Happy Lives and the Highest Good
Gabriel Richardson Lear
Princeton, 2004

"Aristotle believes that the project of grasping truth is more perfectly realized in the exercise of theoretical wisdom. Practical wisdom embodies only to a degree an ideal of rational activity perfectly achieved by theoretical wisdom. In this way, excellent theoretical truthfulness sets the standard for the excellent practical truthfulness of morally virtuous action. So even if making the virtuous choice does not maximize contemplation, it will still be worth choosing for the sake of contemplation because it approximates theoretical truthfulness. It is a sort of contemplation in action." (LEAR-2004, p. 4)

"I will argue that when we attend carefully to the ways in which Aristotelian virtue is fine (kalon), we see that virtuous actions are chosen by the agent because they are appropriate to him as a lover of reason and truthfulness." (LEAR-2004, p. 4)

"[I]n Aristotle's Physics, a telos is a normative standard for a process or activity. It is the point at which a chance achieves its good. Aristotle makes this point explicit at Physics II.2 194a30-33... It is ridiculous, Aristotle says, for poets to write that a person who dies (teleuten) has 'achieved that end for whose sake he was born.' 'For telos does not mean any last point, but the best.' The fact that a change stops at a certain point does not mean that the change is complete. It is only when the good of the process - that is, the result that sets the standard for the success of each stage and of the whole - is achieved that the process is complete. [fn9: See Metaphysics Delta 16 1021b23-25.] A little later in the Physics, when he is enumerating the different kinds of causes, Aristotle says, 'and then there is the end and the good of the other things; for the that for the sake of which will be the best and the end of the other things' (Physics II.3 195a23-25). And, to take one last example, Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that wisdom is 'the science of the end and [i.e.,] the good' (Metaphysics Beta 2 996b12)." (LEAR-2004, pp. 12-13)

"In general, Aristotle thinks that a thing's natural end is intimately associated with its essence or form. [PSA: i.e. 'what it is to be a thing' and 'way of being'.] Indeed, he says that if you want to study a thing's telos, you will study its form (Physics II.2 194a27-b15). This is particularly clear in the case of growing things. Aristotle says that the nature or principle of change in something that is born and develops is the form of the mature being toward which it is developing (Physics II.1 193b12-18).... Because the natural motion of a thing aims to realize its nature or essence, Aristotle virtually equates form and telos on several occasions (Physics II.2 194a27-b15, II.7 198a25ff, 198b1-4, II.8 1999a30-32, II.9 200a14-15)." (LEAR-2004, p. 14) [PSA: it's natural that the completion and the way of being of a thing (especially a living being) are equivalent, because both are manifested in the thing's characteristic energeia or ergon.]

"According to Aristotle's technical understanding of a telos as presented in the Physics, an end is a normative standard for the activity undertaken for its sake. The end determines what counts as success in the activity. For this reason, it is closely associated with the nature of that thing whose end it is. As Aristotle says, 'What a thing is, and what it is for, are one and the same' (Physics II.7 198a25-26)." (LEAR-2004, p. 14)

"When we turn to the Nicomachean Ethics we see that human ends, like ends in the rest of nature, are goods determining the form and conditions for success of the things leading to them. Furthermore, like ends in the rest of nature, human ends are sources of value for the things leading to them." (LEAR-2004, p. 15)

"[T]he concept of an end in Aristotle is much broader than any psychological conception. As we saw, this is particularly evident in Aristotle's natural philosophy, where he is quite willing to talk about the ends of plants, material elements, and a host of other things to which he clearly does not attribute desire or any kind of conscious intentions (e.g., Physics II.8 199a20ff). Even in the animal and human cases, where desire psychology is integral to the workings of natural teleology, an end is not by definition an object of desire or even an appropriate one. It is rather what some creature is naturally *for* and what *therefore* it ought naturally to desire." (LEAR-2004, p. 33) [PSA: using "ought" here doesn't sound quite right; I'd prefer "at its best", "at its most mature", etc.]

"In general, the realization of a final good makes the steps leading to it successful; the subordinate steps are good because the end is good. Thus, like all final ends, the highest good should make the chains of ends leading to it good and worth choosing by being their final cause. Since these chains of pursuit together constitute the happy life, it ought to be true, whether or not Aristotle has this in mind in the self-sufficiency passage of NE I.7, that happiness makes the happy life good by being its organizing principle.... 'The same conclusion seems to follow from self-sufficiency also. For the final good is thought to be self-sufficient.' (1097b7-8) .... [H]appiness is final *and* self-sufficient because it is the end of actions (teleion de ti phainetai kai autarkes he eudaimonia ton prakton ousa telos; 1097b20-21)." (LEAR-2004, pp. 51-52)

"All on its own (monoumenon), the highest good is sufficient to be the organizing principle of a life worth choosing.... Eudaimonia is sufficient to cause the value of the choiceworthy life as a *final* cause. The question whether a monistic good such as contemplation is self-sufficient, therefore, is the question whether a person who does everything for the sake of that good would have a life worth choosing." (LEAR-2004, pp. 52-53)

"It is not necessary that a most final end contain everything that is desirable. What is required is that it explain the desirability of everything else we (correctly) pursue and not lead us to desire something beyond it.... [H]e never says that the self-sufficient good itself lacks nothing desirable. Rather he says the self-sufficient good makes *life* worth choosing and lacking nothing." (LEAR-2004, pp. 58-59) [PSA: explaining the desirability of everything else is one aspect of the *account* of one's life; cf. BURNYEAT-1981 on activity with an account, i.e., meta logou.]

"[T]he idea of right proportion itself, which all good things share, will be of very little practical benefit to someone who is trying to figure out how to realize that proportion in his life (cf. 1097a8-11, where Aristotle argues that the Form of the Good is practically useless). Instead he will determine the appropriate balance of goods by looking to the supremely valuable good that he treats as his final end." (LEAR-2004, p. 59) [PSA: proportion is a much more actionable concept than the Form of the Good.]

"When Aristotle says self-sufficiency makes a life lacking in nothing, he means it lacks nothing for being happy (as opposed to lacking nothing that the person could desire). And, as we saw, that means it will seem worth living to a person who values above all others the final good characterizing that life." (LEAR-2004, p. 62)

"Aristotle is quite clear in MM 1184a14-25 that eudaimonia is a set containing many goods.... in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Magna Moralia the highest good is not ranked with other goods for its sake precisely because it is the final good. Final goods are criteria for ranking other goods." (LEAR-2004, pp. 66-67) [PSA: but the set is not an arbitrary collection, for there is an ordering principle; cf. EE 1214b6-11.]

"Eudaimonia is most choiceworthy because it is the final end and organizing principle of the good life. And in that sense it is impossible for anything to be more choiceworthy, for it is impossible for something to be a more final object of choice than the final good itself." (LEAR-2004, p. 68)

"Aristotle argues that something that moves other things 'as an object of desire or thought (to orekton kai to noeton]' would be such an unmoved mover (Metaphysics 1072a26-27). For when we desire something, the attractive (apparently kalon; 1072a27-28) object first moves our faculty of desire, which then moves us to action, without itself changing in any way." (LEAR-2004, p. 74) Evidence for this distinction can be found in Metaphysics 1072b1-3: 'And that the for the sake of which is present among the group of unmovable things is made clear by the distinction. For there is the for the sake of which as an object of benefit (tini to hou heneka) and the for the sake of which as an object to be attained or realized (to hou heneka tinos), and of these the one is [moveable] and the other is not.' (LEAR-2004, p. 76) [PSA: within an animal or human being, orexis is the moved mover but the psuche is the unmoved mover; cf. CORCILIUS, p. 135.]

"One way a thing can act for the sake of an end without bringing it under its power is to become it. In other words, when a living thing realizes its own form, it acts for the sake of an unmovable end (Physics II.7 198b1-4). Forms are, after all, final causes. When a living thing grows, for example, its development is limited by the nature of the mature thing that it is becoming. The form itself does not change.... So Aristotelian forms seem to be unmovable final causes hou heneka tinos." (LEAR-2004, p. 77)

"It is not clear how acting for the sake of one's own form could provide a model for the final causation of the Prime Mover. A living thing can realize its own form, but it cannot become god." (LEAR-2004, p. 78) [PSA: this is the wrong way to look at things; cf. KOSMAN-2013, p. 186.]

"Aristotle recognizes imitation or approximation as a way of acting for the sake of an end (hou heneka tinos). Indeed, this teleological relation is behind some of the most significant natural events.... A telos ... determines what counts as a successful instance of the subordinate end or activity. But if a good is an object of imitation or approximation, then it is the paradigm by which the subordinate good is to be judged. To the extent that the subordinate good manages to express the nature of its final end, it fulfills its aspirations and is good of its kind.... Furthermore the value of the approximation depends on the value of the object it approximates. In other words, the paradigm is a source of value for the things approximating it. According to Aristotle, reproduction is good for animals because it is the closest they can come to being eternal, which is divine and better. Thus objects of approximation are guiding ends and sources of value." (LEAR-2004, p. 83)

Lear's argument is premised on the hypothesis that "virtuous activity approximates contemplation" (LEAR-2004, p. 85); but she does not seem to seriously consider the possibility that both virtuous activity and contemplation directly emulate something else, such as the free activity of the divine.

"Aristotle seems to think that activities chosen for an end by approximating it can be intrinsically valuable *for the creatures doing the approximating*. That is because there appears to be a special connection between a thing's form and the activity it undertakes for the sake of the divine as an object of love.... Generation, for example, is not just an approximation of the divine; it is the characteristic activity of the nutritive soul (DA 415a25-28) .... Thus to act for the sake of the divine is in this case the same as to act for the sake of one's form.... Aristotle says *everything* living things do in accordance with their natures (which I take to mean 'that realizes their nature as form') is undertaken for the sake of the divine (DA 415b1-2).... To the extent that something acts for the sake of the divine as an object of love, then, it acts for the sake of its form. Or, to put it another way, when we approximate the divine to the extent possible for us, we realize our own nature. But according to Aristotle, the forms of living things are valuable in themselves. They are not instruments of a cosmic soul." (LEAR-2004, p. 86) [PSA: on these matters, see JOHNSON on teleology.]

"Aristotle says that lives are happy only insofar as they participate in (koinonei) some kind of contemplation. When a person exercises phronesis while dealing with distinctly human concerns springing from our animal and political nature, he engages in something like (homoioma ti) divine contemplative activity (1178b27)." (LEAR-2004, p. 92) [PSA: he engages in *awareness*; cf. KOSMAN-2013.]

"[W]hen the theoretical sciences study things that change, they study the unchanging aspects of the phenomena. The objects of practical reasoning, on the other hand, are ta endechomena (whatever can be otherwise than it is) *as such*. That is, practical reason knows whatever concerns us as agents insofar as it concerns us as agents.... But if theoretical reasoning can at some level study things that happen for the most part, then good chunks of practical reasoning look to be theoretical.... [I]nsofar as practical reasoning considers what constitutes our ends, it examines the forms of our ends and their parts." (LEAR-2004, p. 97)

"Reason, like our capacity for nutrition, is a part of the soul; it is, in other words, a life capacity, according to Aristotle. Thus its activation is a way of living. Since the function of the whole rational soul is truth, we can call this way of living 'grasping the truth' or, as I will tend to say, 'living truthfully.' [fn16: ... The verb aletheuo, which can mean 'be right about', indicates that aletheia (truth) can be attributed to the knower himself as well as to what he knows. See 1139b12-13.]" (LEAR-2004, p. 99) [PSA: cf. Jan Patočka on "living in truth".]

"Aristotle believes that without the agreement of the irrational part of the soul, a person will not be able to manifest a grasp of practical truth, and so will not be able, properly speaking, to *have* that grasp.... The good condition of a person's practical reason is not enough, as it turns out, for him to live truthfully with respect to objects of practical concern. [fn18: ... Thus, in interpreting Aristotle we must resist the temptation to say that the akratic perfectly well knows what to do. He does not know it perfectly well, for perfect practical knowing, according to Aristole, is chosen action.]" (LEAR-2004, p. 99)

"As Aristotle repeatedly claims, we deliberate not in order that we might know the variety of ways of obtaining the good but in order that we might actually have it (e.g., 1095a5-6, 1179a35-b2). In other words, the specific function of practical reason, the way in which it expresses or aims to express truthfulness, is choice. Practical reason aims at a determination [PSA: a commitment] *to do* such and such. Action and choice (in normal cases the former follows unproblematically upon the latter) is the telos of practical reasoning." (LEAR-2004, pp. 100-101)

"The akratic agent shows that without some degree of cooperation from appetite, a person's judgments of practical goodness will not express themselves in chosen action. In Aristotle's analysis, the akratic makes a choice in the sense of determining the particular sort of action he ought to perform but fails to actualize this knowledge because of the interference of independent, nonrational desires. The akratic's knowledge exists only as a capacity; it is not active knowing. Thus, practical reason cannot express truthfulness without the cooperation of desire." (LEAR-2004, p. 102)

"[T]he proper objects of practical reasoning - ta endechomena, the things possible for us to bring about - *do* demand a kind of truthfulness peculiar to them and not shared with the objects of theoretical reasoning.... The interest of practical reason in the particular aspects of a scene relevant to action, the search for the most direct means to an end, the abandoning of a train of thought when reason finds out that, in this situation, action by *me* is not possible, all suggest that the proper ergon and final cause of practical reasoning is not idle knowledge but action." (LEAR-2004, p. 103)

"[A]ccording to Aristotle, *practical* reason knows the good. Phronesis, in particular, is concerned with the human good on the most general level (1140b4-6).... But according to Aristotle the good is not only a practical first principle; it is a metaphysical and physical [PSA: i.e., natural] first principle as well. For example, in the Metaphysics Aristotle says that sophia - the most authoritative kind of knowledge - is the science of that for the sake of which, and this is the good at the most general or universal level (Metaphysics Alpha 2 982a19-b10).... Aristotle argues that we cannot give an adequate account of the parts of animals without explaining their final cause or relationship to the good of the whole animal (PA I.1). In De Anima Aristotle differentiates the kinds of soul with reference to their ends and defines soul itself as the final cause of the body (415b9-17). Scientific explanation, then, seems to be very much a matter of getting it right about what the good of each physical thing is. In that way it is analogous to practical reasoning. In both cases, reasoning is more truthful to the extent that it is precise about the good in its sphere of inquiry." (LEAR-2004, p. 105) [PSA: on good as an explanatory principle, see JOHNSON and GOTTHELF-1976.]

"[P]ractical and theoretical reason are truthful when, in their different ways, they grasp precisely and fully the nature of the relevant good.... While reason treats the good *as* the good, nonrational desire does not.... Appetite ... aims at the good though not *as* the good." (LEAR-2004, p. 107)

"[W]hat affirmation and denial are in thinking (dianoia), pursuit and avoidance are in desire (1139a21-22). In other words, pursuit is desire's way of saying 'yes.' Thus, the activity of the desiderative aspect of practical virtue is analogous both to the thinking aspect of that same virtue and to the activity of purely scientific virtue. [38] And when desire is shaped by reason, as it is in choice, that rational desire becomes a grasping of the truth of the human good. [fn38: Gauthier and Jolif suggest that the analogy between practical reasoning and desire is also presupposed at 1139a29-31 when Aristotle says that the function of practical reason is truth homologos echousa tei orexei tei orthe (being in agreement with - having the same logos as - right desire).]" (LEAR-2004, p. 107) [PSA: note the connection between 'homologos echousa' and action 'meta logou'.]

"[F]ully excellent human action is the product of choice. As such, excellent human action is the product of *reasoning of some sort or other*. Thus a human being's capacity to pursue and secure his good, unlike the same sort of capacity in an animal, is an expression of human rationality." (LEAR-2004, p. 117)

"Although the naturally virtuous want the right sorts of things in general, they realize their desires in a scattershot fashion, often to their ultimate harm (1144b4-9, II.8 1116b23-1117a9). Excellent practical reasoning ... changes this natural tendency into a disposition that always hits the mark toward which these natural dispositions direct us." (LEAR-2004, p. 117)

[T]he presence of phronesis transforms the animal pursuit of the good into an expression of rationality.... 'For virtue is not only the state in accordance with the right reason, but it is a state *with* (meta) the right reason; and phronesis is right reason concerning things of this sort' (1144b24-28)." (LEAR-2004, p. 119) [PSA: this is the difference between kata logon = "directed by" (Walker) and meta logou = "unified with" (Flannery); see also BURNYEAT-1981.]

"Aristotle argues that the target (skopos) of practical reason is excellence in truthfulness. That is, reason aims at the excellent exercise of its function. Furthermore, he argues that practical reason cannot fully achieve this aim unless desire pursues the very same things that reason asserts (1139a25-26).... In order for a person to attain complete practical truthfulness, he must be disposed to desire and feel as reason directs." (LEAR-2004, p. 121)

"[T]he beauty qua order [PSA: taxis] of a thing lies precisely in its being well arranged for the sake of its end [PSA: i.e., telos as eidos or way of being]. For instance, in the Parts of Animals Aristotle says that all living things, no matter how humble, reveal something beautiful and elicit in us the pleasure felt in the presence of the beautiful, because they are organized for the sake of an end (PA 645a21-26). And in the Politics (VII.4 1326a33ff) Aristotle says that a beautiful city is one whose size is limited by its proper order." (LEAR-2004, p. 127)

"According to Politics 1284b8-22, something displays symmetry or proportion (summetria) when the size of its parts conduces to its benefit.... But what determines proportionality? It is the well-functioning or good of the whole.... Symmetry, then, is very much like order. In both cases a thing possesses it when its parts are determined in a certain way with reference to the end of the whole. But while order is concerned with the arrangement of all the parts, symmetry is a matter of the properties of those parts taken singly. When each part of a thing is shaped and sized so that it can function in harmony with the other parts for their common good, then the thing as a whole has symmetry."

"There is reason to think, too, that definiteness or boundedness (horismenon) is a property connected to the good.... The idea seems to be that when things have a boundary or limit that is a true horos, they are limited at *just that point* for the sake of fulfilling their function. So, in Politics 1326a5ff ... Aristotle is concerned not just that the city be properly ordered but that its magnitude not exceed a certain limit in either direction (i.e., is neither too large nor too small).... [T]his limit on magnitude is determined by the city's end or good. [fn13: Ross 1924, not. ad 1078a35: 'The megethos which is mentioned in the Poetics [1450b36] and in Politics 1326a33 as an element in beauty answers to horismenon here [Metaphysics Mu.3].']" (LEAR-2004, p. 129)

"[T]he proper size depends on what can be seen or in some analogous way comprehended. If something is too large, its unity and wholeness (to hen kai to holon) will be lost on the people contemplating it; if it is minuscule, they will not be able to see it at all (Poetics 1450b38-1451a3)." (LEAR-2004, p. 130)

"Aristotle says that he seeks the horos, or limit, or the intermediate virtuous states (1138b23-24). As it turns out, the standard of right reason ... sets the boundaries of the virtues (1138b25, b34). Thus, there is a connection between a virtue's being an intermediate state and its displaying ... the formal properties of symmetry and boundedness constitutive of the fine." (LEAR-2004, p. 131) [PSA: actually, arete is not an intermediate state, but a state that reliably settles on the intermediate action or reaction.]

"[F]or Aristotle, as for Plato, actions are praised as fine when they are seen to be appropriate to the agent as fulfilling a human ideal. Aristotle often associates fine actions with what is fitting or appropriate (prepon, prosekon, emmeles). And at Topics 135a13 Aristotle actually says that the fine *is* the fitting (cf. Topics 102a5-6). Now, Aristotle's description of virtuous actions as ones that are performed 'at the right time, with the right things, to the right people, for the right end, and as one ought' (NE 1106b21-22) emphasizes that the virtuous person fits his actions to his circumstances.... [I]n general, virtuous actions are fine because they are appropriate to the agent as well as to his circumstances." (LEAR-2004, pp. 144-145)

"In Aristotle's account, moral virtue depends on a conception of the human good that is sufficiently distinct from particular occasions of morally virtuous action to serve as their principle of order, symmetry, and boundedness. For virtuous activity, insofar as it is fine and choiceworthy for its own sake, is just action - including deliberation - in appropriate relationship to the human good. The phronimos grasps the truth on a particular occasion by ordering his action in the precise way that is appropriate to himself as flourishing. Thus, he must have some vision of human flourishing with reference to which he can determine what is appropriate." (LEAR-2004, p. 145) [PSA: here again, see EE 1214b6-11.]

On "why Aristotle thinks political freedom is so important": "War is for the sake of peace, he says, but the business of peace, once it has been achieved, is for the sake of leisure (Politics 1334a14-16; NE 1177b4-6).... The purpose of political organization, over and above the family, is to make possible the pursuit of leisure activities (Politics VII.14 1333a35-36; 1334a4-5, VII.15 1334a14-16). Thus, for Aristotle, political freedom and peace are worth the risk of death because they allow for leisure. But, of course, leisure is valuable only if it can be used well. ('If it is disgraceful in men not to be able to use the goods of life, it is particularly disgraceful not to be ale to use them in time of leisure - to show excellent qualities in action and war, and when they have peace to be no better than slaves' [Politics VII.15 1334a36-40]).... [H]e thinks free citizens at leisure need philosophy (Politics VII.15 1334a22-25, a31-34; Metaphysics Alpha 1 981a22-25: philosophy requires leisure). Thus, in Aristotle's complete account, the possibility of the most excellent expression of reason is what makes leisure worth wanting and worth dying for." (LEAR-2004, pp. 159-160)

"Temperance concerns the pleasant pursuit of things that are necessary for our life insofar as we are animals. Insofar as we are animals we need food, drink, and sexual intercourse. Indeed, we strongly desire them - so much so that, once we possess the luxury of relative leisure, we could easily give it over to their indulgence. It would be a shame to be willing to risk mere brute life in battle, for example, or to toil in business for the sake of a leisure lived for the sake of animal pleasures." (LEAR-2004, p. 162)

"[T]he great-souled person seems to be concerned above all with the *truthfulness* of his claims.... [T]he great-souled person knows himself, as well.... The great-souled person is, then, a lover of truth." (LEAR-2004, pp. 169-170) [PSA: but on megalopsuchia, see T.W. Smith.]

"Leisure (schole) in Aristotle's sense is not a time of relaxation (though it may be used that way); it is the condition of being free from the demands posed by our natural desire for the necessities of life. A leisurely life is one that is not driven by our need to satisfy necessary desires." (LEAR-2004, p. 185)

"[S]ince leisure is worth having only if there is some valuable activity with which to occupy it, we can say that unleisurely activities are properly choiceworthy for the sake of some valuable leisure activity. This activity that makes leisure worth having, of course, will be eudaimonia (1177b4)." (LEAR-2004, p. 185) [PSA: or it theoria?]

"[A]n authoritative capacity or craft is one that directly gives rise to an activity or product for the sake of which the subordinate activities are worth choosing.... It seems possible, then, that Aristotle thinks that nous is authoritative because its activity is the most final human end toward which all our other actions ought, by nature, to aim. (Notice how at 1177b33-34 he says that we should do everything toward living in accordance with the best part of our soul - panta poiein pros to zen - suggesting that the natural consequence of a part's being best is that its end is most final.) .... The activity of nous is choiceworthy for its own sake alone, while the activity of practical virtue (certainly, at least, in paradigmatic cases) is subordinate to it. The former, then, ought to be authoritative over the latter." (LEAR-2004, p. 191)

"At DA 416a23-25 Aristotle says that we ought to call each soul after the capacity for the sake of which the other capacities are organized. (Since plant souls nourish themselves for the sake of reproduction, it is right to call them reproductive souls.) So, presumably, our souls are called noetic because our other soul capacities are organized for the sake of nous. If this is what Aristotle means by calling us malista nous in the NE, he does not mean that we are, strictly speaking, nous alone; he means that all the capacities of our souls - nutrition, reproduction, perception, locomotion, etc. - are nested (see DA 414b30ff) and teleologically ordered for the sake of noetic capacity." (LEAR-2004, p. 192) [PSA: Lear seems to argue here that the other parts of the soul exist for the sake of nous; but nous is a capacity, not an activity, and activity is more valuable and important than capacity - so do the other parts of the soul exist for the sake of the entire activity of the person (directed by nous) or only for the sake of the capacity? See also FURTH, p. 159.]

"He says that animals do not *participate* in contemplation in any way (1178b24: to me metechein; 1178b28: oudamei koinonei). By contrast, human beings are happy insofar as there is some similarity (homoioma ti) between their activity and contemplation.... By implication, then, any human life that is happy will be happy in virtue of its approximation to divine contemplative life." (LEAR-2004, p. 195) [PSA: this does not necessarily follow.]

"[T]he life as a whole will not be more valuable simply in virtue of its having an hour more contemplation than it might otherwise have had. Aristotelian happiness does not make a life good by being present in it in any old way. Happiness - contemplation - makes a life good by being present as a skopos, or target, of excellent practical reasoning. Thus, it absolutely does not follow from the claim that happiness is contemplation that a person would be better off by maximizing it." (LEAR-2004, p. 201) [PSA: Aristotle's claim that "eudaimonia extends as far as theoria" does not mean that eudaimonia *is* theoria.]

END