Here we are, halfway through the Nicomachean Ethics. Because the path becomes rather steep and stony at this point, we're going to slow down and step carefully so that we don't tumble down the side of the mountain. Hey, no one ever promised that walking with Aristotle was going to be a leisurely stroll in the park!
In Book VI, Aristotle turns to the so-called "intellectual virtues" - personal excellences that enable you to understand the world around you, think things through, and make better decisions. To give you a flavor of what he's talking about, at the very beginning of Chapter 3 he lists five such thrivings: craft [technē], understanding [epistēmē], wisdom [phronēsis], sagacity [sophia], and insight [nous]. These are all acquired traits by which the soul "truths" [alētheuei], in ways that we will explore in depth as we keep climbing.
If you're wondering why we need to concern ourselves with intellectual virtues at all, recall that, on Aristotle's view, the actions and feelings which are admirably appropriate and beautifully right must be deliberately chosen in accord with the "correct account" [orthos logos]. This indicates that at least a few excellences of thought might be involved, such as an understanding [epistēmē] of human nature and the human good, insight [nous] into particular situations, and the wisdom [phronēsis] to make good choices and commitments.
However, of these, only insight [nous] is said to "govern" action and truth; the other two governing factors are perception [aisthēsis] and reaching/yearning [orexis]. Although Aristotle earlier said that action-guiding judgment is a matter of perceiving the particulars of a situation, perception isn't enough for us because whereas animals have perception they don't engage in "taking action" [praxis] in the way that humans do. The source of taking action is choice or commitment [prohairesis]; in turn, the source of choice or commitment is a goal-oriented combination of reaching/yearning and the sort of account [logos] that grounds deliberation and reflection. Because an account is involved, so are insight [nous] and thinking [dianoia]. In order for your actions to be of serious worth [spoudaia], the account needs to be true [alēthēs] and the reaching/yearning needs to be correct [orthos]. Thus doing well [eupraxia], which is nearly synonymous with fulfillment [eudaimonia], requires both character and thinking. The underlying cause seems to be that craft [technē], which Aristotle says doesn't involve character, always has its completion [telos] outside itself (e.g., in an artifact), whereas the specifically human kind of activity has its completion within itself and exists for its own sake.
How can we thread our way through this boulder-field of concepts? Hopefully things will become clearer as we make our way up the mountain, but for now I see a few takeaways, which I'll need to ponder further before I grok them in fullness:
I'll be curious to explore these ideas more comprehensively as we move along in our walk with Aristotle.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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