Aristotle's Ethical Theory
W.F.R. Hardie
Clarendon Press, 1980

"Aristotle associates with his dialectical method a considerable variety of technical, or semi-technical, terms. These terms spring from at least two distinct metaphors. The mind, confronted by a conflict between opinions, or between an opinion and observed facts, is said to be blocked, as when traffic streams meet, and can find no way out (aporia). It then has to 'shift its ground' (metabainein). [EN I.7 1097a24, EE I.6 1216b10] Again the mind is said to be 'bound' and seeks 'release' (lusis) from its chains (EN VII.2 1146a24-27). These metaphors are freely combined as in ... Aristotle's expression for the solution of an impasse, lusis tes aporias (1146b6-8)." (HARDIE, p. 39)

"Aristotle himself represents his discussion of incontinence (akrasia) as only in part dialectical. For at a crucial point he says that we may 'also view' the matter 'with reference to the facts of human nature', phusikos (EN VII.3 1147a24-25). As Burnet points out, the 'physical' (phusikos) treatment of a question is regularly opposed to the dialectical (logikos) treatment. Dialectical examinations of a question use principles and distinctions which have applications in more than one science, while a physical explanation is in term of the principles proper to the special science concerned." (HARDIE, p. 40)

"Mere drill teaches a man to do the same thing in the same circumstances without attending to what he is doing; but virtuosity, like virtue, involves doing the appropriately different thing attentively in varying circumstances. The virtuous action is second nature and not against the grain; but it is not mechanical. The agent must have knowledge and he must choose (EN II.4 1105a31-32)." (HARDIE, p. 104)

"[H]ealth can be impaired by eating or drinking too much or too little, while that which is proportionate (summetron) both produces and increases and preserves it (1104a15-18). The same principle applies to the virtues...." (HARDIE, p. 130)

"Aristotle points out that health, while determinate, nevertheless admits of greater and less. 'The same proportion (summetria) is not found in all things, nor a single proportion always in the same thing, but it may be relaxed and yet persist up to a point, and it may differ in degree' (1173a23-28).... Any degree within a limited range is good enough to avoid the vices of excess and defect. It is not merely that we do not know which degree within that range is the right degree. There is no one right degree." (HARDIE, p. 143) [PSA: That is, no one right degree for all people in all situations.]

"The building of character is like training for a contest, and athletes never stop practicing." [1114a4-10] (HARDIE, p. 174)

"Theoretical wisdom is defined in chapter 7 as 'intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge - scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion' (1141a18-20).... Hence practical wisdom, if it is to be complete and not headless, must include the intuitive thought of the end as well the intellectual powers required for the discovery of means." (HARDIE, p. 227)

"Philosophic wisdom, as part of the complete excellence of man, is, not indeed an efficient, but a formal cause of happiness; a disposition of which the active manifestations constitute happiness (1144a3-6). Practical wisdom is also an element in happiness because 'the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with ethical virtue' (1144a6-7)." (HARDIE, p. 235)

At 1146a4-9, "Aristotle rejects as absurd (atopon) the suggestion that the incontinent man acts against practical wisdom (phronesis). For the same man would then be incontinent and practically wise. Besides, 'it has been shown that the man of practical wisdom is one who will *act*; [cf. 1140b4-6] for he is a man concerned with individual facts, [cf. 1141b16, 1142a24] and who has the other virtues'. [cf. 1144b30-1145a2] We might express Aristotle's doctrine here by saying that practical wisdom necessarily involves commitment, and that an incontinent man could not count as committed to right conduct." (HARDIE, pp. 273-274)

"We may well doubt whether Aristotle's patterns of analysis cover all the facts. It is pertinent, for example, to ask, as Ross does, how, if the wrong act is done in the absence of knowledge, the knowledge has come to be absent. Perhaps, if we tried harder, we could grasp our knowledge more firmly, keep a grip on ourselves. [Cf. VII.7 1150b22-25]" (HARDIE, p. 291)

"The words 'activity' and 'pleasure' may not be used to refer to the same experiences but they are at least used to say different things about the same experience." (HARDIE, p. 315) [PSA: Perhaps energeia and hedone are the same thing but they differ in being; see also the Topics on the way in which one thing can intensify the being of another.]

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