In VI.5, Aristotle finally turns to a deeper analysis of phronēsis. I render this term as "wisdom", whereas others render it as "practical wisdom" (the standard these days), "practical judgment" (Joe Sachs), or "prudence" (prevalent in older translations). The wise person - the phronimos - is "able to deliberate beautifully about things that are good and advantageous, not in part, such as the sort of things that are conducive to health or strength, but the sort of things that are conducive to living well as a whole" (1140a25-28, Sachs translation). By the way, here "conducive" renders πρὸς, the same preposition we find in πρὸς τὸ τέλος, which is Aristotle's phrase for "that which takes us closer to completion" or "that which is toward the goal" - where the goal is living well as a whole, i.e., success [eupraxia] or fulfillment [eudaimonia].
For Aristotle, wisdom is a truth-seeking trait that is suffused with thinking and directed toward taking action [hexis alēthē meta logou praktikēn]. Wisdom is allied with moderation [sōphrosunē] because moderation saves wisdom [sōzousan tēn phronēsin] by preserving the kind of hupolēpsis that is involved in deliberation. I've never been fully clear on what hupolēpsis is, so I had to research that. In his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, Joe Sachs renders it as "judgment", but that seems too definitive. In his commentary on Book VI and in his paper "Hupolêpsis, Doxa, and Epistêmê in Aristotle", C.D.C. Reeve renders it as "supposition", but that doesn't strike me as all that helpful, either. The root sense is taking something up or considering it in an open-minded manner, such that you might go one way or the other (cf. epamphoterizōmen in the Magna Moralia, 1197a30-31). Thus hupolēpsis is a precursor to drawing a conclusion, forming a judgment, or making a commitment [proharesis] - and not the result of the act of consideration.
As we saw in our discussion of Nicomachean Ethics Book III.10-12, moderation saves this kind of "mindedness" because it helps us avoid the greed for pleasure and the fear of pain. Here Aristotle expands on that idea in rather dramatic fashion, since he says that these passions destroy [diaphtherei], deform [diastrephei], and disable [diephtharmenoi] your character, your capacity to deliberate, and your knowledge of the human good. It seems these passions do this by short-circuiting open-minded consideration of the situation and the alternatives it presents. For the decadent person whose policy is to unthinkingly pursue every pleasure that comes along, no consideration or deliberation takes place - this person bypasses thinking altogether, which is why their actions are not "meta logou": they can't actually provide an account for what they do. By contrast, the wise person never completely bypasses their capacity for thought, even when they react quickly in a given situation, because they have deliberately formed commitments to doing what's beautifully right. Plus, they are aware that the truest judgment always resides in the particulars, where is where wisdom really comes into its own.
At the end of VI.5, Aristotle highlights several differences between wisdom [phronēsis] and craft [technē]. First, he says that although there is a virtue [aretē] associated with the beautifully right use of a craft, the craft itself is not a virtue or excellence or thriving of the soul; however, wisdom in itself is indeed such an thriving. Second, wisdom is not merely a trait that is suffused with thinking or can provide an account [meta logou], but is intimately bound up with character; as Aristotle says, a sign of this you can forget a craft but there is no forgetting [lēthē] of wisdom. This might indicate that wisdom is most of all the kind of thing that is true, since the Greek word for truth [alēthē] means, at root, "unforgetting". Perhaps we'll see later in our walk with Aristotle whether this bud will bloom into something of greater significance for people who take life seriously.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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