Bios Theoretikos: Notes on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea X, 6-8
Trond Berg Eriksen
Universitetsforlaget, 1975

"The main word in EN, giving a clue to its structure, is the same as the main word in the definition of happiness in Book I: energeia, the activity which realises the faculties of man and shows him at his best, i.e. exercising his ergon, performing his arete." (ERIKSEN, p. 37)

"In Aristotle, however, the end is not a strange thing, but the completion and aim of the particular species, animal and man alike.... The natural species are to be described from the point of view of their telos, their completion or soul.... [but] human completion [is] different from the completion of other species. The human telos is marked by and depends on the consciousness, the interest of the person.... in man the perfection and completion depend on his decision as well." (ERIKSEN, p. 43)

"In Aristotle the terms telos and teleios do not, then, denote a state or disposition totally different from what is given. The telos is rather what makes man a complete thing. This meaning of teleios is explicitly confirmed by Aristotle (DC 268a21). A thing is complete when all parts of it give their contribution to the whole, as an art or science is complete when it considers all parts of a subject (Pol. 1288b11). In the Metaphysics, Aristotle states the point thus: 'Excellence (arete) is a completion (teleiosis); for each thing is complete and every substance is complete, when in respect of the form of its proper excellence it lacks no part of its natural magnitude' (Met. 1021b21ff, 1055a10; Phys. 207a9)." (ERIKSEN, p. 44)

"[H]appiness means for Aristotle activity and realisation of human nature, in one word: energeia." (ERIKSEN, p. 44)

"For Aristotle activity and human life belong together. It is, then, not the completion of human life to have this or that virtue. This is emphasised in the considerations on the liberal man (EN 1120a8) and the just man (EN 1129b31): the virtues have to be used, employed." (ERIKSEN, p. 46) "It follows, then, that man is man first and foremost in executing his ergo, his proper task." (ibid.).

"Eudaimonia comes to the one who activates his faculties. Otherwise it would belong to that which is merely possible. But all possible things are incomplete.... Happiness must be completely actual, therefore it is its own end." (ERIKSEN, p. 47)

"Self-sufficiency does not mean, then, an ideal of isolation or exclusion from the rest of the world. The ideal of autarkeia is the ideal of freedom: to be one's own master both in the relation to other men and to the necessities of life." (ERIKSEN, p. 51)

"Occasionally, Aristotle mentions 'unimpeded activities' as bringing pleasure and as being similar to the chief good (EN 1153b9ff). But this freedom does not exclude discipline, it only negates compulsion from the outside." (ERIKSEN, p. 56)

"The life of pleasure is the most spurious candidate for the contents of the best life because it does not activate the specific human powers." (ERIKSEN, p. 59)

"The basic contention is that every living being has a proper work, an ergon (cf. Plato's Rep. 352d-353e), and that he finds his real self in the execution of this task (EN 1097b22ff; Pol. 1253a23; Met. 1035b16; Meteor. 390a10; GA 716a23). In the Protrepticus as in EN this is the main argument in Aristotle's defence of philosophy. Maybe it dominates the scene because it is the most comprehensive characterisation of theoria. If it be the 'seeing' of the stars, the principles of science, or the contemplation of God, in every case the realisation of this faculty is the execution of the proper task of man." (ERIKSEN, p. 86)

"The four main lines in Aristotle's account of theoria are clearly different. It is, then, more than remarkable that he does not choose one of them, but takes pains to bring them together. The uniting impulse and the connecting link form the wish to defend philosophy as the proper fulfillment of man's task." (ERIKSEN, p. 89)

Quoting Protrepticus B50: "For the philosopher alone lives with his eye on nature and the divine. Like a good sea-captain he moors his life to that which is eternal and unchanging, drops his anchor there, and lives his own master." (ERIKSEN, p. 92)

"Autarkes meant to the Greek, then, 'strong and free through independence and self-sufficiency'." (ERIKSEN, p. 100)

"Aristotle does not say that the life of God is completely impossible for man. On the contrary, the pattern of complete independence is what drives onwards through the different stages, until at last he is his own master. We are not invited to be like God in some literary sense, but to make ourselves analogous to the divine life.... The freedom and strength of God are not wholly attainable for a human being, but the path to human strength and freedom goes through the mimesis of the divine life. Thus the stages depicted in EN are stages of a progression into freedom. The man with moral virtues alone is not his own master: he is doing the right things without knowing from himself what is right. The man of phronesis knows from himself what is right and may do it. Thus far he is his own master. But the realisation of practical wisdom and moral virtue depends on other men as well. The supreme life, however, is the life that finds the source of happiness in human nature, in nous, the faculty of thinking which we have in common with the gods." (ERIKSEN, p. 101)

"This quality of philosophy, that it is loved for its own sake, not only recalls the general claims to happiness formulated in Books I, and X, 6. It is also a part of the description of the ultimate science, theology, in Alpha of the Metaphysics.... 'Evidently, then, we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake (Met. 982b20ff)." As in the case of the kalai praxeis this does not imply that the science serves no purpose, but it serves no external purpose. The point is that it has its purpose in itself, i.e. that it reproduces its own good." (ERIKSEN, p. 107) Similarly with regard to schole: "But schole is a condition with its end in itself. Schole is, then, closely related to the concept of autarkeia (Pol. 1326b30-32)." (ERIKSEN, p. 109)

"In Aristotle, the supreme activity is no mere mimesis, but an assimilation to the imperturbability of the superlunary region. This assimilation comprises both the realisation of the best human faculty and the imitation of the divine life. We may repeat, however, that Aristotle had no convulsive redemption in mind, but a simple life of thought, a life never lost in accidental circumstances.... What Aristotle had in mind was a private form of life which, in spite of its private character, might inspire the politician and the morally acting person and thus be a principle of order in things human." (ERIKSEN, pp. 121-122)

Thus "athanatizein is a negation of the thneta phronein.... This means that athanatizein is employed to express the counterpart of the mere anthropeuesthai (1178b7).... The positive counterpart of this negation must be the short glimpses of divine beauty and order mentioned in PA 644b22-36, Met. 1072b15, 25 and Pol. 1339b27-31. But the nearer we come to the real answer, the more vague are the expressions of Aristotle. The partaking in the divine life is never described so that we can agree on its contents or even get a clear idea of what he is thinking of.... A difficult passage that may have a bearing on this is MA 700b30-1a25. Here Aristotle maintains that the immovable objects of science and the standards of ethical choice are analoguous to the Prime Mover." (ERIKSEN, p. 126)

"In moral choice man cannot ignore his body and its desires. He rather shapes them, thus making himself a whole in each choice when his rationality overcomes his irrationality." (ERIKSEN, p. 130)

"The highest act of friendship is to love oneself, to become an integrated individual to the extent that you may be a paragon for others. You may do your friends favours more directly, but the best favour you can do them is to make yourself perfectly free so that they can have a pattern to aim at. In this most noble way the philautos may become the cause of his friend's acting.... the best thing a man can do, not only for himself, but also with regard to his friends and the community, is to serve as the paradeigma of the fully realized man, i.e. to be a philosopher (cf. Pol. 1325b15-32)." (ERIKSEN, pp. 135-136) And later: "The best friend is the self-sufficient one who can serve as a pattern for his friends, and not the man who does friendly deeds. Analogically, the best man in the city is thought of, not as the man who is busy with civic duties, but as the man who can serve as a pattern of the fully realised human life." (ERIKSEN, p. 152)

"Sophia is dependent on the practical virtues and the serious decisions of the individual. One becomes just through just acts, and temperate through temperate acts, he says, and continues: 'But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.' (EN 1105b9ff) There is no way to avoid or skip the difficult process through the education of character and moral consciousness. Philosophy proper is impossible without this preparation." (ERIKSEN, p. 142)

"Because it is an arete, theoria can also be said to consist of both praxis and prohairesis. But as the phronimos must reckon with the hindrances of the external conditions for the execution of his virtue, the sophos must fight with the hindrances placed upon him through his nature, as being a man. If he cannot execute theoria always, he is still a sophos, thanks to his choice." (ERIKSEN, p. 150) [PSA: That is, commitment to philosophy as a way of life.]

"Ethics is not a natural science. The ideals may find some support in the correspondence with ta legomena, but the real test is ek ton ergon tou biou (1179a19), i.e. not in the 'facts of life', but in the works and life of the individual who, at first, provisionally accepts this instruction on moral choice and the best activity, and then finds in his own experience that the logos given is true." (ERIKSEN, p. 167) [PSA: note the connection here to 'meta logou', providing an account for how one lives.]

"Politics VII, 3 concludes with the contention that thinking is the supreme praxis. Practical life need not concern others, i.e. theoria is a praxis of privacy. A state may also be a state without foreign policy, Aristotle says. Correspondingly, a man may also be a man without external relations (exoterikai praxeis, 1325b29)." (ERIKSEN, p. 177)

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