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Today would have been Elisa's 70th birthday. Since her passing in February, I have honored her in several concrete ways, such as holding a celebration of life for her at the end of September and purchasing a work of sculpture that we had been thinking to acquire for a special location in our house. In a similar vein, by working with a foundry here in Colorado I've had an earlier work of sculpture converted from plaster to bronze. Elisa had bought the plaster version a few years before we met from her good friend Stuart Feldman, a very fine figurative sculptor in the Philadelphia area. It's always bothered me that we had only a plaster version because that material is quite fragile, so I thought that having a bronze version made would be a great way to honor Elisa and her friendship with Stuart. Thankfully I was able to collaborate with Stuart throughout the various steps of the lost wax process, and the folks at Art Castings in Loveland, Colorado completed the job with great expertise. The work, entitled "Object of the Sun's Desire", is absolutely gorgeous and now has a prominent spot in the living room right off the foyer - a fitting welcome to the house and life that Elisa and I built together.
(Cross-posted at Beautiful Wisdom.)
(Previous: Eudemian Ethics II.5.)
Let us make a fresh start for the ensuing inquiry. All beings are by nature certain sorts of sources, so that each also has the capacity to beget many things of the same kind, as for instance a human begets human beings and in general an animal begets animals and a plant begets plants. On top of this, among animals a human being is the source of certain actions, for we would not say that other animals take action. This sort of source, from which changes first arise, is called decisive - most fittingly that sort of source from which arise things that cannot be otherwise, as perhaps the god rules. In the case of unchanging sources, such as those of mathematics, there is nothing decisive, although they are called sources by a certain likeness; for here too if the source were changed then everything shown would be altered (however, they do not alter themselves if one of them is refuted by another, except by refuting the hypothesis and therefore showing something in that way).
A human being is a certain source of things, for an action taken is a change. Just as in other matters the source is responsible for what is or what comes to be, so here we must think about the action as if it were a kind of spelling something out. For if, the triangle having two right angles, the rectangle must have four right angles, plainly what is responsible for this is the fact that the triangle has two right angles. And if the triangle were altered then the rectangle would be altered, too - for instance, if it had three right angles then the rectangle would have six, and if it had four right angles then the rectangle would have eight. And if the triangle were not altered but were to stay as it was, then so too would the rectangle. The necessity of what we are trying to show is clear from the Analytics; right now we can say precisely neither that it is so nor that it is not so, except this far: if nothing else is responsible for the triangle being as it is, then it will be a sort of source and responsible for what follows from that. Thus if it is possible for some things to be the opposite of what they are, then it must also be possible for their sources to be that way (for what flows from things that are necessary is also necessary, whereas what flows from these can turn out in an opposite way). And many things of this sort are up to human beings, and of them human beings are the source. Thus of the actions for which a person is the source and is decisive, it is plain that these can come about or not come about, and that it is up to oneself what the things over whose being or not being one is decisive in fact come to be or not come to be. And one is responsible for things that are up to oneself to do or not to do, and the things for which oneself is responsible are up to onself.
Excellence and deficiency, along with the deeds that flow from them, are praiseworthy and blameworthy respectively (for blame and praise are not assigned due to things that happen by necessity or luck or nature, but due to things for which we ourselves are responsible - and if someone else is responsible then they receive the praise or blame). So clearly excellence and deficiency are all about those things for which one is oneself responsible and the source of taking action. Thus we must grasp what sort of things it is for which one is responsible and the source of taking action. Now everyone agrees that things which are done willingly and as directed by each person's commitments are things for which one is responsible, whereas things done unwillingly are not things for which one is responsible. Moreover, it is clear that anything forechosen is done willingly. Thus it is also clear that excellence and deficiency would be among the things that are done willingly.
(Next: Eudemian Ethics II.7.)
(Cross-posted at Beautiful Wisdom.)
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Following up on my post about Shige Oishi's concept of psychological richness, I've continued to reflect on the aims of life, which has led me to the following formulation: for myself at least, I aspire to live a life that is joyful, meaningful, and beautiful.
To my mind, "joy" captures something deeper than "pleasure" or even "happiness" because joy is closely bound up with its associated activity; indeed, joy can refer either to a feeling (e.g., "the joy of being alive") or to an activity / thing (e.g., "music is one of my greatest joys"). Moreover, pleasure can be purely physical, whereas joy seems to be suffused with awareness and attention. A joyful life aligns with Aristotle's description of "a life of enjoyment".
As to meaning, psychologists such as Michael Steger have identified cognitive, motivational, and evaluative components: making sense of your life and the world around you, having long-term aspirations that structure your day-to-day activities, and assessing your life as having worth and significance. A meaningful life aligns with Aristotle's description of "a life of excellence".
Although richness of experience seems to be one aspect of a beautiful life, I think there's more: a sense that all the parts of your life fit together well, some measure of balance or proportion, a due ordering of means to ends, a feeling of unity or wholeness, a certain kind of grandeur, and an almost aesthetic perception that your life is something special. A beautiful life aligns somewhat with Aristotle's description of "a life of sagacity" broadly construed, since when you have acquired wisdom you act for the sake of what's beautiful.
If I'm right that the best rendering of the ancient Greek word εὐδαιμονία is "fulfillment" rather than "happiness" or even "flourishing", then we might be able to see that a life of fulfillment is a life filled to the full with joyful, meaningful, beautiful activities and experiences. This feels like a pretty complete list to me, but as always your mileage may vary...
(Cross-posted at Beautiful Wisdom.)
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The other day I found a photo of me reading Hobbes' Leviathan at the foot of Rodin's Thinker outside Philosophy Hall on the campus of Columbia University circa 1986 (the photo was used in advertisements for Columbia's Summer School in the New York Times). This brought back memories of my university studies and my unorthodox attitude toward philosophy even back then.
As I've recounted before, my first philosophical act was ceasing to believe in god when I was nine years old. I had no broader explanation for a godless universe, which is why I was primed to fall so strongly under the influence of Ayn Rand when I first read The Fountainhead at age 12. Here was a comprehensive worldview that could replace Christianity - and, being of both a passionate and an intellectual bent, I was certainly susceptible to that kind of theory. Yet much of what drew me to Rand was that her "Objectivism" was, as she put it, "a philosophy for living on earth" - something not merely theoretical but also eminently practical in the search for joy and reason and meaning in life.
When I studied philosophy more formally at Columbia - reading Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Spinoza, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and such - I felt that something essential was missing. I had a visceral dislike for analytic philosophy of language and as I recall I got a C in symbolic logic. What I wanted were not quasi-mathematical formulations of abstract syllogisms, but insights into how to live the best life I possibly could as a human being. What I was searching for was philosophy as a way of life, but I didn't discover Pierre Hadot's resurrection of that approach until 15 years ago. In the intervening 25 years I was on my own, rummaging through Aristotle, Epicurus, Nietzsche, Thoreau, Lao Tzu, Confucius, and the like while continuing to work my way through and out of Rand. None of this was a full-time pursuit because I had decided not to pursue a Ph.D. in ancient philosophy, instead plunging into the hard realities of making a living in the business world and then stumbling onto a career in Internet technologies when I was 30.
As the years have flown by, my conception of philosophy as the passionate pursuit of wisdom has become ever clearer, but it is rooted in my early encounters with great thinkers and, even before that, in my childhood wonderings about the universe and my lifelong yearning to be a good or even extraordinary person. I'm still working at it...
(Cross-posted at Beautiful Wisdom.)
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(Previous: Eudemian Ethics II.4.)
Excellence is assumed to be the sort of trait from which arises the ability to do what is best and which guides one to being oriented in the finest way toward what is best, where what's best and finest is directed by straight-and-true thinking, which is the middle way in relation to us between going too far and falling short. Thus in each case excellence of character must be a midpoint and is all about some middle way in pleasures and pains as well as things that are pleasant and things that are painful. The midpoint will sometimes exist in pleasures (that is, between going too far and falling short), sometimes in pains, and sometimes both. For the person who goes too far in being delighted goes too far in pleasures and the person who goes too far in being pained goes too far in the opposite direction, and this either full stop or in relation to some boundary marker - for instance, not doing as most people do, whereas the good person does as one should.
Since there is no specific trait as a result of having which a person will in some situations display a tendency to go too far and in others to fall short, it must be that, just as these extremes are opposed to each other and to the middle way, so also the associated traits are opposed to each other and to excellence. Yet it can happen that while sometimes all the oppositions are plain to see, at other times the oppositions lean more toward going too far or to falling short. Because the distance from or nearness to the middle way is not always the same, in some cases one passes more easily to the middle trait from that of going too far and in other cases from that of falling short, so that the one which is farther removed seems to be the more opposed. For instance, with regard to the body, going too far in exercising is healthier than falling short and more akin to the middle way, whereas falling short in eating is healthier and more akin to the middle way than going too far. Thus also the traits of commitment to being passionate about exercise and health will vary depending on the domain of choice involved: in the first case those more prone to much exercise, in the second those more prone to withstanding privation; that is, in the first case the person who exercises not at all is opposed to due measure, to what straight-and-true thinking urges, and to the other two characters, whereas in the second case it is the pleasure-seeking person and not the person who goes hungry. This happens because right from birth our nature is not equidistant from the middle way in all cases: we are not fond of exercise but instead seek pleasure.
Likewise with personhood: we set down as opposed to due measure and what straight-and-true thinking urges the trait through which we and most people are more likely to go astray, whereas the other trait escapes our notice as if it didn't exist (it goes unnoticed because it's rare). For instance, rage is opposed to mildness and the belligerent to the mild, yet one can also go too far in being kindly and conciliatory and not getting angry when attacked. But such people are rare, since everyone inclines more in the opposite direction, which is why anger is vengeful.
At this point we have grasped an enumeration of the traits that go too far and fall short in relation to each of the feelings, as well as the traits opposed to these through which people are directed by straight-and-true thinking. (As to what straight-and-true thinking is, along with the standard to which we should look in saying what the middle way is, we will investigate this later.) Thus it is plain that all the excellences and deficiencies of character are matters of going too far and falling short about pleasures and pains, and that these pleasures and pains arise from the traits and feelings we have mentioned. But in each case the best trait is the middle way; clearly, then, the excellences - either all of them or some of them - will be matters of the midpoints.
(Next: Eudemian Ethics II.6.)
(Cross-posted at Beautiful Wisdom.)
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(Previous: Eudemian Ethics II.3.)
Having grasped these things, next we must say that since there are two aspects of personhood, the excellences too are distinguished according to these: those of the aspect having thought are excellences of thinking things through, whose task is truth about how things are and how they come about, whereas those of the unthinking aspect that yearns after things (for not every aspect of personhood has yearning, if indeed personhood is divisible) determine whether character is worthless or outstanding by pursuing or avoiding certain pleasures and pains. This is clear from the distinctions among feelings, capacities, and traits, for capacities and traits are about feelings - and feelings are distinguished by being painful or pleasant. Thus from these things and from what we set down earlier, excellence of character is all about pleasures and pains, for all personhood naturally becomes worse or better through such things, and its pleasure and pain are oriented toward them and are all about them. And it is due to pleasures and pains that we say people are worthless by pursuing and avoiding either how they shouldn't or what they shouldn't. Hence also everyone declares in an offhand way that excellence is being unaffected or keeping one's equilibrium about pleasures and pains, and that deficiency comes from the opposite.
(Next: Eudemian Ethics II.5.)
(Cross-posted at Beautiful Wisdom.)
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