Dialectic and Philosophy in Aristotle
C.D.C. Reeve
In Gentzler, ed., Method in Ancient Philosophy
Oxford, 1998

"[T]he class of endoxa the aporematic philosopher considers will be broader than the class available to the dialectician, who is limited to employing endoxa that an answerer can reasonable be expected to accept. By the same token, when (F) tells us that dialectic has a road towards first principles because it examines (exetastike), it could be referring to dialectical examination of some sort or to philosophical examination. And, in fact, Aristotle uses the verb 'exetazein' to apply to both sorts of activities. In the opening sentence of the Rhetoric, for example, it refers to dialectical questioning or examining in general: 'everyone attempts either to examine (exetazein) propositions or maintain (hupechein) them' (1354a4-5). At NE 1095a28 and EE 1251a6, on the other hand, it refers to a philosopher's examination of various views, popular as well as expert, on the nature of happiness." (REEVE-1998, page unknown)

Discussing Topics 163b15-16, Reeve states: "This strongly suggests that the sort of euphuia at issue is the sort referred to in the following passage of the Nicomachean Ethics: 'A person doesn't aim at the end through his own choice; rather, he must by nature have a sort of natural eye to make him judge (krinei) well and choose what is really good. Whoever by nature has this eye in good condition has a good nature (euphues). For it is the greatest and finest thing ... and when it is naturally good and fine, that is true and complete good nature (euphuia).' (1114b5-12) Thus, having euphuia is in large part a matter of having a correct conception of the end - of the human good. (1114a31-b1) Part of the passage from the Metaphysics cited earlier underwrites this somewhat surprising result. It tells us that 'philosophy ... differs from sophistic in its decision (proairesei) about how to live' (1004b23-25). But we know that a decision is a deliberative desire that 'accords with wish' (NE 1113a9-14) and 'requires a state of character' (1139a35). And both these features connect decision, and so philosophy, with the human good." (REEVE-1998, p. 251)