Protrepticus
Aristotle

Note: The following passages are from D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson's booklet Aristotle: Protrepticus or Exhortation to Philosophy (2017). However, I am in the process of translating these passages anew for my own use, based on Hutchinson and Johnson's translation; currently many of these passages are their translations with some substitution of words. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are paraphrases by Iamblichus of words spoken by the character 'Aristotle' in the dialogue.

"It [i.e., philosophy] contributes within a person to purity of knowing, subtlety in thinking, precision in words, unity with one's incorporeal essence, proportion, good temper, and acceptance of what is; for each human being it provides order in his life, equilibrium in his feelings, and beauty in his character, as well as discoveries of the other things that are beneficial to human life." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, DCMS ch. xxii, 69.6-13; apparently spoken by the character 'Heraclides')

"Above all, when we are in their community we glimpse for the first time a sight that is free and fitting for philosophers: inherent in each thing is what bears a likeness to its nature, and the activity guided by the free man's inherent way of life is definitively completed within himself, not by anything external." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, DCMS ch. xxiii, 70.17-21)

"For it is agreed certain kinds of understanding are preferred for themselves and not only for what results from them; and this is possible either only or especially for kinds of understanding that are oriented to awareness, because they are completed in nothing but awareness." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, DCMS ch. xxiii, 72.2-6)

"What comes before is always better known than what comes after, and what is better by nature than what is worse, for there is understanding of what is determinate and ordered more than of their opposites, and of causes more than of results. Moreover, good things are more determinate and ordered than bad things, just as a humane person is, relative to a worthless person; for the difference between them is necessarily the same in both cases.... Therefore since personhood is better than body (since its nature is to be more authoritative), and the crafts and wisdom concerned with the body are medicine and physical training (for we assert that these are forms of understanding and say that some people do possess them), for personhood too and its thrivings clearly there is a certain practice and craft, and we are able to attain it." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus ch. vi, 38.3-20)

"Everyone agrees that one who rules should be the most seriously good person and the one who is naturally best, and that the law alone rules and is authoritative; but the law is a kind of wisdom, i.e., an account of things based on wisdom. And again, to us what standard or boundary-mark of good things is more precise than a wise person? Everything that this person will choose, if the choice is based on understanding, are good things and their contraries are bad. And since everybody chooses most of all what conforms to their own inherent traits (a just person lives justly, a person having courage lives courageously, a moderate person lives moderately), it is clear that the wise person will especially prefer to be wise; for this is the task of that ability. Hence it's evident that, according to the most authoritative discernment, wisdom is the best of the good things. Therefore one must not flee from philosophy, since philosophy is, as we think, both a possession and an application of sagacity, and sagacity is among the greatest goods; nor should one sail to the Pillars of Hercules and run frequent risks for the sake of wealth, while not working hard or spending any money for the purpose of wisdom. Yet it would surely be servile to cling to living rather than to living well, and to attend to the opinions of many others rather than to find that they have worth in terms of one’s own, and to search to get money but not to show any concern whatsoever for things that are beautiful." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus ch. vi, 39.13-40.11)

"For human beings, to know and be wise are in themselves preferable, for one cannot live as a human being without them; they are also useful for the human way of life, since nothing good happens for us unless it has been completed after having been activated by reason and guided by wisdom. Whether fulfillment consists of enjoyment, thriving in character, or wisdom, all of these require philosophy; for these things happen to us most of all and most purely when we engage in philosophy. Moreover, within us is both personhood and the body; one of these rules and the other is ruled, indeed one of them uses the other as a tool. It is always in relation to the ruler and the user that the need for what is ruled and what is a tool are arranged. Within our personhood it is our thinking that naturally rules and discerns, whereas the rest is ruled and follows. Everything is well when it is guided by its inherent thriving, for to have attained this is good." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus ch. vii, 41.7-24)

"When what is most authoritative and most glorious thrives, then a thing is well ordered; therefore the natural thriving of that which is better is naturally better. And that which is by nature more of a ruler and leader is better, as a human is better than the other animals; thus personhood is better than body (for it is more of a ruler), as is the aspect of personhood which has reason and thought, for this kind of thing is what both urges and restrains us and says how we ought or ought not to act. The thriving of this aspect is necessarily of all things the thriving that is most preferable plain and simple, both for everything in general and for us; in fact, I think one might down that we are this aspect, either alone or most of all. Furthermore, when not by the way but in itself the natural task of each thing is completed and is said to be most beautiful, that is when one should say that it is good, and the most authoritative thriving should be considered the one by which each thing naturally activates this very condition. Thus something that is composite and partitioned has many other activities, but something that is by nature simple and whose thinghood is not relative to anything else necessarily has a single thriving in itself in the authoritative sense. Thus if a human being is a simple animal whose thinghood is ordered under the guidance of reason and insight, there is no other task for him than only the most precise truth, i.e. to discover the truth about what is; but if several abilities are ingrown in him, it is clear that, of the several things he can naturally bring to completion, the best of them is always a task, e.g. of a doctor health, and of the pilot safety. And we can name no task of thought or a person's insight that is better than truth. Truth therefore is the most authoritative task of this aspect of personhood. And it does this with understanding plain and simple, and more so with greater understanding; and the most authoritative completion of this is awareness. For when of two things one is preferred because of the other, the one on account of which the other is preferred is better and more preferable; for example, pleasure is better than pleasant things, and health than things conducive to health, for the latter are said to be able to create the former.  Thus nothing is more valuable than wisdom, which we say is an ability of what is most authoritative within us: to judge one trait in comparison with another, for the cognitive part, both separately and in combination, is better than all the rest of a person, and understanding is its thriving.

Therefore its task is none of what are are said to be aspects of virtue, for it is mightier than all of them and the completed creation is always superior to the understanding that creates it. Nor is every thriving of personhood a task in that way, nor is it fulfillment; for if it is to be directed to creating, other ones will create other things, as the building skill (which is not a portion of any building) creates buildings; however, wisdom is an aspect of thriving and of fulfillment, for we say that fulfillment either comes from it or is it. Thus according to this argument too, it is impossible for this to be an understanding directed to creating, for the completion must be better than its coming to be, and nothing is better than wisdom, unless it is one of the things that have been mentioned; and none of those is a task other than it. Therefore one should say that this kind of understanding is directed to awareness, since it is surely impossible for it to be completed in a creation. Hence being wise and aware is a task of the thriving, and this of all things is the most preferable for humans - comparable, I think, to seeing for the eyes, which one would choose to have even if there wasn’t any other thing that was going to come into being through it beyond the sight itself." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. VII, 41.24-43.25)

"But yet what is in accordance with nature [κατὰ φύσιν] does come to be for the sake of something, and is always constituted for the sake of something better than what comes to be through craft; for nature does not imitate craft, but craft imitates nature, and it exists to help by filling in even what nature has omitted. For some things nature itself seems capable of accomplishing by itself without actually requiring any help, but it hardly accomplishes others or is absolutely unable. For example, to begin with, even with reproduction, some seeds presumably generate unguarded, whatever kind of earth they fall down into, but others also have need of the craft of farming; and, in a roughly the same way, some animals also attain their full nature by themselves, but humans require many crafts for their security, both at first in respect of their birth, and again later, in respect of their nurturing. Further, if craft imitates nature, a consequence from this for the crafts as well is that everything that comes to be comes does so for the sake of something. For we should posit that everything that comes into being correctly comes into being for the sake of something. And surely if beautifully, then correctly; at any rate, everything that comes to be (or has come to be) in accordance with nature comes to be (or has come to be) beautifully, since what is unnatural is worthless, and a natural coming into being comes to be for the sake of something.... Moreover, the animals are surely things that have come to be by nature [φύσει], either altogether all of them or the best and most glorious of them; for it is no different if someone thinks that most of them have come into being unnaturally because of some destruction or corruption. But certainly a human being is the most glorious of the animals down here; hence it’s clear that we have come to be both by nature [φύσει] and according to nature [κατὰ φύσιν]." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. IX, 49.26-51.6) [PSA: the difference between φύσει and κατὰ φύσιν seems to be the difference between the source / ἀρχή of generation (cf JOHNSON p. 45) and that for the sake of which generation was initiated; another way to put it is that nature initiates the process of generation but also directs or guides (WALKER-2018 p. 19) that process to a particular aim or end - unless, that is, a human craft is needed to bring about the completion, as is the case with nurturing (τροφή) or, more germanely, the acquisition of wisdom and sagacity, for which philosophy is needed; see also the difference between ἄρχειν as starting and πράττειν as doing]

"[S]urely the first aspects of human beings to acquire their completion are the bodily ones, and later on aspects of personhood, and somehow the completion of the better part always comes later than its coming to be. Surely personhood comes after the body, and of personhood the true completion is wisdom, for we see that it is the last thing to come to be by nature in human beings, which is why of the good things only old age lays claim to this; therefore, guides by nature some form of wisdom is what completes us, and ultimately we have come to be in order to be wise. Now surely if we have come to be for the sake of being wise and learning, clearly also we exist for this. Therefore Pythagoras, according to this argument anyway, was right to say that it is for the sake of knowing and being aware that every human being has been constructed by the god. But later one should inquire whether the object of this knowing is the cosmos or some other nature; what we have said is enough for us for now at first. For if wisdom is a completion guided by nature, then to be wise would be best of all. Hence one should do the other things for the sake of the goods that come about in oneself and, of these goods, one should have the ones in the body for the sake of those in personhood, and thriving of character for the sake of wisdom; for this is the highest of all." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. IX, 51.20-52.16)

"To seek for every kind of understanding to produce something outside itself and to require that it be useful is the demand of someone completely ignorant about how much separates from the start the good things from the necessities; they differ the most. For among the things without which living is impossible, one should say that those that are appreciated on account of some other thing are necessities and dependent causes, while all those that are appreciated for themselves, even if no other thing results from them, should be called goods authoritatively; for this is not preferred because of that, and that for the sake of something else, nor does this get lost by going forward to infinity – rather, this stops at some point. So it is absolutely ludicrous, in fact, to seek from everything a benefit other than the thing itself, and to ask ‘So, what’s the benefit for us?’ and ‘How is it useful?’ For what we say is the truth: such a person doesn’t seem like someone who knows what is beautiful and good or who discerns what is a cause and what is a dependent cause.... It is not a terrible thing at all, then, if it [wisdom] does not seem to be useful or beneficial; for we don’t claim that it is beneficial but that it is in itself good, and it is appropriate to choose it for itself, not for the sake of some other thing. For just as we travel abroad to Olympia for the sake of the sight itself, even if there is going to be nothing more to get from it (for the awareness itself is superior to lots of money), and as we observe the Dionysia not in order to acquire anything from the actors (rather than actually spending), and as there are many other sights we would choose instead of lots of money, so too the awareness of the universe should be honored above everything that is thought to be useful. For surely one should not travel with great effort for the sake of beholding people imitating girls and slaves, or fighting and running, and not think one should behold the nature of existing things, i.e. the truth, for free." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. IX, 52.16-54.5)

"[T]he philosopher is the only craftsman to have both laws that are stable and actions that are correct and beautiful. For he is the only one who lives looking toward nature and toward the divine and, just as if he were some good pilot who hitches the first principles of his way of life onto things that are eternal and steadfast, he moors his ship and lives life on his own terms." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. X, 55.24-56.2) [PSA: it's interesting that Aristotle says the philosopher is a craftsman, specifically like a pilot]

"Just as sight is not able to create nor is it a craftsman of anything (for its only task is to judge and clarify each visible thing), but enables us to take action through it and is the greatest help to us in our actions (for we would be pretty much absolutely motionless if robbed of it), so it’s clear that, though the understanding is directed to awareness, nevertheless guided by it [κατ᾽ αὐτην] we do countless things, acquire some things and avoid others, and generally gain through it everything good." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. X, 56.4-12) [PSA: on this sort of argument, see WALKER-2018; note here that neither φρόνησις nor σοφία is a craftsman, but it's said above that the philosopher *is* a craftman - it's not clear how these statements cohere]

"[A] waking person, someone whose personhood is activated [ἐνεργοῦντα], should be said to live more than someone who is sleeping and merely has it, for it’s on account of the former living that we say the latter is too, because, like the former, he is such as to be able to act and be acted upon. Thus using anything is surely this: when the capacity is for one thing someone who does this very thing uses it; but if it is for a larger number of things one uses it when one does the best of them, for example with flutes, one uses it either only or mostly when one uses a flute, for presumably the uses of the other capacities are also for this purpose. Thus one should say that someone who uses a thing correctly is using it more, for the natural objective and mode of use belong to someone who uses a thing precisely [ἀκριβῶς] and well [καλῶς]. Now of personhood, too, thinking [τὸ διανοεῖσθαι] as well as reasoning [λογίζεσθαι] is the only task of the soul, or is most of all its function. Therefore it is now simple and easy for anyone to reach the conclusion that he who thinks [διανοούμενος]  correctly [ὀρθῶς] is more alive, and he who most finds the truth [ἀληθεύων] lives most, and this is the one who is intelligent and observing according to the most precise understanding; and it is then and to those that living completely [τελέως], surely, should be attributed, to those who are using their wisdom, i.e. to the wise." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. XI, 57.19-58.10)

"[W]e will also that that a life is pleasant if its presence is pleasant to those who have it, and that not all in whom it occurs that they enjoy themselves while living are living with pleasure, only those to whom living itself is pleasant and who enjoy the pleasure that comes from life. Thus we attribute living more to the one who is awake rather than to the one who is asleep, and to the one who is wise more than to the one who is foolish; and we say the pleasure that comes from life is the one that comes from the uses of personhood, for this is being truly alive. Further, even if there are many uses of personhood, still the most authoritative one of all, certainly, is to make use of being wise as much as possible. Further, it is clear that the pleasure that arises from being wise and aware must be the pleasure that comes from living, either alone or most of all. Therefore living with pleasure and true enjoyment [τὸ χαίρειν] belong only to philosophers, or to them most of all." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. XI, 58.27-59.13)

"Thus we take the position that fulfillment is either wisdom and a certain sagacity, or thriving of character, or enjoying oneself most of all, or all of the above. Thus if it is wisdom, it is evident that living in fulfillment would belong to the philosophers alone; and if it is thriving of personhood or enjoyment, even so it will belong to them either alone or most of all, for thriving is the most authoritative thing in us; and the most pleasant of all things, comparing one thing with another, is wisdom; and similarly, even if someone were to state that all these same things together are fulfillment, that is to be defined as being wise. Hence everyone who is capable of it should love and practice wisdom, for surely this either is living completely well, or else it is, most of all anyway, comparing one thing with another, a cause of it in their personhood." (Aristotle, Protrepticus, ap. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. XII, 59.24-60.10)

END