In these rather dense chapters, the last of the Nicomachean Ethics except for X.9, Aristotle returns to the topic of human fulfillment [εὐδαιμονία / eudaimonia], drawing several conclusions that sound surprising to modern ears:
Ancient philosophy scholars usually interpret these chapters as a straightforward argument for their way of life, but I'm somewhat skeptical about that. Much hinges on our reading of the term θεωρία / theoria, which is usually translated as contemplation but which I render as conceptual awareness to distinguish it from the perceptual awareness [ἄισθησις / aisthesis] that humans share with non-human animals. Another big question is whether the little preposition κατὰ should be read in a restrictive sense (only the activities of intellectual insight and conceptual awareness are necessary and sufficient for complete fulfillment) or, as I would, in a directive sense (the best and most enjoyable way of life needs to be guided by intellectual insight and conceptual awareness). Finally, as we saw in VI.6-8, I maintain that sagacity [σοφία / sophia] is not limited to understanding of and insight into topics like mathematics and astronomy but includes the biological sciences and the foundations of human action, since the core aspects of human nature are unchanging.
If we put these things together, we end up with an argument not for a passive life of pure contemplation untouched by human concerns, but for the examined life. That's how I see it, anyway - I'll provide a more in-depth treatment of the matter in my forthcoming book Complete Thyself: Aristotle on Human Fulfillment.
(Cross-posted at philosopher.coach.)
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