Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic
J.D.G. Evans
Cambridge University Press, 1977.

"[T]he objects of the expert's faculty are those things which *really are* what the objects of others' - inexperts' - faculties only *seem to be*." (EVANS, p. 5) [PSA: In ethics, the phronimos grasps what really is good.]

"Topics Theta 14, 163b4-16, recommends that the dialectician should have a variety of arguments against each thesis. Among other benefits, this is of value in philosophical enquiry, where it is important to be able to see the consequences of alternative hypotheses. Another passage in the same vein is SE 16, 175a5-12, which mentions two ways in which ability to answer well in debating contests is useful to the philosopher - because it develops in him a sense of the dangers of ambiguity, and because practice in avoiding fallacious reasoning at the hands of others makes it less likely that he will succumb to it in his private deliberations." (EVANS, p. 34)

"[T]here is a similarity between the distinction between dialectic and ontology ... and the distinction which is developed in EN III.2-3 between deliberation and choice; without the deliberation and the reasons for action which it provides there can be no choice of action, but nonetheless the choice is something distinct from the deliberation which is its precondition. Similarly, the testing of proposed definitions, which is the task of dialectic, provides reasons for choosing the definition, but the act of choosing is something distinct from the testing which necessarily precedes it." (EVANS, p. 36)

"At EE I.8, 1218a1-15, Aristotle argues that where we have a series in which one member is prior and others posterior, we cannot allow that all the members share a common characteristic which is distinct from any of them, since that distinct characteristic would then be prior to all the members of the series and thus would claim the primacy that was originally assigned to the primary member.... At DA II.3, 414b20-415a13, Aristotle says that the forms of soul, like the forms of geometrical shapes, constitute a series with prior and posterior members, and that in the case of such a series any common definition which might fit all the members would fail to indicate the distinct nature of each of them. Accordingly, instead of looking for a common definition we should try to give an individual definition of each of the members of the series and also to show how they are ordered in the series. [fn149: 414b32-34] .... But the sort of universality which characterises the primary case is not the sort of universality which is possessed by the attribute which all the cases, primary and otherwise, share. Thus whenever someone has a certain amount of money or possessions, however small, we may speak of *his* wealth, but we can speak of *wealth* only where the amount is sizeable and exceptional. What is common to all the cases of possession is not the characteristic of being wealth but that of being *someone's* wealth, and so in this sense wealth is not the universal characteristic. On the other hand, what unifies all these dissimilar cases of possession is their approximation to, and in some cases realisation of, the common standard of *wealth*, and without this standard they would not constitute a genuine group which could meaningfully be said to have a universal characteristic; in this sense it is the primary case, the standard, which is universal. In the passages which I have been examining Aristotle's argument is, in effect, that certain concepts - Friendship, Soul, Citizen, Shape, Being, Philosophy - have a complexity such that their unity can only be preserved by their possessing some central element to which, like a standard case, reference must be made when we explain how the other elements belong to the same concept. This primary element is universal in the sense in which Wealth is." (EVANS, pp. 42-45)

"Aristotle distinguishes the unqualified object of wish (to haplos bouleton) from the object of someone's wish (to hekastos bouleton).... The object of the individual's wish may or may not coincide with the object of wish; and in fact the two do coincide in the case of the object of the *good man's* wish and only in this case. Thus the good man, or moral expert, is the standard by reference to whose act of wishing we may determine the nature of *the* object of wish." (EVANS, p. 57)

"The distinction qualified/unqualified which we have seen Aristotle use in his analysis of the object of wish is also used by him in the analysis of other central ethical concepts. Thus he appeals to this distinction when he comments on pleasure [1152b27-33, 1176a15-22], the object of friendship [1155b18-27, 1157b25-28], the terrible [1228b18-29], the voluntary [1110a18-19]. He argues that in the case of all these concepts we must recognise a complexity of such a kind that under them fall *both* straightforward instances which stand in need of no further explanation in order to count as instances of the particular concept *and* instances which do need some explicit qualification if they are to count as instances at all." (EVANS, p. 59)

"If we suppose in the case of faculties and their objects that where one of the two elements is qualified as real or apparent the other must be qualified in the same way, we lose the value of these qualifications for the analysis of the relation between faculties and their objects. This value lies in the means provided by these qualifications for distinguishing between *successful* or *proper* exercises of a faculty and the *mere* exercise of the faculty. It is this distinction which is obliterated by each of the two opposing views and preserved in Aristotle's account alone. The view which maintains that the object of wish is the good only allows that successful exercise of a faculty should qualify as exercise; and the view which maintains that the object of wish is the apparent good represents all exercise of the faculty as successful exercise." (EVANS, pp. 60-61)

"When he comments on method in science Aristotle frequently draws a distinction between what is more intelligible *absolutely* and what is more intelligible *to us*.... [I]n a number of passages Aristotle indicates a connection between the logic of Good and that of Intelligible. [fn: Metaphysics Zeta 3, 1029b5-8. At EN I.4, 1095b2-8, the distinction between the two forms of intelligibility is applied to a problem of method in ethics.]" (EVANS, pp. 68-69)

"[N]ot only is that which is intelligible in a qualified way intelligible to someone - the man of unsound mental disposition - but also that which is intelligible in an unqualified way is intelligible *to someone* - the man of *sound* mental disposition. [142a9-11]" (EVANS, p. 72)

"In ethical matters the moral expert is the man who recognises a given property in what really has the property, and in medical matters the man of sound physical disposition finds healthy what really is so; [fn47: For a clear statement of the relation between appearance and reality in ethical matters, cf. IX.5, 1176a15-16, 'evidently in all such cases what appear to the good man *is*.'] and likewise where understanding is concerned, it is the man of sound mental disposition who finds more intelligible that which really is so." (EVANS, p. 72)

"At EN V.1, 1129b4, after distinguishing the simply good from what is good for someone, he says 'men pray for and pursue the former, but this is wrong; they should pray that things good without qualification should be good also for them, but should choose things good for them'.... We must start from where we already are - from what we find good and from what we understand - if we wish to advance to the chosen territory of the absolutely good and the absolutely intelligible. The absolutely good is that which is found to be good by the man who sees the truth in moral matters." (EVANS, pp. 87-89)

"Aristotle's comments on the character of his treatment of dialectic in the Topics bear a considerable similarity to his comments on his treatment of ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics. [PSA: Perhaps because ethical decision making it itself dialectical!] At Topics I.1, 101a18-24, he says that his aim in writing a work on dialectic is not to give a precise account but only to provide an outline description of the various matters which he will treat, since this is sufficient for a work of this character. The similarity between this comment on the treatment of dialectic and the comments on the treatment of ethics is striking. In both cases Aristotle says that he will avoid the precise account, and elects to provide an outline account, as is demanded by the nature of the subject matter." (EVANS, p. 89)

"Aristotle analyses such central concepts of dialectic as the intelligible and the endoxic in a way which parallels his analysis of the object of wish and other central ethical concepts. Moreover this latter analysis conforms with his theory of method in ethics: as we read in EN V.1, 1129b4-6, we must choose what is good for us and pray that this may also be good without qualification. He goes on to draw a parallel between intellectual and moral progress at Metaphysics Zeta 3, 1029b5-8: 'the task is, as in the case of actions to make out of what is good for each man the completely good good for each man, so to make out of what is more intelligible to him the naturally more intelligible more intelligible to him'. Just as in ethics we must proceed from the qualified to the unqualified good, this necessarily lessens the precision which a treatment of the matter can possess, so also in dialectic the nature of the concepts which are to be treated lessens the precision which Aristotle's discussion can possess." (EVANS, pp. 92-93)

"[A]t DA I.1, 403a25-403b19 ... Aristotle distinguishes the two types of definition which may be given of such a thing as a House - 'a shelter which prevents destruction by wind, storm and heat' and 'stones, bricks and wood'. Here he presents the contrast in terms of the distinction between matter and form; but there is in fact a close connection between the problem as it is expressed in DA I.1 and in Metaphysics Beta 3. This is clear from the discussion of this problem in Metaphysics Zeta 10-11. In these chapters Aristotle works together into a single discussion of the problem of the elements of definition, both consideration of the constituent parts of the definiendum and consideration of the relation between material and formal parts in the nature of the subject. [1034b20-32, 1036b21-32]" (EVANS, pp. 117-118) [PSA: Cf. eudaimonia as arche - it is formally not defined as a list of its "material" constituents as in "objective list" accounts of the good.]

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