The Ethics of Aristotle
Alexander Grant
London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1885

"The very word 'conscience,' on which right so much depends, is only another term to express 'consciousness,' and a man differs from a machine in this, that the one has a law in itself - is moved, as Aristotle would say, kata logon: the other is moved meta logou, has the law both in and for himself." (GRANT, p. 79)

"The 'Choice of Hercules' would make it appear as if the allurement of vice were exterior to us, as if 'Hercules' had merely to select, to the best of his judgment, between two external objects offered to him. But this leaves out of consideration the enemy within the camp, the eutheraton hautov mentioned by Aristotle (EN III.i.11), the fact that temptation is in ourselves, and consists in our own nature, which does not leave us free to make cool judgments and to act upon them." (GRANT, p. 146)

"We have already incidentally referred [SE II.6, Metaphysics III.ii.20] to several of Aristotle's views of the Sophists and Sophistry. He does not, any more than Plato, speak of definite doctrines belonging to the Sophists, as if they were a school of philosophers with their own metaphysical or ethical creed. He speaks repeatedly of their *practice*, of their method, of certain tricks in argument commonly used by them; he says (EN X.9.20) that in their teaching they put Rhetoric on a level with Politics; (Rhet I.i.14) that the Sophist differs from the Rhetorician in the purpose or aim (te proairesei) with which he uses the artifices of Rhetoric; (SE XXXIII.11) that Sophistry is the near neighbour of Dialectic; (ibid XI.5) that it differs from Eristic pure and simple in employing fallacy for the purpose of gain." (GRANT, p. 152)

"The end of anything, that for the sake of which anything exists, can hardly be separated from the perfection of that thing, from its idea and form; thus the formal cause or definition becomes absorbed into the final cause (horizetai gar hekaston toi telei, EN III.vii.6)." (GRANT, p. 222)

"Human life and action are rendered finite by being directed to their end or final cause, the good attainable in action." (GRANT, p. 222) [PSA: Instead of "finite" I might say "well-defined".]

"[A]s physical things strive all, though unconsciously, after the good attainable by them under their several limitations, so man may consciously strive after the good attainable in life." (GRANT, p. 223)

"Aristotle assumes that the desires of man are so framed as to imply the existence of this telos (EN I.ii.1). And he asserts that man can only realise it in the sphere of his own proper functions (en toi ergoi tou anthropou, EN I.vii.10), and in accordance with the law of his proper nature and its harmonious development (kata ten oikeian areten, EN I.vii.15)." (GRANT, pp. 223-224)

"[T]he ethical telos not only exists *in* man, but also *for* man; not only is the good realised in him, but it is recognised by him as such; it is the end not only of his nature, but also of his desires; it stands before his thoughts and wishes and highest consciousness as the absolutely sufficient, that in which he can rest, that which is in and for itself desirable (haplos de teleion to kath' hauto aireton aei, EN I.vii.4).... The final cause, then, in Ethics, is viewed, so to speak, from the inside." (GRANT, p. 224)

"[T]he objective and subjective import of the telos are blended together. The end and the consciousness of the end are not separated." (GRANT, p. 226) [PSA: This is an implication of meta logou, of human experience being suffused with thought.]

"A good action is an End-in-itself, as being the perfection [7] of our nature, and that for the sake of which (hou heneka) our moral faculties before existed, hence bringing a pleasure and inward satisfaction with it; something which possesses the qualities of being kalon, horismenon, and energeia teleia. [fn7: In another passage (EN III.vii.6), Aristotle seems to use the term telos in a more purely objective sense to denote perfection. He says, 'The telos of every individual moral act is the same with that of the formed moral character' (telos de pasass energeias esti to kata ten hexin).]" (GRANT, p. 227) [PSA: In Walker's terms, the kata here seems to be constitutive, not directive.]

"A moment of contemplative thought (theoretike energeia) is most perfectly and absolutely an end. It is sought for no result but itself. It is a state of peace, which is the crown of all exertion (ascholoumetha hina scholazomen). It is the realisation of the divine in man, and constitutes the most absolute and all-sufficient happiness [EN X.viii.7], being, as far as possible in human things, independent of external circumstances. [EN X.vii.4]" (GRANT, pp. 228-229) [PSA: I'd prefer to translate theoretike energeia as "fully active awareness".]

"The End-in-itself renders life a rounded whole, like a work of art, or a product of nature. The knowledge of it is to give definiteness to the aims, 'So that we shall be now like archers knowing what to shoot at' (EN I.ii.2). In the realisation of it, we are to feel that there need be no more reaching onwards toward infinity, for all the desires and powers will have found their satisfaction (EN I.ii.1)." (GRANT, pp. 230-231)

"As soon as the proposition has been laid down that the chief good for man is only attainable in his proper work, and that this proper work is a peculiar kind of life, praktike tis zoe tou logon echontos, Aristotle proceeds to assume (theteon) that this life must be no mere possession (kath' hexin) of certain powers and latent tendencies, but 'in actuality, for this is the distinctive form of the conception. (EN I.vii.13) He then transforms the qualifying term kat' energeian into a substantive idea, and makes it the chief part of his definition of the supreme good." (GRANT, p. 237) [PSA: In Walker's terms, is kata here directive or constitutive; it seems constitutive, since how could energeia *direct* our deliberations and decisions?]

With regard to understanding how we learn to be good, Grant writes: "The whole question depends on Aristotle's theory of the hexis, as related to dunamis and energeia. There can be no such thing, properly speaking, as a dunamis tes aretes.... The energeia, however, is no longer indefinite; it has, at all events, some sort of definiteness for good or bad. And by the principle of habit (ethos) ... the energeia reacts upon the dunamis, reproducing itself. Thus the dunamis loses its indefiniteness, and passes into a definite tendency; it ceases to be a mere dunamis, and becomes a hexis, that is to say, a formed and fixed character, capable only of producing a certain class of energeiai.... The hexis, or moral state, is on the farther side, so to speak, of the energeiai. It is the sum and result of them. If hexis be regarded as a sort of developed dunamis, as a capacity acquired indeed and definite, but still only a capacity, it may naturally be contrasted with energeia.... [T]he hexis is a fixed tendency to a certain class of actions, and, if external circumstances do not forbid, will certainly produce these." (GRANT, pp. 240-242) [PSA: it may be helpful here to think of hexis not as a habit but as a practice.]

"Aristotle seems to regard moral acts not so much as the development of a latent excellence, but rather as the development or action of our nature in accordance with a law (energeiai kat' areten).... When he spoke of energeia kat' areten ... he had in his thoughts, that a moral energeia was to the undeveloped capacities as a flower to the seed, as a statue to the block, as the waking to the sleeping, as the finite to the undefined. And he yet farther implied that this energeia was no mere process or transition to something else, but contained its end in itself, and was desirable for its own sake." (GRANT, pp. 242-243)

"[A] psychical energeia must be different from the same category exhibited in any external object. Life, the mind, the moral faculties, must have their 'existence in actuality' distinguished from their mere 'potentiality' by some special difference, not common to other existences. What is it that distinguishes vitality from the conditions of life, waking from sleeping, thought from the dormant faculties, moral action from unevoked moral capacities? In all these contrasts there is no conception that approaches nearer towards summing up the distinction than that of 'consciousness.'" (GRANT, p. 243) [PSA: that is, theoria as active awareness; this is why 'eudaimonia extends as far as theoria does' (1178b28-29).]

"Viewed from without, or objectively, energeia must mean an existence fully developed in itself, or an activity desirable for its own sake, so that the mind could contemplate it without seeing in it a means or a condition to anything beyond. But when taken subjectively, as being an energeia of the mind itself, as existing not only *for* the mind but also *in* the mind, it acquires a new aspect and character. Henceforth it is not only the rounded whole, the self-ending activity, the blooming of something perfect, in the contemplation of which the mind could repose; but it is the mind itself called out to actuality. It springs out of the mind and ends in the mind. It is not only life, but the sense of life; not only waking, but the feeling of the powers; not only perception or thought, but a consciousness of one's own faculties as well as of the external object." (GRANT, p. 244)

"Aristotle's theory rather comes to this, that the chief good for man is to be found in life itself. Life, according to his philosophy, is no means to anything ulterior; in the words of Goethe, 'Life itself is the end of life.' The very use of the term energeia, as part of the definition of happiness, shows, as Aristotle tells us, that he regards the chief good as nothing external to man, but as existing in man and for man - existing in the evocation, the vividness, and the fruition of man's own powers." (GRANT, p. 246) [PSA: This is true for animals as well, and is inherent to Aristotle's account of that-for-the-sake-of-which; value is biocentric.]

"[P]leasure is not a transition, but a fruition. It is not imperfect, but an End-in-itself. It does not arise from our coming to our natural state, but from our employing it. [EE VII.xii.3]" (GRANT, p. 248)

"Aristotle in defining Pleasure as ho teleioi ten energeian, makes it, not 'the sense of what promotes life,' but rather the sense of life itself; the sense of the vividness of the vital powers; the sense that any faculty whatsoever has met its proper object." (GRANT, p. 249) [PSA: in this sense, hedone is a form of, or necessarily involves, awareness.]

"Pleasure then, according to Aristotle, proceeds rather from within than from without; it is the sense of existence; and it is so inseparably connected with the idea of life, that we cannot tell whether life is desired for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life. [EN X.iv.9]" (GRANT, p. 250)

"The passions and desires are infinite; moral virtue consists in introducing limit (peras) into them - in bringing them under law (logoi horizein) - in making them exhibit balance, proportion, harmony (mesoteta), which is the realisation of the law. On the other hand, reason is 'right law' (orthos logos), i.e., is another name for the law itself. It is the standard, and therefore does not require to be regulated by the standard. The intellectual virtues are not mesotetes, because they are logoi." (GRANT, p. 258)

"This is, then, what the term mesotes is capable of expressing; it is the law of beauty. If virtue is harmony, grace, and beauty in action, mesotes perfectly expresses this. That beauty constituted virtue, was an eminently Greek idea. If we run through Aristotle's list of the virtues, we find them all embodying this idea. The law of the mesotes, as exhibited in bravery, temperance, liberality, and magnanimity, constitutes a noble, free, and brilliant type of manhood." (GRANT, p. 261)

"One of the most interesting points ... is the way in which Aristotle regards man in relation to nature as a whole. His view appears to be two-fold; on the one hand he regards man as part of nature.... On the other hand, he looks at the human reason and will as a principle of causation, which is not part of nature, but distinct. 'Man,' he says, 'is the cause of his own actions.' Thus he classifies causation into 'nature, necessity, chance, and again reason and all that comes from man' (EN III.iii.7). 'In art and in action the efficient cause rests with the maker or doer, and not as in nature with the thing done' (EE VI.iv.4). Aristotle's Ethical theory depends on this principle, that the moral qualities are not by nature; i.e., self-caused, but produced in us in accordance with the law of our nature, by the exercise of will, by care, cultivation, and in short the use of the proper means." (GRANT, p. 285)

END