Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship
Suzanne Stern-Gillet
Suny Press, 1995

"Aristotle views psychic unity as the result of a slow process of integration which is broadly co-extensive with the acquisition of moral virtue. Practical reason, in his outlook, constitutes the hub around which the self is formed, since it alone can effect the integration of the various psychic elements into a whole. Whenever it fails to do so, either through akrasia or vice, the individual remains unfree, a mere bunch of unstable elements and discordant parts." (STERN-GILLET, pp. 26-27) [PSA: cf. the Metaphysics on heaps]

"Aristotle assigns to nous the exercise of a regulating and predominating influence over the other elements in the human soul.... Only when nous is unimpeded in the discharge of this function can human beings, in Aristotle's outlook, be said to be 'at one' with themselves." (STERN-GILLET, p. 27) [PSA: on the regulating role of a conception of the complete good, see RICHARDSON-1992a, pp. 328-329]

"[I]n Aristotle's scheme of things the notion of 'self' appears to be an achievement word, since it denotes a state of equilibrium between the various parts of the soul and constitutes an ideal towards which we should strive but which we may not reach." (STERN-GILLET, p. 29) [PSA: on the self ss a product of reflection, see EN IX.4 and SPARSHOTT, p. 268]

"Most of us will not succeed in 'immortalizing' ourselves in the way indicated, and the moral life will have to be our chosen way of becoming a 'self'. It is upon success in that endeavour that the formation of virtue friendship depends, since the formation of *other* selves presupposes that selfhood has been achieved." (STERN-GILLET, p. 35) [PSA: note, however, that the ethical life is a prerequisite for the contemplative life.]

"Of the three kinds of friendship only the friendship of virtue ... establishes a relationship between whole persons, i.e., persons who have achieved the moral excellence required for being selves in Aristotle's normative sense." (STERN-GILLET, p. 39)

"[H]is doctrine of the general primacy of (actualizing) activity over process and passivity leads him to pronounce loving to be more choiceworthy [EE 1241a40] than being loved. [EE 1237a36ff; NE 1168a19-20] For this reason the activity of loving (to philein) appears to be 'the virtue of friends.' [NE 1159a34-35]" (STERN-GILLET, p. 41)

"[V]irtuous friendship actively involves, or at least presupposes, a number of the moral virtues analyzed in the Ethics ... justice ... courage ... temperance ... generosity ... Considerations such as the above must be taken to justify Aristotle's terse statement that friendship is not so much a moral virtue as an activity that involves moral virtue." (STERN-GILLET, p. 46) [PSA: because energeia is more valuable than hexis, the fact that philia is an activity makes it more valuable than the virtues.]

"[F]riendship plays a unique and crucial role in the actualization of moral agents.... [P]rimary frienship enables such agents to gain conscious awareness of their own individual moral excellence, or selfhood, since Aristotelian selfhood is a byword for virtue embodied." (STERN-GILLET, p. 51)

"Furthermore, involving as it does a number of moral virtues, primary friendship will, like them, presuppose an awareness of what constitutes the best good for a human being qua agent. [NE 1141b12-14] This universal is the prime cognitive object of 'practical wisdom' (phronesis), which Aristotle describes as the 'eye of the soul.' [NE 1144a29-30]" (STERN-GILLET, p. 52) [PSA: the complete good is the best life]

"The above Eudemian reasoning [EE VII.12] licenses two inferences. Firstly, the actualization brought about by primary friendship is of a high order since it is obtained through the apprehension of the highly determinate object constituted by moral virtue embodied. Secondly, in primary friendship, where each is both lover and loved, knower and known, the partners become 'other selves' to each other through the process of jointly apprehending and thus becoming their practical excellence or selfhood. Being the happiest and the best, [EE 1245b11] such friendship includes joint reflection [EE 1245b4] and the sharing of such ends as each is capable of attaining. [EE 1245b7-8]" (STERN-GILLET, p. 57) [PSA: (i) note the connection to the kalos, which is determinate (ii) civic friendship or brotherhood extends this model from lover and loved to ruler and ruled.]

"[P]hilautia in the commending sense, which signals the smooth operation of practical reason, *is* nothing less than virtue experienced by the virtuous from within." (STERN-GILLET, p. 82)

"[S]elf-love ... as the reflection of virtue is precisely the harmonization of the elements of the soul which results from a successful attempt to make them all friendly with each other." (STERN-GILLET, p. 83)

"Aristotle ... presents self-love as a reflection of the smooth operation of rational choice in the man of practical reason." (STERN-GILLET, p. 84)

"[T]he base [person] is as full of regret as the akratic, and thus, like him, he can never truly love himself ... Five considerations are brought to bear on the issue.... A. ... 'they are at odds with themselves, and like incontinent people, have an appetite for one thing and a wish for another' (1166b7-8) .... B. ... 'they do not choose things that seem good for them, but choose pleasant things that are actually harmful' (1166b8-10) .... C. ... 'they who have done terrible things hate and shun life because of their vice, and destroy themselves' (1166b11-13) ... The meaning of the phrase anairousin heautous ('they destroy themselves'), as used in the present context, is peculiarly Aristotelian; in the De Sophisticis Elenchis (176b36) it refers to self-contradiction. [PSA: cf. FLANNERY] .... D. ... 'vicious people seek others to pass their days with, and shun themselves. For when they are by themselves they remember many disagreeable actions' (1166b13ff) .... E. ... 'such a person does not share his own enjoyments and distresses. For his soul is in conflict ... so each part pulls in a different direction, as though they were tearing him apart' (1166b18-25)." (STERN-GILLET, pp. 91-92)

"Before the cumulative effect of wrongdoing had taken over his life, he could have resisted the promptings of his pleasure drive, made other choices, sought, and steadfastly abided to, a correct conception of the end of human life. Every akratic lapse progressively enfeebles not only the will but also the capacity for making and keeping to coherent long-term plans. [PSA: i.e., commitments] Ultimately, the decision-making agencies in the soul become harnessed to the pursuit of short-term, irresistable, and un-coordinated impulses. Thus akrasia may in the end deprive an agent of moral sagacity altogether." (STERN-GILLET, pp. 94-95)

"In Aristotle's brand of ethical objectivism the achievement of happiness (eudaimonia) is conditional upon desires and reason operating in harmony towards the realization of the human specific function (ergon). Failure in that respect cannot but lead to psychic strife (statis), and, in so far as the wicked [person] suffers from a divided self [PSA: or no self at all], he can properly be said to be his own worst enemy." (STERN-GILLET, p. 96)

"Not only does the apolaustic and appetitive life require the sacrifices of one current appetite in favour of another, but it also involves privileging the present self at the expense of the future self. (EE 1240b22)" (STERN-GILLET, p. 96) [PSA: see also IRWIN-1988, p. 338]

"[M]oral virtue ... generates a state of serene internal peace. While the wicked 'murders' his own personality (EE 1240b27), the virtuous person successfully effects the integration, within his psyche, of intellection, desires, and passions.... Insuring the continuity between his past, his present, and his future, he makes himself 'one and indivisible' (EE 1240b14) ... Thus building his own self, he nurtures his inner freedom (EN 1168a33) .... [T]he virtuous person's self-determination is as complete as humanly possible." (STERN-GILLET, p. 98)

"[T]he priority of love of self over that of others is rooted in definitional considerations as well as moral psychology. 'The defining features of friendship,' he writes, 'would seem to be derived from features of friendship towards oneself.' (EN 1166a1-2) As virtuous agents live in harmony with themselves (EN 1166a13) and delight in their own being, (EN 1166a17-25) in like manner are they in deep-rooted agreement with their primary friends and rejoice in their excellence." (STERN-GILLET, p. 100)

"To be motivated by the fine consists more generally in acting from the recognition of the appropriateness (EE 1249a9, Topics 145a22) of the act or the end itself." (STERN-GILLET, p. 107)

"Whenever the virtuous man strives to perform a fine action, it is not primarily in order to benefit others but because he correctly understands that the action is required by the circumstances and is consonant with the telos of human life." (STERN-GILLET, pp. 120-121)

"Aristotle approaches the problem of self-sufficiency or autarky (autarkeia) through his teleological conception of nature. A self-sufficient entity, he holds, is an entity whose essence is fully realized: '... what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.' (1256b32ff) .... Self-sufficiency, which in the first place characterizes the divinity, [EE 1244b7-10] can nevertheless also pertain to ends (eudaimonia, most notably [EE 1238a12, NE 1097b7-8]), types of life (the life of study [NE 1177a27-28]), as well as individuals (great-souled men [NE 1125a12], kings, [EN 1160b3-5] as well as lesser mortals) and, of course, states.... [S]elf-sufficiency accrues to individuals through the possession of goods both internal (i.e., goods of the soul and of the body) and external (e.g., good birth, friends, money, and honour) [Rhetoric 1360b26-28, NE 1099a31-b6, NE 1169b9-10]." (STERN-GILLET, pp. 124-125)

Aristotle's emphasis on self-knowledge as a benefit uniquely afforded by friendship should not be construed to mean that the virtuous person will choose and cultivate his friend *in order*, primarily, to gain noetic actualization." (STERN-GILLET, p. 141)

"Humans are so constituted that they require others actually to become what they essentially are, and virtuous agents are those who succeed in actualizing their nature to the fullest extent." (STERN-GILLET, p. 141)

END