Statesman
Plato
tr. Benjamin Jowett

"STRANGER:

Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

How can they be made?

STRANGER:

First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian or manager.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

True.

STRANGER:

And the art of management which is assigned to man would again have to be subdivided.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

On what principle?

STRANGER:

On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Why?

STRANGER:

Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are utterly distinct, like their modes of government.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

True.

STRANGER:

Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Certainly.

STRANGER:

And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true king and statesman?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account of the Statesman." (276c-277a)

"STRANGER:

If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

True.

STRANGER:

And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Certainly.

STRANGER:

But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for the royal science will be impossible.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Very true.

STRANGER:

Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.

STRANGER:

But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort —

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

What?

STRANGER:

That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

True; and what is the next step?

STRANGER:

The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes." (284a-e)

"SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange vision.

STRANGER:

Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and just now I myself fell into this mistake — at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Who is he?

STRANGER:

The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry." (291b-c)

"STRANGER:

Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Of course not.

STRANGER:

But the law is always striving to make one; — like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked — not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded for some one.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner which you describe.

STRANGER:

A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of simple.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

True.

STRANGER:

Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be investigated.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Certainly.

STRANGER:

Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic contests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men compete in running, wrestling, and the like?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Yes; they are very common among us.

STRANGER:

And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you remember?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

To what do you refer?

STRANGER:

The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and to prescribe generally the regimen which will benefit the majority.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Very true.

STRANGER:

And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may be.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

True.

STRANGER:

And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular case." (294a-295a)

"SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

He who is willing to take a command under such conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.

STRANGER:

Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy prating sophist; — further, on the ground that he is a corrupter of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written law, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising motion, — I say, if all these things were done in this way according to written regulations, and not according to art, what would be the result?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable." (299b-e)

"STRANGER:

You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

How?

STRANGER:

We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

True.

STRANGER:

And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

To be sure.

STRANGER:

And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

How do you mean?

STRANGER:

We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Very true.

STRANGER:

But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, the names of either are changed into terms of censure.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

How so?

STRANGER:

Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

In what respect?

STRANGER:

In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to either class of actions they distribute praise and blame, — praise to the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite party — and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them." (306e-307d)

"STRANGER:

The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof — these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following manner.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

In what manner?

STRANGER:

First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal nature, and binds that with human cords.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

I do not understand what you mean.

STRANGER:

The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Yes; what else should it be?

STRANGER:

Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Likely enough.

STRANGER:

But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names which are the subject of the present enquiry.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Very right.

STRANGER:

The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Certainly.

STRANGER:

And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Quite true.

STRANGER:

Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Impossible.

STRANGER:

But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who have been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say that union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest?

SOCRATES THE YOUNGER:

Very true." (309b-301a)

"STRANGER:

It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion about the honourable and good; — indeed, in this single work, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised — never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State." (310e)

END