The Wisdom of Aristotle
Carlo Natali
SUNY Press, 2001

"Science ... can be used in a correct way (orthos) or incorrectly.... [I]t is not possible for arete to be a science, because if it were, it could also be used to do evil." (NATALI-2001, p. 7) [PSA: the same is true of techne.]

"Phronesis necessarily contains within itself an element of personal and emotional participation, of good desire; this makes it a different kind of knowledge from pure science. In order to define practical truth, the virtue of logistikon, i.e. of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle is obliged to establish what is meant by 'truth' or, better, 'correctness' in speaking of desire.... Just as in scientific knowledge truth is affirming or denying in conformity with the state of things, so too in desire truth is a movement toward the true good and away from the apparent good.... It is thus characteristic of phronesis that it not only possesses practical truth, but also tends to put it into practice, harmonizing rationality and correct desire." (NATALI-2001, pp. 12-13)

"In the definitions of individual ethical virtues, this logos that determines the mean is apparently personified in expressions such as hos o logos, or hos ho orthos logos keleui, in which logos is 'reasoning,' the act of phronesis, and not 'rule'; this logos is determined by reference to a model of correct practical reasoning, rather than by reference to a universal rule." (NATALI-2001, p. 16)

"Aristotelian virtue cannot be compared to virtue in the modern sense, whereby a virtuous person does good with no thought of any reward, punishment or form of pleasure connected with it. Rather, it is the expression of a balanced and harmonious character and, as such, is part of a complete and happy life." (NATALI-2001, p. 37)

"[T]he expression hoste hou heneka dei proaireisthai (1227b13-14) already expresses the idea that, when one makes a choice, one does so in view of an end that differs from the immediate act being performed.... The above-quoted passage is paralleled by another passage in the Politics, which amplifies on and clarifies a concept that is already quite clear. [VII.13 1331b26-28] Here the distinction between the 'choice' and the 'end of the choice,' discussed in the previous lines, is replaced by that between two objects of choice, the 'end' and 'what leads to the end,' ta pros ton skopon or, more commonly, ta pros to telos, an expression that nowadays we translate, rather imperfectly, as 'the means.'" (NATALI-2001, p. 40) [PSA: see also "ta pros ton kairon" at 1104a8-9.]

"[I]t is natural to identify the end with the right mean. Indeed, Aristotle does make this identification in the following passage.... '[T]he what-for [PSA: hou heneka] is the end; indeed, every choice is a choice of something and for something; the mean is the what-for, the cause of which is virtue, the choosing of the what-for. However, the choice is not of this, but of what leads to this.' (1227b36-39).... For Aristotle, nevertheless, 'to make a good choice' does not mean to find the technically most effective means for the realization of just any end; rather, it means to find the effective means for achieving a good end." (NATALI-2001, pp. 42-43)

"The task of deliberation is more difficult than that of justification. It is not just a question of finding the middle term; we must also find term (C'), which is an action.... In this way the end, which is still universal, is determined by [PSA: made determinate by] the means." (NATALI-2001, p. 47)

"Aristotle uses the expression 'natural virtue' to indicate a spontaneous and generic tendency to do good, without knowing how to achieve it in practice... like children or handicapped people: 'though even children and animals are endowed with natural habits, yet without nous such habits seem to be harmful. Besides this, we apparently observe that, just as a strong but sightless body, when it moves, may perhaps fall headlong, because it cannot see, so it may happen in this case, too. But if a person acquires nous, the difference is seen in action, and though the habit is the same as it was before, now there is virtue in the strong sense. (1144b8-14) .... Aristotle posits ability [deinotes] and natural virtue [arete phusike] as two extremes, and arete kuria, which is not aneu phroneseos (1144b17), as the mean." (NATALI-2001, pp. 52-53) [PSA: the extremes that fall short of or go beyond phronesis are foolishness (εὐήθεια, here equivalent to natural virtue) and cunning (πανουργία, here equivalent to ability).] 

"[D]esire and reason work together, i.e. they determine each other (EN 1144b27, 1178a16-19), as components of virtue in the strong sense. Desire manifests itself in 'pursuit' and 'flight' (dioxis kai phuge, 1139a22), since a virtuous man finds pleasure in doing good and pain in doing evil. This reaction is measured and determined by reason (EN II.3), which establishes the exact measure of the passions and emotional reactions in relation to the time, the situation, the ends and the correct means (EN 1106b21-23)." (NATALI-2001, p. 57)

"It is thus wisdom that determines the right mean of emotions in relation to the end, i.e. to eupraxia and kalon." (NATALI-2001, p. 58)

"There is no opposition between a single act of eupraxia and happiness; rather, the relation is one of part to whole." (NATALI-2001, p. 58)

"[A]s the faculty that deliberates and finds the means, phronesis governs over desire. In this case desire depends on wisdom, and must take as its object what phronesis has shown to be an effective means for attaining the proposed end. In the choice of the action to be performed, there is a moment when reason has priority, and desire adapts itself to it. This occurs in the analysis of a given situation that is known as 'deliberation'." (NATALI-2001, p. 60)

"Since choosing is choosing something for something else, Aristotle admits there is a hupolepsis tou dia ti, an assumption regarding the reason (1226b23), which in this context is an assumption of the final cause. This assumption of the end occurs in the deliberative part of the soul ... 'in fact, the part of the soul that keeps its eyes on a certain cause is deliberative' (1226b25-26)." (NATALI-2001, p. 68)

Commenting on EN VI.8 / EE V.8, Natali states: "The nous Aristotle is talking about here is the capacity to grasp the particular meanings of practical situations; for this reason it is attributed to the same people who have gnome, sunesis, and phronesis (1143a26-28). The object of all these faculties is individual, practical cases (1143a33-35), i.e. the object of voluntary behavior (cf. 1110b6-7). The type of (practical) nous we are talking about here is acquired by experience (1143b6-9).... This type of practical nous is not an immediate knowledge of the ultimate ends and first principles of human action, but is like a general knowledge of the facts of life." (NATALI-2001, pp. 74-75)

"[T]he deliberative analysis starts from an as yet undetermined form present in the mind of the one who acts, and gradually specifies it in relation (1) to the given situation, and (2) to a series of technical and practical notions.... In this way the end is defined every more closely." (NATALI-2001, p. 81)

"Aristotle almost always considers the search for the means as an analysis of the end. This is clear, for example, in EE II.11 1227b30-32." (NATALI-2001, p. 81)

"[I]n the first three chapters of Topics III ... Aristotle establishes how one can determine which of two or more entities is preferable, in those cases in which the most preferable is not immediately obvious (116a4-9)." (NATALI-2001, p. 89)

"[I]n 118b27 [CHECKTHIS] et seq. Aristotle distinguishes what produces the useful from what produces the beautiful or pleasant, and he stresses the fact that what is preferable on the basis of more than one of these determinations is preferable to that which is preferable on the basis of a single determination. Hence what is both fine (noble) and pleasant is preferable to that which is only fine (noble). In this way any kind of asceticism is rejected." (NATALI-2001, p. 90)

"There is, in fact, no reason why topoi of this kind, collected and elaborated to be used in dialectical discussions on ethics, cannot be used also by those who deliberate and debate with themselves about how to act." (NATALI-2001, p. 91)

"Practical reasoning, since it is linked to the action it gives rise to, partly repeats the structure of such action. Just as acting is 'doing something in view of something else' - in view of attaining an end - so too in practical reasoning the basic elements are the end and what-leads-to-the-end, the so-called means. And practical reasoning itself is, at bottom, only seeing 'something,' a practicable course of action, in the light of 'something else,' an end, and hence desiring (or not desiring) this 'something'.... Deliberation thus produces a transmission of desire: when rational analysis demonstrates, to desire and to the emotional part of our soul, that a certain action is a way of bringing about a desired state of affairs, then that action itself becomes desirable. Deliberation therefore causes us to perceive something in a particular way, as being good and desirable; without deliberation, the same thing might seem indifferent to us, or even bad and repugnant." (NATALI-2001, pp. 96-97) [PSA: note the connection between this "seeing" or awareness and theoria.]

With regard to the so-called practical syllogism, "Aristotle says: 'either he does not have [the premise] 'if this here is so-and-so', or it is not active' (1147a7); this means that, if the just-quoted minor premise were present and active, the practical conclusion would necessarily result. (NATALI-2001, p. 102) [PSA: here, "to have" means "to have in knowledge" and "to be active" means "to be active in awareness"; cf De Anima etc. on the distinction between episteme vs. theoria, between knowing and actively using that knowledge in action.] After several pages of further analysis, Natali observes that when one goes astray in one's action-oriented reasoning, "the error consists in not possessing at all, or not possessing in the appropriate way, the practical minor premise." (NATALI-2001, p. 107) Here also, "not possessing at all" means "not knowing" and "not possessing in the appropriate way" means "not holding that knowledge in awareness".

"In EE I.4, Aristotle states: ... 'although one must necessarily have a certain character, it is above all necessary that one's actions should have such a character' (1215a23-25).... happiness can be identified with virtue only if one accepts the thesis that the most typical characteristic of virtue is to cause right actions.... 'It certainly makes no small difference whether one considers the greatest good to consist of possession (ktesis) or of use (chresis) - a habitual disposition (hexis) or an activity (energeia)' (1098b31ff) .... The key terms of Speusippus' and Xenocrates' definitions are mentioned, viz. disposition and possession (hexis, ktesis), and they are replaced by new key terms, chresis and energeia, use and activity.... This is why Aristotle often says that eudaimonia is eupraxia, correct behavior (Physics 197b3-5; Politics 1325b18-21; 1325b14; eupragia Rhetoric 1360b14). In EE II.1 .... Aristotle demonstrates his thesis that activities and actions are greater and better than states and dispositions; in this way, Aristotle defends his decision to define happiness in terms of energeia and not of hexis." (NATALI-2001, pp. 119-120)

"It was, in fact, said that, of all goods, the best, and those from among which happiness must be identified, are the goods of the soul; that the realities of the soul are modes of being and activities; and that activities are better than modes of being, since they constitute the end of such states of the soul. Happiness, as a perfect or complete (teleon) good, does not include all goods, but only the best. The use of the term teleon does not suffice to lead us to conclude that happiness is an all-inclusive set within the category of 'goods.' On the contrary, it is a very selective set; only fine actions are component parts, mere, of it.... Aristotle thus restricts the choice of what is to be considered a 'part' of happiness: 'this is clear from our hypotheses; as indeed it was said that happiness was the best thing [cf. 1214a7-8] amd that the ends within the soul were the best of goods [1218b32-35], {that the things in} it are either habitual states or activities p1218b35-36], and since (1) an activity is better than the disposition from which it comes, and (2) the best activity is proper to the best habitual state [1219a6-8, 11-13, 17-18], then the activity of virtue is the best thing in the soul. And it was said that happiness was the best thing [here he repeats a29]; therefore happiness is the activity of a good [ = excellent, virtuous] soul.' (1219a28-35)" (NATALI-2001, p. 123)

With regard to eudaimonia as described at EE I.2 1214b6-14, Natali states: "it is useful to distinguish at once the components and the necessary conditions... 'that without which it is not possible to stay healthy, and staying healthy, are not the same thing, and this is true for many other cases; so then living well and that without which it is not possible to live well [are also not the same thing].' (1214b14-17) The definitions of happiness mention only the component parts and not the necessary conditions.... Aristotle's definition of happiness ... aims to distinguish, in the ends men set themselves, the good ones (those which are really a part or a specification of happiness) from the mistaken ones (in which the relation between ends and means is misrepresented). This same distinction lies, for example, behind the criticism of the blind pursuit of wealth in Politics I.9. In conclusion, therefore, it is possible to maintain that in the life of an individual, or in that of a city, the necessary conditions (that without which the whole does not exist) are not on the same plane as the parts of the compound (what the whole consists of). On the other hand, not all the parts are equal to one another, although they have a common element which their being part is based on. 'To be a part' means to take part, 'to a certain extent,' in the life of the whole.... [I]n the life of an individual not every virtuous activity has the same importance, but some virtues are more important than others, though they are all parts of the happy life." (NATALI-2001, pp. 125-126)

Citing 1176a26-29, Natali observes: "The happy life will thus be composed of hexeis such as virtue and wisdom (sophia) or, better, of the actions derived from them, plus the pleasure that accompanies and perfects such actions. These are the parts of happiness, the elements that enter into its makeup." (NATALI-2001, p. 134)

"[A] person who conducts a certain kind of life does not thereby perform only a single kind of action. Nomadic or herbivorous animals do not devote every single minute of their day to wandering around or chewing grasses; in the same way hunters do not only hunt nor do fishermen only fish. At a higher level, a civil community such as the polis of the Spartans is characterized by a bios stratiotikos, a military life (Politics 1270a5), but this does not mean that the Spartans devote every minute of their lives to marches, military exercises and battles.... Nonetheless, in some way their lives are organized around war as their principal activity. It is thus our opinion that a bios is a way of life, and as such it is composed of a series of different activities, but it is characterized by one predominant type of action, which to some extent determines all the rest, and enables us to distinguish one bios from another." (NATALI-2001, p. 135)

"Aristotle considers the bios to be a way of living characterized by a predominant kind of activity. Thus many bioi are possible, and each of them will be characterized by a different predominant activity. It is, however, impossible for the same person to live more than one bios at a time; furthermore, the idea of bios seems to imply a certain duration. It is thus just possible that the same person may, in the course of his existence, devote himself to more than one bios." (NATALI-2001, pp. 137-138) [PSA: see also DAHL, p. 87, on theoria as a stage of life.]

"Aristotle's position is marked by the absolute pre-eminence given to the notion of ergon, and hence to the "function" of a being with respect to all its other characteristics and properties. [PSA: this might imply that multiple bioi are acceptable, as long as they are pursued in a thoughtful, reflective manner.] This is clearly due to Aristotle's doctrine of the priority of act over potential, as is stated in Metaphysics IX.8. In this latter text, the idea that the ergon is more important than the potential, and the idea, referred to the substance (ousia), of the superiority of act over potential are explicitly linked. The end of a capacity is actualization, not vice versa. This was said earlier, in EE II.1, and is repeated here: 'the ergon is the end, and activity is action (ergon), and for this reason, also with regard to its name, the activity (energeia) is called after the action (ergon) and leads to the act (entelecheia).' (1050a21-23) According to Aristotle, the good of a being lies mainly in the activity and being-in-act of the being itself. This is what the substance and the essence of every being mainly consist of. The importance of an ergon thus does not lie in its being part of an organic context, not in its being valuable as a tool, but rather in the fact that it is mainly through its ergon that a being expresses what it is. In the Metaphysics Aristotle explicitly connects this doctrine to the idea of 'happiness': 'where there is no other ergon except activity, it lies in the agents; for example, vision [is] in those who see, contemplation in those who contemplate, life is in the soul, and hence so is happiness, since it is a kind of life.' (1050a34-b2)" (NATALI-2001, p. 147)

In comparing the ergon argument of the NE with that of the EE, Natali says: "As in EE II.1, Aristotle speaks of the arete of the soul, meaning by this the best habitual disposition, which gives rise to the best ergon.. This ergon is a certain type of activity, defined in EE II.1 as zoe spoudaia, 'virtuous, excellent life'; here, in 1098a14, it is defined as the life spoudaiou andros, i.e. of the excellent or virtuous man." (NATALI-2001, p. 149) [PSA: on the meaning and significance of spoudaios, see LU-2013.]

"In lines 1098a4-5 we distinguished between two kinds of life of the rational soul, one 'as obeying reason' and one 'as possessing reason.' These kinds of activity correspond to two different habitual dispositions, i.e. two different kinds of virtue, as well as two different parts of the soul. These two types of virtue consist of, first, the habitual disposition to listen to reason, the habitual disposition to exercise one's own rational faculty. The second of these dispositions is the more perfect one, teliotaten, 1098a17. The fulfilment of it, viz. the use of the properly rational part of the soul, is human happiness, which is a certain kind of activity of the rational soul 'as possessing reason and reflecting' (1098a4-5). Human happiness cannot consist of the activity typical of the habitual disposition that is only capable of obeying logos, e.g. obeying orders given by other people." (NATALI-2001, pp. 149-150). [PSA: note the connection between developing one's own ability to think (acting meta logou) and full maturation or completion as a human being.]

With reference to 1099b26-1100a5, Natali notes: "The 'complete virtue' of the above-quoted passage, like the 'most perfect, or complete virtue' of the previously quoted passage, is not contemplation, but the virtues of the adult man, who can govern himself and those who depend on him." (NATALI-2001, p. 150)

"It thus seems to us that the most perfect virtue mentioned in 1098a17 is the virtue of the most important part of the rational soul, that it includes both sophia and phronesis, and that it is not at all just theoria." (NATALI-2001, p. 151)

"Sophia and phronesis are thus ends in themselves, as are honor and virtue in EN I.7, and not means for something else. It is therefore not correct to approach the question by just asking what they are 'useful' for. Their desirability does not stem from the fact of their producing anything, but first of all from the fact that each is the excellence and perfection of a 'part' (of the soul)." (NATALI-2001, p. 151)

"At line 1177b1, Aristotle begins to contrast the 'theoretical life' with the 'political life'.... The terms of comparison are here explained quite clearly: it is not a question of setting the exercise of theoretical virtue against the exercise of the virtues of character (plus phronesis, which is closely linked to them). Instead, the opposition lies between a life in which the interest in science and philosophy is paramount, and a life in which the predominant interest lies in τιμή and participation in power struggles, in conformity with the morality prevailing in Athenian democracy in Aristotle's day. In our opinion this means that the moral virtues typical of social life, such as generosity and justice, are fully legitimate parts of both of these bioi." (NATALI-2001, p. 158) [PSA: but see the Politics on a more balanced approach to the bios of the "true politician", who does not act for the sake of power.]

"Aristotle's model of happiness is clear: the happiest man is a private citizen who is moderately well-off and in good health, who acts properly and correctly in his relations with others, especially family members, friends and fellow citizens, who stays out of the struggle for political power and devotes himself, insofar as possible, to the life of contemplation, exercising his faculty of theoretical reflection." (NATALI-2001, p. 162)

"[T]he argument contained in EE VIII.3 is not very different from that contained in EN X.8 and EN I.... All these passages state that the best quantity of external goods is a moderate amount, and they estimate this 'moderate amount' in relation to the needs of theoria." (NATALI-2001, p. 163)

"Aristotle's position shows all its originality also if it is compared with more modern theories. It appears that both Kant and Hegel, though they pursue very different theoretical ends, understand happiness to be a subjective state of self-contentment, which may be at most the consequence, but not the principle, of ethical action. As we have seen, the kind of active life that, for Aristotle, constitutes the happy life is not without a certain pleasure; hence Aristotle's happiness is also 'contentment,' but this is not its essence." (NATALI-2001, p. 172)

"In every bios there is one kind of virtuous activity that prevails over the others and, in some way, subordinates them to itself. This particular virtuous activity does not exhaust the bios, nor is it the end of every other good activity, but it does give a distinctive trait to that particular way of life and makes it possible to judge a person who devotes himself to it." (NATALI-2001, p. 174)

"Aristotle's 'happy life' is a *weighted equilibrium* of components that have different degrees of importance and dignity. A man realizes himself most fully if he gives the greatest play to the most worthy and laudable capacities he possesses." (NATALI-2001, p. 175)

"The life of politics - the central part of which was occupied, in the ancient world, by war - requires great courage, whereas the life of philosophy, as Aristotle says in the Politics, requires mainly justice and moderation, to prevent one from becoming arrogant. This confirms what was said above: the room allowed to the various ethical virtues depends on which virtuous activity it is that characterizes the bios." (NATALI-2001, p. 175)

END