Aristotle's First Principles
T.H. Irwin
Clarendon, 1988

Irwin quotes Topics 142a9-11 as follows: 'What is known unconditionally is not what is known to everyone, but what is known to those in good intellectual condition, just as what is unconditionally healthy is what is healthy for those in a good bodily condition.' (cf. EE 1235b30-1236a6, 1237a16-19) (IRWIN-1988, pp. 3-4)

"The constructive role of dialectic is not as obvious in Aristotle as it is in Plato, because the surviving works do not present his argument in the form of a Socratic dialogue. They are not conversations with several speakers, but continuous treatises in which the author appears, as Plato never does in the dialogues, in his own person. Still, this difference in presentation does not reflect a basic difference in method. Aristotle's works show their dialectical character by their conformity to the rules of the Topics, and ultimately to the pattern of the Platonic dialogues. [15] Aristotle intends such works as the De Anima, the Physics, and the Ethics to fulfil the claims made in the Topics for the constructive uses of dialectic. [fn15: Though Topics 155b10-11 suggests that question-and-answer is the normal method for dialectic, it is possible for the same person to take both parts; and Aristotle's works characteristically follow this procedure. Topics 163a36-b16 shows how preparation for dialetical conversation develops into philosophical exploration." (IRWIN-1988, p. 8)

"Aristotle eventually reaches the conclusion that substance is form [PSA: thinghood is way of being] and that the primary substances [PSA: entities] are particular forms, as opposed to the matter constituting them. At first sight, his conclusions seems to conflict with my efforts to regard his argument as part of first philosophy. For his actual conclusion - that goal-directed natural organisms are the primary substances - seems to rest on empirical considerations, especially about causation and explanation.... To answer these questions, I consider Aristotle's arguments for identifying the essence of somethings [PSA: what it is to be these things] with their first actuality [PSA: primary activity], a combination of actuality and potentiality, and for identifying this with form [PSA: way of being]. The proper conception of essence for first philosophy identifies something's essential properties with those that explain the rest of its properties and behaviour; such properties are rightly identified with a subject's persistent potentialities; and these persistent potentialities turn out to belong to its form rather than its matter. Hence it is reasonable to identify a basic subject with a pattern of functional, goal-directed organization, rather than with its constituent material." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 20-21) [PSA: yet energeia as way of being is more fundamental than the organization as physical form of a thing.]

"We need to know how to conduct 'encounters' {enteuxeis, Topics 101a27}; for we have to proceed through the common beliefs on each topic, and we must 'examine' (exetazein) the prevalent views. [38] And if our examination is to make progress, we must 'redirect' (or 'modify', metabibazein) beliefs in the right direction, and so we must know both what the right direction is and how to make someone else see that it is the right direction. [fn38: On exetazein cf. Topics 164a8-15, EE 1215a4-8, EN 1095a28-30, Metaphysics 1091a19.... The connexion of exetasis with the exposure (emphanisis) of conflicts [PSA: and thus aporiai] in someone's beliefs is made clear in Rhet. Alex. 1427b12-30.]" (IRWIN-1988, p. 37) [PSA: note the connection of exetazein to the examined life.]

After citing and discussing Metaphysics 995a27-b4 and Topics 145b17-20, Irwin observes: "Dialectic encourages us to reflect further on the beliefs we already hold; and the puzzles {aporiai} show us where the revision is needed." (IRWIN-1988, p. 42)

With regard to "dialectical appearances", Irwin writes: "The puzzles they generate are a sign of confusion: for if we have arguments for contradictory conclusions, we are unsure about the implications of our beliefs, and therefore about their content. In deciding if they really imply what they seem to imply, we clarify them." (IRWIN-1988, p. 44) [PSA: this seems especially difficult, or at least differently difficult, in action-oriented deliberation as opposed to knowledge-oriented inquiry.]

"Aristotle ... characteristically begins his constructive arguments by trying to 'make a new start' (DA 412a3-6, Metaphysics 1041a6-7, EN 1174a13-14, EE 1218b31-32; cf. EN 1097a24). A suitable new start should emerge from appearances, or modified versions of them, that have not been challenged by any of the puzzles that have been raised." (IRWIN-1988, p. 44) [PSA: often these new starts also signal a move to a phusike inquiry.]

"In dialectic, then, our plausible and undisputed 'new start' should show how far beliefs that appeared to generate the puzzles are credible, and how far they can avoid generating puzzles. Sometimes our new start allows us to see that at least one of the arguments for the two sides of a puzzle adds some false premisses to the appearance that seemed to cause the trouble; sometimes it shows us that when we articulate appearance more carefully, we should not interpret it in the way that causes the puzzle. On the other hand, a theory will reject some appearances, if a puzzle shows that doubt about them is well founded, and if their rejection allows us to solve the puzzle. Hence the success of the theory must be considered from these two points of view at once." (IRWIN-1988, p. 47)

"We are more readily and fully convinced if our false beliefs can be explained rather than ignored; if they were not explained they might still appear to be sources of objections to dialectical arguments (cf. EN 1154a22-26, EE 1246a13)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 47) [PSA: note the importance of explanation (apodeixis) in coming to a complete understanding (episteme) of the sources and causes for a thing.]

"Dialectic seeks coherence and mutual adjustment.... If a dialectical inquiry succeeds, we will have achieved coherence among our beliefs, by revision of the appearances we began with." (IRWIN-1988, p. 49)

"Not just anyone's untrained and inexperienced judgment about self-evidence is proof of self-evidence. Discovery of the appropriate first principles demands the right experience; and when we have this we will be able to see what is self-evident. Aristotle does not claim, indeed he denies, that what is self-evident in itself will always seem so to us before we inquire." (IRWIN-1988, p. 136) [PSA: this is also true in ethics]

After quoting Metaphysics 1036b28-32, Irwin comments: "Form is the first actuality that explains the structure and organization of the matter. In this case, perception is an actuality of this material body, and part of its form, because it explains why this body is composed and organized as it is. It explains these things teleologically by showing how the activities for which the body is organized are good for the creature. If such an explanation is true, the creature must have other actualities besides perception, and in particular it must be capable of moving itself, since the function of perception is to guide a creature's movements for its benefit. For a creature incapable of motion, perception would not have this function, and therefore would not explain its movements; hence perception would not be part of the essence." (IRWIN-1988, p. 246)

"He thinks being alive is an important common property because it is a teleological order of the parts and bodily processes of the organism to achieve some constant goals - the survival and flourishing of the organism or of its species [PSA: on this latter, see Balme]. The claim that something is alive implies that it is ordered to achieve these goals, and therefore implies some fairly definite expectations about the subject's structure and behavior." (IRWIN-1988, p. 284)

"What we live by primarily is whatever explains our vital activities; and since Aristotle has shown that these are goal-directed activities, their primary explanation must refer to the teleologically organized, goal-directed features of the subject, to the form rather than the matter." (IRWIN-1988, p. 284) [PSA: here again, for 'form' read 'way of being'.]

"The living creatures performs its particular goal-directed activities when it does, and in the sequence it does, because it has the functional organization and functional states it has; and these are the states Aristotle identifies with the soul and first actuality, which is the proximate potentiality for the vital activities." (IRWIN-1988, p. 285)

"[A] a collection of flesh and bones constitutes a single living organism in so far as it is teleologically organized; the activities of the single organism are the final cause of the movements of the different parts. Since the organism has a single final cause, it has a single soul and a single body, which are the soul and body of a single organism. Similarly, since the soul is the form, its identity and persistence determine the identity and persistence of the creature that has it, explaining why Socrates is properly identified with his soul." (IRWIN-1988, p. 288)

"An account of the formal cause requires knowledge of what an organism does." (IRWIN-1988, p. 296) [PSA: this is nearly tautological, given that an organism's eidos is its way of being.]

"Aristotle argues that the actualization of a second potentiality (the transition from first to second actuality) is not an alteration (417a30-b2)....  [F]ormal states arise only in the processes that constitute them; but they are not themselves essentially processes, but tendencies towards the final cause, or, as the Physics says, 'completions' (246a13). Aristotle adds that the acquisition of a first potentiality by learning from a teacher should not be called a way of being affected, or else we should recognize a type of alteration that is not the deprivation of a contrary but the acquisition of a state and of something's nature (417b9-16).... When a subject learns, the learning is an actualization of his potentiality and the fulfilment of his nature.... Since organisms are constructed to gain the benefits of perceiving, perceiving is an actualization of their natural potentiality; it is part of an animal's form, the final cause of its structures and organs." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 305-306)

Citing DA 433b5-10, Irwin writes: "To form a rational desire [PSA: commitment] we must compare the present and future benefits and harms of different actions, and reach a conclusion that will be expressed in a desire." (IRWIN-1988, p. 336)

"The wise person deliberates with a view not to this or that limited end, but with a view to living well (i.e., happiness, eudaimonia) in general (1140a25-28). In this case living well is our end and we deliberate about how to achieve it (1111b28-30). Good deliberation will find what is suitable to the end that is grasped by wisdom (1142b31-33)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 337)

"A correct conception of my good requires some conception of the sort of being that I am, some view of my nature, and some thought about the sorts of desires and aims that best suit my nature. This aspect of deliberation implies a fairly extensive possible criticism and rational assessment of current desires." (IRWIN-1988, p. 338) [PSA: and this conception is part of the "account" presented when one acts "meta logou"; cf. BURNYEAT-1981]

"Thought of my good requires thought of my life as a whole; and this requires the thought of myself as existing in past, present, and future." (IRWIN-1988, p. 338)

"The deliberation and decision that rest on this conception of a whole life are characteristic of a rational agent. The good of such an agent must be a complete good that belongs to a complete life (EN 1098a18-20); and a rational agent will consider his particular desires and actions against some view of how they will affect his complete life. A non-rational animal or a child has no conception of his whole life or of how he might shape his desires in the light of this conception; and so he is incapable of forming the states of character that Aristotle takes to be essential to happiness (1099b32-1100a1). [fn27: The energeia referred to in 1100a1 is fine action proceeding from a virtuous character, 1099b31-32. Since a virtuous character requires the right prohairesis, and a rational soul (cf. Aspasius 27.11-13), and this requires a conception of one's life and one's good, animal and children cannot have it.]" (IRWIN-1988, p. 339)

[I]f Aristotle can show that a rational creature is moved by reasoning about his good, resulting from reflexion on his life as a whole, he has good reason to claim that reason marks out a different sort of life." (IRWIN-1988, p. 339)

"[A] rational agent is influenced by a conception of his life as a whole and the conception of happiness that he wants to belong to this life as a whole. He can modify his particular desires, and vary his satisfaction of them, according to his conception of happiness. His decision [PSA: commitment] will reflect the results of his deliberation about his happiness, and therefore will express the sort of attitude that a non-rational agent cannot take to himself." (IRWIN-1988, p. 341)

"I have a rational soul in so far as I live by decision and rational planning resting on some conception of my life as a whole." (IRWIN-1988, p. 343)

"To have a conception of my good I need not have a conscious or detailed plan for my future welfare; I need to be ready to adjust one desire to another and to think about the effects of my action on my future self, regarded as the same self that now chooses. Continuity in these habits of choice and concern makes me a single self." (IRWIN-1988, p. 345) [PSA: this is one reason why the self is an *achievement*; cf. STERN-GILLET.]

"The De Anima aruges that the essence of human beings is their capacity for rational thought, desire, and action.... The Ethics is about what is good for creatures of this kind.... The account of the human essence explains why human beings are the appropriate subjects for ethics. They are open to praise and blame because they have the capacity for decision and for the rational desire that forms a conception of the agent's happiness. It is the same capacity that makes someone a responsible agent and makes him an agent properly concerned with ethics. Hence Aristotle offers his advice to 'everyone who is capable of living in accordance with his own decision' (EE 1241b6-7)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 346)

"[I]t is plausible to assume that answers to the questions 'What is the good for F?' and 'What is a good F?' both depend on the answer to the question 'What is F?'. Both the good for a dog and the goodness of a dog seem to depend on the sort of thing a dog is. An answer to the first of these questions gives us an account of happiness, and an answer to the second gives us an account of virtue." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 351-352)

"Aristotle argues that a complete and self-sufficient end cannot be considered for an individual by himself, living a solitary life, but must include the good of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, since a human being is naturally political (1097b8-11). The task of the Ethics is to find the complete good for an individual human being, and it cannot fulfil this task by considering only his good in isolation from the good of others. It must, then, be a work of political science.... [O]ur account of the good must remain incomplete until the community is described.... Aristotle urges us to study political theory 'so that as far as possible our philosophy about human matters will be completed' (1181b14-15)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 353) [PSA: see also DEPEW-1995.]

"Aristotle addresses agents capable of forming their lives by rational decision. 'On these points we must first notice that everyone who is capable of living in accordance with his own decision sets up some goal of living finely - either honour or reputation or wealth or education - with reference to which he will do all his actions; for not having one's life organized with reference to some end is a sign of much folly.' (EE 1214b6-11) .... Aristotle ... argues that failure to have one's *life* organized towards some end is a sign of much folly. He addresses an agent who is concerned about the character of his life, not simply with his desires at each stage of his life." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 359-360)

"Aristotle claims that the final good must be complete (teleion) (1097a25-b6).... He therefore rejects the possibility that there are several goods that meet this condition, each pursued for its own sake and none pursued for the sake of anything else. [fn30: I render teleion as 'complete', rather than 'final' or 'perfect'... 'Complete' is needed at 1098a18 for the bios teleios; and this is so closely connected with teleiotaten, immediately proceeding, that we should try to render the term uniformly throughout the argument of I.7. This initial argument about the EN might be supplemented, through more disputably, by appeal to MM 1184a8-14, EE 1219a35-39." (IRWIN-1988, p. 361)

"For Aristotle, anything complete must be a whole, leaving nothing outside (EE 1219b7-8, Physics 207a8-10, Metaphysics 1021b12-23, 1023b26-34), and a unified whole, in contrast to a mere collection. 'In one way we call a thing one if it is a quantity and continuous. But in another way we do not call anything one unless it is some sort of whole - that is to say, unless it has one form.' (Metaphysics 1016b11ff, cf. 1024a6-8, Physics 228b11-15).... He assumes that a rational agent wants her life to be a whole, not simply a collection of ends without further structure. If we agree about this, we will agree that only one end is unconditionally complete, and that it must cover the whole of a person's life; any less global end would have to be chosen for the sake of a whole life that includes it as a part. We already know that Aristotle regards a substance as a whole, and therefore as a unity that is more than a mere heap (soros) of its parts (Metaphysics 1040b5-10). He requires the parts of an organism's life to have the same sort of structure, both synchronic and diachronic, and in a rational agent he assumes some awareness of the structure." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 361-361)

"[T]he complete good is determined by objective norms and standards, beyond the agent's desires, for real goods." (IRWIN-1988, p. 363)

"We achieve a complete good, according to the normative conception, only if we completely fulfil our nature, not if we simply fulfil our conception of the good." (IRWIN-1988, p. 363)

"In confining the human function to a life of action of the rational part, Aristotle does not exclude all animal or vegetative activities. He assumes only that rational activity is the distinctive and essential feature of the human soul, and that this organizes the human being's other activities in the way perception organizes a non-rational animal's other activities. The life of action will include other activities besides the activity of reasoning; but in a human being they are essentially guided by reasoning." (IRWIN-1988, p. 364)

"To claim that the human function consists in a life according to reason is to claim that human behaviour is teleologically explicable as the product of practical reason guiding other activities." (IRWIN-1988, p. 364)

Citing EN 1174a1-4 and EE 1215b23-26, Irwin states: Similarly, we are right to deny happiness to a satisfied person who is satisfied with the wrong things, or lacks the appropriate sort of rational activity. On these grounds we can rule out the three most popular candidates for happiness - the lives of gratification, honour, and virtue. The life of gratification is fit only for grazing animals (1095b19-20), not for rational and active subjects. The life of honour depends on our being honoured by other people, and therefore makes us passive, not active, in relation to the most important aspect of our happiness; against this we intuitively believe that the good is 'something of our own', expressing our rational agency, not something that leaves us essentialluy passive (1095b23-26; cf. 1159a12-33). If we identify happiness with virtue, we must claim that someone can be happy when he is asleep or when he is suffering terrible misfortunes (1095b31-1096a2). Aristotle thinks we will agree that this is an absurd claim because both conditions prevent rational activity; when we are asleep we are inactive, and in terrible misfortunes we are victims of circumstances that 'impede many activities' (1100b29-30)." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 368-369) [PSA: consider the broader range of things that impede activity.]

"[I]f we think a human being's welfare does not require the completion of human nature, we are failing to remember that we are concerned with the welfare of a human being, not of some other kind of thing." (IRWIN-1988, p. 369)

"He has argued that happiness is the good performance of the human function, and that therefore it is the realization of the soul in accordance with complete virtue in a complete life. Complete virtue consists of those states and conditions that promote the best sort of realization of human functions. This sort of virtue makes its owner perform her function well (EN 1106a14-24, 1139a15-17, EE 1218b37), and 'completes' nature (1103a23-26; Physics 246a13, 247a3); it is *eudaimonic* virtue." (IRWIN-1988, p. 373)

"Virtues of character resulting from habituation are needed to fulfil the human function, because nature does not infallibly complete itself (1103a23-26). To complete nature we have to realize our essential capacity of rational determination of human choice and action." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 374-375)

"[S]ome capacities are essential to human beings, and some realizations of these capacities are essential activities of human beings. These realizations can fairly be taken to complete a human being's nature. Hence the realization of the capacity for rational direction of actions will complete a human being's nature; and in so far as virtue realizes this capacity it can claim to complete human nature." (IRWIN-1988, p. 375)

"A virtue is worth acquiring partly because it is a firm and unchanging state (1105a33) that gives us a stable and persisting future self to be concerned about." (IRWIN-1988, p. 378)

"Synchronic and diachronic conflicts result from the vicious person's failure to love himself as a rational agent; and this is the condition that Aristotle describes as wretched (1166b26-29)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 380)

"The 'complete life' that Aristotle demands for a happy person must include a complete range of human activities under the complete control of practical reason.... the activities must include enough to realize the appropriate range of human capacities, and that practical reason must control them to the full extent that is compatible with their appropriate range. Though these demands for completeness do not supply an exact criterion, they rule out minimalist plans." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 386-387)

"Aristotle seeks to show that the virtues of character fulfil a person's function in a stronger sense than the commonsense analogies make clear; for he argues that a human being's essential function is realized by the virtues of character, because they 'complete' us in the right way (1103a23-26)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 388)

"[T]he happy person is self-sufficient, not by being sufficient all by himself, but because he has a complete and self-sufficient life [CHECKTHIS], which must include friends. (IRWIN-1988, p. 389) [PSA: "loved ones" is more accurate and comprehensive.]

"[O]nly the virtuous person takes the attitude proper to genuine and complete (teleia, 1156b7) friendship. Only the virtuous person is concerned for the friend for the friend's sake, because only he is concerned for the friend 'in himself' (kath'hauton; cf. 1156a10-11), 'because of himself' (di'hauton, 1156b10), and 'in so far as he is who he is' (1156a17-18)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 390)

"Concern that ignores a person's character is not clearly concern for the person himself, and, as Aristotle says, it is friendship with that particular person only coincidentally. Metaphysics is needed to tell us what the person himself is, and hence to tell us what attitude is appropriate for genuine friendship." (IRWIN-1988, p. 391)

"The city is the all-inclusive community, of which the other communities are parts, since it aims at advantage not merely for some present concern but for the whole of life (EN 1160a9-30). Since happiness is complete and self-sufficient, the city is a 'complete community' (Politics 1252b28) aiming at a complete and self-sufficient life (1252b27-30, 1280b29-35). It is self-sufficient in so far as it includes all the goods that are needed for a happy life (1256b2-10, 26-39, 1257a28-30, 1326b2-11). It is 'a particular kind of community of similar people, for the sake of the best possible life' (1328a35-37)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 400)

"A marriage is 'for every day' (Politics 1252b13), and a village is formed for 'intercourse for more than a day' (1252b16). Marriage is characteristic of human beings, because it includes communication about the beneficial and just; unlike animals that simply mate with the unconscious end of reproduction (1252a26-30), human beings have foresight (1252a31-32), and consider the rest of their lives (EN 1162a19-24). The village is more comprehensive than the household, both in time and in scope; it is not limited by the lifetime of individuals, and it can make plans that would be pointless for individuals or temporary associations." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 401-402)

"[T]he city is naturally prior to the individual just as the whole is prior to the parts.... His claim is reasonable ... if 'self-sufficient' means 'achieving my complete and self-sufficient good'; the city is necessary not for our survival, but for our happiness." (IRWIN-1988, p. 404)

"The relation between fellow-citizens expresses, instead of simply facilitating, the extended concern and interest that realizes each person's capacities. That is why relations within a city are a part of each person's happiness, and not simply a means to it." (IRWIN-1988, p. 406)

"Aristotle holds that freedom and independence require leisure. Leisure is not 'being at leisure', if that suggests being unoccupied; nor is it recreation as opposed to serious business (cf. EN 1176b27-1177a6). It is contrasted, however, with being occupied in the production of necessities (Politics 1333a30-36).... Leisure is not necessary for virtuous action (1334a22-28); but Aristotle thinks it is necessary for the sort of freeedom that the virtuous person values." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 411-412)

"We prefer the exercise of rational agency in conditions that allow its maximum extension and development in forming the character of our lives." (IRWIN-1988, p. 413)

"The craftsman reasonably values the *distinctive* realization of himself in the world - something that exists because of him and would not have existed otherwise. The same sort of concern seems reasonable for the rational agent concerned with his own individuality and distinctiveness; and to the extent that this concern is reasonable, so is Aristotle's concern with leisure." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 413-414)

"Living for a friend [PSA: loved one] imposes some constraints on my life that I would be free of if I were not attached to him; but it does not reflect an extension of necessity or a contraction of freedom and leisure. The constraints are those I have rationally chosen for my own happiness, without the pressure of needs and necessities; and whereas I would prefer a life that was free of the necessity of earning a precarious living, I would not prefer a life without the constraints imposed by friendship." (IRWIN-1988, p. 421)

About Aristotle's statement that 'In a household the free people are least at liberty to act at random, but have everything or most things ordered' (Metaphysics 1075a19ff), Irwin says: "This claim is intentionally paradoxical. It is natural to connect being free (eleutheros) with the maximum extent of freedom or liberty (exousia) to do as one pleases, and hence to agree with the democratic conception of what suits a free person. In fact, however, we should identify greater freedom with the greater extension of my rational control over the conditions of my life." (IRWIN-1988, pp. 421-422)

"Aristotle ascribes concern for the fine to all the virtues, since they all produce actions that are done because they are fine (1116a11), and for the sake of the fine (1115b12-13).... Such active concern for the fine rather than the merely expedient is characteristic of the virtuous person (1162b34-1163a1, 1169a4-7).... Concern for the fine is characteristic of reason (1117a18, 1162b35, 1169a4-6, 1180a4-5, 10-12, EE 1229a1-9), and especially characteristic of the correct reason that xies [CHECKTHIS] the mean appropriate for each virtue (cf. 1115b17-20)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 440)

"[T]he wise person should choose the inflexible commitments characteristic of the virtues rather than the flexible and adaptable attitude that would be readier to compromise for the sake of external goods. To defend inflexibility Aristotle needs to appeal to the rational person's concern with himself as a stable and persistent rational agent. The wise person wants more of his definite and specific commitments to persist through his life, since their persistence will be his persistence. Concern for himself justifies him in forming a relatively fixed character with determinate and inflexible aims." (IRWIN-1988, p. 447)

"[T]he virtuous person makes the best of the circumstances (1332a19-27), and ... virtue is worth our while even in bad conditions.... [W]e should be as virtuous as we can be in the circumstances. The virtues express a person's decision [PSA: commitment] to guide his life by his rational agency, and to follow the same principles even if he lacks the external goods necessary for happiness; and this is the dominant constituent of his happiness even in unfavourable conditions." (IRWIN-1988, p. 457)

"Aristotle admits that both tyranny and extreme democracy tend to encourage degraded and vicious attitudes and practices in citizens (e.g. 1311a8-28, 1313b32-1314a29)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 458)

"[H]e recommends the cultivation of the virtues that are contrary to [a regime's] distinctive vices (1319b37-1320a4)." (IRWIN-1988, p. 459)

END