Contemplating the Beautiful: The Practical Importance of Theoretical Excellence in Aristotle's Ethics
James L. Wood
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 49:4, 391-412 (2011)

"We might well conclude from this account that theoretical activity has nothing to do with practical activity, even if each is independently necessary for complete human happiness, and even if, as Aristotle says, practical excellence is somehow necessary to prepare the way for theoretical excellence (cf. VI.13, 1145a6–11). I wish to counter this impression, however, by showing that there is a theoretical dimension to excellent practical activity. More precisely, I will argue that theoretical activity contributes to practical excellence by furnishing the principles (archai) of practical reasoning to the calculative faculty and the motivating end (telos) of action to the irrational-appetitive (to alogon) part of the soul. The intellectual faculty that performs this theoretical activity is nous; the principles that nous apprehends are the first premises of ethical and political deliberation; and the telos that nous holds up to the appetitive soul as an orienting and motivating object is to kalon. What distinguishes this activity from the theoretical activity that furnishes the principles of scientific reasoning (episteme) for the sake of knowledge is both the kinds of objects studied and the purpose of the study. One typically studies mathematics or astronomy in order to gain knowledge, not to act virtuously; however, one can certainly study the principles of human nature for the sake of virtuous action (as well as knowledge), as Aristotle himself does in the Ethics and other treatises (cf. II.2, 1103b27–29). [fn5: Cf. I.1–2, 1094a6–b6; I.3, 1094b19–22; VI.1, 1139a6–8; Metaphysics [Meta.], 1025b18–24, 1030a6–31a14, 1036b–36a1, 1064a10–19; Topics, 145a15–18, 157a10–11; Posterior Analytics [Post. An.], 87b19–27.] Moreover, the theoretical study of the most 'beautiful and divine' realities, described in Book X of the Ethics and Book XII of the Metaphysics, raises the possibility of a direct contribution of theoria at the highest levels to praxis through the mediating activity of nous in the contemplation of the highest beauty and divinity." (WOOD, p. 392)

"[T]o kalon is not only the virtuous end but also the most comprehensive end, for by grasping to kalon we will also obtain the advantageous and the pleasant (cf. I.8, 1099a7–16; VIII.3, 1156b12–24). We may surmise, then, that to kalon is the rightly desired object (to orekton) that truthful thought must first grasp and then reason correctly in relation to in order for desire to motivate the performance of the virtuous actions that are ends in themselves as constitutive components of happiness. If happiness is found most essentially in lifelong virtuous activity, then practical happiness, which is to say eudaimonia as eupraxia, is equivalent to acting consistently for the sake of to kalon. Whatever the relation between one's theoretical conception of happiness and one's practical orientation toward the beautiful or noble, a topic to which we shall return in the next section, it would seem that one cannot obtain happiness, at least in a practical sense, without acting for the sake of to kalon. [fn18: Two parallel passages make clear the inseparability of happiness, goodness, to kalon, and pleasure for Aristotle: NE, I.8, 1099a24–31; EE, 1214a1–8.]" (WOOD, p. 396)

"Given how closely the two overlap, we might well suppose that arethe itself could serve as the end of action without any reference to the mysterious kalon; yet Aristotle himself clearly and frequently establishes to kalon (and/or to agathon) as the end — not arete as such. But his reasons for doing so become less mysterious if we reflect on the ordinary connotations of 'to kalon,' for 'kalon' (more than 'arete') conveys both the immediately perceptible quality and the motivating power that is necessary for the object of action to prompt thought and incite desire simultaneously. [PSA: further, arete is a hexis, whereas to kalon is an energeia.] Indeed, if we examine Aristotle's corpus more broadly, we can see that 'to kalon' regularly connotes perceptibility and desirability, along with a certain teleological normativity. As a close survey of the relevant passages shows, to kalon for Aristotle involves right order, visibility, and pleasure. [fn22: Cf. Gabriel Richardson Lear, "Aristotle on Moral Virtue and the Fine" ["Aristotle"], in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, ed. R. Kraut (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 116–36. Among the relevant passages are Meta., XII.10, 1075a11–23; XIII.6, 1078a36–b1; EE, 1218a21–23; Parts of Animals [Part. An.], 641b18–19, 645a21–26; Politics, 1284b8–22, 1326a5 and following; Rhet. 1361b7–14, 1366a33–34; and Poetics, 1450b34–51a3.] Right order is understood as a symmetrical arrangement of parts or aspects in relation to the overall function (ergon), end (telos), and boundary or definition (horos) of a given kind of thing. This order takes on a perceptible quality that allows it to be seen, sought, and praised, and the perception and obtainment of this order is inherently or naturally pleasurable. [fn25: That is, pleasant to a well-formed character (cf. I.4, 1095b5; I.8, 1099a7–20; III.4; III.5, 1113b8–17). Lear stresses the intellectual dimension of this pleasure: "Pleasant appreciation of an action's goodness is not a dispensable moment of self-satisfaction; it completes the virtuous person's grip of the practicable good by completing the rational activity of knowing it" ("Aristotle," 131).]" (WOOD, pp. 397-398)

"[B]ased on Aristotle's own distinction between to logistikon and to epistemonikon, practical thought necessarily depends on some sort of theoretical thought both to grasp to kalon as the end of every excellent action and to formulate the universal principles that guide practical reasoning in relation to the highest end of happiness." (WOOD, p. 399)

"Nevertheless, what varies here is not to kalon itself but the situation in which it becomes manifest; in either situation the invariable goal is to do the most noble or beautiful action, which is the action that best manifests the human function and end in the specific form of one or more of the virtues, and in so doing, brings pleasure to an agent (or observer) with a well-formed character. The nature of to kalon is invariable in its essence because human nature is invariable in its essence. So even if we must admit that human beings "admit of being otherwise" in the many particular and contingent features of their lives and actions, the "principles" of their being, and the principles that govern the living of a good human life and the performance of good actions, "do not admit of being otherwise." Such things, as Aristotle notes, are grasped with the scientific and not with the calculative faculty of our reason." (WOOD, p. 400)

"[W]ithout both the intellectual perception of to kalon and the scientific understanding of happiness in relation to beauty and virtue, happiness is impossible." (WOOD, p. 402)

"[N]ous deals with particulars by perceiving the universal beauty or nobility in them, and phronesis deals with them by calculating the relation of possible particular actions in particular situations to more general ends to determine what choice and action will be best (i.e. the most beautiful or noble). When Aristotle says that ta eschata are *perceived*, he means here not the capacity of the particular senses (ton idion: VI.8, 1142a27) to perceive sensible objects, but the capacity of nous to see in the particulars of a situation general principles and ends, which calculative thought then may use in its practical deliberations (VI.8, 1142a23–30, 1143b5)." (WOOD, p. 403)

"[W]e can only aspire to become more completely what God always is perfectly. But the fact that we are capable of this aspiration, and of progressing toward its realization, even if only ever incompletely, indicates the point of contact and connection between the human and the divine in the activity of nous." (WOOD, p. 408)

"Does the theoretical apprehension of divine nous along with the other "beautiful and divine" objects of theoria have any effect on the soul-body composite and its actions and virtues? Aristotle provides no clear answer to this question, but there are good reasons to think that it does — or can. While scientifically oriented theoretical investigation need not result in practically applicable knowledge, when study is directed to the highest object or to lower objects in the light of the higher, and is focused not just on knowledge as such but on the beauty or goodness of its objects, there may well be practical ramifications. [fn52:  It is when theoria is oriented simultaneously to human and divine beauty or nobility, in the comprehensive pursuit and practice of good living, thinking, and doing, and on the basis of a well-trained character, that practical excellence finds itself perfected and completed by the highest kind of theoretical excellence.]" (WOOD, p. 409)

"[I]n apprehending divine nous, our nous makes the beauty and being of the divine manifest to the aspects of our nature that are not nous but are bound up with it in the whole human being. Nous acts as a conduit in this way in its grasping of to kalon in anything, but if the beauty or nobility of anything depends on its connection within the whole of nature to the unifying first principle of everything, the theoria of to kalon in anything, including practical particulars, finds its completion in the theoria of to kalon in divine nous. The possibility here opened up to us is that nous, by grasping and reflecting the beauty of the divine within itself, reveals to our composite nature the ultimate orekton, and so motivates the practical part of the soul to seek to kalon in its own way, through action. Accordingly, the more thorough, sustained, and excellent the contemplative activity of nous, the more motivated the soul becomes by the beauty or nobility presented to and present within it both to contemplate the beautiful further and to behave beautifully, so that to kalon may be captured and reflected in the soul by all the means at its disposal. [fn54: [P]ractical wisdom and excellent praxis deliberate, choose, and act for the sake of theoretical wisdom and excellent theoria by clarifying and strengthening the capacity of nous (the "eye of the soul") to grasp the beauty of the divine, the first principle of thought and action, a grasping which in turn strengthens the capacity of practical wisdom and the irrational-appetitive part of the soul to deliberate, choose, and act for the sake of to kalon.]" (WOOD, p. 410)

"Here at the end it is perhaps worth acknowledging that on Aristotle's account, as I have presented it, complete human happiness will be almost impossible to achieve, and will in any event be extremely rare. Not only is the contemplation of kalon kai theion rare, fleeting, and never fully attainable for human beings, and the philosophical comprehension and articulation of that contemplation still more difficult, if not ultimately impossible; but theoria can only grasp to kalon, and philosophical theory can only aid theoria and praxis, on the basis of a prior cultivation of the character. Aristotle repeatedly calls attention, especially at the end of the Ethics (X.9), to the limited efficacy of ethical discourse, which as ethical theory, theory about practice, both depends on the previous cultivation of its audience and is hindered by the unavoidable contingency of action and the actionable. Practical skill in the application of principles is always necessary, but such skill depends for its fullest excellence not only on excellent theoretical activity and character cultivation, but also on long experience in practical affairs, which is to say life experience, and on the capacity to respond properly to that experience on the basis of one's "natural virtue" (both ethical and intellectual) — which is to say the luck of good birth. All of this is, to put it mildly, asking a lot. Still, we should not be surprised if full and genuine virtue on Aristotle's account turns out to be rare and hard to achieve, for such is the sad state of things in the real world." (WOOD, p. 410)

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