Senses of Being in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
May Sim
In Sim, ed., The Crossroads of Norm and Nature. Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

"Since the focal sense of substance or primary substance is form ... rather than form *and* matter in the Metaphysics, it follows that the highest human activity is also an activity of form rather than of form and matter; i.e., the highest human activity is contemplation, which is an activity of soul alone, rather than practical wisdom, which is an activity of soul and body. The contemplative activity of man's form is nonetheless in harmony with the activity of practical wisdom for Aristotle because the substance of man always already presupposes his matter. That is, just as metaphysical form presupposes the matter it informs, contemplation, which is the act of the human form, presupposes phronesis, which is the activity of form-and-matter." (SIM, p. 52)

"[T]he perfection of the two parts of the rational soul is not only the 'for the sake of which', the best of final end of such a being. We also see that the human virtues are already *in* the essence or form of the thing (200a14 'the that for the sake of which is in the definition' cf. 200b4-5, 10-11). Aristotle's view, then, is that every human being strives for the perfections of the two parts of the rational soul as long as nothing interferes (199a11, b18). This also explains why Aristotle thinks that we need to look to the best manifestation or actualization of the definitive parts of the human being in the good man to arrive at the definition of human beings (Politics 1254a36-37, NE 1166a12)." (SIM, p. 61)

"Another reason why contemplation is essential for phronesis is because this is the activity of the soul that allows us to get at unchangeable objects. Since the human essence is something unchangeable for Aristotle, noesis is also the activity that gets at our human essence." (SIM, p. 68)

END