Two Perspectives on the Ultimate End
Susanna Hill
In Sim, ed., The Crossroads of Norm and Nature. Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

"[T]he process of becoming always moves toward the actualization of a form, and it is for the sake of this end that the substance has the potentiality that it has. Thus, the form or actuality toward which the development proceeds is its final cause, and such a final cause moves the potential by being its goal.... [B]ehind this movement toward its own actuality is a reaching out toward complete actuality." (HILL, p. 101)

"[H]uman theoria develops as a response to the practical life and differs from the activity of the first principle in that it depends upon knowledge of the physical world. Given that this is the case, Aristotle's audience would not be able to benefit from theoria unless they already possessed the practical aretai." (HILL, p. 106)

"[J]ust as those who deny that there is an ultimate end or final cause deny that there is anything good (Metaphysics 2.2 994b9-15), so too those who deny that there is an ultimate end for the sake of which an agent chooses all other actions and goods must hold that all choices are empty and vain (NE 1.2 1094a20-21)." (HILL, p. 107)

"If one examines the role of reason in the practical life, one will see that, although its object differs from that of theoretical reason, practical reason is similar to theoretical reason." (HILL, p. 107)

"[E]xperience is inferior to phronesis because a person acting from it does not consciously understand the principle governing the course of his or her action, and he or she may be mistaken. The phronimos is aware of the features that make the new case an instance falling under the same general rule, and he or she will not fail to act well. Thus, like theoretical reason, practical reason begins with a grasp of first principles, and like theoretical reason, it proceeds by deducing, in this case via practical syllogism. Further, as theoretical knowledge is marked by an ability to explain why, what separates the phronimos from the person of experience is the former's ability to give an account." (HILL, p. 109) [PSA: the ability to give an account is acting meta logou, as BURNYEAT-1981 has described it.]

"Because Aristotle inquires into the ultimate end of action from two perspectives, he asks two questions, 'What is the end toward which human nature is directed' and 'What is it best for an agent to pursue?' Yet, because the ethical works depend on the physical and metaphysical works, the answer to the two questions coincide. Theoria is the ultimate end. Active reflection on what is known is human flourishing (NE 10.7 1177a11-18). However, as we have seen, the reason theoria is valuable as a *human* good is that it is a rational activity, and all rational activity is valuable. The practical aretai, being tied to phronesis and being the perfection of a part of the human soul, are also valuable, even if their exercise is a less perfect form of eudaimonia. These aretai do lead to a further good. They are the necessary conditions for human theoria." (HILL, p. 112)

"Aristotle often used theorein interchangeably with skopein, and Bonitz takes theorein to include both contemplation and rational investigation. Further, it would be odd of Aristotle to say that one can have fellow workers in theoria if theoria only refers to the contemplation of already acquired knowledge." (HILL, p. 113, fn12)

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