First Alcibiades
Plato
tr. Benjamin Jowett

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SOCRATES:

And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

ALCIBIADES:

That is all.

SOCRATES:

And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

ALCIBIADES:

I should not.

SOCRATES:

And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?

ALCIBIADES:

Certainly not.

SOCRATES:

Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?

ALCIBIADES:

Certainly.

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SOCRATES:

But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?

ALCIBIADES:

I fear that you are right.

SOCRATES:

And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, Pericles.

ALCIBIADES:

Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.

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SOCRATES:

And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?

ALCIBIADES:

I should think so.

....

SOCRATES:

And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?

ALCIBIADES:

I cannot say.

SOCRATES:

At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?

ALCIBIADES:

True.

....

SOCRATES:

And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves?

ALCIBIADES:

Impossible.

SOCRATES:

And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

ALCIBIADES:

At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.

SOCRATES:

But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.

ALCIBIADES:

That is true.

SOCRATES:

Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.

ALCIBIADES:

You say truly.

....

SOCRATES:

Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?

ALCIBIADES:

That appears to be true.

SOCRATES:

He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?

ALCIBIADES:

That is true.

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SOCRATES:

The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.

ALCIBIADES:

What caution?

SOCRATES:

Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way.

ALCIBIADES:

Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.

SOCRATES:

Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.

ALCIBIADES:

That is true.

SOCRATES:

And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?

ALCIBIADES:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?

ALCIBIADES:

Very good.

SOCRATES:

But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul? — For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?

ALCIBIADES:

What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

SOCRATES:

I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.

ALCIBIADES:

What do you mean?

SOCRATES:

Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be: — That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?

ALCIBIADES:

Clearly.

SOCRATES:

And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?

ALCIBIADES:

Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.

SOCRATES:

Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?

ALCIBIADES:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking?

ALCIBIADES:

That is quite true.

SOCRATES:

Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?

ALCIBIADES:

That is evident.

SOCRATES:

But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

ALCIBIADES:

Very true.

SOCRATES:

Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

ALCIBIADES:

True.

SOCRATES:

And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?

ALCIBIADES:

I agree, Socrates.

SOCRATES:

And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

ALCIBIADES:

There is none.

SOCRATES:

Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?

ALCIBIADES:

Clearly.

SOCRATES:

And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

ALCIBIADES:

True.

SOCRATES:

But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?

ALCIBIADES:

How can we, Socrates?

SOCRATES:

You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?

ALCIBIADES:

It would be quite impossible.

SOCRATES:

Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?

ALCIBIADES:

How could we?

SOCRATES:

And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?

ALCIBIADES:

Clearly not.

SOCRATES:

Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

ALCIBIADES:

So much may be supposed.

SOCRATES:

And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

ALCIBIADES:

Very true.

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END