On the last section of our walk, we started to pick our way through a boulder-field of concepts that Aristotle introduced to kick off Book VI. Here we'll glance at two of those concepts: understanding [epistēmē] and craft [technē]. Aristotle's purpose here is not to examine these phenomena in detail, but to set up a contrast with wisdom [phronēsis] and sagacity [sophia], which will become the primary focus later in Book VI.
As Aryeh Kosman and Myles Burnyeat identified years ago in two papers I discussed last November, for Aristotle understanding a thing is actually understanding how to explain or spell out or give an account [logos] of why it is the way it is. As a result, understanding is an "explanatory trait" [hexis apodeixis]. Here and elsewhere, Aristotle states that this kind of knowing applies to things that cannot be otherwise, since it leads to a pure awareness [theoria] of something's nature.
The contrast Aristotle draws is with things that can be otherwise, especially the objects of craft and of action: you deliberate about how to make something or do something only if your deliberations might make a difference in the world. This is why Aristotle says that craft is a production-oriented trait "with an account" or "suffused with thinking" [meta logou] and, similarly, that wisdom is an action-oriented trait meta logou. Whereas providing an account for the way things are is plain and simple what understanding accomplishes, that's not the central purpose or organizing principle for craft and action.
Although many scholars reduce these distinctions to a difference between theoretical knowledge and practical or productive knowledge, or to a difference between the contemplative life and the active life, as I see it that's not exactly what's going on here. In VI.1, Aristotle had talked about two parts or aspects of the mind: the "understanding part", which is aware of [theorein] things that cannot be otherwise, and the "deliberative part", which is aware of [theorein] things that can be otherwise. Looking ahead slightly, in VI.5 he will mention that statesmen like Pericles "are aware of [theorein] what is good for themselves and for human beings" more generally. This indicates that ancient theoria is not exclusively "theoretical" in our modern sense; instead, Aristotle appears to be making use of an underlying concept of conceptual awareness (recall his widespread references to "meta logou"), which plays a key role not only in theoretical inquiry but also in productive making and practical doing.
As we move forward in Book VI and beyond, we'll see that these insights are crucially important to human fulfillment and the examined life.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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