Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation
Matthew D. Walker
Cambridge University Press, 2018

"Like 1097a7-8, which identified the human function as "activity of soul according to (kata) reason or not without reason," the function argument's conclusion at 1098a17-18 presents an ambiguous kata ("according to") + accusative construction, which is open to both *restrictive* and *directive* construals. On a restrictive reading of this kata, some activity of soul A is kata some virtue V only if a constitutes the exercise of V. On a directive reading, however, A is kata V if A constitutes the exercise of V *or* if A is directed by the exercise of V." (WALKER-2018, p. 19)

"[I]n EN VI.13, Aristotle apparently agrees with those who maintain that virtue is a state "according to correct reason", and so, by extention, "according to phronesis" (1144b23-25). Hence, all the ethical virtues (including, e.g., temperance) accord with phronesis. But they are not themselves kinds or instances of phronesis." (WALKER-2018, p. 20)

"[E]ven if Aristotle identifies "the best and most complete" virtue with one highest virtue to the exclusion of other virtues, nothing precludes a broad range of life-activity from constituting happiness - as long as that activity accords directively with the highest virtue." (WALKER-2018, pp. 20-21)

With regard to the epistemonikon vs. logistikon, Walker states: "EN VI.1 claims that "we contemplate" things whose principles do not admit of change with the scientific element, and "contemplate" things whose principles do admit of change with the calculative element (1139a6-8). [fn25: For similar uses of theorein, see EN VI.4, 1140a11; VI.5, 1140b8-10; VI.7, 1141a25.]" (WALKER-2018, p. 25)

"[W]hen Aristotle says that the exercise of sophia constitutes "complete happiness".... he could mean (2) that contemplation is the most complete of *the many* virtuous activities that compose our happiness. On reading (2), happiness includes other activities. Yet contemplation, as the exercise of "the best and most complete" virtue, would still be the most choiceworthy *element* of our happiness. [fn44: ... though one need not identify the most choiceworthy element of happiness as itself a bios]" (WALKER-2018, p. 34)

"For Aristotle, then, "the life according to intellect" [i.e., directed by nous] (1178a6-7) is happiest." (WALKER-2018, p. 35)

"[I]n a well-functioning soul, the authoritative function is not simply subserved by its subordinates, which receive no guidance in return. Instead, by guiding the lower functions, the authoritative function secures the biological analogue of the whole organism's common advantage. The authoritative function thereby constitutes part of, and is thereby primarily responsible for, a living system marked by wholeness, determinacy, good order, and functional integrity." (WALKER-2018, p. 70) [PSA: note that the first three of these qualities are aspects of to kalon]

"Organisms, then, imitate god by living, as far as possible, *as* the kinds of life-forms they are. They immortalize themselves in exercising their life-functions as actively as they can. Approximating the divine, therefore, is not some separate goal for, e.g., plants and animals, that somehow stands over and above, or in tension with, their living as such organisms. Instead, it just is their living *as* plants and animals - in a maximally complete, stable, self-maintaining way." (WALKER-2018, p. 75)

"Yet how well does Aristotle's account of the human good (specifically) cohere with his account of the good for living organisms (generically)? Nature does not work in vain when plants and animals possess and exercise their respective authoritative functions.... By contrast, theoria, the exercise of contemplative nous according to sophia, is a useless and - at first sight - strangely inert function. Contemplation apparently offers no active guidance for lower human life-functions. Indeed, one struggles to imagine how actively understanding the cosmos' divine and unchanging first principles and causes even could authoritatively guide such life-functions." (WALKER-2018, p. 80) [PSA: I note that it might not be that difficult to imagine if success at living depends on full understanding and continuous conceptual awareness of human nature and of the best and highest human potential.]

"[T]he 'nature does nothing in vain' principle requires that all of an organism's parts and powers conduce to an organism's living well. Therefore, contemplative nous, in conducing to happiness, should conduce, in part, to a complete life. So, contemplative nous should play some useful - actively guiding - role in human self-maintenance across time." (WALKER-2018, p. 86)

"When Aristotle advises contemplators to immortalize themselves "as far as possible," we should read this qualifier in relation to the similar qualifiers that Aristotle uses in DA II.4 and GA II.1 when he discusses the ways that plants and animals approximate the divine. Plants and animals, however, approximate the divine not by radically transcending their vegetative and perceptive modes of life (i.e., by living as something other than plants or animals). Instead, they accomplish this task by living their own proper modes of life in an intensified, self-maintaining way." (WALKER-2018, p. 94) [PSA: on intensification, see Topics 115a26-31 and JOHNSON, p. 205]

With regard to "such 'fine and serious things' as honor, gain, wealth, and victory (EN VII.4, 1147b30; cf. Rhetoric I.10, 1369a12-13; I.11, 1370b32-24)", Walker notes that "[a]ccording to Aristotle, such external goods establish conditions for the fullest exercise of the human function in at least two ways. (1) These items (such as wealth) partly constitute certain virtuous actions (such as generous giving) (EN I.8, 1099a32-b2). (2) These items establish the optimal background for our actions, a context conducive to our unimpeded agency." (WALKER-2018, p. 104)

"Hence, reason does not simply *repress* nonrational desires. Instead, when perfected, it allows their fulfillment within a measured limit. What conduces to, and is consistent with, a human being's persistence and full activity as a human being, I take it, constitutes these limits." (WALKER-2018, p. 111)

"Virtue, I suggest, allows one to pursue and enjoy, compatibly and compossibly, external goods that fulfill human needs.... Thus, virtue and virtuous action manifest proper order, symmetry, and boundedness - what Aristotle calls the kalon, i.e., the fine, the noble, or the beautiful. Virtue and virtuous action are for the sake of the kalon, I suggest, by displaying, and conducing to, the virtuous agent's harmonized soul, possession of external goods, and way of life.... Reason's authority establishes a harmonized, synergistic soul whose various powers are well-ordered for the good of the whole - i.e., for the persistence and exercise of a rational (ultimately contemplative) way of life." (WALKER-2018, pp. 113-114) [PSA: on harmony, see also STERN-GILLET, pp. 83, 96, 100]

"EN X.7 describes contemplative nous as "the authoritative and better" part of us (to kurion kai ameinon: 1178a3). For such nous "seems to rule and to lead the way and have in mind the fine and divine" (dokei archein kai hegesthai kai ennoian echein peri kalon kai theion: 1177a14-15).... The verb archein often signifies the power to direct and guide; and the appearance of hegesthai confirms this sense....given hegeisthai's ordinary connections, 1177a14-15 more naturally suggests that contemplative nous actively guides in some way." (WALKER-2018, pp. 124-125) [PSA: on eudaimonia as a regulative or guiding ideal, see RICHARDSON-1992a, pp. 328-329, 349-350]

"Metaphysics A.2 holds that the sophos' authoritativeness signals his wisdom. The theoretically wise person qua wise is capable of *ordering*; he properly rules, not obeys (982a17-19). By analogy, sophia is the most sovereign kind of understanding, for it grasps to what end each thing should be done (gnorizousa tinos eneken esti prakteon ekaston: 982b5-6). The theoretically wise person knows the good of each thing, since the good is one of the primary causes (982b4-10). So, Aristotle apparently thinks that contemplation can authoritatively guide one's action in light of a certain *understanding* of the good - in particular, god - that such contemplation provides." (WALKER-2018, p. 125) [PSA: but see KOSMAN-2013, p. 186 for a more naturalistic account of the divine]

With regard to the distinction between techne and arete, Walker comments: "[a]rt, strictly speaking, requires a reasoned understanding of the "why," an awareness of *why* certain actions are to be done and *why* certain products are good (Met. A.1, 981a24-26; An. Post. II.19, 100a6-9). Hence, master artisans - whose work is truly *excellent* - will know the "why" as well and will be wiser, "more sophos" (sopheterous) than other artisans (Met. A.1, 981b5).... Virtuous agency requires one to act on the basis of one's own internalized understanding of why certain actions are choiceworthy and such as to be performed. To rely on the understanding of others who provide counsel is to remain in the position of a learner.... To grasp the "why" fully, however, one requires *theoretical* understanding of human nature and the human good.... To understand the human good, Aristotle suggests, we require a certain theoretical understanding of human nature (i.e., a grasp of its universal and unchanging features: cf. EN VI.1, 1139a6-9)." (WALKER-2018, pp. 130-132) [PSA: developing the ability to provide an account, to engage in activity 'meta logou', is part of the process of maturation]

"Protrepticus 8, 46.22-47.4/B103 distinguishes between the phronesis that we need to live (zen) versus the kind that we need to live finely (zen kalos). The former is narrowly concerned with the tasks of living; the latter, by contrast, "will know the truth." As Düring observes, this passage invites comparison with the popularizing restatement of Book VI's distinction between practical and contemplative wisdom that appears in MM I.34, 1198b12-20. It also matches Metaphysics alpha's distinction between practical knowledge (whose goal is practice) and contemplative knowledge (whose goal is truth). (993b19-24)." (WALKER-2018, p. 144) [PSA: knowing the truth is necessary in order to give the correct account (orthos logos) of one's actions and life]

Similarly, quoting Protrepticus 10: "But [it is] clear that for the philosopher alone among producers are there both stable laws and correct and fine actions. For [the philosopher] alone lives looking toward nature and toward the divine, and, just like some good steersman fastening the first principles of [his] life to eternal and steadfast things, he goes forth and lives according to himself." (WALKER-2018, p. 146)

"Protrepticus 55.14-23/B49 likens bad agents to bad artisans. Just as the latter rely on inexact measures, the former guide their practical reasoning by inexact measures of *the human good*." (WALKER-2018, p. 148)

"[H]uman beings and human goods show up as relatively incomplete when compared against the standard of divinity. For Aristotle allows that we *can* obtain a certain awareness about ourselves, i.e., about our mortality and our relative weakness and shortness of life (47.19-20/B105). We can obtain this awareness by 'beholding eternal things' (47.17-18/B105), i.e., by contemplating what is immortal and divine. In other words, contemplating the divine clarifies the *upper limits* of the human good." (WALKER-2018, pp. 158-159)

"A sharp grasp of human finitude and mortality, however, is not the only insight that contemplation provides. For Aristotle suggests that by 'beholding eternal things,' we would also discover the *lower limits* of the human good.... Among all our human possessions, Aristotle insists, only our intellect seems immortal and divine (48.9-13/B108); indeed, nous 'is the god in us' (48.16-17-B110).... Hence, in contemplating the divine, Aristotle's philosophers would be in a position to recognize not only their finitude in relation to the divine, but also their *relative kinship* with the divine. On this basis, Aristotle suggests, contemplators will recognize that 'in comparison with everything else, the human being seems to be a god' (48.15-16/B109).... In contemplating the divine, contemplators therefore grasp their intermediate place in the cosmos between beasts and gods." (WALKER-2018, pp. 159-160)

"Consequently, contemplation of the divine would be useful for deriving boundary markers of the human good - the target we seek - in a quite literal sense. Such contemplation would elucidate what demarcates the ethical mean between excess and deficiency.... contemplation would disclose most fully how the human essence and good is delimited, bounded, or defined by the good of beings above us and below us." (WALKER-2018, pp. 160-161)

"The Protrepticus' implicit answer to the question of exactly how contemplation can provide boundary markers for legislators offers additional insight into Aristotle's claim that 'the contemplation of god' can serve as 'the finest boundary marker' (1249b19) for statesmen seeking to determine the proper amount of natural goods for their citizens (EE VIII.3, 1249b16-23). As a boundary marker for the possession of natural goods (e.g., bodily goods, wealth, friends), 'the contemplation of god' establishes an upper limit on the possession of such goods. It rules out excess (1249b20), for our possession of natural goods should not 'hinder' us (1249b20) in exercising contemplation. Attaining and using such goods should not focus our attention on our lower functions, shared with other mortal life-forms, at the expense of regular, ongoing contemplation, which we share with god. At the same time, 'the contemplation of god' establishes a lower limit on the possession of such goods. It rules out deficiency in possession - literally, 'need' (1249b19). For given the requirements of our lower mortal nature, including our threptic needs, a lack of natural goods also hinders our contemplation. By choosing according to such a natural boundary marker (or boundary markers), we approximate god's eternal activity as fully as we can as human beings..." (WALKER-2018, p. 162)

Thus "contemplating the divine provides theoroi with a certain *self-knowledge*, an understanding of their nature, limits, and proper good as human beings.... the phronimos possesses a kind of self-knowledge: 'the one knowing about himself, and spending time on himself, seems to be phronimos' (EN VI.8, 1142a1-2)".

Walker connects Aristotle's remarks on the contemplation of friends (EN IX.9) and theoretical contemplation (EN X.7-8) with the First Alcibiades of Plato, wherein Socrates and Alcibiades explore the idea that "one gains self-awareness through contemplating other human souls" and conclude that "one completes one's self-awareness ... in contemplating god." (WALKER-2018, p. 170)

Indeed, "contemplation ... reactivates and preserves the contemplator's self-knowledge (cf. DA II.5, 417b2-5; De Memoria I, 451a12)." (WALKER-2018, p. 182)

The result of this virtuous circle is "a fully active, harmonized, self-maintaining system of life-functions ordered around, and actively guided by, contemplation. In virtue of its full integration, stable persistence, and complete activity, such life-activity approximates, as far as possible for mortal nature, god's fully active way of being. Such life-activity is most of all fit for the designation eudaimonia." (WALKER-2018, p. 183)

Walker also explains how contemplation is useful with regard to specific excellences of character such as temperance and justice. For instance, "pleonexia displays a merely animal outlook most apparent in beastliness: 'For just as, when perfected, the human being is best of the animals, so too, when separated from law and justice, [he is] worst of all' (Politics I.2, 1253a31-11)." (WALKER-2018, p. 201n26)

"Aristotle denies that contemplation is, by itself, a source of change. It does not itself deliberate about which ends to pursue or flee. But in providing cognitive access to boundary markers of the human good, virtuous contemplative nous is the power *in accord with which* complete phronimoi ultimate make decisions and act: 'Contemplative indeed, then, is this knowledge, but it allows us to produce, in accord with it, everything' (Protrepticus 10, 56.2-4/B51)." (WALKER-2018, p. 210)

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