The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue
Nancy Sherman
Clarendon, 1989

"[T]he orthos logos remains always much closer to the particulars: a way of 'improvising' and 'conjecturing' (stochazomai) given experience and what is now at hand (1141b13; cf 1142a33ff, 1109a24). (Thus, stochazomai means both to aim and shoot at a target and to proceed by informed guessing and conjecture.)" (SHERMAN, p. 25)

"Aristotle introduces the problem of self-knowledge in NE II and again in the later books on friendship, especially IX.9. In II.4 he insists that to act from virtue is necessarily to act knowingly, for the right reasons (1105a31) where this means consciously (eidos) choosing to do what is virtuous for its own sake (1105a32), i.e. because it is fine." (SHERMAN, p. 27) [PSA: this is connected with activity 'meta logou']

"Virtue and practical wisdom require a reflective grasp (hupolepsis) of the right ends, and a confidence that actions have in fact been guided by them. Being aware of what sort of person one is (1147a5, DA 433a18-20) and the degree to which one exhibits avowed ends is part of critically reflective choice." (SHERMAN, p. 27)

"At NE 1114b1ff Aristotle asserts that the ends of action correspond to character, 'for we ourselves are somehow part causes [sunaitioi] of our states of character, and in being persons of a certain kind we posit the end to be so and so ...' (1114b24). But he also asserts that how an end appears also corresponds to character: 'Someone might say that everyone aims at the apparent good, but does not control its appearance; but the end appears to each person in a way that corresponds to his character. For if each person is somehow responsible for his own state of character, he will also be himself somehow responsible for its [viz., the end's] appearance [phantasia]. (1114b1-3; cf. 1114b17)" (SHERMAN, p. 32)

"[A] character, for Aristotle, produces plans that express an overall unity of ends in life. Such planning is carried out by the deliverative capacities and by a capacity to make reasoned choices, or prohairesis. These choices involve the assessment of actions as they cohere within some overall system of good living as well as the arrangement and revision of ends within that system. In so far as they are about long-term ends, prohairetic choices are often future indexed." (SHERMAN, pp. 57-58) [PSA: although it's unclear to me where Aristotle talks specifically about "life plans", if the complete good is the highest good achievable in action, i.e., the best life, then Sherman's basic point holds.]

"Although on some occasions Aristotle does refer to prohairetic intention as a hybrid - a deliberative desire and a desiderative belief (NE 1139b5, EE 1226b18) - his more careful explication at EE 1227a3-5 follows the lines of the practical syllogism: prohairesis is itself neither intrinsically belief nor desire, but a product derived from both through reasoning: 'It is clear that prohairesis is neither unqualifiedly wish nor belief, but both wish and belief when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation' (cf. EE 1226b9)." (SHERMAN, p. 67)

"[T]he agent must merely believe that it *could* come about through one's agency, not that it necessarily will. To believe that an action is within one's power and practicable is thus consistent with having doubts about one's success in bringing it about. Depending upon the difficulty of the task at hand or the skill involved, confidence may vary." (SHERMAN, p. 67)

"For Aristotle, rationality requires that agents think of themselves as connected with the future (DA 433b8), as persisting over time, and as making decisions which motivate, whether they act upon them now or later." (SHERMAN, p. 75)

"The etymology of Aristotle's technical word prohairesis underlines the notion of preference. Literally, it means 'choosing over' or 'choosing before', i.e., preferring, and Aristotle exploits this meaning. So at EE 1226b7-16 Aristotle says: 'Prohairesis is a taking, but not taking simply, but taking one thing over another ... deliberating about what is better or worse.'" (SHERMAN, p. 80)

"Given the effect of prohairesis on bouletic desires, these desires will, in the ideal agent, come to reflect an ordered sense of character. They will be ends 'thought to be good' within an overall conception of good living. We might think of them as stable and integrated policies within a reflective life. [fn35: So rational wishes are for what is 'noble and pleasant' as they appear 'to each character' (kath' hekasten hexin) (NE 1113a31). See EE 1223b8, 1223b33; cf. Politics 1253a14.]" (SHERMAN, p. 81)

"In several places, Aristotle stipulates that prohairetic choices must issue from an actual process of deliberation (bouleusis) (1113a5, EE 1226b12). But it would be unnecessarily restrictive to require that all prohaireseis be generated in this way." (SHERMAN, p. 82)

"As Aristotle himself says at 1151a17, habituation *teaches*, is an instructor (didaskalikos) of right opinion about first principles, which suggests that teaching need not be narrowly construed as a method appropriate only to the purely intellectual part (cf. 1103a15). Acquiring virtue is not a mindless process." (SHERMAN, p. 88)

"At 1140a28 Aristotle says that practical wisdom is about what contributes to the whole of good living (to eu zen holos), and not merely its parts.... He continues this thought at 1142b30, suggesting that we distinguish between excellence of deliberation in the unqualified sense 'which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense' (pros to telos to haplos; i.e. the final good or happiness for a human being) and a more qualified excellence which is 'relative to a more limited end' (pros ti telos)." (SHERMAN, pp. 88-89)

"At 1140b9 Aristotle says that we think certain individuals are practically wise men, like Pericles, 'because they can study [theorein] what is good for themselves and what is good for human beings in general'. He says again at 1140b13-20 that the practically wise, unlike the base, recognize and preserve the ends of good living, that is, the principles (archai: 1140b16, 1140b18) for the sake of which we choose and act. The emphasis on ends is explicit. The use of theorein at 1140b10 need not detract from the deliberative mode of their grasp. The word can be rendered as 'see' (as in the revised Oxford translation), but also, as I have preferred to render it, as 'study', or comparably 'consider' or 'investigate'. This rendering gives the word an active sense, and reinforces the notion of deliberation (at 1112b23 and 1142a31ff) as inquiry and investigation (zetesis)." (SHERMAN, p. 90)

"[W]hat is divine in us, namely the life according to reason ... is not the whole of us. 'This reason', he says, 'is what is *most of all*, or what is *especially* [malista] a human being (1178a8). But, as David Keyt pointedly notes, 'To be most of all man is to be less than, and nonidentical with, man'. The force of malista is thus to suggest that the identification of self with theoretical reason is at best qualified. It is not exclusively us, nor its activity exclusively our happiness." (SHERMAN, pp. 100-101)

Citing EE 1214b7ff and 1226b31, Sherman notes: "Aristotle says that to fail to arrange one's life with regard to ends is a sign of foolishness. The word for foolishness is telling. It is aphrosune - lacking in reason; it suggests a contrast with sophrosune - literally, preserving reason or soundness of mind (though more commonly, temperance). The term is used by ancient writers to convey an overall sense of self, and in Plato's Charmides it is explicitly linked to aidos or a sense of shame. Aristotle may be relying on the contrast here, suggesting that if living without prohairesis is foolishness, then living with prohairesis comes from a sense of self and purpose." (SHERMAN, pp. 106-107)

"[T]he akolastos ... on Aristotle's view, typically sets ends that indulge the appetites. His end, says Aristotle, is 'always to satisfy the present pleasure' (1146b24).... As such, the goals of this life seem to compromise what is minimally necessary for character coherence. In this vein, although Aristotle says the akolastos act prohairetically and 'with conviction', the fact that he 'chooses' (prohairoumenos) the bestial 'life of dumb grazing' suggests that prohairetic capacities will inevitably be affected by the very content of the end chosen." (SHERMAN, pp. 108-109)

"We might say that living amongst friends is a general, though substantive, way of specifying the formal criterion of happiness as a mode of activity (energeia, 1098a8, 1098a16). [fn15: Aristotle also suggests (at 1097b7-12) that it is a substantive way of interpreting the self-sufficiency criterion of NE I.7.] Just as it would be absurd to call a person happy who slept away his life (1099a1-6), so too it would be absurd to think that the person who lacked friends could be happy (1155a5-6, 1169b8-10, 1169b16-17). These endoxa seem to be deeply rooted in our nature, and not unrelated to each other, as Aristotle goes on to argue. For if sustained excellent activity is a basic aspect of our happiness, then a most basic way of sustaining and making more continuous our activity is through a life in companionship with others (1170a5-9; cf. 1177a22). Even when the activity is contemplation, the pursuit is better sustained when it is a co-operative enterprise (1177a34)." (SHERMAN, p. 127)

"At 1236b3-6, he argues that the best sort of friendship among relatively virtuous adults (i.e. character friendship) displays not only the acknowledged reciprocation of affection and goodwill, but the acknowledged reciprocation of a choice of one another: 'It is apparent from these things that the primary sort of friendship, that among good persons, requires mutual affection [antiphilia] and mutual choice [antiprohairesis] with regard to one another ... This friendship thus only occurs among humans, for they alone are conscious of reasoned choices [prohaireseis].' Again, at EE 1237a30ff, he makes a similar point: 'If the activity of friendship is a reciprocal choice, accompanied by pleasure, of the acquaintance of one another, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind is in general a reciprocal choice [antiprohairesis] of the things that are without qualification good and pleasant, because they are good and pleasant.' The significance of the claim rests on Aristotle's technical term, prohairesis.... [A] prohairesis is a reasoned choice that is expressive of a character and the overall ends of that character." (SHERMAN, p. 131)

"[I]n the Eudemian Ethics, ... he says that friends 'wish to share with each other in a joint life [suzen] the end which they are capable of attaining' (1245b8); they pursue together, to the degree which they can, the best good (to ariston) (1245a20-22). This involves not merely sharing space, or even casual discourse (1245a13-15), but sharing activity (sunergein, 1245b3).... Aristotle explains this sort of 'singleness of mind' (mia psuche, EE 1240b2, 1240b9-10) through notions of sympathy and empathy, and argues that these sentiments are heightened the more intimate the friendship.... In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle indicates that friends wish to express not merely sharing of grief (ou monon sullupeisthai), but empathy, 'feeling the same pain [alla kai ten auten lupen] (for example, when he is thirsty, sharing his thirst), if this were possible, and if not, what is closest to it' (1240a36-39)." (SHERMAN, p. 135)

"[T]he good life requires excellent activity (1098a8), but since perception or understanding is a defining characteristic of human life (1170a16), to live that life in its fullest sense (kurios) requires self-perception of that activity (1170a17-19). Moreover, the pleasure that is intrinsic to that excellent activity (and essential for the good life) is enhanced through the pleasure and good of an awareness of it (1170b1-3)." (SHERMAN, p. 143)

"[I]n Book I of the Politics Aristotle says that the child has a deliberative part (to bouleutikon), 'but in an undeveloped form' (ateles), 1260a13-14). And he continues: 'Since the child is undeveloped [ateles], it is clear that his virtue is not relative to himself, but relative to the fully developed individual, and the one who is in authority over him' (1260a32-33). These remarks openly invite a developmental model in which the child is viewed not statically, but as in progress toward full humanity, on his way to some end." (SHERMAN, p. 161)

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