On Aristotle's Conception of the Soul
Michael Frede
In Nussbaum and Rorty, eds., Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Clarendon, 1992.

"Aristotle often talks as if the soul itself were a set of abilities the organism has to do the kinds of things which are characteristic of its kind.... Thus to say that an object has a certain nature is not to postulate a mysterious force or a mysterious kind of causation; it is to say something about how the object and its behaviour have to be understood and to be explained.... It is in this way, then, that Aristotle can say that the soul, qua form, essence, or nature of the organism, is that in virtue of which it is alive. It is alive in so far as it does the kinds of things an organism of this kind characteristically does." (FREDE, p. 102)

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