Sophist
Plato
tr. Benjamin Jowett

"THEODORUS:

Nay, Socrates, he is not one of the disputatious sort — he is too good for that. And, in my opinion, he is not a god at all; but divine he certainly is, for this is a title which I should give to all philosophers.

SOCRATES:

Capital, my friend! and I may add that they are almost as hard to be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, and such as are not merely made up for the occasion, appear in various forms unrecognized by the ignorance of men, and they 'hover about cities,' as Homer declares, looking from above upon human life; and some think nothing of them, and others can never think enough; and sometimes they appear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists; and then, again, to many they seem to be no better than madmen." (216b-c)

"STRANGER:

But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and who baits his hook only with pleasure and exacts nothing but his maintenance in return, we should all, if I am not mistaken, describe as possessing flattery or an art of making things pleasant.

THEAETETUS:

Certainly.

STRANGER:

And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only for the sake of virtue, and demands a reward in the shape of money, may be fairly called by another name?

THEAETETUS:

To be sure.

STRANGER:

And what is the name? Will you tell me?

THEAETETUS:

It is obvious enough; for I believe that we have discovered the Sophist: which is, as I conceive, the proper name for the class described.

STRANGER:

Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the appropriative, acquisitive family — which hunts animals, — living — land — tame animals; which hunts man, — privately — for hire, — taking money in exchange — having the semblance of education; and this is termed Sophistry, and is a hunt after young men of wealth and rank — such is the conclusion." (222e-223b)

"STRANGER:

Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?

THEAETETUS:

Certainly.

STRANGER:

The latter should have two names, — one descriptive of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of knowledge.

THEAETETUS:

Of course.

STRANGER:

The name of art-seller corresponds well enough to the latter; but you must try and tell me the name of the other.

THEAETETUS:

He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking; no other name can possibly be right.

STRANGER:

No other; and so this trader in virtue again turns out to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced from the art of acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue.

THEAETETUS:

Quite true.

STRANGER:

And there may be a third reappearance of him; — for he may have settled down in a city, and may fabricate as well as buy these same wares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a Sophist?

THEAETETUS:

Certainly.

STRANGER:

Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells the knowledge of virtue, you would again term Sophistry?

THEAETETUS:

I must, if I am to keep pace with the argument.

STRANGER:

Let us consider once more whether there may not be yet another aspect of sophistry." (224b-e)

"STRANGER:

I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is far from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may be fairly termed loquacity: such is my opinion.

THEAETETUS:

That is the common name for it.

STRANGER:

But now who the other is, who makes money out of private disputation, it is your turn to say.

THEAETETUS:

There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time." (225d-226a)

"STRANGER: When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect." (229c)

"STRANGER:

But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good —

THEAETETUS:

There they are quite right.

STRANGER:

Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way.

THEAETETUS:

In what way?

STRANGER:

They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

THEAETETUS:

That is certainly the best and wisest state of mind.

STRANGER:

For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful state of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest." (230a-e)

"STRANGER:

But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?

THEAETETUS:

That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.

STRANGER:

And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?

THEAETETUS:

But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children's play?

STRANGER:

Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics." (234d-235b)

"STRANGER:

The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.

THEAETETUS:

How do you mean? And where does the danger lie?

STRANGER:

When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think falsely, or what do we mean?" (240c-d)

"STRANGER:

And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the help of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all things; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes, which make them possible?

THEAETETUS:

To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences.

STRANGER:

How are we to call it? By Zeus, have we not lighted unwittingly upon our free and noble science, and in looking for the Sophist have we not entertained the philosopher unawares?

THEAETETUS:

What do you mean?

STRANGER:

Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?

THEAETETUS:

That is what we should say.

STRANGER:

Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.

THEAETETUS:

Quite true.

STRANGER:

And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?

THEAETETUS:

Who but he can be worthy?

STRANGER:

In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.

THEAETETUS:

For what reason?

STRANGER:

Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?

THEAETETUS:

It seems to be so.

STRANGER:

And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine." (253b-254b)

"STRANGER:

For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all existences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an educated or philosophical mind.

THEAETETUS:

Why so?

STRANGER:

The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reasoning; for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attain to discourse of reason.

THEAETETUS:

True.

STRANGER:

And, observe that we were only just in time in making a resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

THEAETETUS:

Why so?

STRANGER:

Why, that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of being; for if we could not, the worst of all consequences would follow; we should have no philosophy. Moreover, the necessity for determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; if utterly deprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and deprived of it we should be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.

THEAETETUS:

Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we must determine the nature of discourse.

STRANGER:

Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.

THEAETETUS:

What explanation?

STRANGER:

Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many classes diffused over all being.

THEAETETUS:

True.

STRANGER:

And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with opinion and language.

THEAETETUS:

How so?

STRANGER:

If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say what is not — is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.

THEAETETUS:

That is quite true.

STRANGER:

And where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit.

THEAETETUS:

Yes.

STRANGER:

And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols and images and fancies.

THEAETETUS:

To be sure.

STRANGER:

Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being.

THEAETETUS:

True.

STRANGER:

And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will probably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out the connexion of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class." (259d-260e)

"STRANGER:

We divided image-making into two sorts; the one likeness-making, the other imaginative or phantastic.

THEAETETUS:

True.

STRANGER:

And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place the Sophist.

THEAETETUS:

We did say so.

STRANGER:

And our heads began to go round more and more when it was asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance, because in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as falsehood.

THEAETETUS:

True.

STRANGER:

And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise.

THEAETETUS:

Quite possible.

STRANGER:

And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art?

THEAETETUS:

Yes." (264c-d)

"STRANGER:

And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed?

THEAETETUS:

Yes, that is very common.

STRANGER:

And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true?

THEAETETUS:

The very opposite.

STRANGER:

Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator — to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows?

THEAETETUS:

True.

STRANGER:

Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance — that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation.

THEAETETUS:

Granted.

STRANGER:

The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.

THEAETETUS:

Very true.

STRANGER:

Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see whether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still some crack in him.

THEAETETUS:

Let us examine him.

STRANGER:

Indeed there is a very considerable crack; for if you look, you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple creature, who thinks that he knows that which he only fancies; the other sort has knocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.

THEAETETUS:

There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.

STRANGER:

Shall we regard one as the simple imitator — the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator?

THEAETETUS:

Very good.

STRANGER:

And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two divisions?

THEAETETUS:

Answer yourself.

STRANGER:

Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two; there is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech, and the dissembler, who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself.

THEAETETUS:

What you say is most true.

STRANGER:

And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the statesman or the popular orator?

THEAETETUS:

The latter.

STRANGER:

And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?

THEAETETUS:

The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word sophos. What shall we name him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist.

STRANGER:

Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his genealogy to the other?

THEAETETUS:

By all means.

STRANGER:

He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows — who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class of phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine — any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth.

THEAETETUS:

Undoubtedly." (267c-268d)

END