Walking with Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics IV.3-4

by Peter Saint-Andre

2024-07-11

As hinted last time, Book IV, Chapter 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics has its oddities. Aristotle's discussion of greatness of soul (traditionally translated as "pride") has, I suspect, turned many people away from the valuable insights to be found throughout his writings because his "great-souled man" comes across as a haughty, arrogant prig that few of us would want as a friend.

What's going on here? Based on my reading of the scholarly literature, I see a few possibilities...

In Chapter 2, Aristotle talked about a virtue (magnificence or μεγαλοπρεπεία) that applies only to exceptionally wealthy people, so it might make sense that he would then talk about a virtue (greatness of soul or μεγαλοψυχία) that applies only to exceptionally powerful or high-status people. The "μεγα" in both words means "big", and only the "big man" has the wealth or status to demonstrate these excellences. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that Aristotle included magnificence and greatness of soul as a sop to the Macedonian kings and princes and generals he interacted with, such as King Philip, Alexander the Great, and Antipater.

That strikes me as going too far, because the great-souled man (along with the man of more moderate status described in IV.4) has some things going for him. In particular, he has a true, accurate grasp of his own worth and thus avoids both the boasting attitude of the vain person and the shrinking self-deprecation of the small-souled person.

In his brilliant book Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle's Dialectical Pedagogy, Thomas W. Smith contends that Aristotle comes not to praise μεγαλοψυχία but to bury it. As we saw in the ergon argument of NE I.7, the essence of human fulfillment is activity (ἐνέργεια) in accordance with the underlying task (ἔργον) of being human; straying from that path makes your life not flourishing but languishing, inactive, inert (ἀργόν = not-ἔργον). Yet the great-souled man is so obsessed with status / honor (τιμή) and self-sufficiency (αὐταρκεία) that he ends up being inactive in precisely this way (cf. ἀργόν at NE 1124b24).

If the "great-souled man" is not the ideal but is actually deficient in his way of life, how and why has he gone astray? The problem seems to be an excessive focus on honor; yes, τιμή is the highest of the external goods, but external goods are second-class citizens, ethically speaking: the first-class citizens are internal qualities and attainments like knowledge/understanding, wisdom, craft/skill, and character (each of these is what Aristotle calls a ἕξις or acquired trait), which find their highest application in our close, loving relationships (φιλία) with other people.

Smith argues that Aristotle's intent in the Nicomachean Ethics is to lead his audience of aristocratic Greek men away from their unreflective attachment to traditional virtues like manliness/courage, love of honor, and greatness of soul, instead leading them toward a more examined life. Observe how Aristotle says that the great-souled man is "not much given to wonder, for nothing is great (μεγα) to him" (NE 1125a2-3); but the love and practice of wisdom (i.e., philosophy) begins in wonder, especially wonder about the highest, grandest, most beautiful aspects of existence: personal relationships, human societies, artistic creation, aesthetic experience, scientific investigation, contemplation of the divine, and the like.

So which is it? Is greatness of soul the crown/adornment (κόσμος) of the virtues, or an ultimately inert dead end that prevents us from finding fulfillment in life? Only by walking further along with the path with Aristotle will we get closer to the answer...

(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)

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