Finding Oneself with Friends
Patrick Lee Miller
In Polansky, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Cambridge, 2014

"In his definition of virtue, rational choice aims at the intermediate, but Aristotle's discussion of philia does not rely on this notion at all.... What, then, is the target of reason in the case of philia? The phileton (roughly, the lovable). Like its closest the English equivalent, this Greek word is ambiguous between two senses: what is loved (descriptive), and what should be loved (normative). Sensitive to this important ambiguity, as well as to the great variety of things people do in fact love, Aristotle distinguishes three types of phileton: the good, the pleasant, and the useful (1155b18-19)." (MILLER-2014, pp. 323-324)

With regard to the philia of those who love based on the good, Miller writes: "[E]ach limits his goodwill toward the other by one thing only: who that other really is. But this is not really a limit. Aristotle thus calls their philia perfect or complete (teleia: 1156b6). 'Complete philia is the philia of good people similar in virtue,' he writes, 'for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in themselves' (1156b7-9). Unlike the inferior types of philia, then, the relationship of superior philoi is in no way instrumental - they love each other not because of anything else, but because of who they really are. 'Only good people,' Aristotle writes, 'can be philoi for the sake of the other person himself' (1157a20)." (MILLER-2014, p. 328)

"[W]e typically behave foolishly when we are young, and maturation is difficult (1095a2-11). The perfection of our characteristic activity requires a lifetime of effort, years of practice in the virtues that perfect it (1098a8-21).... In philia of virtue, therefore, the philoi strive to help each other function well, actualize their essence, and thereby become more fully who they most of all are." (MILLER-2014, p. 330)

"[W]hether a situation demands virtue of character or virtue of intellect, moral or intellectual virtue, it is easy enough to imagine philoi of virtue checking their choices with one another.... They are prepared to hear that they are making a mistake, ready to respect contrary advice, correction, or even reproof. One hallmark of the best sort of philia is that it not only withstands such moments; it is fortified by them." (MILLER-2014, p. 332)

"[T]he discussion of philia that occupies the eighth and ninth books of this treatise follows neatly from its seventh book's discussion of akrasia. After learning there how self-deception works, philia of virtue now enters Aristotle's ethics as the best practical insurance against it." (MILLER-2014, p. 332)

In short: 'a sort of training in virtue emerges from good people's living in each other's company' (1170a11-12). (MILLER-2014, p. 333)

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