Traditionally, connections to Internet services such as websites are secured using SSL/TLS with digital certificates issued by third-party certification authorities. Because this dependency on CAs isn't always a good thing (can you say Diginotar?), building atop DNSSEC some smart folks at the IETF designed DANE as a way for application service providers to specify their own keying material. This works just fine for protocols like HTTP in which a client to look up a server "directly" using DNS A or AAAA records. However, it doesn't work for protocols like IMAP or XMPP in which a client uses DNS SRV records to find the server to which it will ultimately connect. Because we care about this scenario in the Jabber/XMPP community, Matt Miller and I volunteered to help Tony Finch finish his initial work to fill this gap. The resulting document was published today as RFC 7673. Security FTW!
Peter Saint-Andre > Journal