The Virtues of Aristotle
D.S. Hutchinson
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.

After citing key passages such as 1094b11-16, 1098a26-29, 1103b34-1104a9, 1105b11-18, 1140b17-20, 1143b11-14, 1144a23-b1, 1165a12-14, 1179b4-18, and 1227b34-1228a2, Hutchinson states: "[A] hexis is ... a special sort of disposition, which is itself a quality; it is special by being especially well entrenched in the thing of which it is a hexis. A hexis is either an excellence or an aberration; an excellence is a hexis which is a perfection, and something is perfect when it is most in accordance with its nature." (HUTCHINSON, p. 5)

"[P]eople have characters which are complex and which have the good or bad features which they do in virtue of their parts being arranged in a particular way." (HUTCHINSON, p. 9). [PSA: Note the connection to aspects of to kalon; in particular, the arrangement or relationship or 'taxis' between the part having reason and the part listening to reason.]

"Compared to a mere disposition, a hexis is hard to change (8b30, 9a5, 9a10), ... longer-lasting (8b28, 9a5, 9a9), and permanent (8b30)." (HUTCHINSON, p. 19)

"[T]hose things which are part of a thing's nature are those things which are well entrenched." (HUTCHINSON, p. 19) [PSA: Shields calls this an "indwelling state".]

"Excellence ... is a sort of perfection (teleiosis).... something is perfect 'of its kind if it cannot be surpassed in excellence and goodness, e.g. a perfect doctor and a perfect flute-player when, in respect of the form of the appropriate excellence, nothing is lacking' (Metaphysics 1021b14-17).... 'excellence is a sort of perfection, for everything is perfect and every substance (ousia) is perfect when, in respect of the form of the appropriate excellence, it lacks no portion of its natural greatness' (1021b20-23).... 'when anything acquires its excellence, it is then called perfect, for then it is most natural' (Physics 246-13-15)." (HUTCHINSON, p. 21)

"[T]his connection between perfection/imperfection and excellence/defect is mediated by the idea that animals determinately have a particular and distinctive way of organizing their structure and their activities, which allows us to say that a certain feature is in the nature of the animal.... This way of talking about perfection occurs regularly in Aristotle's biology. [e.g., citing GA 75317-11, Hutchinson states...] Here there is the idea that perfection is the terminus of a process of development; only fully developed, mature animals could count as perfect specimens.... When an animal is mature, it is no longer changing very much, and its dispositions are relatively stable and constant." (HUTCHINSON, p. 22-23)

"[V]irtues of character are perfections, and ... they are perfections in virtue of the fact that those who have them are maximally in accordance with their (human) nature." (HUTCHINSON, p. 24)

One of the premises that Hutchinson identifies in Aristotle is that "if a thing's ergon is good, then it is most in accordance with its nature"; e.g., he cites Meteorology 390a10ff: "'what a thing is is always determined by its ergon; a thing really is what it is when it can perform its ergon; an eye, for instance, when it can see' .... a thing has the nature it has by being able to perform its ergon." (HUTCHINSON, p. 27)

Citing PA I.5 645b14-20, Hutchinson states: "The natural end of the development of creatures or their parts is the state in which they can perform the ergon for the sake of which they have developed." (HUTCHINSON, p. 29)

"A similar dual point is made at NE 1139a15-17: 'One must understand that the best hexis is of each of these things, for that is each thing's excellence' .... The same point is made at EE 1218b37-1219a1: 'an excellence is the best disposition or hexis or faculty of everything which has some use or ergon.'" (HUTCHINSON, p. 30)

"[A] thing's excellence is that hexis which causes the ergon of the thing to be performed well." (HUTCHINSON, p. 31) [Here Hutchinson goes on to cite EE 1219a19-29.] 

Contra Michael Woods, Hutchinson argues that the ergon argument in the EE (1218b32-1219a39) is indeed unified and that its conclusion is "the claim that happiness is activity of a perfect life in accordance with perfect excellence." Support is found in Metaphysics 1050a34-b2, where "it is again stated that happiness is a certain kind of life." (HUTCHINSON, p. 45)

"It is not that the soul is the source of vitality in bodies as electricity is the source of vitality in robots; as Aristotle makes abundantly clear in DA 413a20ff, the relation is much closer than that, and life (and so the soul) is *defined* in terms of the activities of thinking, perception, movement and growth. See also NE 1170a16-19 where life is defined in terms of the activities of thinking and perceiving. The soul produces vitality not as the electricity does, by being a fund of energy, but by causing the activities which comprise the organism's living.... An animal's soul is the source of its life in virtue of being the source of the various activities which comprise its life." (HUTCHINSON, pp. 47-48)

"[P]erfect excellence is total excellence, while imperfect excellence is partial excellence (EE 1219a36-37). This is further explained in the EE; a man can have partial excellence in two ways (according to EE 1219b39-1220a4, with EE 1219b28-31), but having excellence in the part of him which prescribes, but not in the part of him which obeys and listens, or by having excellent in the latter but not in the former part. The first partial excellence matches the specification of continence and incontinence (NE 1102b13-28) while the second partial excellence matches the specification of natural virtue (NE 1144b1-17)." (HUTCHINSON, p. 55)

"Rational activity is not to be conceived either as a species of activities among other species or as a genus of activities among other genera. We ought to conceive it as a *form* of activity which human beings display in the course of their specific activities." (HUTCHINSON, p. 59)

"Aristotle ... takes the high road. He represents the unexamined life as not fit for a man, quite literally; for if someone is to be a man he must be a creature whose conduct is informed by practical reason." (HUTCHINSON, p. 66)

"The life according to excellence ... is the best life that a creature like me can live." (HUTCHINSON, p. 68)

Aristotle's "sense of 'good', then, is objective, and, if you like, scientific, for it is part of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, which recognizes goals, functions, and purposes and therefore good and bad as part of the reality of things." (HUTCHINSON, p. 68)

"[W]hen, in the case of virtuous conduct, the agent chooses the action for its own sake, he chooses the action for the sake of the activity involved (as is said at 1176b6-9: 'something is chosen for itself if nothing is sought from it beyond the activity (energeia), and virtuous conduct is of this sort, for doing good and noble things is something chosen for itself') ... this is comprehensible in view of the fact that he is the sort of person who enjoys that sort of activity." (HUTCHINSON, p. 102)

"The correct test of a man's character is what he does when he is not acting for an ulterior object, viz., when he is acting for the sake of the activity itself. In the case of the truthful man, it is not just when he needs to keep faith in agreements that he is truthful; 'where nothing of the kind is at stake he is truthful in word and deed because he has that sort of hexis' (NE 1127b1-3)....  Our truthful man is now said to be a lover of truth, which indicates a distinctive concern for truth; it is a concern which will motivate him even in the absence of all considerations about the action other than that it is a case of telling the truth.... It will follow that the truthful man, because he is a lover of truth, will enjoy telling the truth. This is why he does it in cases where nothing else is at stake. The mark of a state of character is what a person chooses to do where nothing else is at stake for him save what that kind of activity is for him. This state of character is a disposition to enjoy certain courses of conduct." (HUTCHINSON, p. 103)

"Aristotle reminds us, consistently, that 'it is not in his ability [to deceive] that he is a pretentious man, but in his choosing, for it is in respect of his hexis and by being a man of a certain kind that he is pretentious' (NE 1127b14-15)." (HUTCHINSON, p. 104)

"What men are praised and blamed for is feeling a feeling reasonably (i.e., feeling it on the right occasions, with the right object, with the right degree of intensity) or for feeling it unreasonably. What is laudable (or the reverse) is a correct (or incorrect) relation between a situation and an emotional response." (HUTCHINSON, p. 117) [PSA: note the connection to practical truth.]

"[H]exeis cause us to have our feelings reasonably or unreasonably (EE 1220b9-10 and b18-19)." (HUTCHINSON, p. 117)

"Feelings ... are responses to the situation the agent conceives himself to be in, and are, or contain, specific desires inspired by the situation as thus conceived. They can be mistaken, in virtue of that conception being mistaken, and ... this is one way for feelings to occur reasonably or unreasonably." (HUTCHINSON, p. 118)

"[S]ince excellence in rationality occurs only in mature people, so will the associated character traits. We know that we shall find excellence in the performance of their ergon only in mature individuals, and these are individuals whose dispositions are also hexeis." (HUTCHINSON, p. 121)

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