Aristotle on States of Character

by Peter Saint-Andre

2023-02-23

One of the distinctive features of Aristotle's philosophy of human affairs is his analysis of the various states of character, of which he identifies at least four: the corrupted person, the unrestrained person, the self-restrained person, and the good person. I might describe them briefly as follows:

  1. The thoroughly corrupted person (i.e., the μοχθηρός) has no knowledge of the beautifully right and fully human way to live, and therefore consistently indulges in ignoble actions and feelings according to momentary desires. Therefore this person lacks knowledge and doesn't act or feel aright in many or most circumstances.
  2. The unrestrained person (i.e., the ἀκρατής) has knowledge of the beautifully right and fully human way to live, but that knowledge can be overruled by momentary desires to indulge in ignoble actions and feelings. Therefore this person has knowledge but doesn't always act and feel aright in certain circumstances, and thus doesn't experience inner harmony.
  3. The self-restrained person (i.e., the ἐγκρατής) has knowledge of the beautifully right and fully human way to live, and uses that knowledge to override momentary desires to indulge in ignoble actions and feelings. Therefore this person has knowledge and acts aright in the end but doesn't always feel aright, and thus doesn't always experience inner harmony.
  4. The thoroughly excellent person who takes life seriously (i.e., the σπουδαῖος) has knowledge of the beautifully right and fully human way to live, and also has a settled desire to consistently apply that knowledge in actions and feelings. Therefore this person has knowledge, acts aright, feels aright, and experiences inner harmony.

Two points here are potentially confusing.

First, these states are not all or nothing. We're all familiar with people who might be unrestrained in one respect (say, they have a gambling problem) but who behave in acceptable ways in other aspects or domains of life. Although Aristotle mentions this nuance a few times, he doesn't talk about it in great detail (perhaps because he's interested in understanding the nature of the character states, not in judging individual people).

Second, when we describe these states of character in terms of knowledge and desire, we might infer that there is an inherent conflict between reason and emotion. However, that's not accurate, for two reasons: knowledge too involves yearning (for "all human beings yearn to know") and a wholehearted commitment to the beautifully right and fully human way to live is a seamless combination of yearning and thinking (for "commitment is either desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire").

Finally, what about this concept of "the beautifully right and fully human way to live"? Isn't that antithetical to pluralism about values? Well, maybe, but that's a large topic for a future post or my forthcoming book on Aristotle...

(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)

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