Aristotle on Teleology
Monte Ransome Johnson
Oxford, 2005

"For Aristotle, teleological explanations explain how animal parts and behavior are 'adapted' to their environment, and not how the environment is adapted to the needs of animals or other organisms (including humans)." (JOHNSON, p. 4)

"While the artificial ends of plants and animals are only instrumentally useful to us, the natural ends of plants and other animals are intrinsically valuable and, as objects of contemplation, have paramount significance for the ultimate end of human life." (JOHNSON, p. 5)

"Teleological notions were widespread among his predecessors, but Aristotle rejected their conception of extrinsic causes such as mind or god as the primary causes for natural things. Aristotle's radical alternative was to assert nature itself as the internal principle of change and an end, and his teleological explanations focus on the internal and intrinsic ends of natural substances - those ends that benefit the natural thing itself." (JOHNSON, p. 6)

"Aristotle conceives of natural motion and change in general teleologically, as a condition of completion with respect to something's capacities." (JOHNSON, p. 8)

"Social, political, and rational animals present unique problems, but Aristotle treats them nonetheless as natural bodies and substances, and so explains them by the methods developed in the science of nature in general. The account of human ethics, for example, commences by establishing the function or functions of the human organism [PSA: in EE, psuche] in a parallel fashion to the determination of the functions of other natural entities." (JOHNSON, p. 10)

"[N]ature is a principle of the good for each kind of things individually." (JOHNSON, p. 11)

"Aristotle's teleology, whatever its scientific merits, still has promise for axiology - the theory of values - in offering us a naturalistic account of goods." (JOHNSON, p. 11)

In Chapter 2, Johnson provides an overview of the first three of the "four causes":

(1) The Cause 'Out of Which', which "primarily signifies that out of which anything is made, whether that be raw materials, parts, or even letters and arguments." (JOHNSON, p. 45)

(2) 'Whence the Source of Change', which "is whatever active principle initiates change (or rest)." (JOHNSON, p. 45)

(3) The Form and 'What It Is to Be Something', which is to ti en einai or "'that which something [always or all along] was to be'" or, I would perhaps say, what it has been to be that kind of thing (i.e., that kind of thing's way of being). Johnson argues that "This is especially important in cases of biological generation and development. For in such cases, not every phase of development is the basis for its explanation, but only the animal 'in a state of completion' (entelecheia), i.e. a fully mature adult, which corresponds to its form. Something persists through the embryonic, infant, pubescent, adult, and geriactric stages. The definition and substance of biological entities refers to a fixed point in a continuous development." (JOHNSON, pp. 48-49) This fixed point is the akme of the thing's existence. Johnson then goes on to quote GA 715a4-6, where Aristotle states that 'both the cause for the sake of which as an end and the account of the substance should be regarded as almost one and the same.' (JOHNSON, p. 49)

"[T]he two senses of 'for the sake of which' may be characterized as a difference between the aim of something and the beneficiary of the achievement of that aim." (JOHNSON, p. 66)

Citing EE VIII.3 1249b9-16, Johnson writes: "There is a sense in which the art of medicine gives orders - imperatives - to the doctor, for the sake of the health of the patient. In this analogy, god is not like the art of medicine, much less like the doctor, but rather like health. Health is the unmoved mover and that for the sake of which the doctor moves the patient. The patient is benefited, but health is not. Similarly, the activity of the divine is that for the sake of which natural agents act, but the agent or patient is benefited by doing so - not god." (JOHNSON, p. 73) [PSA: within an animal or human being there is also an unmoved mover: orexis is the moved mover but the psuche is the unmoved mover; cf. CORCILIUS, p. 135.]

Citing DA II.4 415b7-21, Johnson writes: "Here we have an argument for why the soul should be thought to be a cause of the living thing in three different ways: substance or existence, source of change, and that for the sake of which. The soul is a cause 'for the sake of which' because nature, like reason or art, creates things for the sake of something. And nature has generated or created the physical bodies of plants and animals. But physical bodies are instruments of souls, and so exist for the sake of them. But then that for the sake of which is 'in two ways'. The body exists for the aim of the soul's functioning, and the soul's functions exist for the benefit of the individual organism that lives through the soul and with the body. To be more specific, the various bodily organs exist for the aim of (hou heneka-hou) the various functions of the soul (roots for nutrition, feet for locomotion, eyes for perception), but for the sake of the organism (hou heneka-hoi) which has them as beneficiary (plants or animals or people). Philoponus' comments on this passage seem to reaffirm the way in which both senses of 'for the sake of which' are predicated of individual living things: the activities of the soul are that at which the body aims, and the same souls are beneficiaries of the instrumentality of their bodies." (JOHNSON, pp. 75-75)

"When we use natural things (like earth stone, or wood) in accordance with art, we ourselves become the end of the creation. For example, if we fashion wood into a rudder, we are an end in that it is we who are piloted by the boat using the rudder. We can see how the two senses of hou heneka apply: they distinguish the objects of the two kinds of art - that which produces something (by imposing an external form on the matter), and that which uses the thing (by using the thing produced for the sake of some human objective, like transportation). This is why Themistius says that when we are beneficiaries we not only *know* the things that benefit us, but we also *use* them." (JOHNSON, p. 77) [PSA: (1) this points toward the difference between episteme and theoria, with the latter being the active application of what we understand to achieve the goal of further inquiry and discovery; (2) Aristotle also says that we *use* arete (cf. p. 87 below), which might indicate that we create arete within ourselves in order to use it in our activities, i.e., energeiai.]

"Aristotle strongly contrasts 'that for the sake of which' (to hou heneka) with 'in vain' (maten): 'Nature does nothing in vain, for everything by nature is for the sake of something' (DA III.12 434a31-31) .... In other similar expressions, Aristotle uses as synonyms for maten terms like random, irrational, superfluous, and incomplete (etuche, DC 290a31; alogos, DC 291b13; periergon, GA 744a36; ateles, Politics 1256b21)." (JOHNSON, p. 80)

Regarding an interpretation of Aristotle as advocating providential design, Johnson argues that Aristotle's "expressed principle that art imitates nature in fact discourages it. Consider the following statement: 'generally art either completes that which nature is unable to make work, or imitates it' (Physics 199a15-17; cf. 194a21-22, Meteorology 381b6, On the Universe 396b11-12, Protrepticus 84.19-20, 80.7-9, 80.18-19).... And Aristotle is just as capable of asserting the principle without mentioning god, or even connoting agency, as in the following: 'The works of nature are not haphazard but for the sake of something to the highest degree. And that for the sake of which they are constituted or have come to be occupies the place of the fine.' (PA I.5 645a23-26) 'Nature is for the sake of the better and the end.' (GA II.4 738a37-b1) 'Things according to nature are as fine as can be.' (NE I.10 1099b21-22)" (JOHNSON, pp. 80-81)

"What the contrast with methen maten shows is that things that are heneka tinos are complete and functional entities, rationally explicable, non-random, and which somehow manifest axiological predicates, like 'better' (beltionos) and 'finest' (kallista)." (JOHNSON, p. 82)

In a section entitled "End, Limit, and the Complete", Johnson delves into Aristotle's conception of completeness.....

"The telos as an end blocks infinite regresses that would otherwise render demonstration, motion, and activity, incomplete, vain, and ineffectual.... The clearest case is intentional activity: if the chain of reasons for our actions did not end somewhere ... there would be no end of the deliberative process, and so no principle on which to begin the action." (JOHNSON, pp. 82-83)

"The idea of reaching a telos or being complete (teleion) applies to things as diverse as syllogisms (Prior Analytics 24b22-23), particular animal species (GA 736b4-5), the reproductive soul (DA 416b24-25), cities (Politics 1252b28), and poetry (Poetics 6 1449b24-25). That Aristotle avails himself of teleological terminology in all these diverse domains confirms that we are dealing with a general and flexble mode of explanation." (JOHNSON, p. 83)

"It is important to realize that the explanation or cause 'for the sake of which' is an end in this specific sense - that of providing a limit which makes things comprehensible and achievable. If I can ascertain that for the sake of which something is produced or exists, then I can begin to understand its structure, constituents, history, development, and so forth." (JOHNSON, p. 83)

"[T]he completed being (entelecheia) is determined by powers or capacities (415b14-15). These are ends, but not as terminal points or final stages." (JOHNSON, p. 83)

"The term teleion is the adjectival form of the noun telos. Here Aristotle's enumeration of uses of the term makes explicit the relationship between ends, finality, and the cause for the sake of which. [fn37: With this should be compared the discussion of the 'complete' or 'perfect' in Physics VII.3 246a10-b3. There he says: 'excellence is a perfection, for when anything acquires its proper excellence we call it perfect, since it is then really in its natural state'. See also the commentary by WARDY 1990, pp. 209-213.] 'Complete means: (1) that which not a single thing, not even a single part, is taken to be outside; for example, the complete time is that outside of which there is no time to take which is part of that time; (2) that which according to its excellence and good has no superior with respect to its kind; for example there is a complete doctor and a complete flautist according to the kind of excellence native to them when nothing is lacking.... For each thing is something complete, and every entity is something complete when according to the kind of excellence native to it no part of its natural dimensions are lacking.' (Metaphysics V.16 1021b12ff) .... A most important feature of this definition is the notion that the complete ... is complete relative to 'the kind of excellence native to it' ... Complete means having reached an end that constitutes an excellence condition of a specific kind of thing. [fn38: Thus an excellence or defect 'puts that which possesses it in a good or bad condition with regard to its native affections, where by "native affections" I mean those by which the thing is naturally produced or destroyed' (246b8-10). Later he repeats the point: 'excellence puts its possessor in good condition, while defect puts its possessor in bad condition, with regard to its native affections' (247a3-4)." (JOHNSON, p. 84)

After citing several relevant passages about the meanings of ergon and energeia (1050a21-23, 1055a10-19, 390a10-12, 1219a8-23, 1168a8-9, 1047a30-b2), Johnson notes: "Aristotle asserts that energeia means activity, because it is connected with action and motion - the word ergon indicating 'work' or 'job' but essentially 'active functioning' ... The term energeia thus literally means something like 'being in action i.e. 'doing work' or 'exercise'. Aristotle typically uses it in a somewhat enriched sense meaning 'internally functioning' (i.e. of an organism), and this is the reason for the prefix 'in' (en-)." (JOHNSON, pp. 87-88)

"Aristotle uses entelecheia in another important definition, when he says that 'the soul is *a state of completion* - *the first* of a natural body that is potentially alive' (DA II.1 412a27-28). We can relate this definition to the use of entelecheia to designate the fully developed adult specimen, capable of reproduction. We have already seen a case of such usage when we were told that the account of the powers or capacities of the soul depends on comprehending the completed state of the organism (415b15). In connection with this, Aristotle uses the term to designate the most completely developed kind of substance. A thing is more truly what it is when it is entelechei than when it is only potentially so (Physics 193b7-8). For example, a seedling is potentially a tree, and a seed is potentially a seedling; now a seedling is more a tree than a seed, and a sapling even more so, and a mature oak completely so. This stipulation indicates how parts, qualities, and in general capacities and powers are to be understood: with reference to a specific living thing in a state of completion. The generation and growth of animal parts cannot be understood apart from the mature organism, because the parts cannot be generated and grown except on the way to the completion of the whole animal (GA II.1, 734a30, b35)." (JOHNSON, p. 89)

Johnson then cites Metaphysics IX.8 1050a4ff: "'[T]he function {ergon} is the end {telos}, and the *internal function* {energeia} is said in the sense of the function, and that is why the term *internal function* is derived from the function and extended to the thing *in a state of completion* {entelecheia}.' The passage makes it clear that Aristotle intends each of the pieces of the compound term entelecheia to be significant. Both functioning and the completion have to be understood as internal - in this passage Aristotle obsessively uses the term 'in' or 'into' (en, eis, eso) and 'in' compounds (energeia, energounta, entelecheian). This is something the translations 'actuality' and 'activity' fail to convey. But functioning has to be understood as a process towards or transition to a complete state, an end." (JOHNSON, p. 90)

"[T]he cause for the sake of which means not just aim (i.e. the function or activity to be achieved), but also the beneficiary. When we understand that the objects of teleological explanation must be understood as beneficiaries, it becomes clear that we must understand the axiological terms used to gloss teleological terms literally; that which benefits something is good for it. Consider yet another formulation of the teleological scientific principle. 'Nature makes everything for the sake of something, and this is something good.' (De Somno 455b17-18) Aristotle in similar expressions of the scientific principle often uses different terms in lieu of 'good' (agathon), such as 'fine' (kalon). He also uses comparative and superlative terms, such as 'better', 'best', and 'finest' (GA 717a16, PA 687a16, IA 704b17, Juv 469a29)." (JOHNSON, p. 91)

In a discussion of Physics II.7 198b4-9, Johnson writes: "[T]eleological notions like 'the for the sake of which', 'the end', 'completion', 'the developed being', and 'the good', are always applied to some specific kind of thing." (JOHNSON, p. 92) [PSA: see also the good relative to us (pros hemin) in ethics.]

"Aristotle emphasizes specificity in the application of teleological explanations, and expects that they indicate why an organ or behavior or arrangement is better for the sake of the animal (either individually or as a kind) that has it, and not simply in general." (JOHNSON, p. 93)

In a discussion of Physics II.8 199b13-26 and II.6 197b32-37, Johnson notes: "There is an emphasis on the point that the principle is internal: 'nature is a principle and cause of being moved and made to rest *in* that to which it belongs primarily - intrinsically - and not incidentally' (Physics II.1 192b21-23); each natural thing 'has *in* itself a principle of motion and rest' (Physics II.1 192b13-14); 'nature is always *in* a subject' (Physics II.1 192b34). As we saw in examining Metaphysics IX.8 1050a4-23, the prefix en- in the terms energeia and entelecheia is anything but incidental.... So intense is Aristotle's emphasis on the internality of goods and ends, that the phrases 'in it as good' and 'in it as end' are listed by Aristotle among the major senses of the term 'in'; this is, he adds, 'that for the sake of which' (Physics IV.3 210a22-23)." (JOHNSON, pp. 100-101)

"Aristotle specifies nature as an internal principle and an end because he does not think that the good of individual things should be transferred to things external to it, or assimilated to some greater being. He is concerned with the natural good, survival, preservation, and flourishing of 'each kind of living thing' and 'the individual entity and that which is itself'." (JOHNSON, p. 124)

"[T]eleological explanations have to be made with reference to specific substances, [36] and substances that do achieve such states of completion, and so can be identified as beneficiaries of the end. [fn36: See such passages as: Physics II.7 198b4-9; IA 704b15-18, 708a9-12; Metaphysics V.16 1021b12-1022a3; EN X.2 1173a4-5.]" (JOHNSON, p. 156)

"Aristotle describes the substances for which the explanations are offered as the beneficiaries of their parts and motions. For plants and animals, that benefit is primarily their own survival and reproduction. The orientation of teleological explanations towards the individual, and by extension its kind, is thus consistent with the substance-specific orientation of teleological explanations." (JOHNSON, p. 159)

"[I]n teleological explanation, the order of generation and the order of explication are reversed: the starting point of the explanation is what you end up wtih in the process of generation. It is only once the 'effect' or end (the aim or the beneficiary) is established, that it is possible to discuss the processes that lead up to this development and are thus prior in time to it.... 'We say that "this exists for the sake of that" every time some end is evident, towards which the motion proceeds if northing impedes it.... [T]he seed is potentially something. It is potential insofar as it is in a state oriented towards a state of completion.' (PA I.1 641b23-642a1; cf 640a19-26; Metaphysics XII.7 1072b35-1073a1)" (JOHNSON, p. 166) [PSA: compare the phrase 'pros entelecheian' here to the phrase 'pros to telos' in ethics.]

"Aristotle conceives of the individual organism (as opposed to the species, the cosmos, or god) to be the beneficiary of teleologically explicable processes." (JOHNSON, p. 167)

"For Aristotle, the cause for the sake of which is not an 'efficient cause'. The cause for the sake of which explains *why*, not *how* the process happens." (JOHNSON, p. 167)

"The stages of development, from embryo, to infant, child, adolescent, adult, and so forth, aim at a state of completion where all the parts are capable of performing the functions for which the organism's soul has capacities. The explanation of these parts thus makes reference to the soul, really the 'first complete state of the organism', in which these capacities are functional." (JOHNSON, p. 169) [PSA: we could translate proton entelecheia as "first fulfillment".]

"In art {techne} the formula is not just the outline or shape of the artifact, but even more importantly, the end for which it is to be used; in nature it is the form of the living thing, the soul, which is, taken as a whole, the end for the sake of which it comes to life." (JOHNSON, p. 170)

"[T]he fact that the soul exists primarily both for the sake of living and for the sake of a living organism is not a problem, since the same soul - the nutritive soul - manifests both functions, living and reproducing. This is a key case where the dual sense of the cause for the sake of which - aim and beneficiary - is fully apparent." (JOHNSON, p. 174)

Johnson then quotes GA 731a24ff as follows: 'Of animals, however, reproduction is not the only function, for this is common to all living things, but they all also participate in a kind of knowing, some more and some less, others still admittedly quite a small amount. For they have perception, and perception is a kind of knowing. But their value and disvalue is considered very different relative both to wisdom, on the one hand, and to the kind of thing that is lifeless, on the other. For relative to being wise the participation in touch and taste seem to be nothing, but relative to being plants and stones it is wonderful. For to happen upon this knowledge would seem to be cherished, rather than to remain lifeless or non-existent.' (JOHNSON, p. 174)

"There would be no point to infinite reproduction and permanent existence unless we could point to some good which this eternal and infinite process aims at. That good, I contend, is the life, survival, activity, and flourishing of the individual living specimen." (JOHNSON, p. 176) [PSA: on this point, see also Balme.]

"[T]he nutritive soul as a form, and the animal as a kind or species are 'for the sake of' in the sense of 'for the aim of' (hou heneka-hou), while the individual specimen is 'for the benefit of' (hou heneka-hoi), and the only possible one, since it both needs the functioning of the soul and can change in accordance with the benefit is receives." (JOHNSON, p. 177) [PSA: but see Balme.]

"[M]otion and change are in general understood in terms of states of completion with respect to specific powers or capacities. Aristotle's complaint about the predecessors' theories is not that they fail to mention these powers, but rather that they fail to discuss what constitutes the exercise or completion of those powers.... Thus for Aristotle, an explanation of a natural kind has to specify not just, and not first, the capacities, but rather the activities and that for the sake of which the capacities exist and become active." (JOHNSON, pp. 179-180)

"A corollary of this is that the manner of a thing's existence [PSA: i.e., its bios or way of life] should be stated before the manner of its genesis (640a10-b4)." (JOHNSON, p. 181)

"Aristotle stipulates that, in the context of living things, explanation cannot even begin until the for the sake of which has been identified. It is indispensable to explanation in natural science: if there is not for the sake of which, then there is no nature to be explained. The cause for the sake of which includes an aim and a beneficiary, and without a beneficiary of the activity or part, there can be no 'explanation' of it." (JOHNSON, pp. 185-186)

"The key to getting the explanation right is properly demarcating the explananda by fully fleshing out the aim and beneficiary of the cause for the sake of which." (JOHNSON, p. 187)

"[A]nimals have different ways of life, not only different functions and capacities, but also different environments, ways of rearing young, relating to their kin, and so forth. Aristotle holds that these differences necessitate a variation in their parts." (JOHNSON, p. 192)

"The last kind of teleological explanation of living natures mentioned by Aristotle is that which indicates: 'It is fine (or noble, kalos) this way'. This means that the part serves some direct benefit (unlike the incidental necessities), but is not strictly hypothetically necessitated by the definition of the organism (unlike the hypothetical necessities).... This kind of explanation is inferior to the other two, because it only shows *why* and not *how* the part exists. It is clear that the part has a benefit ... but the necessitating factors are not evident, and so it is not clear that this counts as a full-fledged explanation." (JOHNSON, pp. 197-198) [PSA: see also Lennox and Irwin.]

"[W]hat determines the natural and intrinsic motion and good of the animal kind is the good of the animals or specimens of that kind, not the relationship of its species to something else, or some other kind of good." (JOHNSON, p. 203)

"All animals possess, in addition to the nutritive-reproductive power of the soul, the ability to perceive (GA I.23 731a30-34; cf.: DA II.2 413b2; III.1 425a8-10; III.12 434b17-24; Sensu 1 436b11; Juv I 467b24-25; Metaphysics I.1 980a27-28). Animals can be defined, simply, as beings that can perceive (PA II.5 651b3-4; III.4 666a34-35). Because this is also the highest function of all non-human animals, it is, in the final analysis, their end: 'Perception and thought is the end (telos) for every being to which either of these pertains. For these are the best, and the end is what is best' (De Somno 2 455b23-25; cf. EN IX.9 1170a16-19)." (JOHNSON, p. 204)

"The power of perception greatly expands the activities, practices, and characters of animals, but these are most clearly manifested in the activities of feeding and rearing the young." (JOHNSON, p. 204)

"The possession of more advanced capacities of the soul does not reduce the importance of the primary and basic ones. On the contrary, the more advanced powers result in more complex, social, and intelligent behaviors or technologies in support of those basic functions." (JOHNSON, p. 205)

"Some kinds of animals exhibit industry, resourcefulness, and a sort of practical intelligence in these regards, and hence their behaviors are to some extent comparable to those of humans. Some of the gregarious animals are even said to be political. [HA I.1 488a7-8; VIII.1 589a1-2; Politics I.3 1253a7-9.] These traits must not be considered merely metaphorical; rather the human versions are intensifications and modifications of these." (JOHNSON, p. 205) [PSA: on intensification, see also Topics 115a26-31.]

"As a whole, non-human animals 'live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected experience; the human race, however, lives also by art and reasoning' (Metaphysics I.1 980b27-28; cf. DA II.10 433a11-12; Politics VII.14 1332b4-5). Non-human animals are incapable of discourse (HA IV.9 536b1-3; cf. Politics I.2 1253a7-18 and I.5 1254b23), and so of deliberation, inquiry, and technology. Nonetheless, Aristotle recognizes that they engage in highly advanced and complex activities, especially with regard to their own survival and reproduction." (JOHNSON, p. 206)

Quoting HA VIII.1 589a8-9 ('What is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and all animals pursue pleasure in keeping with their nature'), Johnson comments: "The pleasure that attends upon the satisfaction of their basic functions (procreation and nutrition) is manifest to animals' sense perception, their highest function. Because their modes of procreation, nutrition, and parturition are different, the sensations and pleasures that correspond to successful activity in these regards are different. This ... is really just a development of the more general doctrine that different kinds of things (both natural and artificial) are completed in different ways. [fn29: In this connection, Aristotle asserts that there are different pleasures unique to each kind of animal at: NE III.14 1119a7-8, X.5 1176a5-9; EE VII.2 1237a26-29; and Politics I.8 1256a27-29).]" (JOHNSON, p. 208)

"[T]he ergon argument is really an application of the general principle that different kinds of things are completed or perfected by different things, and thus have individual excellences or virtues, and that teleological explanations are to be made with reference to these specific excellences. If the ergon argument works, it must be the case that other kinds of beings besides humans have their own functions and goods and states of perfection." (JOHNSON, p. 222)

"Another key aspect of the ergon argument is that there must be a good and best condition for various parts or capacities of the soul. There must be a good condition of both the non-rational and the rational parts of the soul." (JOHNSON, p. 223)

"The primary unmoved mover certainly is an end and that for the sake of which (as an aim, not as a beneficiary). But the unmoved mover is not the universe itself, but rather a substance at the limiting perimeter or boundary of the physical universe and outside of nature. The universe itself does not have an end in the way it has matter or form.... There is no 'purpose' of all of existence; purpose, if it exists, is in the individual things that exist." (JOHNSON, pp. 254-255)

"[T]he things that imitate the unmoved mover(s), i.e. the stars, move for the sake of the unmoved mover(s) as an aim - in order to imitate eternal activity, but not for the sake of a different beneficiary." (JOHNSON, p. 257) [PSA: the same is true of all living things.]

"[T]he promise of teleological explanation, whether on a physical, biological, human, or cosmological level, depends on the possibility of an identification of practicable goods: goods that benefit the natural substances that attain them, really or apparently." (JOHNSON, p. 270) [PSA: cf. the discussion of practicable goods in EN]

"[I]n nature the moving cause and the end for the sake of which - the beneficiary - are the same.... In both animal self-locomotion and human deliberate action, the paradigm cases of natural change and motion can be teleologically explained, the mover and the moved is both the agent and the beneficiary of the good and change for the sake of which, like a doctor treating himself or herself." (JOHNSON, p. 286) [PSA: cf. Physics II.8 199b30-33.]

"If we were transplanted to the Isles of the Blessed, where there is no need of anything (or if we were gods, whose only activity is contemplation) ... plants and animals would be valuable to us as objects of contemplation and beauty, and not because we could use them to serve our needs and interests. From this loftier perspective, consideration of the potential uses of nature for our needs is burdensome and boring - to use an unfashionable word, banausic. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a kind of biophilia, which loves and delights in natural objects and their causes (and in nature and its causes generally) in their own right, not insofar as they can turn a profit.... Once we have got what we need to survive, we should turn our attention to understanding natures in terms of their own ends and goods." (JOHNSON, p. 290)

END