Aristotle's De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays
Martha Craven Nussbaum
Princeton, 1978

(Note: The following passages come from Essay 5: "The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle's Explanation of Action".)

"We can never copy an object in all the ways it is; we are always representing it *as* something." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 227)

"[W]hat phainetai F to someone is, after all, what is seen by him *as* F. His phainomenon agathon is his view of the good. The phainomena are things in the world *as seen* (and reported) by human observers. This broad interest in how things appear to sentient beings seems to form the basis for Aristotle's more specialized discussions of envisaging and of the sort of awareness that leads to action, much as, in Ishiguro's account, the concept of 'seeing-as' is basic to the elucidation of the more specialized concepts of imagining and picturing." (NUSSBAUM-1978, pp. 231)

"Phantasia, along with aisthesis and nous (or dianoia), is a member of ... the 'distinction-making faculties' (kritika), which seem to do two jobs in connection with action: they present to the animal some object of desire and they present the concrete situation *as* an example of what is or is not desired." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 232)

"EN V, 1130a12 tells us that arete is the name of the virtuous disposition simpliciter, dikaiosune its name in its aspect of relating to other human beings. This seems to suggest not that there are some activities of the disposition that are other-directed and some which are not, but rather that qua other-directed they have a different name and a different description. [fn28: ... At EN 1141b23ff., the statement that politike and phronesis are 'the same disposition' (he aute hexis) but not the same in einai is often interpreted to mean that politike is practical wisdom concerning one's dealings with other men, phronesis practical wisdom concerning the realization of one's own good. But read in the context of the chapter as a whole it seems to indicate, instead, just that phronesis and politike are the same virtue seen from different points of view, phronesis being the general name of the disposition, politike its name when we focus on its public consequences.]" (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 235) [PSA: cf. FOSSHEIM]

"Another potentially informative passage, DA II.2, 413b21ff., is too obscure to be decisive; on its most likely reading, it indicates that phantasia and aisthesis are indeed coextensive, but that phantasia has some particular connection with apprehending the object of desire." (NUSSBAUM-1978, pp. 236-237)

"At 431b2, Aristotle continues: 'The thinking creature, [fn32] therefore, thinks the forms in the phantasmata; and, since in these what is to be pursued and avoided is determined for it, it can be moved even without actual perception, when it is concerned with phantasmata.' [fn32: Hamlyn, in his commentary on this passage, argues persuasively that 'to noetikon' must be the creature, since it is the subject of the verb of motion.] .... phantasia, as in the MA, is said to present the noetic faculty with a 'form' (eidos) of its object, 'determined' as an object of pursuit or avoidance." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 239) [PSA: Reasoning similar to Hamlyn's could be applied to constructions like 'to orektikon'; also note the connection to deliberation as method of tranforming indeterminate goals into determinate resolutions for action.]

De Anima "III.8 makes a similar claim about all thinking: 'Since there is nothing that has a separate existence, it seems, apart from perceptible magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the perceptible forms, ... and for this reason unless one perceived things one would not learn or understand anything; and when one reflects, one must reflect simultaneously with a phantasma. For phantasmata are like aisthemata, only without matter.' (432a3-10)" (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 240) [PSA: It is nous / insight that enables the thinking creature to see the objects of thought *in* in the perceptible forms.]

Phantasia "is closely linked to the operations of desire and somehow presents the object of desire to the animal in such a way that it can be moved to action." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 240)

"Often when Aristotle uses phantasia and related words, the context makes no reference to imaging, and the words serve in a very general way to indicate Aristotle's interest in the way a scene looks to the living creature, what his awareness of it is, what he perceives it *as*. The following passages indicate how closely phantasia remains linked to phainetai, even in what, in the last example, seems to be a 'technical' context: EN 1114a32ff.: 'All men strive for the apparent good (phainomenon agathon): but no one is in control of the appearing (phantasia): the way the end appears (phainetai) to someone depends on what sort of a man he is.' EE 1235b25-29: 'Pleasure is desired, for it is an apparent good (phainomenon agathon). Some believe it is good; but to some it appears (phainetai) good, even if they do not believe it to be so - for phainetai and doxa are not in the same part of the soul.'" (NUSSBAUM-1978, pp. 244-245)

"A phantasia would seem to be a single, isolated impression, in contrast to doxa, which is based on experience and reflection. Thus EN VII (1147b2ff.) draws a contrast between following a phantasia of particulars and following a general belief. The Insomn. passage, though characteristically interpreted with reference to images, is quite comprehensible without them; it seems very similar to the EE statement. In both cases something in the world may appear a certain way to a creature, even while he holds an opposing belief about its nature." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 245)

Aristotle's "interest is in how an object or state of affairs registers with the creature, what content it has for him. If this is so, we will expect that for Aristotle to talk of a sensory phantasia would be to ascribe some (potentially motivating) content to the animal's perception, and that the animal who "phantasizes" will not just perceive an object, but perceive it *as* a thing of a certain sort, a thing that could become for him an object either of pursuit or avoidance." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 246) [PSA: This notion is perhaps not far from Gibson's concept of an affordance.]

With regard to shadow-pictures (skiagraphia) and dream-images (enupnia), Nussbaum notes: "'They are something,' says Aristotle (1024b23), 'but not what they give the impression of being (hon empoiei ten phantasian),' not what we see them as. We take the shadow picture for an animal, a dream situation for a real one. Even clearer is 1025a5 ff. A man, Aristotle observes, can be called 'false' if he often gives others a false impression, 'just as we call states of affairs false if they create a false phantasia.'" (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 247)

"The phantasia is just our interpretation of the data presented to us. It is an activity that may go wrong, and a clever hypocrite can delude us in words and deeds, so that he appears to us to be what he is not." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 248)

"In numerous contexts, then, in which he is analyzing problems of delusion, dreaming, and memory, Aristotle speaks of phantasia and phantasmata. But the evidence indicates that his basic interest is in how things in the world appear to living creatures, what the creatures see their objects *as*." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 255)

"The use of phantasia in action-contexts, and its broad connection with phainetai throughout Aristotle, suggested to us that phantasia is the faculty in virtue of which the animal sees his object as an object of a certain sort, so that we can say the perception has for him some potentially motivating content." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 255-256) [PSA: Another way to put this is that phantasia focuses on an object as an external mover.]

"The statement that aisthesis, but not phantasia, is always going on (428a8-9) might mean that we are always receiving various stimuli, but not always attending to them or perceiving them as anything in particular.... The statement that aisthesis is always accurate, but phantasia can be false (428a11-12) is more clearly helpful in that it emphasizes the mechanical, reproductive side of aisthesis in Aristotle's theory." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 256)

"Phantasia, or thought accompanied by phantasia, works by presenting the animal with the form or essence of its object, which has an effect like that of the object itself (701b19ff., 703b19ff.). The forms presented by phantasia were called the forms 'of the pleasant or painful' (701b21), or, equivalently, 'of that which produces the affections' (703b19-20). These remarks seem to imply that whereas in aisthesis the animal becomes just like the object, when phantasia is operative he becomes aware of the object as a thing of a certain sort. So far the evidence indicates that phantasia is a special kind of awareness of a perceptible object. But why is this special kind of awareness important? Our initial examination of some attempts to distinguish it from aisthesis proper indicates that it is because of the passive character of Aristotelian aisthesis that a further faculty is required to explain the agent's selective fastening on certain aspects of his environment." (NUSSBAUM-1978, pp. 257-258)

"But to be moved to action an animal has to become aware of something qua what-it-is-called; he has to see the man as a man, not just as pale. The forms said to be presented by phantasia were forms of the pleasant and the fearful, hence necessarily of the thing as a unitary object under some description, not just as an assortment of various perceptible characteristics. We are always passively receiving perceptual stimuli, but when we actively focus on some object in our environment, separating it out from its context and seeing it as a certain thing, the faculty of phantasia, or the phantasia-aspect of aisthesis, is called into play." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 259)

"The claim that aisthesis and phantasia are 'the same faculty' now amounts to the contention that reception and interpretation are not separable, but thoroughly interdependent. There is no receptive 'innocent eye' in perception. How something phainetai to me is obviously bound up with my past, my prejudices, and my needs." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 261) [PSA: Here again the connection to affordances is relevant.]

"If phantasia is not opposed by judgment, and if the creature desires the object as presented by phantasia, he will, then, act accordingly. In the case of animals, there will seldom be opposition; they cannot weigh one phantasia against another, deliberate about which to pursue, or even correct one with the aid of judgment, so they generally just follow whatever presents itself to them as suitable. [fn64: Cf. EN 1150b28, 1147b4-5, and Metaph. 980b25-27, which denies that animals can acquire experience. DA 428a21-23 distinguishes phantasia from doxa by claiming that the latter requires the additional element of pistis, which other animals lack. (Pistis is conviction dependent on experience, relying on logos as well as perception - cf. Pol. 1322a32, 1326a26, Ph. 262a18, EE 1216b26, etc.)" (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 262)

"The workings of deliberative phantasia are explained in the following way: 'For whether he will do this or this is already the job of reasoning. And he must measure using a single criterion; for he seeks the greater good. So he is able to make one phantasmata out of many. (434a7-10) .... I would argue that the sense of the passage is, instead, the following: creatures with reason do not always, like animals, follow one phantasia after another, sporadically and without an overall plan. Animals can act only according to the awareness of the moment. Human beings can, however, look to the future and to past experience, deliberating and weighing one 'this' against another." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 263)

"[T]he activity of deliberative phantasia often can involve picturing, or at least some sort of envisaging. This is not an implausible thing to say. I have interpreted the passages speaking only of 'appearing' in order to show that coherent sense can be made of them without invoking pictorial images, a sense that seems to tie them more closely to what I have argued is Aristotle's basic intuition in constructing a theory of awareness." (NUSSBAUM-1978, pp. 264-265)

"Aristotle insists in both DA III.9 and MA 6-7 that thinking by itself is insufficient to lead to action. The object of thought must be present to the animal's awareness as an object of desire before he will move towards it. It is, as we argued, through phantasia that a perceptible object is seen as an object under a certain formal description. Only once phantasia has endowed the object of perception with a formal content can it become an object of pursuit or avoidance. This is what Aristotle seems to mean by saying that in the phantasmata what is to be pursued or avoid is determined (horistai) for the creature (431b2)." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 265) [PSA: Note the connection to theoria in action for humans.]

"The basic insight underlying the theory is the important one that perceptual reception is inseparable from interpretation - that we cannot explain an animal's perception of something as a distinct feature in his environment with reference only to a process of receiving or imprinting, but must refer also to his interpretive activity, the activity in virtue of which the scene appears a certain way to him. This activity, as Aristotle saw, is dependent not only on the creature's natural endowment, but also on its past and on its other present activities. As in science generally the philosopher must begin with and return to the phainomena (and not to some 'pure' or 'raw' data), so, in the explanation of action, he must begin not with received, unprocessed sensory material, but with the way the world looks to the particular creature, what it sees things *as*." (NUSSBAUM-1978, p. 266)

END