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Not long ago I ran across a wonderful quote from Frédéric Chopin:
Simplicity is the final achievement. After one has played a vast quantity of notes and more notes, it is simplicity that emerges as the crowning reward of art.
Ironically, I tend to associate Chopin's music with "a vast quantity of notes"; to find simplicity, I would seek out, say, the music of Erik Satie, whose Trois Gymnopédies I've been re-learning on guitar of late.
Or, as is written in chapter 56 of the Tao Te Ching:
Those who know don't say
Those who say don't know
And, of course, Thoreau, who in Walden urged us to "simplify, simplify."
Pondering the matter makes me want to contemplate more and write less...
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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Here at the very end of the Nicomachean Ethics, after tens of thousands of words about human fulfillment, Aristotle somewhat wryly observes that words are powerless to encourage most people to understand and enact what is good and beautifully right, for they live by their feelings and respond more readily to correction and punishment than to wisdom and insight.
So who is the Nicomachean Ethics for? As he said in the beginning and reiterates here, it's for people of good character who have been raised well and already love what's beautifully right, but need to understand and practice it even more fully. This is especially important in our interactions with other people individually (thus Aristotle's major focus on love and friendship) and in society (where brotherhood is even more valuable than justice). This last topic leads Aristotle to end the Ethics by introducing politics as the crowning achievement and completion of the philosophic study of human affairs. So even though in X.6-8 he seems to have claimed that the best life is contemplative or a life of inquiry, immediately he brings things back to earth by reinforcing the centrality of sociality in human existence.
Although it might therefore seem that ethics is merely the handmaiden of politics, those who have read Aristotle's Politics know he ends that work by deeply considering the central role of education in the health of the community. Yet it's little noted by scholars that Aristotle makes a similar argument at the conclusion of the Nicomachean Ethics. Because character is so dependent on a good upbringing, early learning about the truly human way of life is key. Yet he says that we must maintain these beautifully right doings and feelings as adults, too, by practicing and applying what we've learned and enculturating [ἐθίζεσθαι / ethizesthai] ourselves to the highest possibilities of human existence. This kind of ethical education needs to be tailored to each person since the applications of what we learn are more precise when the practices are individualized [ἰδία / idia]. Only after achieving this kind of ethical improvement is it appropriate for someone who wants to gain greater skill and awareness in ethical understanding [ἐπιστήμη / episteme] to proceed to the study of ethical universals, since that enables such a person to give the kind of care [ἐπιμελεία / epimeleia] that can help others (friends, family, students, etc.) to become better people.
These musings, rarely remarked upon by ancient philosophy scholars, indicate to me that Aristotle saw himself as offering just this kind of care to the people in his own life and even to those who would read his writings after his passing. This hunch is reinforced by the fact that he immediately goes on to criticize the sophists of his day, who professed to know and teach how to improve their paying students and society at large but who didn't practice what they preached. For Aristotle, the deception [ἀπάτη / apatē] involved in sophistry is the very opposite of sagacity [σοφία / sophia], for the sophist lacks a commitment to truth whereas the sagacious person is dedicated above all to φιλοσοφία / philosophy as the love of wisdom and the search for truth, not only in theoretical inquiry but in practical experience. By reading this passage - and the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics - with care and attention, we come to see that Aristotle was deeply committed to philosophy as a way of life, just as Plato and Socrates were before him.
This journal entry marks the end of our walk through the Nicomachean Ethics. For the convience of future readers, I've reformatted this series of thirty posts into a standalone guide that I'll continue to update over time. And although I plan to go on a few more intellectual journeys with Aristotle (starting with his Eudemian Ethics), I've decided not to blog about those since in-depth analysis of Aristotelian texts might not be of general interest. I'll soon return to my regular schedule of philosophical reflections.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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In these rather dense chapters, the last of the Nicomachean Ethics except for X.9, Aristotle returns to the topic of human fulfillment [εὐδαιμονία / eudaimonia], drawing several conclusions that sound surprising to modern ears:
Ancient philosophy scholars usually interpret these chapters as a straightforward argument for their way of life, but I'm somewhat skeptical about that. Much hinges on our reading of the term θεωρία / theoria, which is usually translated as contemplation but which I render as conceptual awareness to distinguish it from the perceptual awareness [ἄισθησις / aisthesis] that humans share with non-human animals. Another big question is whether the little preposition κατὰ should be read in a restrictive sense (only the activities of intellectual insight and conceptual awareness are necessary and sufficient for complete fulfillment) or, as I would, in a directive sense (the best and most enjoyable way of life needs to be guided by intellectual insight and conceptual awareness). Finally, as we saw in VI.6-8, I maintain that sagacity [σοφία / sophia] is not limited to understanding of and insight into topics like mathematics and astronomy but includes the biological sciences and the foundations of human action, since the core aspects of human nature are unchanging.
If we put these things together, we end up with an argument not for a passive life of pure contemplation untouched by human concerns, but for the examined life. That's how I see it, anyway - I'll provide a more in-depth treatment of the matter in my forthcoming book Complete Thyself: Aristotle on Human Fulfillment.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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In X.1-5 Aristotle revisits the topic of pleasure, reiterating some of the points he made in VII.11-14 (e.g., that every activity has its own inherent pleasure) but also extending them in several ways.
Aristotle presents evidence indicating that the enjoyment of an activity completes [τελειοῖ / teleioi] that activity. When we perceive with the senses or conceive with the mind, we are most completely active or "at work" if we are engaged with the most beautiful [καλός / kalos] and serious [σπουδαῖος / spoudaios] objects of awareness. The reason seems to be that we enjoy both the active being of what we perceive/conceive (say, the aliveness of a bird in flight) and our own active awareness of what we perceive/conceive. Although Aristotle doesn't put it quite this way, we could say that enjoyment is a form of awareness: it consists in awareness of the world and (since, as we saw in IX.9-12, for human beings living simply is perceiving and thinking) awareness of our own aliveness.
Furthermore, because pleasures are bound up with the activities they complete, they in turn are brought to completion in ways that correspond to the activities: the inherent [οἰκείος / oikeios] pleasures of sight differ from those of hearing or taste or touch, the pleasures of the mind differ from those of the senses, there are various pleasures of the mind (e.g., recollecting, imagining, hoping, learning, contemplating), etc. Thus pleasures are not interchangeable but deserve to be valued and pursued in ways that do justice to the nature of the underlying activities.
Based on these factors, Aristotle argues that the most complete activity is the most enjoyable: for instance, it's more pleasurable to deeply understand a significant concept than to become acquainted with a trivial fact, or to witness a seriously worthy person performing a beautifully right action than to witness a worthless, morally corrupt person performing a repulsively ugly action. Naturally, there are many kinds of corruption and damage that human beings can experience, but corrupt/damaged people and their feelings and pleasures are not the standard of value in human life. Instead, the measure [κανόν / kanon] of what is truly enjoyable is the kind of person who is completely developed, mature, serious, worthy, good, beautifully right, wise, sagacious, fulfilled, etc.
These considerations lead up to Aristotle's final integrations in the remainder of Book X.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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In IX.9-12, Aristotle finishes off his consideration of love and friendship by wondering how many close relationships one really needs, the times in life when such relationships are most valuable, etc.
The first question is whether the person who leads a life of fulfillment (εὐδαιμονία / eudaimonia) needs any friends at all. One of the conditions for fulfillment, discussed in I.7, is that the complete good is characterized by αὐτάρκεια / autarkeia, typically rendered as "self-sufficiency" although I prefer "wholeness". Aristotle points out that it's absurd to say the fulfilled person wouldn't need close relationships, because we think such a person has all good things and loved ones are the greatest of external goods. The reason is that human beings are inherently social and we're naturally made for sharing the activities of life [συζήν / suzēn] with other people. Indeed, we can be more continuously [συνεχῶς / sunechōs] active if we are active with others; since fulfillment consists of activity [ἐνέργεια / energeia], and since activity consistent with core human capacities and directed by thriving of character is both beautifully right and enjoyable, the more active we are the more fulfilled we are. Thus the person who takes life seriously needs loved ones who are just as serious [σπουδαῖος / spoudaios].
Furthermore, because for human beings living in the most authoritative sense simply is awareness [ἄισθησις / aisthesis] and thinking [νοήσις / noēsis], sharing the activities of life consists most of all in conversing [λόγος / logos] together and thinking things through [διανοία / dianoia] together.
Yet we can't expect to build close relationships with very many people; going through life together might not be completely exclusive, but it's a rather special state of affairs. Indeed, Aristotle notes that the celebrated friendships are all pairs - say, Achilles and Patroklus in the Iliad or, to choose a slightly more modern example, Michel de Montaigne and Étienne de La Boétie as recounted in Montaigne's essay Of Friendship. We're fortunate to find even a few such friends in life, perhaps only one.
Although we say that "a friend in need is a friend indeed", Aristotle says that it's more beautifully right [καλός / kalos] to share in good fortune than in bad fortune, because as mentioned in IX.4-7 success enables us to demonstrate in "well-action" [εὐέργεται / euergetai] that we stand in a relation of "well-mindedness" [εὐνοία / eunoia] toward our friends.
Finally, Aristotle observes that whatever we think are the essential activities of life are the ones that we prefer to pursue with those who are dear to us: athletes exercise together, musicians make music together, philosophers philosophize together, etc. Moreover, these activities have a reinforcing effect: if the activities are bad then they further corrupt the people who engage in them, whereas if the activities are good then by putting the friendship into action [ἐνεργοῦντες / energountes] the friends straighten each other out [διορθοῦντες / diorthountes] and thus become better together. This ethical component is a big reason why philia was valued so highly in ancient Greece.
Thus we come to the end of Aristotle's analysis of love and friendship. We have one more book of the Nicomachean Ethics to cover in our walk with Aristotle, starting with his second discussion of pleasure and enjoyment in X.1-5.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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Up until now Aristotle has considered love for other people, but in IX.8 Aristotle asks some probing questions about love of self. All the central qualities of love (summarized in my post about IX.4-7) seem to apply most of all to oneself, such that love toward others seems to grow out of self-love. But how can this be? After all, it also seems that the unserious/unworthy [phaulos] person whose character is corrupted [mochthēros] acts out of pure selfishness. The conflict between these appearances sets up what Aristotle calls an impasse [aporia], and we'll need to find a way through it in order to make further progress toward wisdom and sagacity.
Harkening back to distinctions he introduced in I.8, Aristotle claims that the unserious person succumbs to greed [pleonexia] regarding the kinds of external goods that people fight over: wealth, fame, honor, power, and so on. By constrast, the person who takes life seriously cultivates internal goods like character, knowledge, and wisdom. Because these internal goods are the most beautifully right things in life, the person who is especially serious [spoudaios] about them goes after the very best things and therefore has the highest degree of self-love. Although we don't happen to call such a person a self-lover, in fact that's what he or she is.
Moreoever, it is beautifully right actions that gratify the most authoritative [kurios] part of the soul, which is the mind; as a result, the serious person's doings and feelings are suffused with thinking [meta logou] and the correct account [orthos logos] of human life. Thus the person who takes life seriously experiences inner harmony, whereas the unserious, unworthy person experiences disharmony and constant regrets over doing what ought not to be done.
Finally (although Aristotle doesn't spell it out fully here), the person who engages in the thoroughgoing love and practice of what's beautifully right inherently values and enacts what is most to be loved and cherished [philētos] in life - the very concept he introduced as of paramount importance at the beginning of his discussion of philia in VIII.1. Therefore if we're seeking a relationship based on character rather than use or pleasure, the true self-lover makes for the best friend, whereas the false self-lover is poor material indeed.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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