Gorgias
Plato
tr. Benjamin Jowett

"POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest." (448c)

"SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them." (464b-465a)

"SOCRATES:

Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?

POLUS:

Clearly, the health.

SOCRATES:

And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business? — But they will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.

POLUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it." (467c-d)

"POLUS:

Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.

SOCRATES:

What events?

POLUS:

You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?

SOCRATES:

At any rate I hear that he is.

POLUS:

And do you think that he is happy or miserable?

SOCRATES:

I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.

POLUS:

And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?

SOCRATES:

Most certainly not.

POLUS:

Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?

SOCRATES:

And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.

POLUS:

What! and does all happiness consist in this?

SOCRATES:

Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.

POLUS:

Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?

SOCRATES:

Yes, my friend, if he is wicked." (470c-e)

"SOCRATES:

Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst? — to do injustice or to suffer?

POLUS:

I should say that suffering was worst.

SOCRATES:

And which is the greater disgrace? — Answer.

POLUS:

To do.

SOCRATES:

And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

POLUS:

Certainly not.

SOCRATES:

I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?

POLUS:

Certainly not.

SOCRATES:

Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?" (474c-d)

"SOCRATES:

Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?

POLUS:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?

POLUS:

Very true.

SOCRATES:

And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.

POLUS:

To the physicians, Socrates.

SOCRATES:

And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?

POLUS:

To the judges, you mean.

SOCRATES:

— Who are to punish them?

POLUS:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?

POLUS:

Clearly.

SOCRATES:

Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?

POLUS:

That is evident.

SOCRATES:

Which, then, is the best of these three?

POLUS:

Will you enumerate them?

SOCRATES:

Money-making, medicine, and justice.

POLUS:

Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.

SOCRATES:

And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?

POLUS:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?

POLUS:

I think not.

SOCRATES:

A useful thing, then?

POLUS:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain — that you get well?

POLUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?

POLUS:

Clearly he who was never out of health.

SOCRATES:

Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.

POLUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil — which of them is the most miserable?" (477e-478d)

"SOCRATES:

That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?

POLUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut: — Is not that a parallel case?

POLUS:

Yes, truly.

SOCRATES:

He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?" (478e-479c)

"SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand: — is any other inference consistent with them?" (480a-b)

"SOCRATES:

But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?

CALLICLES:

I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul.

SOCRATES:

See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?

CALLICLES:

I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state — they ought to be the rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects.

SOCRATES:

But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?

CALLICLES:

What do you mean?

SOCRATES:

I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule others?

CALLICLES:

What do you mean by his 'ruling over himself'?

SOCRATES:

A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions." (491a-d)

"SOCRATES:

And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?

CALLICLES:

The latter follows from our previous admissions.

SOCRATES:

What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?

CALLICLES:

I suppose that you mean health and strength?

SOCRATES:

Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other.

CALLICLES:

Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?

SOCRATES:

Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. 'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not?

CALLICLES:

True.

SOCRATES:

And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly: — and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?

CALLICLES:

Granted.

SOCRATES:

And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree?" (504b-e)

"SOCRATES:

Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument: — Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?

CALLICLES:

Go on, my good fellow.

SOCRATES:

Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men; — for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding — the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry. — Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric — all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true." (505e-508c)

END