The Aristotelian Ethics
Anthony Kenny
Oxford, 2016

"We are told at 1221b29 that there are aretai corresponding to different parts of the soul: the aretai of the rational part are the intellectual virtues 'whose ergon is truth, either about how things are, or about bringing into existence'. The distinction between these two kinds of truth fits perfectly the distinction between the subject matter of phronesis and sophia in book B: sophia, we are there told, unlike phronesis, is not concerned with bringing into existence (oudemias esti geneseos, 1143b20)." (KENNY-2016, p. 165)

"If we take it that Aristotle is saying that nous is concerned with both extremes in both realms, practical and theoretical, then all becomes clear: we have universal speculative nous (the nous 'kata tas apodeixeis ton akineton horon kai proton' of 1143b2 and 1140b31ff.), particular speculative nous (the nous of particulars which is aisthesis, of 1143b6 and 1142a29), particular practical nous (the nous which is 'en tais praktikais tou eschatou kai endechomenous' of 1143b2), and universal practical nous (the nous of the hetera protasis of 1143b3)." (KENNY-2016, p. 171)

"The pattern nous-logos-nous is common to both sides of the division. Just as sophia can be described as episteme plus nous ('knowledge with a head on it' 1141a19), so phronesis could have been described as euboulia plus nous: instead, euboulia is described as phronesis minus nous, as what you are left with if you discount that element of phronesis which is the right conception of the end (1142b32-24)." (KENNY-2016, p. 172)

"Thus at 1246b13-14 the incontinent man is described as an intemperate man with nous... the incontinent man differs from the intemperate man by having a correct appreciation of the end - the nous tes heteras protaseos of 1143b3." (KENNY-2016, p. 173)

"When Aristotle says that a human being is by nature compounded of superior and inferior, it is not the composition of soul and body he has in mind, but the division between the irrational and rational part of the soul. If we apply to this case the general rule that one should look to one's superior, we infer that a human being should govern his life in accordance with what is required by his rational soul.... So applying the rule about looking to one's superior, we must obey the commands of wisdom, and take account of the needs of that which is related to wisdom as health is related to medical science. So far - up to 1249b14 - all is reasonably clear. But now we naturally want to ask: well, what *is* it that stands in the same relation to wisdom as health does to medical science? .... Health was related to medical science, we said, as its raison d'etre or hou heneka. But the hou heneka of an institution or activity may be either that which it seeks to attain, or that which it seeks to benefit. Aristotle often invokes the distinction, without offering a clear instance to illustrate it (Physics II.2 194a35-36; DA II.4 415b2-3, b20-21; Metaphysics Lambda 1072b2).... Well, then, what *is* the hou heneka whose good is being aimed at, and is it to attain God? Aristotle gives no explicit reply, but the answer is clear enough from the concluding passage: that which benefits from the commands of wisdom is that which serves and contemplates God; and this service and contemplation is itself the only kind of attainment of God which is possible.... If Aristotle does have the Euthyphro in mind here, then the service of God could well include acts of moral virtue. These are the kalai praxeis of the kalos kagathos which are the subject of the first part of the same chapter; they could well be regarded as the polla kai kala which we, under the arche of God (1248a25ff.), find our fulfillment in the performing and by which we make our contribution to the splendour of the universe." (KENNY-2016, pp. 176-178)

"[I]n ethics, if we are to know the right action to do we must know the nature of a healthy - i.e., a virtuous and happy - mind: we must know what the parts of the soul are, what their functions are, and how they are related to each other. This is why the horos can also be called the skopos (1138b23): it is a right understanding of the end of conduct, namely a good life, that is necessary for right reasoning in morals.... But of course in B itself in the concluding chapters the relationship of phronesis to sophia is discussed and the relationship of both to happiness is sketched (1144a3-6; 1145a6-11). The relevance of this to the question of the horos is not however brought out either in NE or in AE B. For that we have to turn to EE VIII.... Aristotle does not say here, as he does in B, that we must inquire what *is* the orthos logos: the answer he goes on to give is an answer to the question what is the horos - the horos of kalokagathia or perfect virtue, as is said in the concluding summary (1249b24).... [T]he discussion in EE VIII *does* give the general standard for the exercise of virtue. The 'things that are good by nature but not praiseworthy' are health, strength, honour, birth, wealth, and power (1248b24, b28-30; 1249a10-11). These are the subject matter of the virtues of magnanimity, magnificence, and liberality (EE III 1231b28ff.). The subject matter of the virtues of courage, temperance, and meekness, on the other hand, are the passions of the irrational soul. For these too a standard is sketched in the last chapter of the EE: 'Thus it is, too, with the soul, and this is the best standard for the soul, to be as little as possible conscious of the irrational part of the soul qua irrational' (1249b22-25). Thus the last chapter of the EE does give a standard for the exercise of the six virtues which are discussed in the official treatment of the virtues in EE III and which together constitute the perfect virtue or kalokagathia of the first part of the final chapter." (KENNY-2016, pp. 181-183)

"[T]he distinction between hexis and energeia, I shall argue, it central to his own solution to the relationship between the traditional three lives and the nature of happiness. Moral virtue and wisdom, though different hexeis, are exercised inseparably in a single energeia, so that they are not competing but collaborating elements in happiness, and pleasure is identical with the unimpeded energeia of the appropriate hexeis: so that happiness, understood as energeia kat' areten, has the characteristics of the three philosophical opinions about the nature of happiness." (KENNY-2016, p. 193)

""[W]hich of these two, the ergon or the state producing it, is better? Clearly the ergon: for an ergon is an end: and we saw in the final stage of EE that an end is the cause of goodness in the things whose end it is.... Applying this to the case in point, the ergon of soul is life, so the ergon of the arete or excellence of a soul is a good life (1219a26-28). But the life that is meant here is active, waking life, and this is identical with the activity of the soul. So the best thing in the soul which we are looking for as the essence of happiness turns out to be the activity of arete or the activity of a good soul (1218a35). But arete can be either complete or incomplete, according to whether we mean arete as a whole, or a particular partial arete; and life, whose active stage is the energeia of the soul, likewise can be complete or incomplete (in the sense of running its proper course or not). So happiness - which is something perfect and complete - must finally be defined as 'activity of complete life in accordance with complete virtue' (1219a39)." (KENNY-2016, pp. 198-200)

"[A]mong good men we must distinguish between those of a utilitarian cast, who pursue virtue for the sake of non-moral goods, and the kaloi kagathoi who pursue the natural goods only for the sake of the virtuous actions for which they are useful." (KENNY-2016, p. 206)

"[F]or the ideally virtuous man the concepts 'agathon', 'hedu', 'kalon' coincide in their application. If what is pleasant for a man differs from what is good for him, then he is not yet perfectly good but incontinent (1237a8-9); if what is good for him does not coincide with what is fine for him, then he is not yet kalos kagathos but only agathos: for the kalos kagathos the natural goods of health and wealth and power are not only beneficial but fine, since they subserve his virtuous activity (1249a9). So for him, goodness, fineness, and pleasantness coincide. The bringing about of this coincidence is the task of ethics (1237a3). But whereas something can be kalon or agathon whether it is a hexis or an energeia (1248b35-37, b23-24) it is only an energeia or a praxis that can be pleasant. So it is in the fine activities of the good man that the highest pleasure is to be found and that pleasure, goodness, and fineness meet. But the fine activities of the good man are the activities of perfect virtue with which happiness was identified in book one. So the treatise has reached completion: Aristotle has carried out the promise of his first paragraph to show that happiness combined the three superlatives - finest, best, and pleasantest - of the Deliac inscription (1214a7-8)." (KENNY-2016, p. 207)

"The final section about the criterion of kalokagathia is there to tell us not only that it is part of happiness itself but that it sets the standard to which the activities of the other virtues must conform if they are to remain within the realm of virtue and happiness.... [V]irtuous action consists in executing choices about the right amount of other things - the passions and external goods which are the field of operation of the moral virtues - and it is reference to the horos which is necessary to decide what *is* the right amount of such things. This does not conflict with the doctrine that virtue must be chosen for its own sake, because it is kalon; the horos provides the measure, not the motive, of virtuous action." (KENNY-2016, p. 208)

"Aristotle's aim is not to show that wisdom is a moral virtue, but to show that here too there can be an application of the mean to the case of wisdom. Aristotle, at 1221a36, shows how it applies in the case of the choice of means. But the contrast between the inclusive and the dominant notion of happiness shows us how the doctrine of the mean applies also to the choice of ends. The parameter to which the mean is to be applied is given by the question: how many values does a man pursue? The stupid man pursues *too many*: he follows one little project after another: he is guilty of the folly we were warned about in EE I 1214b9. The wise man pursues the right number: he follows the Aristotelian ideal which combines the values of the contemplative, political, and hedonic lives. The cunning man pursues a single dominant goal and is ruthless about other values. An intemperate man who pursues pleasure, come what may, would, provided he was intelligent, provide an obvious example of a cunning man (cf. AE 1142b18; 1144a28). But so, if I am right, would the man who gave himself to the single hearted and unrelenting pursuit of philosophy without regard for the moral virtues. A person who organized his life entirely with a view to the promotion of philosophical speculation would be not wise but cunning, not phronimos but panourgos." (KENNY-2016, p. 214)

"What is the horos of virtue (1249b23)? I used to think that this question was the same as the question about what the skopos of virtue is. I now think that was a mistake. Any ethical system has to distinguish between two questions: (1) What are the values that the system serves (2) Is there any limit to the means that are legitimate in pursuit of those values? The answer to the first question gives the skopos, the answer to the second question gives the horos." (KENNY-2016, p. 287)

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