Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics are devoted to philia. The translators all say this word means friendship - but I think they're wrong. According to Aristotle, the paradigm case of philia is a mother's love for her children (1161b27). Going out on a limb (as I am wont to do), I therefore render philia as love.
Why does Aristotle dedicate one-fifth of the Nicomachean Ethics to love? In the first sentence of Book VIII, he asserts that love is a kind of virtue [aretē tis] or suffused with virtue [met' aretēn], and that it is most necessary for our way of life [bios]. Because human beings are social animals, all of our goals and activities take on greater significance if they are pursued and shared with other people - especially the people who are dear to us and with whom we live, work, think, feel, and act.
Hearkening back to his earlier analysis of the good, Aristotle looks into "what is loved" (philētos) and distinguishes three kinds: what is useful [chrēsimos], what is enjoyable [hēdu], and what is good [agathos]. Thus there are three associated kinds of personal relationship: that based on usefulness (e.g., work colleagues), that based on enjoyment (e.g., poker buddies), and that based on goodness of character (e.g., best friends). The first two kinds tend to be unstable and relatively short-lived, since what we find pleasant or useful can change over time, as can our emphasis on one or the other at different times of life: younger people seek what's enjoyable and older people seek what's useful.
By contrast, the complete [teleia] kind of love exists between people who are good in themselves and similar in excellence of character, since they wish what's best for each other and take action to make it so. Because character is stable and long-lasting, so is the relationship rooted in good character. The individuals who share in such a relationship certainly benefit from it and enjoy it, but use and pleasure are not the purpose of their love.
A close relationship like this is not merely a feeling of mutual goodwill and affection, though. Its completeness is further enhanced by time, intimate acquaintance [sunētheia], mutual disclosure, trust, shared activities, and frequent or continual proximity.
Indeed, just as with excellence of character, so too love can be seen from two perspectives: that of the underlying trait [hexis] and that of the living activity [energeia]. Although the trait is a necessary foundation, the activity that expresses the trait is more primary and more significant, for activity involves commitment [prohairesis] and commitment in turn flows from deliberation and is suffused with our thoughts and values.
Such is the ideal of Aristotelian love as sketched out in Nicomachean Ethics VIII.1-5. In the remainder of Book VIII and in Book IX, Aristotle will consider a number of qualifications and complexities with regard to human relationships, since not all of our interactions exemplify the ideal. More on that next time.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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