Justice in the Nicomachean Ethics Book V
Hallvard Fossheim
In Miller, ed., Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide
Cambridge, 2011

With reference to 1129b25-27 and 30-33, Fossheim states that his interpretation is not "that 'justice is the whole of virtue in relation to another' (Irwin), but that the 'just is complete virtue, not as such but relation to another' (1129b25-27). The import of 'complete' (teleia) is then picked up and spelled out a couple of lines further down: justice is 'complete virtue to the highest degree because it is the exercise [chresis] of complete virtue' (1129b30-31).... Thus, justice is complete in being the *use* of virtue towards another, not in being virtue towards another." (FOSSHEIM, p. 267) [PSA: note the similarity to knowledge, where merely having knowledge is less complete than actively using it in theoria.]

The repeated use of the term chresis is emphatic. It is unique to these passages, in the sense that it is not used in a similar manner to characterize the ethical virtues in Books II-IV. On the contrary, we recognize this term from the earlier books precisely as Aristotle's way of stressing the distinction between having and using - that is, between state and activity. The conceptual pair ktesis (possession) / chresis (use) is how Aristotle brings home the difference between virtue and happiness, and is then also spelled out as the contrast between hexis and energeia (I.8 1098b31-33; cf. also EE III.4 1232a4-6). Aristotle's use of the word is systematic in this respect, being his main way of indicating that an activity (energeia), in contrast to a state, is what is intended. To sum up, I suggest that 1129b11-1130a1 can be taken not as an argument that general justice is identical to complete virtue, but as an argument that complete virtue turns out to be virtue displayed in relation to another, and that justice will be the complete use of such complete virtue." (FOSSHEIM, pp. 267-268)

With reference to 1130a5-13, Fossheim comments: "It is not easy to say how we should take the two final sentences (1130a12-13).... The idea seems to be that general justice and virtue are the same - that is, they identify or point to the same things - while to be justice is not the same as to be virtue - that is, that they have different 'being,' essence, or definition." (FOSSHEIM, p. 270)

"What is just is ultimately determined in terms of what upholds the constitution as the form of the polis, while what is generous is ultimately determined in terms of the virtue and happiness of the individual. If both constistution and individuals are ideally good, the constitution of the polis will support the happiness of the citizens as their individual constitutions do, and the same act will be generous and just. This does nto imply, however, that what it is for the act to be just is the same as for it to be generous. Moreover, this difference is also of practical importance, since Aristotle seems to think there never have been and never will be such ideal constitutions or such ideal individuals. For just actions, the primary criterion remains that the act is in accordance with law." (FOSSHEIM, p. 270)

He then makes the following addendum: "[T]he preceding argument does not depend on it, but the formula "X and Y are the same, but their being (einai) is different / not the same" recurs in several other places in the corpus. I do not have occasion here to go into the metaphysical implications of its uses, but one usage, where the different in being is spelled out as a different between potential and activity (energeia), or between two or more potentialities in relation to one activity, is well attested. [fn34: Among the clearest examples are, for the first, DA II.12 424a25; for the second, DA III.2 425b26-27; Physics III.3 202b5-10, 13-16. Other sites where the formula is employed are Metaphysics XII.10 1075b4-6; EN VI.8 1141b23-24; Topics V.4 133b34; DA III.2 426a15-17; DA III.7 431a12-14; DA III.7 431a17-20.] This in itself would appear to be a reason for thinking that the difference Aristotle is getting at is a distinction in terms of activity and potentiality - whether the relation should be one of a potentiality (virtue) relating to an activity (the just and virtuous action), or of two potentialities (the city's and the individual's, respectively) relating to one activity (the same action)." (FOSSHEIM, pp. 270-271)

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