Rhetoric
Aristotle
tr. Joe Sachs

"The end [τέλος] is different for each of these, three for the three kinds. For the advisory speaker, it is what is advantageous [συμφέρον] or harmful [βλάβερον], since someone who exhorts is advising something as best, and someone who warns is warning against something as worse; other things, that it is just or unjust, beautiful [καλός] or shameful [αἰσχρός], they take in as side-issues to that. For courtroom speakers, it is what is just or unjust; they take in other things as side-issues to those. And for those engaged in praising and blaming, it is what is beautiful or shameful; they bring other things back to refer to these." (1358b20-29)

"[T]hose engaged in praising and blaming do not consider whether someone has performed advantageous or harmful actions, but often they even make it a matter of praise that he did some beautiful thing in disregard of what was profitable to himself; for example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his companion Patroclus in the knowledge that he would have to die, though it was possible for him to live. For him, a death of that sort was a more beautiful thing, though living was advantageous." (1358b38-1359a5)

"The first thing to be taken up, then, is what sorts of good and bad things an advisory speaker [συμβουλέων] gives advice about, since it is not about them all but as many as admit both of happening and of not happening; as for those things that either are or will be the case necessarily, or are incapable of being the case or happening, there is no advice about them. In fact, it is not even about all things that admit of happening or not, since there are some good things among these that happen by nature or from chance, about which giving advice is of no use. But it is clear that advice is concerned with everything there is deliberation [βουλεύεσθαι] about, namely, all the things that are of such a nature as to be traceable back to us, and of which the source of their coming into being is up to us [ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν]. We investigate [σκοποῦμεν] things up to that point at which we discover whether they are possible or impossible for us to do. Now it is not required on the present occasion to seek to enumerate each of these particulars with precision, and to divide up into specific kinds the things people are in the habit of consulting about, and to go on to make definitions about them as far as possible in accord with truth [κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν], because that doesn't belong to the rhetorical art but to one more amenable to knowledge and truth. And far more subjects than it properly studies have been given over to it nowadays, for what is true is exactly what we said before, that rhetoric is composed of a knowledge of analytics and of that part of politics that has to do with types of character, and is similar in some respects to dialectic and in others to sophistical arguments." (1359a30-1359b17)

"For just about every person in private and all people in common there is a certain target [σκοπός] they are aiming at in the things they choose [αἰροῦνται] and avoid [φευγοῦσιν], and this, to state it in sum, is happiness and its parts. So for the sake of example, let us take up what happiness, simply stated, is and what its parts consist of, for all exhortations and warnings deal with this and with the things that are directed to this and opposed to it; for it is necessary to perform the actions that provide for this or for any of its parts, or make them greater rather than less, while not performing actions that destroy or impede them [ἐμποδίζοντα] or produce their opposites. So let happiness be good activity [εὐπραξία] combined with virtue, or self-sufficiency [αὐτάρκεια] in living, or the most pleasant life consistent with safety, or abundance of possessions and bodies along with the power to protect and make effective use of them, since everyone pretty much agrees that happiness is one or more of these things. So if happiness is that sort of thing, it is necessary that the following are parts of it: being well born, having many friends, having good friends, having good children, having many children, having a good old age, and also the virtues of the body (such as health, beauty, strength, size, athletic power), reputation, honor, luck, and virtue; for this is the way one would be more self-sufficient, if these goods, both within himself and external, were to belong to him, since there are no others besides these. Those within himself are the ones that have to do with the soul and the ones in the body, and the external ones are being well born, friends, possessions, and honor; also, we believe he must attain to positions of power and have luck, since his life would be safest in that way." (1360b4-29)

"[S]ince the target [σκοπός] immediately before for someone giving advice is what is advantageous (for people deliberate not about the end [τέλος] but about the means to the end [πρὸς τὸ τέλος], and these are things advantageous in regard to actions, and what is advantageous is good), what needs to be grasped would be the elements that go into something good and advantageous, taken simply. So let the good be that which is chosen [αἱρετόν] itself for its own sake, and for the sake of which we choose something else, and at which all things that have sense perception and intelligence [νοῦς] aim (or would if they were to get intelligence), and all the things that intelligence would give over to each and all the things that intelligence in each case does give over to each; for the good for each thing is that which, when it is present, puts that thing in a sound [εὖ διάκειται] and self-sufficient condition, and its good is its self-sufficiency along with the things that tend to produce or preserve such things and the things from which such things follow, as well as the things that prevent and destroy their opposites." (1362a15-29) [PSA: the aside "when it is present" is connected to Aristotle's observation at Poetics 1451a32-35 "that which makes no noticeable difference when it is there or not there is no part of the whole" - here the "noticeable difference" making something less sound or self-sufficient.]

It is necessary "for pleasure to be a good thing; for all animals desire it by nature, and so it is necessary for both pleasant things and beautiful things [τὰ καλά] to be good, since the former tend to produce pleasure, while among beautiful things, some are pleasant and others are themselves chosen in virtue of themselves." (1362b5-9)

"To speak of them one by one, it is necessary for the following to be good things. Happiness, since it is both chosen in virtue of itself and self-sufficient, and we choose everything for its sake. Justice, courage, temperance, greatness of soul, magnificence, and other active conditions [ἕξις] of that sort, since they are virtues of a soul. Health and beauty and things of that sort, since they are virtues of a body and tend to produce many things, as health tends to produce both pleasure and life, which is why it seems to be the greatest good, because it is responsible for two of the things most honored [τιμιώτατον] by most people, pleasure and life. Riches, since that is the virtue of acquisition and tends to produce many things. A friend and friendship, for a friend is chosen in virtue of himself, and also tends to produce many things. Honor and reputation, for they are both pleasant and tend to produce many things, and for the most part the possession of the things for which people are honored goes along with them. The power of speaking [λέγειν] and of action [πράττειν], for all such things tend produce many good things. Also natural giftedness [εὐφυία], memory, ease of learning, quickness of mind, and all such things, since these powers tend to produce good things. Similarly, all kinds of knowledge [έπιστήμη] and all arts [τέχναι]. And life, for if no other good thing were to follow from it, it would still be chosen in virtue of itself. And justice, for it is something advantageous in common." (1362b10-28)

"[S]ince often when people agree that both of two things are advantageous, they dispute over which is more so, the next thing to be spoken of would be concerned with the greater good and what brings more advantage. Let what is so much and beyond it be exceeding and what is contained within be exceeded; let greater and more numerous always be relative [πρὸς] to less, and great, small, many, and few be relative [πρὸς] to the size of most things, and let what exceeds be great and what falls short be small, and the same way with many and few. Now since we call something good that is itself chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, and something that all things aim at and would choose if they were to get intelligence [νοῦς] and practical judgment [φρόνησις], and what tends to produce, to preserve, or to follow upon such things, and since an end [τέλος] is that for the sake of which other things are done, and what has these attributes relatively to a certain person is good for him, it is necessary that more than one of these things, or more than some lesser number, when that one or that lesser number are counted in among them [συναριθμουμένου], would be a greater good; for it exceeds them, and what is included within something is exceeded." (1363b5-22) [PSA: compare the use of "relative" here to the mean πρὸς ἡμᾶς at EN 1106a26ff and EE 1220b21ff; also, compare συναριθμουμένου here to συνκρινομένον at MM 1184a34-38.]

"[W]hat is more choiceworthy [αἱρετώτερον = preferable] in virtue of itself is greater than what is chosen not in virtue of itself; for instance strength is greater than something healthy, since the latter is not chosen for its own sake, but the former is, which is what the good meant. And if one thing is an end while another is not an end; for the latter is chosen for the sake of something else, but the former for the sake of itself, as gymnastic exercise is chosen for the sake of the body's well-being. And that which has less additional need [προσδεόμενον] of any other thing or things, since it is more self-sufficient; and what has additional need of fewer things or of things easier to get has need of less. And when this is not present without that, or is not capable of coming into being, but that is without this, the one without the need is more self-sufficient, and is thus manifestly a greater good." (1364a1-9)

"[T]he things that the more beautiful or serious kinds of knowledge are concerned with are also more beautiful and more serious, for the truth about something has the same standing as the knowledge of it, and each kind of knowledge has command of what belongs to it. And the kinds of knowledge concerned with more serious and more beautiful things are proportionate to them for the same reason. And it is a necessity that what people with practical judgment - either all, or many, or most, or the best of them - would judge or have judged to be a greater good is that the way either simply or in the respect in which it accords with the judgment [κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν] they made about it. This is a point that applies in common to other things as well: for what anything is, and to what degree, and of what kind, are the way knowledge [έπιστήμη] and practical judgment would say they are. But we have been speaking about good things, for the good was defined as what something that acquired practical judgment would choose in each case; it is evident, then, that the greater good is the one practical judgment moreso says it is. Also what is present in better people is a greater good, either simply or in the respect in which they are better; for instance courage is a greater good than strength. Also what a better person would choose, either simply or in the respect in which hs is better, for instance to suffer injustice rather than commit it, since a more just person would make that choice. Also what is more pleasant in comparison to what is less pleasant, since all things pursue pleasure and long for having pleasure for its own sake, and the good and the end were defined by these things; and what is more free of pain or pleasant for a longer time is more pleasant. Also what is more beautiful in comparison to what is less beautiful, since the beautiful is either what is pleasant or what is chosen in virtue of itself. Also those things people themselves moreso want to be responsible for, either for themselves or for friends, are greater goods, while those people want less to be responsible for are greater evils. Also more enduring things in comparison to those of shorter duration, and things that are more constant rather than more unreliable, for the use of enduring things is greater on account of time and that of constant things on account of one's wishes, for the use of something constant is more available whenever people want it." (1364b7-34)

"[O]ne must not fail to note the end sought by each form of government, since people make choices in reference to the end. And the end sought by democracy is freedom [ἐλευθερία], by oligarchy riches, by aristocracy the things that have to do with education and customary practices, and by tyranny self-preservation." (1366a2-6)

"And these kinds of character will be grasped by way of these same ends, since one's character is manifest as a result of choice [κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν], and one's choice is made in reference to one's end [πρὸς τὸ τέλος]." (1366a13-16)

"Let us next speak about virtue and vice, and about what is beautiful or shameful, for these are the things someone who praises or blames has in view. And as we speak about these things at the same time is will turn out that those things will also become clear on the basis of which we will be assumed to be people with character of a certain sort, which was a second means of persuasion; for based on the same things, we will be able to present both ourselves and someone else as trustworthy [ἀξιόπιστος] in regard to virtue." (1366a23-28)

"[T]he beautiful is that which is praised as being choiceworthy on account of itself, or is good and is pleasant because it is good, and if this is the beautiful, it is necessary that virtue is something beautiful, since it is praised for being good. And virtue is thought of as a power of providing and safeguarding good things, as well as a power of conferring many great benefits, in fact all sorts of benefits in connection with all things. The parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, greatness of soul, generosity, practical judgment, and wisdom. [PSA: cf 'complete virtue' in EN and EE] And the greatest virtues would necessarily be those that are most useful to others, if in fact virtue is a power of conferring benefits, and for this reason people give the most honor to those who are just and courageous, since the one virtue is useful to others in war, and the other in both war and peace. Next is generosity, since such people give freely and do not get into disputes about money, which other people make their highest aim. Justice is a virtue through which each person has what belongs to him and what is in accord with the law; and injustice is that through which people have things that belong to others, and things not in accord with the law. Courage is that by which people are capable of performing beautiful actions in dangerous situations, and as the law prescribes, and are willing to serve the law, and cowardice is the opposite. Temperance is a virtue through which people conduct themselves in the way the law prescribes in relation to the pleasures of the body, and self-indulgence [ἀκολασία] is the opposite. Generosity is a beneficent disposition concerning money, and stinginess is its opposite. Greatness of soul is virtue disposing one to do things of great benefit, and magnificence is a virtue disposing one to produce great things in expenditures; smallness of soul and chintziness are their opposites. Practical judgment is a virtue of thinking in accord with which people have the power to deliberate well about the good and bad things that were mentioned as influencing happiness." (1366a33-1366b22)

"[T]he virtues and deeds of those who have a more serious stature by nature are more beautiful, such as those of a man in comparison to those of a woman. And things that cause enjoyment for others rather than for oneself; this is why a just deed and justice are beautiful." (1367a17-20)

"Since praise is based on actions, and an action in accord with a choice [κατὰ προαίρεσιν] is particularly a mark of a person of serious stature, the thing that needs to be done is to try to show that someone was acting in accordance with a choice. And it is useful for him to appear to have engaged in such actions many times; hence things that happened incidentally and by luck need to be taken as part of his intention, since, if one brings forward many similar instances, that will seem to be a sign of virtue as well as of choice." (1367b22-27)

"And deeds are signs of the active condition of one's character, since we would make an encomium upon someone who had not performed any actions, if we believed him to be the sort who would. Congratulating someone on his blessedness or happiness are the same as one another, but not the same as praise and encomium, but just as happiness encompasses virtue, so too congratulating someone on his happiness includes praise and encomium." (1367b32-36)

"[T]he things people do willingly are all those they do knowingly without being forced. Now the things people do knowingly are not all done by choice, but all things done by choice, they do knowingly, since no one is unaware of what he chooses. The things on account of which people choose, contrary to law, to do harm and do base things are vice [κακία] and lack of self-restraint [ἀκρασία]. For if certain people have one or more faults of character [μοχθηρία], they are also unjust in connection with that about which their characters happen to be at fault; for instance, a stingy person will be unjust about money, a dissipated one about pleasures of the body, a person with a soft character about taking easy options, a coward about dangers (because they leave those who share the dangers with them in the lurch on account of their fear), an ambitious person will be unjust for the sake of honor, a sharp-tempered person from anger, a lover of victory for the sake of winning, a bitter person for revenge, a foolish person [ἄφρων] from being misguided [ἀπατᾶσθαι] about what is just and unjust, a shameless person from contempt of opinion, and similarly with each of the others about each of the underlying faults of character." (1368b9-24)

"[S]ince everything that is like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and each person himself bears this relation to himself most of all, everyone is necessarily a lover of self to a greater or lesser extent, because all such conditions are present in relation to oneself most of all. And since all people are lovers of self, the things that are their own are necessarily pleasant to everyone, such as their deeds and words, and this is why people for the most part have a love of flattery, for those who are in love with them, for honor, and for their children, since their children are their own work. And completing [ἐπιτέλειν] anything that is lacking is pleasant because that comes from their own work. And since it is most pleasant to be in authority, it is also pleasant to be thought to be wise [σοφός], since having good judgment [τὸ φρόνειν] contributes to exercising authority, and wisdom [σοφία] is a knowledge [έπιστήμη] of many wondrous things [θαυμαστῶν]." (1371b18-28) [PSA: note the connection to the Pericles passage in EN V.]

"Three things are responsible for making the speakers themselves be believed, because that is how many things there are, apart from demonstrative arguments, on account of which we feel trust. These are judgment [φρόνησις], virtue [ἀρετή], and goodwill [εὔνοια]. For people go wrong in the things they speak of or give advice about by reason of all these or of any one of them, since they either have incorrect opinions on account of a lack of judgment, or while having correct opinions do not say what seems true to them on account of vice, or, if they are of good judgment and decent [ἐπιεικεῖς] but not good-willed, it is possible for that very reason for them to fail to give the best advice they know how to give; besides these there are none. It is a necessity, therefore, that anyone who seems to have all these attributes will be trusted by his hearers. The things on the basis of which one might appear to be of good judgment and high moral stature [σπουδαῖοι] need to be gathered from the distinctions that were made about the virtues, since one might present himself as such on the basis of the same things he would use to present someone else in that way; [this is why] good will and friendship need to be spoken of in a discussion of the passions." (1378a6-19)

"What sorts of things make people feel ashamed or shameless, and in whose presence, and what their condition is, will be clear from the following. Let shame be understood as a certain pain [λύπη] or agitation [παραχὴ] over bad deeds, present, past, or future, that appear to bring one into disrepute, and let shamelessness be a certain belittling and indifferent attitude toward these same things. So if shame is as defined, then necessarily shame is felt at bad deeds, either in oneself or of people one cares about, that seem to be ugly [αἰσχρός]. All deeds that result from vice are of this sort, such as throwing down one's shield and running away, which comes from cowardice; or embezzling money left in trust, which comes from injustice; or having relations with women whom one ought not, or where or when one ought not, which comes from self-indulgence; or profiting from petty or ugly sources or from helpless people, such as the poor or the dead (about which there is a proverb about looting a corpse), which comes from base profiteering and miserliness; or not helping someone in money matters when one is able to, or helping less than one could, or accepting help from those with lesser resources, or borrowing when it will seem like begging, or begging when it will seem like asking for repayment, or asking for repayment when it will seem like begging, or praising things one will seem to be begging for, and doing so none the less after one has failed to get them, all of which are signs of miserliness, while giving praise when people are present is a sign of flattery; or overpraising good qualities and glossing over bad ones, or grieving to excess in the presence of someone in grief, and all the other things of that sort, which are signs of flattery; or not submitting to labors that older people or those who are frail or in higher positions of authority, or generally those less capable, do undergo, all of which are signs of softness; or to accept favors from another person, and do so often, and still complain about the person who did the favors, all of which are degrading signs of a small soul; or talking all the time about oneself, holding forth and claiming for oneself things done by others, which are signs of braggadocio. And similarly with deeds that come from each of the other vices of character, and the things that are signs of them or resemble them, since they are ugly and shameless things to do. And it is shameful not to take part in those beautiful things that everyone, at least everyone or most everyone like oneself does take part; and by 'like' I am speaking of those who are like in nationality, citizenship, age, family connections, and generally those of equal standing, for it is already shameful, for example, not to take part in education to the same extent, and in other things like that. And all these things are more shameful when they appear to be one's own fault, since that makes them appear, from that point on, to be more a result of vice, once one has become responsible oneself for one's past, present, and future attributes." (1383b11-1384a15)

"[I]f emulation [ζῆλος] is a certain pain [λύπη] at the apparent presence, with people of a nature like one's own, of good things held in honor and possible to get for oneself, not because they belong to someone else but because they do not belong to oneself as well (which is why emulation is a decent passion of decent people, while envy [φθόνειν] is a base [φαῦλος] passion of base people, since the former sort of person, led by emulation, makes himself attain good things, but the latter sort, led by envy, makes his neighbor lose them), then it is necessarily those who regard themselves worthy of good things they do not possess who tend to feel emulation (and for things it is possible for them to get, since no one regards himself worthy of things that appear impossible). It follows that the young and those with great souls are of this sort." (1388a32-1388b2)

"And if it is good things held in esteem that are the objects of emulation, then necessarily the virtues are of this sort, and everything that is of benefit and service to others (since people honor those who perform such services and who are good), as well as all those good things one's neighbors get enjoyment out of - riches and beauty, for example, rather than health." (1388a10-14)

In II.12-13 Aristotle has a lengthy discussion of the positive and negative qualities that typify younger people and older people; in II.14 he then describes the mean between these: "For those in the prime of life [ἀκμή], it is obvious that their character will be in between those of the other two ages; they eliminate the excess, and are neither greatly confident (for such a things is indicative of rashness) nor overly fearful, but hold a beautiful position with respect to both, not trusting everyone and not distrusting everyone either, but judging instead by the truth of the situation, and living with a view not to what is beautiful or what is advantageous alone but to both, and not to what is thrifty or what is wasteful but to what is fitting, and likewise with respect to spiritedness and desire, their temperance is combined with courage and their courage with temperance. For in the young and the old these are separated, since young people are courageous and self-indulgent while the elderly are temperate and cowardly. Speaking in a general way, whatever advantages youth and old age have in separation, they have paired together, and in whatever respects the two ages are excessive or deficient, they hold the mean and fitting position between them." (1390a28-1390b9)

"What has to do with greatness and smallness among actions, the greater and the lesser, and large and small matters in general, is obvious from things said by us above.... To seek to go further beyond these things on the subject of magnitude and excess taken simply is to waste words, for in matters of action it is the particulars more than the universals that are decisive to the business at hand." (1393a9-19)

"Let the virtue [ἀρετή] of wording [λεξεῶν] be defined as being clear - for since a word is a certain kind of sign, if it does not make anything clear, it will not be doing its proper work [τὸ αὑτὸν ἔργον]." (1404b2-4)

"One needs to speek in fitting [ἁρματτούσας] metaphors, as in fitting epithets. This will depend on proportion [ἀνάλογον]; if there is none, it will appear inappropriate, because discrepancies are most apparent when things are next to one another." (1405a10-13)

"[I]n contests, the ones concerned with performance are fitting [ἁρμόττει], and hence, when the performing is taken away, they are not doing their proper work [τὸ αὑτὸν ἔργον] and appear foolish [εὐήθη]." (1413b17-19)

"[I]t is obvious that the mean [τὸ μέσον] is fitting [ἁρμόττει]." (1414a25)

"[W]hat is right [τὸ εὖ] is not rapid or curtailed but in measure [μέτριος]." (1416b35-36)

"Character is not revealed by speaking in the way that reflects thinking, the way people nowadays write, but in the way that reflects the making of a choice: "I wanted it because that was what I chose; if I get no benefit from it, still it is the better thing." One way is that of someone with practical judgment, but the other is that of a good person, for the mark of someone with practical judgment is seen in the pursuit of something beneficial, while that of a good person is seen in the pursuit of something beautiful." (1417a22-28)

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