Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue
Richard Sorabji
In Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics
University of California Press, 1980

"Where commentators have talked simply of *means* to an end, Aristotle uses a variety of terms.... [W]hen he says we choose [4] what is *pros* some goal, this need mean no more than we choose what is *related to* a goal. The word *pros* does not imply means.... [A]ccording to 3.3 we choose sometimes the means (*dia*) and sometimes the manner (*pos*) of doing something (1112b15; 30). It looks as if at b30 a difference is intended between means and manner parallel to that between choosing a tool and choosing how to use it. [fn4: Strictly, we consider (skopein 1112b16) and seek (zetein b28) these, and deliberate about (bouleuesthai peri b11-12) them. But this implies that we choose them, for we choose what is decided upon as a result of deliberation (ek tes boules krithen 1113a4, and see the other phrases at 1112a15; 1113a2; 10; 11-12).]" (SORABJI, p. 202) [PSA: this is similar to Schwartz's distinction between the problem of relevance and the problem of specificity.]

"[P]ractical wisdom is contrasted in 6.7 1141b16-21 with experience, because it involves perceiving what to do in particular cases in the light of knowledge of something more universal. Book 6, chapter 1, gives a vivid description. When you want to hit the mean, there is a mark (skopos) at which you must look (apoblepein) as you relax or tighten the string (1138b22-23). The mark at which the man of practical wisdom looks is, presumably, his conception of the best (to ariston), at which he is said to aim (1141b12-14) and from which his reasoning is said to start (1144a31-33). And this is further confirmed by 1094a23-24, which is talking of the knowledge of the highest good ... when it says that such knowledge will have a great influence on life, since, like archers who have a mark, we shall better hit what is right. The point from which the reasoning of practical wisdom starts is compared with the first premises of a theoretical science (EE II.11 1227b24-25; 28-30; NE VII.8 1151a16-17)." (SORABJI, p. 207)

"[V]ices destroy our conception of the good life while virtue preserves the conception (1140b11-20; 1144a34-b1; 1151a16-16 [sic CHECKTHIS]; cf. EE 1227b12-19).... [V]irtue involves not only a conception of the good life but also a desire for it, and it is the desire that "preserves" the conception.... [H]e is talking about what protects our general conception of the good life from distorting influences, and he assigns this task to the desire involved in moral virtue." (SORABJI, pp. 212-213) [PSA: love of "to kalon" as a form of moral ambition.]

"[H]abituation ... is not a mindless process.... [H]abituation involves assessing the situation and seeing what is called for. So habituation is intimately linked with ... intuitive perception (nous).... Nonetheless, habituation is concerned with desire as well as reason. The learner is habituated to like reacting in accordance with his intuitive perception of what is required. And as induction gives him an increasingly general conception of what is required, habituation makes him like that general ideal." (SORABJI, p. 216)

"What sort of things can be learned through teaching? The Nicomachean Ethics itself shows us. Among other things the pupil will get from Aristotle's lectures a fuller and clearer conception of the good life, and this conception will be grounded in a discussion of human nature." (SORABJI, p. 217)

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