Philebus
Plato
tr. Benjamin Jowett

"SOCRATES:

Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides?

PROTARCHUS:

By all means.

SOCRATES:

Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?

PHILEBUS:

Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.

SOCRATES:

And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to you?

PROTARCHUS:

I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left the field.

SOCRATES:

Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be ascertained.

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Shall we further agree —

PROTARCHUS:

To what?

SOCRATES:

That you and I must now try to indicate some state and disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy.

PROTARCHUS:

Yes, by all means.

SOCRATES:

And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? Then both of us are vanquished — are we not? But if this life, which really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of wisdom.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated; — do you agree?

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

And what do you say, Philebus?

PHILEBUS:

I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

PROTARCHUS:

You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matter?

PHILEBUS:

True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so.

PROTARCHUS:

You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we will proceed with the argument.

SOCRATES:

Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS:

Very good.

SOCRATES:

The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human — it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance, — that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!" (11a-12b)

"SOCRATES:

And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one and also many (i.e., how they have one genus and many species), and are not at once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity (i.e. into the infinite number of individuals).

PROTARCHUS:

That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do: — Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.

SOCRATES:

Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.

PROTARCHUS:

That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered — No, not those, but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight against us in this way." (19a-e)

"SOCRATES:

Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in review.

PROTARCHUS:

How do you mean?

SOCRATES:

Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.

PROTARCHUS:

Impossible.

SOCRATES:

And will you help us to test these two lives?

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Then answer.

PROTARCHUS:

Ask.

SOCRATES:

Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly I should.

SOCRATES:

Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly not.

SOCRATES:

Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?

PROTARCHUS:

Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.

SOCRATES:

Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?

PROTARCHUS:

I should.

SOCRATES:

But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise?

PROTARCHUS:

No.

SOCRATES:

But is such a life eligible?

PROTARCHUS:

I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from me the power of speech.

SOCRATES:

We must keep up our spirits; — let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn.

PROTARCHUS:

And what is this life of mind?

SOCRATES:

I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?

PROTARCHUS:

Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.

SOCRATES:

What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?

PROTARCHUS:

Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

SOCRATES:

Yes, that is the life which I mean.

PROTARCHUS:

There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.

SOCRATES:

But do you see the consequence?

PROTARCHUS:

To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.

SOCRATES:

Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity." (20d-22b)

"SOCRATES:

I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,' 'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set upon them — do you remember?

PROTARCHUS:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure — all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited or finite; what do you say?" (24e-25b)

"SOCRATES:

I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.

PROTARCHUS:

That is very probable.

SOCRATES:

And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.

PROTARCHUS:

I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?

SOCRATES:

Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration?

PROTARCHUS:

What phenomena do you mean?

SOCRATES:

Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?

PROTARCHUS:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.

PROTARCHUS:

Very true.

SOCRATES:

And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?

PROTARCHUS:

Granted; what you say has a general truth.

SOCRATES:

Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?

PROTARCHUS:

Good.

SOCRATES:

Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.

PROTARCHUS:

Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.

SOCRATES:

Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.

PROTARCHUS:

You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue.

SOCRATES:

Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?" (31d-32e)

"SOCRATES:

And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures.

PROTARCHUS:

They are.

SOCRATES:

The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?

PROTARCHUS:

Doubtless.

SOCRATES:

Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar character?

PROTARCHUS:

There are.

SOCRATES:

And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future?

PROTARCHUS:

Quite true.

SOCRATES:

And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right?

PROTARCHUS:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?

PROTARCHUS:

How do you mean?

SOCRATES:

I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist." (40b-d)

"SOCRATES:

We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?

PROTARCHUS:

I should say as you do that there are three of them.

SOCRATES:

But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with pleasure.

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly not.

SOCRATES:

Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to mean by that statement?

PROTARCHUS:

I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.

SOCRATES:

Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third which is neither.

PROTARCHUS:

Very good.

SOCRATES:

Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?

PROTARCHUS:

Impossible.

SOCRATES:

No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful." (43c-e)

"SOCRATES:

The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi.

PROTARCHUS:

You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.'

SOCRATES:

I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.'

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.

PROTARCHUS:

Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.

SOCRATES:

Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?

PROTARCHUS:

Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will.

SOCRATES:

Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?

PROTARCHUS:

What are they?

SOCRATES:

In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is.

PROTARCHUS:

Yes, that is a very common error.

SOCRATES:

And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really has not.

PROTARCHUS:

Of course.

SOCRATES:

And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are.

PROTARCHUS:

Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.

SOCRATES:

And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom?

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?" (48c-49a)

"SOCRATES:

Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order.

PROTARCHUS:

Excellent.

SOCRATES:

These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind.

PROTARCHUS:

Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true?

SOCRATES:

True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.

PROTARCHUS:

Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.

SOCRATES:

My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?

PROTARCHUS:

I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning clearer.

SOCRATES:

When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.

PROTARCHUS:

Yes, there are such pleasures.

SOCRATES:

The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.

PROTARCHUS:

I understand.

SOCRATES:

To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them." (50e-52a)

"SOCRATES:

I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of something.

PROTARCHUS:

What manner of natures are they?

SOCRATES:

The one majestic ever, the other inferior.

PROTARCHUS:

You speak riddles.

SOCRATES:

You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them.

PROTARCHUS:

I should think so.

SOCRATES:

Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and are present everywhere.

PROTARCHUS:

Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates.

SOCRATES:

There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class subserve (absolutes).

PROTARCHUS:

Your many repetitions make me slow to understand.

SOCRATES:

As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning will become clearer.

PROTARCHUS:

Very likely.

SOCRATES:

Here are two new principles.

PROTARCHUS:

What are they?

SOCRATES:

One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence.

PROTARCHUS:

I readily accept from you both generation and essence.

SOCRATES:

Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?

PROTARCHUS:

You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?

SOCRATES:

Yes.

PROTARCHUS:

By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.

SOCRATES:

I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question.

PROTARCHUS:

Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?

SOCRATES:

I have no objection, but you must take your part.

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence.

PROTARCHUS:

Assuredly.

SOCRATES:

Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake of some essence?

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

And that for the sake of which something else is done must be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of something else, in some other class, my good friend.

PROTARCHUS:

Most certainly.

SOCRATES:

Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?

PROTARCHUS:

Quite right.

SOCRATES:

Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.

PROTARCHUS:

Assuredly.

SOCRATES:

And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest end.

PROTARCHUS:

Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?

SOCRATES:

I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be mentioned.

PROTARCHUS:

That is certainly what they appear to think.

SOCRATES:

And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought." (53d-55a)

"SOCRATES:

Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a little whiteness, if that little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher claims." (58b-d)

"SOCRATES:

And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first only the true ones.

PROTARCHUS:

It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones first.

SOCRATES:

Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?

PROTARCHUS:

Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to mingle.

SOCRATES:

The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all mingle?

PROTARCHUS:

What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?

SOCRATES:

Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom to answer for themselves.

PROTARCHUS:

How?

SOCRATES:

Tell us, O beloved — shall we call you pleasures or by some other name? — would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows:

PROTARCHUS:

How?

SOCRATES:

They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves in every respect.

PROTARCHUS:

And our answer will be: — In that ye have spoken well.

SOCRATES:

Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will reply: — 'What pleasures do you mean?'

PROTARCHUS:

Likely enough.

SOCRATES:

And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her about wherever she goes, — mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of sense in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good — there would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup.' — Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion?

PROTARCHUS:

Most certainly.

SOCRATES:

And still there must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every mixture.

PROTARCHUS:

What is that?

SOCRATES:

Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist.

PROTARCHUS:

Impossible.

SOCRATES:

Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.

PROTARCHUS:

I agree with you, Socrates.

SOCRATES:

And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good?

PROTARCHUS:

I think that we are.

SOCRATES:

What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind.

PROTARCHUS:

Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge.

SOCRATES:

And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.

PROTARCHUS:

What do you mean?

SOCRATES:

Every man knows it.

PROTARCHUS:

What?

SOCRATES:

He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which brings confusion on the possessor of it.

PROTARCHUS:

Most true.

SOCRATES:

And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture.

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them.

PROTARCHUS:

Quite right.

SOCRATES:

And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable among gods and men.

PROTARCHUS:

Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end.

SOCRATES:

We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most akin.

PROTARCHUS:

You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?

SOCRATES:

Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself — as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.

PROTARCHUS:

There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most like truth, and the truest.

SOCRATES:

Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?

PROTARCHUS:

Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge.

SOCRATES:

Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?

PROTARCHUS:

No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, present, or future.

SOCRATES:

Right.

PROTARCHUS:

But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day.

SOCRATES:

Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature has been found.

PROTARCHUS:

Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said.

SOCRATES:

In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright.

PROTARCHUS:

I dare say.

SOCRATES:

And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul — sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is.

PROTARCHUS:

Surely.

SOCRATES:

The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses.

PROTARCHUS:

Perhaps.

SOCRATES:

And now, as Orpheus says,

'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.'
Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set the crown on our discourse.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus.

PROTARCHUS:

How?

SOCRATES:

Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the good.

PROTARCHUS:

I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant a recapitulation.

SOCRATES:

Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

But, suspecting that there were other things which were also better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first.

PROTARCHUS:

You did.

SOCRATES:

Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the unsatisfactory nature of both of them.

PROTARCHUS:

Very true.

SOCRATES:

The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection.

PROTARCHUS:

Most true.

SOCRATES:

But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure.

PROTARCHUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

And, according to the judgment which has now been given, pleasure will rank fifth.

PROTARCHUS:

True.

SOCRATES:

But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so; — although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy.

PROTARCHUS:

And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.

SOCRATES:

And will you not set me free?

PROTARCHUS:

There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from the argument..." (62e-67b)

END