Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics Fred D. Miller Oxford University Press, 1995 "Aristotle states in the Metaphysics that 'the free human being exists for his own sake and not for the sake of another' (982b26).... Aristotle, like Plato, believes that the ideal of freedom is easily corrupted. In the opinion of the many, to be free is merely to be able to do whatever one wishes. [fn40: Politics 1317b11-13; cf. Politics 1310a31-32 and Metaphysics 1075a19-22]. As interpreted by Callicles, individual freedom degenerates into licence (see Plato, Gorgias 492c5 and cf. Republic 344c5 and Laws 707a7). Nevertheless, freedom remains an important political ideal for Plato (see Laws 693b2-5) and for Aristotle, who contrasts slavery with political rule on the grounds that the subjects of the latter are free and equal (Politics 1255b20; cf EN 1134a26-28). The term exousia is closely associated with freedom [fn41: See especially Plato, Republic, VIII 557b4-6, where freedom in democracy is associated with free speech (parrhesia) and the liberty (exousia) to do whatever one wants.], and denotes the unobstructed ability to perform a particular action." (MILLER-1995, p. 102) "The highest aim of the lawgiver and the educator is to promote those actions which involve leisure, peace, and nobility. Leisure is understood as intrinsically valuable activity, and its opposite, absence of leisure, as 'for the sake of something not present' and 'not chosen for itself' (VIII.3 1338a1-6; cf. EN X.7 1177b16-26). The goal of the lawgiver is thus to promote activities of the citizens which are ends in themselves existing for their own sakes (cf. Pol VII.3 1325b20)." (MILLER-1995, p. 226) "He thinks it a sign of the correct constitution that the citizens are ruled *voluntarily*, whereas the subjects of despotic rules are involuntary (see 1272b30-31; 1285a27-28). Also, in the best constitution the citizen *chooses* to be ruled and to rule in order to live a virtuous life (1284a1-3). Further, individuals must attain happiness through their own efforts (1232b25). Accordingly, political justice presupposes that the citizens are free (EN 1134a26-28). None the less, this endorsement of freedom and liberty is severely qualified, and Aristotle's sketch of the best constitution in Politics VII-VIII contains many restrictions on individual liberty.... Aristotle does not justify such measures on holistic grounds that individual interests may be sacrified in order to promote the general good. Rather, he justifies them on the ground that the aim of the polis is to promote moral perfection in the individual citizens." (MILLER-1995, pp. 248-249) "For Aristotle liberty is an external good necessary for virtuous activity but which can be possessed in excess (see EN 1178a28-33). However, when it is defined by the ancient democrats as 'doing whatever one wishes' (Politics 1310a31-32), it becomes an impediment to personal moral perfection and a threat to constitutional order (see Politics 1316b21-27; 1318b38-1319a1). Aristotle's critique of democratic is revealing: 'So that in such democracies each person lives as he wishes and "for what he craves", as Euripides says; but this is base; for [he] should not believe that living in relation to the constitution is slavery, but preservation' (1310a32-36). The aim of the individual should not be unlimited liberty but moral perfection, which is achieved through conformity to the constitution. Freedom is an external good subject to the Aristotelian mean." (MILLER-1995, pp. 250-251) [PSA: EN 1178a28-33 seems to be about generosity, not freedom: "a generous person will need money to perform generous actions..." / τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια...] "On the other hand, in a democracy, if the principle of freedom is applied without restraint, the progeny of the poor will tend to become licentious as 'each person lives as he wishes and for the sake of whatever he relishes' (1310a32-33). Aristotle admonishes the democrats, 'This is base; for one ought not to believe that it is slavery to live relative to the constitution; rather [it is one's] preservation' (1310a34-36)." (MILLER-1995, p. 299) END