Topics
Aristotle
tr. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge

"An accident is something which, thought it is none of the foregoing - i.e., neither a definition nor a property nor a genus - yet belongs to the thing; and something which may either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing.... To accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together, when expressed in language that is derived in any kind of way from accident; such as, for example, the question, 'Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?' and 'Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence [άπὀλαυσις] pleasanter?', and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these." (102b4-19)

"A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice [αιρεσις] and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge [γνωσις], and does that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something which either people hold no opinion either way, or most people hold a contrary opinon to the wise, or the wise to most people, or each of them among themselves. For some problems it is useful to know only with a view to choice and avoidance, e.g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not, while some it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge, e.g. whether the universe is eternal or not; others, again, are not useful in themselves for either of these purposes, but yet help us in regard to some such problems; for there are many things which we do not wish to know in themselves, but for the sake of other things, in order that through them we may come to know something else." (104b1-12)

"Moreover, see if one use of a term has a contrary, while another has absolutely non; e.g. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none, so that pleasure is used in more than one way. To love [φιλεῖν] also, used of the frame of mind [διἀνοια], has to hate as its contrary, while as used of the physical activity [σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια] it has none; clearly, therefore, to love is homonymous." (106a36-b4)

"Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term, and see if they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same, then clearly the term is homonymous: e.g. good in the case of food is what is productive of pleasure, and in the case of medicine what is productive of health, whereas as applied to the soul it is to be of a certain quality, e.g. temperate or courageous or just; and likewise also, as applied to a man. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, as (e.g.) what happens at the right time; for what happens at the right time is called good. Often it signifies what is of a certain quantity, e.g. as applied to the proper amount; for the proper too is called good. So then good is homonymous." (107a2-12)

"Often in the actual accounts [λὀγοι] as well homonymy creeps in without being noticed, and for this reason the accounts also should be examined. If (e.g.) any one describes what betokens and produces health as being in a balanced state [τὸ συμμἐτρως ἔχον], we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term 'balanced' in each case, e.g. if in the latter case it means that it is of the right amount to produce health, whereas in the former it means that it is such as to betoken what kind of state [ἕχις] prevails." (107b6-12)

"[T]he man whose star [δαίμων] is good [σπουδαῖος] is well-starred [εὐδαἰμον] - as Xenocrates says, he who has a noble soul [ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαἰαν] is well-starred. For a man's star is his soul." (112a36-38)

"If the addition of one thing to another makes that other good or white, whereas formerly it was not white or good, then the thing added will be white or good - it will possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. Moreover, if an addition of something to a given object intensifies the character which it had, then the thing added will itself as well be of that character." (115a26-31) [PSA: here "intensifies" is literally "makes it more like what it is" (mallon poiei toiouton hoion); this sounds like what hedone does to an energeia.]

"The question which is the more desirable [hairetoteron], or the better [beltion], of two or more things, should be examined upon the following lines... First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so; and so is that which is more likely to be chosen by the prudent [phronimos] or by the good man [agathos aner] or by the right law [nomos orthos], or by men who are good [spoudaios] in any particular line, when they make their choice as such; i.e. either whatever most of them or what all of them would choose; e.g. in medicine (or in carpentry) those things are more desirable which most, or all, doctors would choose; or, in general, whatever most men or all men of all things would choose, e.g. the good; for everything aims at the good. In the second place, that which is essentially so is more desirable than that which does not come under the genus - e.g. justice than a just man; for the former falls within the genus, whereas the other does not, and the former is essentially good, whereas the latter is not.... Also, that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more desirable than gymnastics; for the former is desired for itself, the latter for something else.... Also, that which is itself the cause of good is more desirable than what is so per accidens, e.g. virtue than luck (for the former is in itself, and teh latter per accidens, the cause of good things).... Also, what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is good for a particular person, e.g. recovery of health than a surgical operation.... So too what is good by nature is more desirable than the good that is not so by nature, e.g. justice than the just man; for the one is good by nature, whereas in the other case the goodness is acquired. Also the attribute is more desirable which belongs to the better and more honourable subject, e.g. to a god rather than to a man, and to the soul rather than to the body.... Also that is better which is inherent in things better or prior or more honourable: thus (e.g.) health is better than strength and beauty.... Also the end is benerally supposed to be more desirable than the means, and of two means, that which lies nearer the end. In general, too, a means directed toward the end of life is more desirable than a means to anything else, e.g. that which contributes to happiness than that which contributes to prudence.... Moreover, what is in itself nobler and more precious and praiseworthy is more desirable, e.g. friendship than wealth, and justice than strength. For the former belong in themselves to the class of things precious and praiseworthy, while the latter do so not in themselves but for something else; for no one prizes wealth for itself but always for something else, whereas we prize friendship for itself, even though nothing else is likely to come to us from it." (116a1-117a4)

"Also, everything is more desirable at the season when it is of greater consequence; e.g. freedom from pain in old age more than in youth; for it is of greater consequence in old age. On the same principle also, prudence is more desirable in old age; for no man chooses the young as leaders, because he does not expect them to be prudent. With courage, the converse is the case, for it is in youth that the active exercise of courage is more imperatively required. Likewise also with temperance; for the young are more troubled by their passions than are their elders. Also, that is more desirable which is more useful at every season or at most seasons, e.g. justice and temperance rather than courage; for they are always useful, while courage is only useful at times." (117a25-36)

"Moreover, things which our friends can share are more desirable than those they cannot. Also, things which we like rather to do to a friend a more desirable than those we like to do to anyone, e.g. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the semblance of them; for we would rather really do good to our friends than seem to do so, whereas towards anyone the converse is the case. Also, superfluities [periousiai] are better than necessities, and are sometimes more desirable as well; for the good life is better than mere life, and good life is a superfluity, whereas mere life itself is a necessity. Soemtimes, though, what is better is not also more desirable; for there is no necessity that because it is better it should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is better than to make money, but it is not more desirable for a man who lacks the necessities of life. There is superfluity whenever a man possesses the necessities of life and sets to work to secure as well other noble acquisitions. Roughly speaking, perhaps, necessities are more desirable, while superfluities are better." (118a1-15)

"Again, that is more desirable which serves the better purpose, e.g. that which serves to promote virtue more than that which serves to promote pleasure. Likewise also in the case of objectionable things; for that is more objectionable which stands more in the way of what is desirable, e.g. disease more than ugliness; for disease is a greater hindrance both to pleasure and to being good." (118b32-37) [PSA: note the connection to being impeded from engaging in good activity.]

"[S]ome people hold that prudence [phronesis] is both virtue and knowledge, and that neither of its genera is embraced by the other - although certainly not everybody admits that prudence is knowledge. If, however, anyone were to admit the truth of this assertion, yet it would still be thought to be necessary that the genera of the same object must at any rate be subordinate either the one to the other or both to the same thing as actually is the case with virtue and knowledge. For both fall under the same genus; for each of them is a state [hexis] and a disposition [diathesis]." (121b31-38)

"[S]ee whether the contrary of the species is not found in any genus at all, but is itself a genus, e.g. the good; for it this is not found in any genus, neither will its contrary be found in any genus, as happens in the case of good and evil; for neither of these is found in a genus, but each of them is a genus." (123b8-12)

"[I]f a capacity [dunamis] is a disposition [diathesis], then also to be capable is to be disposed, and if the use of anything is an activity [energeia], then to use it is to be active." (124a31-33)

"[V]irtue is essentially noble and essentially good, and yet, while virtue is a relative, good and noble are not relatives but qualities." (124b25-27)

"They also make a mistake who rank a state [hexis] within the capacity [dunamis] that attends it, e.g. by calling good temper mastery [enkrateia] of anger, and courage and justice mastery of fears and of gains; for courage and good temper belong to the man who is immune from passion, whereas mastery is exhibited by the man who is exposed to passion and not led by it. Quite possibly, indeed, each of the former is attended by a capacity such that, if he were exposed to passion, he would control it and not be led by it; but, for all that, this is not what is meant by being courageous in the one case, and good-tempered in the other; what is meant is an absolute immunity from any passions of that kind at all." (125b20-27)

"If anyone says that shame is fear, or that anger is pain, the result will be that genus and species are not found in the same thing; for shame is found in the reasoning faculty [logistikon], whereas fear is found in the spirited faculty [thumoeidos]; and pain is found in the faculty of desire [epithumetikon] (for in this pleasure is also found), whereas anger is found in the spirited faculty. Hence the terms given are not the genera, seeing that they do not naturally come to be in the same thing as the species. Likewise, also, if friendship is found in the faculty of desire, it is not a form of wishing [boulesis]; for wishing is always found in the reasoning faculty." (126a6-13)

"A property relative to something else is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing, as does the property which virtue possesses, relative to knowledge, viz. that the former is naturally produced in more than one faculty, whereas the latter is produced in that of reason alone.... On the other hand, a difference that is found for the most part and in most cases, is one such as the faculty of reason possesses relative to that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands [prostattein], while the latter obeys; for the reasoning faculty does not always command, but sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command, whenever the man's soul is vicious [mochtheros]." (128b36-129a17)

"[A] man who has stated that it is a property of virtue to be what makes its possessor good has rendered as property something that always follows, and so the property of virtue will in this respect have been correctly rendered." (131b2-4)

"[I]nasmuch as it is a property of prudence [phronesis] to be essentially the natural virtue of the rational faculty [logistikon], and so too taking each of the other virtues in this way, it will be a property of temperance (sophrosune) to be essentially the natural virtue of the faculty of desire [epithumetikon]." (136b10-14)

"[I]nasmuch as prudence [phronesis] is identically related to both the noble [to kalos] and the base [to aischros], since it is a knowledge [episteme] of each of them, and it is not a property to be knowledge of the noble, it will not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. And if prudence is a property of knowledge of the noble, it will not be a property of knowledge of the base." (137a12-17)

"[W]ith anything it is easier to do it than to do it correctly [καλῶς]." (139b8)

"For desire [epithumia] is always for the pleasant, so that what is the same as desire will also be for the pleasant. Accordingly our definition of desire becomes appetition [orexis] for the pleasant; for there is no difference between desire and appetition for the pleasant, so that both alike will be for the pleasant." (140b27-32)

"Xenocrates says that prudence defines [horistiken] and contemplates [theoretiken] reality."

"[A] definition is rendered in order to come to know [gnorisai] the term stated, and we come to know things by taking not any random terms, but such as are prior and more familiar, as is done in demonstrations [apodeixis] (for so it is with all teaching and learning)." (141a27-31)

"What is familiar without qualification is what is familiar, not to all, but to those who are in a sound state of understanding [to tois eu diakeimenois ten dianoian], just as what is without qualification healthy is what is healthy to those in a sound state of body." (142a9-11)

"[E]very form of knowledge [episteme] and potentiality [dunamis] is generally thought to be relative to the best [beltistos]." (143a11)

"See if he passes over the genera, defining, e.g., justice as a state [hexis] that produces equality or distributes what is equal; for by defining it so he passes over virtue, and so by leaving out the genus of justice he fails to express its essence [to ti en einai]; for the substance ]ousia] of a thing in each gase involves its genus." (143a15-19)

"A state [hexis] indicates what a virtue is, whereas good indicates not what it is but a quality, and to indicate a quality seems to be the function of a differentia." (144a17-19)

"Again, see if he has rendered an affection [pathos] as the differentia; for every affection, if intensified, subverts the substance of the thing, while the differentia is not of that kind; for the differentia seems rather to preserve [sozein] that which it differentiates; and it is absolutely impossible for a thing to exist without its appropriate [oikeias] differentia." (145a2-7)

"The definition [horos] of a thing's natural correlative is that for which it would be used by the prudent man [phronimos], acting as such, and by the science [episteme] appropriate [oikeia] to that thing." (145a25-27)

"Every disposition [diathesis] and every affection is formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition, as knowledge is formed in the soul, being a disposition of soul." (145a34-37)

"[A]n equality between contrary reasonings [logismon] would seem to be a cause of perplexity [aporia]; for it is when we reflect [logizomenois] on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which of the two we are to do [praxomen]." (145b16-20) [PSA: note that the primary result of working through an impasse is that we figure out what to *do*, not what to *think*.]

"Or see if a relative term has been described not in relation to its end [telos], the end in anything being whatever is best [beltiston] or gives its purpose [hou chalin] to the rest." (146b9-10)

"Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered the term is a process [genesis] or an activity [energeia]; for nothing of that kind is an end [telos], for the completion of the activity or process [to energekenai kai gegenesthai] is the end rather than the process or activity itself. Or perhaps this rule is not true in all cases; for almost everybody would rather be enjoying themselves than have ceased enjoying themselves, so that they would count the activity [to energein] as the end rather than its completion [to energekenai]." (146b13-19)

"Moreover, in the case of appetitions [orexeon], and in any other cases where it applies, see if the word 'apparent' is left out: e.g. wishing [boulesis] is an appetition after the good, or desire [epithumia] is an appetition after the pleasant - instead of the apparently good or pleasant. For often those who exhibit the appetition do not perceive [lanthanei = grasp] what is good or pleasant, so that their aim [actually their orexis = reaching] need not be really good or pleasant, but only apparently so." (146b35-147a4)

"Again, see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake [to di' auto haireton = what is valuable in itself] as desirable for what it produces or does [poetikon he praktikon], or as in any way desirable because of something else [di' allo], e.g. by saying that justice is what preserves the laws or that wisdom [sophia] is what produces happiness; for what produces or preserves something else is one of the things desirable because of something else. It might be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable because of something else as well; but still to define what is desirable in itself in such a way is none the less wrong; for what is best [beltiston] in anything is especially part of its substance, and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself than to be desirable because of something else, so that the definition ought rather to have indicated this." (149b31-39)

"Moreover, look at it from the point of view of things that stand in the same relation to each other. For if healthy is productive of health, vigorous will be productive of vigour [euexia from hexis], and useful will be productive of good. For each of these things is related in like manner to its appropriate end [to oikeion telos], so that if one of them is defined as productive of that end, this will be the definition of each of the rest as well." (153b35-154a3)

"Anyone who intends to frame questions must, first of all, select the ground [topos] from which he should make his attack; secondly, he must frame them and arrange them one by one to himself; thirdly and lastly, he must proceed actually to put them to the other party. Now so far as the selection of his ground is concerned the problem is one alike for the philosopher and the dialectician; but how to go on to arrange his points and frame his questions concerns the dalectician only; for in every problem of that kind a reference to another part is involved. Not so with the philosopher, and [i.e.] the man who is investigating [zetounvti] by himself: the premisses of his reasoning, although true and familiar, may be refused by the answerer because they lie too near the original statement and so he foresees what will follow if he grants them; but for this the philosopher does not care. Indeed, he may possibly be even anxious to secure axioms as familiar and as near to the question in hand as possible; for these are teh bases on which scientific deductions [hoi epistememonikoi sullogismoi] are built up." (155b4-16)

"Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the sake of training and examination [gunasias kai peiras] - for the aim [skopos] of those engaged in teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition; as is the latter from that of those who discuss things together in a spirit of inquiry [skepsis]; for a learner should always state what he thinks (for no one tries to teach what is false); whereas in a competition the business of the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other, while that of the answerer is toe appear unaffected by him; on the other hand, in dialectical meetings held in the spirit not of a competition but of an examination and an inquiry, there are as yet no articulated rule about what the answerer should aim at, and what kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or incorrect defence of his position - inasmuch, then, as we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others, let us try to say something upon the matter for ourselves." (159a25-37)

"Moreover, as contributing to knowledge [gnosis] and to philosophic wisdom [philosophias phronesis] the power [dunamis] of discerning [sunoran] and holding in one view [suneorakenai] the results of either of two hypotheses is no mean instrument [organon]; for it then only remains to make a right choice [orthos elesthai] of one of them. For a task of this kind a certain natural ability [euphua] is required: in fact real natural ability just is the power rightly [kalow] to choose the true and shun the false. Men of natural ability can do this; for by a right liking [eu philountes] or disliking for whatever is proposed to them they rightly select [eu krinousi] what is best [beltiston]." (163b9-16)

END