters with a view to its own advantage and not that of those who are ruled. For this reason it is involuntary, since no free person willingly puts up with that sort of rule." (1295a17-23)

"What is the best form of government, and what is the best life for most cities and most human beings? The questioms are posed not to those who measure by a standard of virtue that is beyond ordinary people, or by an education that requires a fortunate nature and resources, or by having in place a government one might wish for, but by a life that is possible for most people to share and a form of government which most cities are capable of taking part in." (1295a25-31) [PSA: these remarks might shed light on the audience for whom the Politics - and by extension the EN and EE - were written.]

"Judgment about all these things is drawn from the same elements. For if it was beautifully said in the Ethics [i.e., EE 1153b9-21] that the happy life is one in accord with unimpeded virtue [κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον], and that virtue is a mean [μεσότητα], then the mean [τὸ μέσον] in life, consisting of a mean condition [μεσότητα] every person is capable of attaining, would necessarily be best, and these same terms would necessarily also apply to the virtue and vice of a city and a government, since a form of government is one sort of life of a city. And in all cities, the city has three parts - those who are exceptionally well off, those who are exceptionally needy, and those in the third group in between these. Now since it is agreed that measure [τὸ μέτριον] and the mean [τὸ μέσον] are best, it is clear that even with the gifts of fortune, a moderate possession [ἡ κτῆσις ἡ μέση] is best of all. For that makes it easiest to be obedient to reason [τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν], whereas an extreme degree of beauty, strength, high birth, or wealth, or the opposite of these, an extreme degree of beggarliness or weakness or exceptional dishonor make it hard to follow reason. For the one sort tend more to become insolent [ὑβρισταὶ] and vicious [μεγαλοπόνηροι] on a grand scale, while the other sort are too apt to become dishonest and succumb to petty vices; and acts of injustice stem from either insolence or dishonesty. Also, those in the middle range are least likely to avoid ruling or be eager to rule, and both these things are harmful to cities. And in addition to these things, those who have an overabundance of the goods of fortune - strength, wealth, friends, and other things of that sort - do not want to be ruled and do not even know how to. And this is already part of them straight from when they are children at home, for the result of luxury is that they do not get into the habit of being ruled even in their schoolrooms. But those who suffer from an extreme state of neediness in these things are too broken in spirit. Consequently, the latter sort of people do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled under a slavish rule, while the former sort do not know how to be ruled in any way at all, but only how to rule the way slavemasters rule. So a city comes to consist of slaves and masters and not of a free people [οὐκ ἐλευθέρων], with one group resentful and the other contemptuous. These things are the farthest removed from friendship and political association, for association has a friendly character." (1295a34-1295b24)

"For lawlessness creeps in unnoticed, in the same way that a small expenditure frequently repeated wastes away one's property. But the expense goes unnoticed because it does not happen all together, for one's thinking [διάνοια] reasons falsely [παραλογίζεται] about the expenditures, as with the sophistical argument, 'if each is small, then all are too.'" (1307b32-37)

"And besides all these things, there is something that must not be disregarded, which is disregarded at present in the deviant forms of government: the mean [τὸ μέσον]. For many of the things that seem inclined toward popular rule are the undoing of democracies, and many that seem oligarchic undo oligarchies. People who suppose that one of these characteristics is the only virtue [μίαν ἀρετὴν] carry it to the extreme, in ignorance of the fact that, just as it is possible for a nose to deviate from the straightness that is most beautiful, toward being hooked or turned up, but still be beautiful and graceful to the eye, thought if one were to stretch it any further to the extreme, he would first of all be throwing out the fitting proportion [μετριότητα] of the part, and finally get to the point at which he would make it not even look like a nose, on account of its excess in one of the opposite directions and deficiency in the other. And it is the same way with the other parts as well, and this happens with forms of government too. For it is possible for oligarchy and democracy to be in good enough shape even though they are departures from the best arrangement [τάξις], but if one were to stretch either of them any further, he would first of all make the government worse, and finally make it not even a government. This is why this is something the lawgiver and student of politics must not be ignorant of." (1309b18-36) [PSA: Aristotle's mention of "the only virtue" suggests that a balance of virtues is required both in governance and within the soul; this further suggests that Aristotle's talk about "complete virtue" is not misplaced]

"The tyrannical objective [σκοπός] is what is pleasant; the kingly objective is what is beautiful [τὸ καλόν]. Hence the objects of tyrannical ambition are things of monetary value, while those of the kingly sort lead to honor [τιμή] instead." (1311a4-7)

"Tyrannies are preserved in two ways that are complete opposites. One of these is the traditional method by which most tyrants maintain control of their rule .... by cutting down those who stand out and getting rid of those with proud thoughts, and not allowing common meals, clubs, education, or anything else of that sort, but guarding against everything from which two things customarily come - pride and trust [φρόνημά τε καὶ πίστις] - and not letting there be any schools or other collegial gatherings for leisured pursuits [σχολαστικούς], and doing everything that will keep all the people as unknown to one another as possible (since familiarity breeds a greater degree of mutual trust). Another measure is to require the townspeople to be always out in the open and spend their time near the palace gates (since in that way what they are doing would be least likely to go unnoticed, and they would get in the habit of thinking small [φρονεῖν ἂν ἐθίζοιντο μικρὸν] and as a result of always living like slaves)." (1313a34-1313b9)

"[A] valued person in both [tyrannies and democracies] is the flatterer [κὀλαξ]: in popular governments this is the demagogue, since a demagogue is a flatterer of the populace, and with tyrants it is those who hang around them in a self-abasing manner, which is how flattery works. And it is for this reason that tyranny is friendly to corrupt people, since tyrants enjoy being flattered, and this is something no one who thinks like a free person would do. Decent people are friends; in other words, they do not flatter. And corrupt people are useful for corrupt employments - a nail hammered at a nail, as the proverb has it. And it is characteristic of a tyrant to take no pleasure in anyone dignified [σεμνός] or free [ἐλευθέρος]. For the tyrant considers himself to be the only person of that sort, and anyone who matches him in dignity and carries himself like a free person robs tyranny of what is exceptional and masterful about it." (1313b39-1314a9)

"These things and their like are the characteristic of tyranny and are safeguards of its rule, and there is no sort of vileness they leave out. One may say that they are all encompassed within three forms, for tyranny aims at three things. One is for its subjects to think small, since a small-souled person [μικρόψυχος] would not plot against anyone. A second is for them to distrust one another completely, since a tyranny cannot be overthrown until some people have trust among themselves. And this is the reason tyrants make war on decent people as detrimental to their rule - not just because such people do not think they deserve to be ruled like slaves by a master, but also because they are trusted, among themselves and by others, and do not inform on their own kind or anyone else. And the third aim is a lack of power for action, since no one attempts impossible things, and hence no one overthrows a tyranny if the power to do so is not there. So the ultimate terms into which the intentions of tyrants are reducible are just these three, since one may trace every tyrannical measure back to these three underlying purposes: making the people not trust each other, making them have no power, and making them think small." (1314a12-29)

"For a license [ἐξουσία] to act however one wishes leaves no capacity to guard against the baser element [φαῦλον] in every human being." (1318b39-1319a1)

"[M]ost people find it more pleasant to live an undisciplined life [τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως] than a moderate one [σωφρόνως]." (1318b31-32) [PSA: to live ἀτάκτως is to live without τάξις]

"This is why one must first have agreement about which way of life [βίος] is most worthy of choice [αἱρετώτατος] for practically everyone." (1323a18-19)

"[O]f the three classes of goods - external ones, those of the body, and those of the soul - all of them must belong to those who are blessedly happy [μακαρίοις]." (1323a25-27)

"[L]iving happily, whether this is found by human beings in enjoyment or in virtue or both, belongs to a greater extent to those who have set in order [κεκοσμημένοις] their character [ἦθος] and thinking [διἀνοια] to the utmost and are moderate [μετριάζουσιν] about the acquisition [κτῆσις] of external goods." (1323b1-4)

"[E]ach of the goods pertaining to the soul is more useful [χρήσιμον] to exactly the same extent that it goes on increasing, if indeed one ought to speak of these things too not only as beautiful [καλόν] but also as useful. And in general it is clear that we will maintain that the best conditions of a variety of things in relation to one another follow the ranking of priority which is allotted to those things of which we say they are the conditions. So if the soul is a more valuable [τιμιώτερον = more glorious] thing, both simply and for us, than both possessions and the body, then it is necessary that the best conditions of each have a relation corresponding to these things. Furthermore, it is the soul for the sake of which these things are naturally worthy of choice, and for the sake of which all those who think soundly [εὖ φρονοῦντας] ought to choose them, and not the soul for their sake." (1323b10-21)

"[T]he best city is one that is happy and gets along beautifully [καλῶς πράττειν]. But it is impossible for those who do not perform beautiful actions to get along beautifully, and there is no beautiful deed [καλὸν ἔργον], whether of a man or of a city, apart from virtue and good judgment [χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως]. And courage, justice, good judgment, and moderation in a city have the same power and form [δύναμις καὶ μορφὴ] that every human being who is called courageous, just, sensible, and moderate participates in." (1323b30-36)

"[T]he best way of life [βίος ἄριστος], both separately for each person and in common for cities, is one equipped with virtue to such an extent that one can take part in the actions that proceed from virtue." (1323b40-1324a2)

"Something that remains to be said is whether one should claim that happiness is the same or not the same in each one human being and in a city, but this fact is obvious, since everyone would agree that they are the same." (1324a5-7)

"But then there are the following two questions that need examination. One is whether the life more worthy of choice is that lived by being governed in common and sharing in a city [συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως], or rather that of an outsider [ξενικὸς] free of the bonds of political association [τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος]. And the other, regardless of whether sharing in a city is worthy of choice for everyone or for most though not for some, is which form of government and which way of arranging a city one ought to rank as best." [PSA: on "the life of a stranger" as a reference to that of the philosopher, see ARENDT-1977a p. 53]

"Now it is obvious that the best form of government would necessarily be that ordering [τάξις] by which anyone whatsoever could act the best [ἄριστα πράττοι] and live blessedly [ζῴη μακαρίως]. But among the very people who agree that the life involving virtue is most worthy of choice, there is disagreement about whether a political and active life [ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος] is preferable, or rather one which is free of dependence on all external things [ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος], such as some sort of contemplative life [θεωρητικός τις], which some claim is the only sort for a philosopher." (1324a23-29)

"As for those who agree that the life most worthy of choice is one involving virtue, but differ about the pursuit of it, a reply needs to be made by us to both these groups. For the one group dismisses the worthiness of political offices, in the belief that the life of a free person [τὸν τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίον] is the most choiceworthy of all, and is different from that of someone engaged in political life; the other believes that the latter is best, since it is impossible for someone who engages in no action to get along well [ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ], and that well-being [εὐπραγία] and happiness [εὐδαιμονία] are the same thing. Both groups are right in some of the things they say and not right about others. One group says that the life of a free person is better than one devoted to mastery, and this is true, since there is nothing grand [σεμνός = revered, holy] about using a slave as a slave; giving orders [ἐπίταξις = commanding] about necessities [τῶν ἀναγκαίων] plays no part in beautiful deeds [τῶν καλῶν]. To regard every sort of rule [πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν] as being mastery [δεσποτείαν], however, is not right, for the separation between rule over free people and rule over slaves is no less than that between what is itself free by nature and what is naturally a slave. But distinctions about these things were made sufficiently in our first chapters. And it is not true to praise inaction [τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν] over action [τὸ πράττειν], and the actions of just and moderate people also contain the fulfillment of many beautiful things [καλῶν τέλος]." (1325a16-34) [PSA: Note the similarity between ἐγκράτεια as overruling one's emotions and "giving orders" [ἐπίταξις] or governing by commanding or overmastering. (It is difficult to find the right vocabulary for these distinctions.) By contrast, the internal authority of phronesis and sophia resembles the political authority of a ruler who is a servant of the laws instituted among a free people, cf 1287a18ff.]

"Then if these things are beautifully argued and happiness needs to be set down as well-being in action [εὐπραγία], the active life [ὁ πρακτικός] would be the best one, both for a whole city in common and for each person. But it is not necessary for what is active to be directed toward others [πρὸς ἑτέρους], as some imagine, nor is it necessary that the only active thoughts [διάνοια] are those that are for the sake of the consequences [ἀποβαινόντων] that come from acting; rather, those acts of contemplation [θεωρία] and thinking [διάνοια] that are ends in themselves [αὐτοτελεῖς] and for their own sake [αὑτῶν ἕνεκεν] are much more active. For their end is well-being [εὐπραξία τέλος], so that it too is an action [πρᾶξίς τις]. And even in the case of external actions, we speak of those who are master-planners [ἀρχιτέκτονας] of those actions by means of their thinking [διάνοια] as *acting* in the most authoritative [κυρίως] way. And certainly cities situated off by themselves that choose to live that way are not necessarily inactive [ἀπρακτεῖν], since it is also possible for action to take place among its parts [κατὰ μέρη], because the parts of a city have many kinds of interaction [κοινωνίαι] with one another. And this is similarly the case with human beings, for any one of them at all. For otherwise the god and the whole cosmos, which have no external actions over and above their own [οἰκείας] within themselves, could hardly be in a good condition [σχολῇ ... εἶχε καλῶς = could hardly be beautifully at leisure? CHECKTHIS in other translations]. So it is obvious that the same way of life is necessarily best for each human being and for cities and human beings in common." (1325b14-32) [PSA: this argument seems somewhat odd, because the god does not have parts that interact with one another; however, on Aristotle's psychology this is true of human beings and reinforces the importance of internal τάξις]

"For there is also a certain work [ἔργον] that belongs to a city, so that city ought to be thought of as greatest which is most capable of accomplishing this work." (1326a13-14)

"For the actions of the city are those of either the rulers or the ruled, and the job [ἔργον] of a ruler is command [ἐπίταξις] and decision [κρίσις]." (1326b12-14)

"For the nations in cold regions, particularly those in Europe, are full of spiritedness [θυμός] but deficient in thinking [διάνοια] and art [τέχνη], which is why they are more successful at staying free, but are nonpolitical and not capable of ruling their neighbors. But those in Asia, though they have an aptitude for thinking and art in their souls, are unspirited, which is why they stay subject and enslaved. But just as the race of Greeks is in the middle [μεσεύει] in terms of places, it likewise has a share in both temperaments, for it is both spirited and thoughtful; this is why it both stays free and is best governed, and it is capable of ruling everyone if it were to unite in a single government. And the same distinction holds among the Greek peoples in relation to one another, since some have a one-sided nature while others are well blended of both these capacities [δυνάμεις]. It is clear, then, that people who are going to be easily led toward virtue by a lawgiver need to be both thoughtful and spirited." (1327b23-38)

"And since the best thing is happiness, and this is the being-at-work of virtue [ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια] and some complete way of putting it into practice [χρῆσίς τις τέλειος], and it so happens that some people are capable of sharing in it while others have little or no capacity, it is clear that this is the reason why more than one form of city and variety of government arises. For since each group hunts for this in a different way and by different means, this produces different ways of life [βίοι] and forms of government." (1328a37-1328b2)

After discussing the functions of a city (food, crafts, defense, money, religion, and mutual decision-making [κρίσις] about what is advantageous and just), Aristotle says: "For a city is not a random multitude but is, as we claim, self-sufficient for life, and if any of these things happens to be lacking [ἐκλεῖπον], it is impossible for that association to be simply self-sufficient." (1328b16-19)

In VII.9, Aristotle looks into whether the functions of defense and deliberation should be completely separate, concluding: "What remains, then, is for the government to assign both these functions to the same people but not at the same time. Just as power [δύναμις] is naturally present in younger people and judgment [φρόνησις] in older ones, it is advantageous and also just for these functions to be distributed on the same basis to them both, for this division is what is in accordance with merit [κατ᾽ ἀξίαν]." (1329a13-17) [PSA: this passage is relevant for hints at life stages, since φρόνησις emerges later in life]

"And since the citizen group has been divided into two parts, one bearing arms and the other deliberating [βουλευτικόν], and it is fitting for those who are weary after the passage of time to be assigned the service [θεραπεία] of the gods and to have a rest [ἀνάπαυσις], it is to them that the priesthoods should be assigned." (1329a30-34)

"For the difficult thing in such matters is not thinking up [νοῆσαι] but carrying out [ποιῆσαι], since talk is the work of our wishes [εὐχῆς] while results are the work of chance [τύχης]." (1331b19-23)

"And seeing how well-being [τὸ εὖ] in all matters consists in two things, one of which is for the target [σκοπός] and end [τέλος] of the actions to be rightly [ὀρθῶς] set out while the other is to discover [εὑρίσκειν] the actions that are conducive to the end [τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος], it is possible for these to be either out of harmony [διαφωνεῖν] with each other or in harmony [συμφωνεῖν]." (1331b26-30)

"But both of these have to be mastered [κρατεῖσθαι] in the arts and forms of knowledge, the end and the actions leading to the end [τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις]. Now the fact that everyone aims at living well and being happy is obvious, but some have the opportunity to achieve these while others do not, due to some chance or to nature. For living beautifully [τὸ ζῆν καλῶς] also requires certain equipment, but less of this for people whose inherent condition is better and more for those in whom it is worse. But others from the outset do not seek happiness in the right way [οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι], even though the opportunity for it belongs to them." (1331b37-1332a2)

"It is clear that the question of what happiness is must not be passed over. And we claim, and have so determined it in the Ethics [EE 1219a38], if any of the arguments there is helpful, that it is the being-at-work [ἐνέργεια] and putting to use [χρῆσις] of complete virtue [ἀρετῆς τελείαν], and this not in any conditional sense but unconditionally. By conditionally [ἐξ ὑποθέσεως] I mean what is necessary [τἀναγκαῖα]; by unconditionally [ἁπλῶς] I mean what is beautiful [τὸ καλῶς]. An example may be seen in what pertains to just actions, for just acts of retribution and punishment do not stem from virtue but are matters of necessity, and they have beauty on condition of necessity. For it would be more worthy of choice for a man or a city to have no need of any such acts. [PSA: e.g., the gods have no such need] But actions to bestow honors or abundance [εὐπορία] are of the highest beauty unconditionally. For the other sort is the removal of something bad, but actions of this sort are just the opposite, since they are acts that prepare for and give rise to good things. A man of serious moral stature [ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ] would cope with poverty and disease and other strokes of bad luck in a beautiful way, but the state of being blessedly happy consists in the opposite of these things. For this too was determined in the writings on ethics [EE 1248b26], that someone of serious moral stature is the sort of person who, because of virtue, finds things good that are unconditionally good. But it is clear that the uses to which such a person puts these good things will necessarily be unconditionally serious and beautiful as well; this is why human beings consider external goods to be the causes of happiness, as if they were to give the credit for a shining example of beautiful harp-playing [τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς] to the harp rather than to the artistry of the one playing it." (1332a7-27)

"Now certainly people become good [ἀγαθοί] and excellent [σπουδαῖοι] by means of three things, and these three are nature, habit, and reason. For it is necessary to have a nature in the first place, as a human being and not any of the other animals, and thus have a body and a soul of a certain sort. But in some cases having the nature is of no benefit, since habits make it change. For there are some things that develop in two directions by nature, for worse or for better as a result of habits. Now while the other animals live by nature most of all, and in some small respects also by habits, a human being also lives by reason, for he alone has reason. So these things need to be in harmony [συμφωνεῖν]. For people do many things contrary to their habits and their nature on account of reason, if they are persuaded that it is better for them to be otherwise. The sort of nature people ought to have if they are going to be easily molded by the lawgiver, we have determined earlier. The job [ἔργον] that remains from that point is one of education. For people learn some things by being habituated and other things by listening [ἀκούοντες]." (1332a36-1332b11)

"Now there is a distinction between two parts of the soul, one of which has reason in its own right [ἔχει λόγον καθ᾽ αὑτό], while the other, which does not have it in its own right, is capable of listening to reason [λόγῳ δ᾽ ὑπακούειν]. The virtues for which a man is said to be good in any way belong, we claim, to these parts. To those who make the distinction the way we assert it, there is no unclarity about how one should state where the end is more appropriately to be found. For the worse is always for the sake of the better - this is obvious in things that come from art and from nature alike - and the better part is the one that has reason. And this is also divided in two, in the way we habitually make the distinction, for there is practical reason [πρακτικός λόγος] on the one hand, contemplative reason [θεωρητικός λόγος] on the other, so it is plainly necessary that this part of the soul be divided in the same way. And we shall speak of their activities as being in proportion to them, and say that activities of a part that is better by nature must be more worthy of choice for people who are capable of attaining all of them or two of them. For the most choiceworthy thing for each person is always that which is the highest [ἀκροτάτου] he can attain. And all of life is divided as well, into business [ἀσχολία] and leisure [σχολή], and into war and peace, and among actions, some are necessary and useful [τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα] while others are beautiful [τὰ καλά]. Among these, the choice must be the same as with the parts of the soul and the activities of them: war must be for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, and necessary and useful actions for the sake of beautiful ones. Laws made by a political ruler should be made, then, by one who takes all these things in view, in accordance with the parts of the soul and their activities [κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν], and giving priority to what is better and to ends. And the same thing applies to way of life and to choices among objects of concern, for one ought to be capable of conducting business and war, but even more so of living in peace and occupying one's leisure [σχολάζειν], and one ought to perform necessary and useful actions, but even more so beautiful ones." (1333a16-1333b2)

"But since the end for human beings appears to be the same in common and in private [κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ], and it is necessary that the same standard apply to the best man and the best form of government, it is obvious that the virtues that are for leisure [τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς] need to be present. For, as has been said often, peace is the end at which war aims, and leisure is that of business. And among the virtues that are for leisure and passing one's time, there are some whose work [ἔργον] is done at leisure and some through being busy. For many necessities have to be present in order for one to have the opportunity to be at leisure; this is why it is appropriate for a city to be moderate, courageous, and capable of endurance. For as the proverb goes, there is no leisure for slaves, and those who do not have the capacity to face dangers courageously are the slaves of those who attack them. So there is need for courage and endurance when one is busy, and for philosophy when one is at leisure, while moderation and justice are needed at both times, and even more in those who are living at peace and at leisure. For war forces people to be just and moderate, while the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure that accompanies peace tend instead to make them insolent [ὑβριστὰς]. So a good deal of justice and moderation is needed by those who seem to be the best off and to be enjoying all the blessings of those, if there are any, who dwell, as the poets say, in the isles of the blessed. It is they most of all who will need philosophy and moderation and justice, to the extent that they have more leisure among an unstinting supply of such good things. So it is obvious why a city that is going to be happy and be of excellent stature [σπουδαία] needs to partake of these virtues. For it is shameful [αἰσχρός] for people to be incapable of making use of good things, and even more so to be incapable of making use of them when at leisure, and to display themselves as good when busy and at war but slavish when at peace and at leisure." (1334a11-40) [PSA: this seems to imply that philosophy (although perhaps he means σοφία?) is itself an ἀρετή - and one especially suited to times of peace and leisure.]

"We arrived at a distinction above, that there is need for nature, habit, and reason. And among these, it was determined earlier what sort of nature people ought to have, but it remains to look into whether they ought to be educated first by reason, or first by habits. For these things ought to be harmonious with each other in an optimal harmony. For it is possible to have mistaken the best hypothesis by one's reason, and to be led astray in the same direction by one's habits. And this at least is clear first of all, that, as in other cases, our birth is from a starting point, and the end that comes from a starting point is the starting point for another end; but in us, reason [λόγος] and intellect [νοῦς] are nature's end [τέλος], so that it is for them that birth and the concern with habits ought to be a preparation. Next, just as soul and body are two, so too do we observe two parts of the soul, one irrational and one having reason, and the active conditions [ἕξεις] of these parts are two in number; one of them is desire [ὄρεξις] and the other the activity of intellect [νοῦς]. And just as the body is prior to the soul in coming into being, so too is the irrational part prior to that having reason. This is obvious, since spiritedness [θυμὸς] and willfulness [βούλησις], and desire [ἐπιθυμία] as well, are present in children right when they are born, while reasoning and intellect come in naturally as they go on. Hence attention [ἐπιμέλεια] to the body necessarily comes first, before attention to the soul, and attention to desire [ὄρεξις] comes next, though the attention to desire is for the sake of intellect, and attention to the body for the sake of the soul." (1334b6-28)

"One might already raise questions about skill at music [τὴν μουσικὴν]. For most people these days take part in it for the sake of pleasure, but those who originally assigned it to education did so because, as has been said more than once, nature itself strives not only to be busy in the right way [ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς] but also to be capable of being at leisure in a beautiful way [σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς]. For this one principle governs everything, so let us speak about it again. If one has need of both, but being at leisure is more worthy of choice and more an end than being busy, what needs to be sought out is what one ought to spend one's leisure doing. Surely not playing παίζοντας], for then play [παιδιὰν] would necessarily be the end [τέλος] at which our life [βίος] aims. But if that is impossible, and playful amusements ought to be made use of in the course of occupation with business (for someone who is working needs relaxation [τῆς ἀναπαύσεως], and play is for the sake of relaxation, and being busy is accompanied by work and stress), one ought for that reason to watch for the right times for the use of playful amusement to be brought in, as if one were applying it medicinally. For this sort of motion of the soul is a relief, and the pleasure of it brings relaxation. Being at leisure, on the other hand, is thought to have in itself pleasure, happiness, and a blessed way of life [τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως]. And this is not present in people occupied in business but in those who are at leisure. For a person who is busy is busied for the sake of some end he assumes is not present, while happiness is an end which everyone conceives of as accompanied not by pain but by pleasure. They do not, however, all go on to place this pleasure in the same category, but each in accord with their several kinds and with the active disposition [ἔξις] that belongs to them; and the best person sets it down as the best pleasure and the one derived from the most beautiful things. And so it is obvious that one ought to learn certain things and be educated for the leisure in the course of one's life, and that these teachings and studies are for their own sake, while those for occupation with business are assumend to be necessities and for the sake of other things. And this is why those who came before us assigned music a place in education not as necessary (since there is nothing of the sort about it) nor even as useful.... What remains, then, is that it is for the part of life one spends in leisure, which is obviously what people introduce it for. For they assign this as its place, which they conceive of as being the way of life suited to free people [διαγωγὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων]." (1337b28-1338a23)

Aristotle asks "whether it ought instead to be assumed that music is conducive in some way to virtue, on the grounds that it is a potent thing [ὡς δυναμένην], and just as gymnastic training brings the body into a certain condition, music makes one's character be in a certain condition by habituating [ἐθίζουσαν] people to a capacity to enjoy things rightly [χαίρειν ὀρθῶς]; or whether it makes some contribution to a way of life and a wise judgment [πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν], since this also needs to be set down as third among the things that are said. Now it is not unclear that one ought not to be educating the young for the sake of play; they are not playing when they are learning, since learning comes with pain [μετὰ λύπης]. And surely it is not fitting to attribute a way of life to children at ages such as theirs, since a state of completion is not present in anything that is incomplete [οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος]." (1339a21-31)

"What needs to be inquired about first is whether music should be put into an education or not, and what power it has out of the three kinds we raised questions about: education [παιδείαν], play [παιδιὰν], or a way of life [διαγωγήν]. It makes good sense to assign it to them all, and it does appear to play a part in each. For play is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation is necessarily pleasant, since it is a sort of remedy for the pain that results from exertions; and by general agreement, a way of life ought to be not only beautiful but pleasant as well, since being happy derives from both of these things." (1339b11-19)

Aristotle further asks about music "whether it also contributes [συντείνει] in any way to one's character and to the soul. And this would clearly be so if, by means of it, we become people of certain kinds in respect to our characters. But the fact that we do become people of certain kinds is surely obvious by many means, and not least through the melodies composed by Olympus; for by general agreement, these cause the soul to be divinely inspired, and divine inspiration is an attribute [πάθος] of the character in one's soul. Moreover, all those who listen to imitative performances are affected sympathetically, even apart from their rhythms and melodies. And since music is incidentally one of the pleasant things, and virtue has to do with enjoying, loving, and hating in the right way, one plainly ought to learn and be habituated to nothing so much as to making the right judgments [κρίνειν ὀρθῶς] about taking delight in decent kinds of character and beautiful actions. And there are, in rhythms and melodies most of all, likenesses to true natures of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and moderation and all the opposites of these and the other states of character. And this is clear from the facts, for we experience a change in the soul when we listen to such things. But the habituation to feel pain and take delight in their likenesses comes close to being in the same relation to the original things. If, for instance, someone delights in contemplating [θεώμενος] the image of something for no other reaason than just for its form, it necessarily follows from this that the contemplation of the thing itself, whose image he is contemplating, will be pleasing. But no likeness to states of character happens to be present in other kinds of sense perception such as objects of touch and taste, and it is present only slightly in objects of sight. For there are figures that have this sort of quality, though to a small extent, and everyone shares this sort of perception, yet these are not *likenesses* [ὁμοίωμα] of states of character; instead, the gestures and colors that come with them are indications [σημεῖα] of states of character, and they are distinctive marks [ἐπίσημα] in those who experience them." (1340a5-35)

END