There's something unsatisfying, almost clinical, about Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics (which also happens to be Book IV of the Eudemian Ethics - more on that some other time). Whereas in Books II through IV his exploration of various character traits repeatedly emphasized the importance of action and feeling for the sake of what's beautifully right, that quasi-aesthetic perspective gives way here to dry discussions of proportionality, reciprocity, compensation, and the like. To me this indicates the severe limitations of justice as a virtue, not its centrality to ethics and the good life.
In V.1, Aristotle begins by observing that, in one sense, justice is complete virtue: for justice is doing what the law enjoins, and the law disallows the most extreme vices (cowardice in the form of military desertion, immoderation in the form of adultery, anger in the form of assault, etc.). Yet in practice this isn't all that helpful, because few of us go so far astray that we do what's repulsively wrong; it's in the great middle ground where we need more specific guidance to identify and enact what's beautifully right - yet here the law is silent.
Eventually, in V.10, Aristotle points in a more beautiful direction: yes, justice is good, but even better is ἐπιείκεια, which I would translate as humaneness. Because the law needs to keep things simple and can't cover all situations, it addresses only what is true universally or for the most part; but as Aristotle has said repeatedly, the truest judgment always resides in the particulars. Humaneness sets things straight [ἐπανόρθωμα] and speaks correctly [ὀρθῶς], making what is ill-defined under the law well-defined in action; thus it is more just than justice, as it were - it is the best form of justice, because it honors not the letter but the spirit of the law.
Stepping back from the often-boring details of Book V, as I've done here, enables us to see the dialectical trajectory that Aristotle takes in the Nicomachean Ethics. Looking backward, in IV.7 Aristotle had remarked that certain people are truthful in their words and deeds even when there's no advantage to be gained, since they act that way from an acquired character trait and take inherent pleasure in doing what's beautifully right (just as deceitful people take a perverse pleasure in lying, cf. NE 1127b16). And, as noted last time, in IV.8 he had said that "a free and gracious person will conduct his life this way, since he is like a law unto himself". The ethical person who takes life seriously doesn't consider mere legislation to be the ultimate guidance, but instead follows a higher law.
Looking forward, Aristotle's brief consideration of humaneness will lead in two separate but complementary directions. First, in Book VI he will delve deeply into deliberation, practical wisdom, and what makes for a correct account [ὀρθός λόγος] of our actions and feelings. Then, in Books VII and VIII he will thoroughly explore the even more complete humaneness present within love-and-friendship [φιλία] in all its forms. Glancing even further ahead, by the end of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle will weave these two strands of wisdom and love back together when he shows that the love of wisdom (i.e., φιλο-σοφία) is absolutely essential to human fulfillment.
Having briefly previewed the rest of our walk through the Nicomachean Ethics, next time we'll pick up with Book VI on the so-called "intellectual virtues", with a special focus on practical wisdom.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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